The Secret War in the South:

The Covert Center in Algiers

and

British and American Intelligence in the Western Mediterranean 1941 – 1944

by

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Introduction: The Anglo-American Intelligence Agencies, the 'Special Relationship' and the Case for a Regional History of the Secret War

The Secret War in the South and the Case for a Regional History of Intelligence

This study concerns the activities of the British and American intelligence hub that developed in Algiers during the Second World War. From 1941, when the first US intelligence agents arrived in the area, until late 1944, when the Anglo-American clandestine contingent largely departed to follow the Allied armies on their advance into the Axis heartland, the city served as a regional headquarters in the secret war against Hitler. At a whitewashed villa above the harbor, and a former holiday resort west of the city, hundreds of British and American agents learned clandestine tradecraft until they were prepared for insertion into fascist Europe. Those that remained behind helped support their comrades by monitoring enciphered requests for supplies through wireless telegraphy (W/T), and dispatching arms, cash and other necessities to the anti-Fascist Resistance.

In its broad outlines, the history of the secret British and American networks based in Algiers may seem familiar. Since the mid-1960s scholars have chronicled the exploits of Allied agents behind enemy lines during the Second World War; with the cycle of fiftieth and sixtieth anniversary commemorations over the last fifteen years, a popular audience for the work has developed. The exploits of the Algiers agents, even if compelling in individual terms, might be dismissed as insignificant within a larger historical context. But this would be a mistake. An investigation of the secret war conducted from Algiers offers new perspectives on three issues of scholarly concern: the utility of intelligence in war, the role of intelligence agencies in the so-called 'special relationship' between Britain and the United States, and the use and abuse of clandestine information and special operations by Allied leaders.

A regional approach, which allows for comparative analysis, is what makes examining the secret war from Algiers worthwhile and revelatory. By 1944, Allied intelligence networks with command and logistics bases in Algiers extended throughout the western Mediterranean, and had substantial presences in Italy and southern France. Additionally Spain, where Allied policymakers prohibited most clandestine activity to avoid driving Franco into the arms of the Axis, became involved as a smuggling conduit to agents in the south of France. These secret

campaigns utilized similar doctrine and tactics – sometimes even the same men and women – but achieved divergent results. Algiers-based intelligence networks active in France emerged from the War covered in glory, but in Italy the same tactics were relatively ineffectual. Understanding this discrepancy helps illuminate both the power and the limitations of the secret world. It suggests how, when and where intelligence was an effective tool – and why it sometimes was ineffective or a liability.

A regional history of wartime intelligence also provides a new perspective on friction between Britain and the United States. The close, mutually dependent but competitive relationship that developed during the War between the two Allies is exposed, blemishes and all, by their secret interactions. Examining the success or failure of their cooperative intelligence enterprises across the Algiers region shows how important, and how difficult, inter-Allied comity was to achieve. The competitive aspect of the 'special relationship' exacerbated institutional infighting involving the Anglo-American intelligence agencies. This, in turn, sometimes led to the employment of clandestine assets in inappropriate situations, where parochial national or agency concerns and bureaucratic point scoring were the objective, rather than the good of the war effort. In other situations, where necessity or the cosmopolitan outlook of certain leaders intervened, these tendencies were suppressed and cooperative intelligence ventures were both possible and effective. For the most part, however, integrated British-American clandestine projects in the Algiers region were driven by military imperatives, rather than a sense of congruent interest.

The third and final theme that this study addresses is the use and misuse of intelligence by Allied leaders. Here there is a focus on both the makers of British and American policy, and the heads of the clandestine agencies. Secret information is not collected, analyzed, and acted upon by machines, but by men and women with their own personal and political agendas. Nor are covert operations commissioned in a vacuum. During the Second World War, policymakers and agency heads each had their own, occasionally incongruent goals. When government policy was contradicted by intelligence, leaders were free to ignore or selectively interpret the available information. Absent specific guidance from their political or military leaders, agency heads also chose to emphasize – or deemphasize – certain subjects or operations. Comparing how these decisions and interactions played out in Italy and France allows for new insights.

Probing these three themes – the utility of intelligence in war, the influence of the 'special relationship' in the secret world, and how Allied leaders presented and used their covert capabilities – through a regional history of the Algiers networks leads to a few observations on the nature of the secret war.

First, secret intelligence and special operations rarely had a significant strategic impact during conflict in the western Mediterranean from 1941 to 1944. Most of the time, the clandestine war was merely a necessary addendum to the conventional military campaign. Only in exceptional circumstances – like in France during the summer of 1944 – did covert activity have a major impact on the battlefield. These special conditions mostly stemmed from the massive Allied armies operating in France, and the unusual pressure they put on the German police state.

Second, while Allied leaders knew that special operations were only effective in narrow circumstances, they often employed them more generally. They sometimes did so for political reasons or in order to improve the morale of Resisters; but frequently special operations forces were deployed in a bid to accrue parochial national or agency prestige. At times, Anglo-American rivalry exacerbated this tendency.

Finally, in the intelligence world, the 'special relationship' was mostly defined by issues of power and control. When one partner was weak and the other strong, the stronger partner would offer help to promote the capability of the weaker party, as an addendum to its own power. But when the former subordinate achieved parity or pulled ahead, the previous leader would resist further cooperation, lest it become a mere appendage of the new power. In conventional military terms, this is the pattern of UK-US relations over the course of the War. Britain began as the dominant military partner in the European theatre, and grew restive as its power and influence on strategy slipped away. Yet in the intelligence theatre centered on Algiers, the British were able to maintain their primacy. There, it was the Americans who chafed against cooperative enterprise, which they correctly saw as a vehicle for British control.

To defend these conclusions and explore its chosen themes, this dissertation revisits some arguments that have long been the subject of historical debate, and makes new contributions to the historiography of intelligence. Through a narrative divided into three sections, it deals with each area within the purview of the Algiers networks. In roughly chronological order these are: North Africa, Italy, and France.

Although new archival discoveries and observations from surviving participants are incorporated throughout, this study breaks the most new ground on Italy. The sections on North Africa and France are mainly reinterpretations, although they benefit greatly from comparative analysis with the Italian campaign.

The history of wartime intelligence in northwest Africa – particularly the Maghreb – has mainly been the province of French historians. This is unsurprising, given that the entire region apart from Spanish Morocco and Tangier was under French jurisdiction during the Second World War. But it has left covert Anglo-American activities comparatively neglected, particularly after November 1942 when the area was occupied by Allied forces after operation 'Torch.' Martin Thomas has touched on the history of 'Massingham,' the British special operations base established west of 'Algiers' following 'Torch,' but his main concern was its relationship with the French secret services. Jay Jakob's book *Spies and Saboteurs* is more revealing regarding the secret 'special relationship' in the Algiers context, particularly the way in which the British and American intelligence establishments were forced to work together after the assassination of Admiral Jean Darlan in December 1942. In the pre-'Torch' era there is a clear authority. Arthur Funk's *The Politics of TORCH* describes the American secret agents who operated in the Maghreb after the summer of 1941, their contacts with anti-Vichy plotters, and the coup they attempted to bring about in Algiers prior to the Anglo-American invasion. Funk's work is comprehensive and has not been bettered in English. But thus far scholars have not traced in detail how these early endeavors coalesced into the permanent British and American secret bases outside Algiers, which gradually assumed responsibility for covert activities in southwest Europe.[1]

Indeed, British intelligence at 'Massingham' was deeply involved in subverting Mussolini's government long before the Duce fell from power in July 1943, and again in the secret negotiations that led to the surrender of Marshal Pietro Badoglio's successor regime in September. Michael Howard meticulously explored this latter event in his volume of *The Grand Strategy* and every subsequent history of the 'secret surrender' must credit his account. But Howard's work was published before the British government allowed the signals intelligence operation at Bletchley Park to become public knowledge in 1974. Thus it does not describe how poor analysis of 'Ultra' intelligence and Allied policy vacillation may have led to the eleventh hour scramble to conclude an armistice with Badoglio. The subsequent

history of British and American intelligence in Italy, which was dominated by agents who passed through the Algiers hub until late 1944, is largely unrecorded. Although Italian scholars have written a great deal about the anti-fascist Resistance, the covert Anglo-American role remains mostly hidden. Christopher Woods, the man designated to write the official history in Britain, has yet to complete the work. This study helps cover the neglected, tragic, frustrating experience of British and American intelligence during the Italian campaign.[2]

In contrast, French, British and American historians have put Anglo-American covert activity in France during the war years under the microscope. In the English language the standard work is M.R.D Foot's magisterial *SOE in France*, which sketches the activities of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) in great detail. Foot may occasionally be over-generous in his assessment of the military impact British special operations had on the Wehrmacht. But for sheer detail and depth of empathy for the agents involved, the book remains unequalled. His portraits of the British agents secreted in southern France, where supplies and communications were controlled from Algiers, are particularly good. But the most detailed work on the clandestine campaign in southern France during the summer of 1944, one of the principle focuses of this study, is Funk's *Hidden Ally*. The book is comprehensive: it details the strategic impact of clandestine action, the Algiers connection and the political concerns of the Resistance. Its scholarship is impeccable and there are few interpretive flaws. Again, however, the secret war in France can benefit from a comparative analysis vis-à-vis the Italian campaign.[3]

This comparative approach, which a regional purview allows, is what sets this dissertation apart. Studying the Anglo-American covert networks based in Algiers, and their tendrils into southwestern Europe, is more valuable than the sum of its parts. Analyzing why the same clandestine doctrine, executed in similar ways, produced such different results in Italy and France reveals much about the utility of intelligence in war. How and why secret intelligence and special operations were employed exposes something of the motives of British and American policymakers and agency chiefs. And competition for power and control between the Allied secret services lays bare one aspect of the 'special relationship.'

The Secret War in the South in the Context of Intelligence History

Regional histories of intelligence are rare. To understand why requires a brief survey of the historiography of wartime intelligence. The historiography of intelligence, as one historian observes, has an affinity for political and military history and enhances the understanding thereof. But it has been confusingly Balkanized into sub-disciplines that focus on different aspects of intelligence – although many studies of wartime intelligence, including this one, try to encompass all of them. These categories include special operations (SO), the art of sabotage and guerilla warfare; secret intelligence (SI), or the clandestine collection of information by human means; and signals intelligence ('sigint'), the intercept and deciphering of enemy communications. Intelligence historiography has also progressed more haltingly than the study of political or military history, due to the pall of government secrecy that shrouded wartime intelligence during the Cold War.[4]

According to Canadian historian Wesley Wark's formulation, the modern study of intelligence only began in the 1970s, stimulated by several political developments. In the United States, this included public fallout from the 'Watergate' scandal, the Vietnam War, and Senator Frank Church's exposure of CIA assassination schemes promulgated since the 1950s. The CIA, while slow to respond to demands for greater openness and accountability, eventually began to share some of its secrets: including a trickle of information on its Second World War predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Faced with similar pressure, the British government allowed veterans of its wartime intelligence effort to reveal two of its greatest secrets: the 'Ultra' program at Bletchley Park, which allowed the Allies to read many German military signals during the War, and the Double-Cross (XX) system, a network of German double-agents that the Security Service (MI5) used to feed false information to the Nazis. At around the same time, some of the files of Britain's wartime SO agency, the Special Operations Executive (SOE) became publicly available. Although the records of its sister agency and sometime rival, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) remained sealed and may never be released, glimpses of SIS activity in the files of OSS and SOE allowed historians to piece together some of its wartime activities.[5]

This new openness stirred excitement among historians, and allowed for the new discipline of intelligence history to develop. Until then the field had been dominated by private memoirists, 'official' historians and oral historians with contacts

in the intelligence world. The government releases allowed more methodical historians to examine the record of Allied intelligence during the Second World War. They knew that the history of wartime intelligence held the key to understanding the origins, and subsequent development, of the great intelligence-gathering bureaucracies that were founded at the time. What they discovered, particularly about the institutionalization and use of British and American special operations, inaugurated a new critical approach to intelligence history.[6]

SOE, the first British or American agency dedicated to special operations, was founded in May 1940 as a response to Nazi victory in the Battle of France. Hitler's victory was so swift and devastating that Neville Chamberlain, among others in the British war Cabinet, circulated the exculpatory thesis that it had been the result of a huge German subversion program. In fact, Nazi special operations had no role in the Battle of France. Although, as Ernest May demonstrates in his book *Strange Victory*, the Germans did enjoy a significant advantage in the procurement and use of battlefield intelligence at the time, fears of a Nazi 'fifth column' were misplaced.[7]

This misconception propelled SOE, along with RAF Bomber Command, into a leading role in Britain's plans to strike back against the Nazis. After several months of heavy losses in ill-fated *coup de main* sabotage missions, however, SOE concluded that its strategy had to change. Henceforward, as David Stafford explained in his work *Britain and European Resistance*, the agency would adopt what it called the 'detonator concept.' This involved using agents to recruit and supply 'secret armies' among European resistance movements. When the time was right – namely before a conventional Allied invasion – these secret armies would rise up, sabotage the enemy's logistics, and even stage guerilla attacks on Axis forces. As Hugh Dalton, the Minister in charge of SOE during its early years noted, these activities would be a boon to Britain and her allies when they began their offensive. The problem was that, once armed, the Resistance sometimes had a hard time waiting for the Allied armies to arrive. Premature attacks were brutally crushed by the Nazis, who practiced cruel forms of collective punishment. Most British policymakers, including Churchill, were willing to accept this price. "The blood of the Martyrs was the seed of the church," the Prime Minister observed. But restraining resistance forces, while maintaining their morale, were persistent problems with SOE's scheme. Although the 'detonator concept' was considered moot after the Grand Alliance was formed –

which made conventional military victory conceivable for Britain – the 'concept' became deeply ingrained in SOE's culture and was exported to the United States.[8]

British policymakers, perceiving that their hope for victory over the Nazis depended on drawing America into the conflict, sought to foster closer ties with the United States. This was accomplished through both overt and covert contacts. The latter included William J. Donovan, a personal representative of President Roosevelt. In June 1940, Donovan was dispatched on the fist of several trips to London in order to ascertain whether Britain could survive and, if so, compile a list of weapons and material the United States could provide. Donovan's mission opened doors in Whitehall, but his background opened eyes. As a prominent Republican who apparently enjoyed the confidence of the President, and as a decorated 'hero' of the First World War with British sympathies, Donovan might be a powerful ally in Washington. William Stephenson, the head of British Security Coordination (BSC) in New York, an organization that directed the activities of SOE, SIS and MI5 in the Western Hemisphere, was convinced he had found the man who could head a new American intelligence institution. After some cajolery, he convinced Donovan to approach the President on the issue. In June 1941, FDR authorized the creation of the Office of the Coordinator of Information, with Donovan as its director. A year later the organization was militarized, placed under the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and renamed OSS. Like BSC, OSS represented a fully-integrated approach to intelligence bureaucracy, including SO, SI and Research and Analysis (R&A) divisions. Its organization and doctrine (including the 'detonator concept') owed a great deal to British intelligence and Stephenson.[9]

Thomas Troy, a historian who began his career under the aegis of the CIA, is the person responsible for describing Stephenson's role in the creation of COI-OSS. Troy's original account, *Donovan and the CIA*, was declassified and published in 1980. His subsequent work on the subject illuminates how Donovan was grateful the help provided by the British in OSS's early days, but chafed against British attempts to co-opt or control its activity.[10]

Troy's book describes two important themes in intelligence history, which surface again in this dissertation on the Algiers networks. These are OSS's concurrent struggles to carve out a permanent niche for itself in Washington despite vicious bureaucratic turf wars, and to defend itself against any appearance of being an appendage of British intelligence. OSS's activities in Algiers and French North

Africa had an important role to play in both these struggles. SOE, barred from any permanent presence in the region after the Mers-el-Kebir sinkings in 1940, ceded control of the secret war there to OSS in July 1942. Donovan, as detailed in chapter 2 of this study, saw this as an opportunity to earn credit for OSS in Washington. Utilizing special operations and the 'detonator concept,' techniques that set OSS apart from other US agencies with responsibility for intelligence, would be the means. Thus, when he discovered after the 'Torch' operation that SOE and British intelligence were not going to abandon the region after all, Donovan was furious. From November 1942 to May 1944, as this dissertation demonstrates, the OSS director cast about for means to resist cooperation with the British, which he viewed as a backdoor attempt to subordinate OSS.[11]

More recently intelligence historians have turned their attention to these issues of power and responsibility, and their effect on the 'special relationship' between the Anglo-American allies. British attempts to use American resources as a vehicle for preserving its influence on the world stage have a long history. In 1917 Lord Robert Cecil told the Cabinet that because of its "vast power," if "America adopts our point of view," in foreign policy, "it will mean the dominance of that point of view in all international affairs." David Reynolds notes that "these hopes were given new substance by the alliance of 1941-1945." Indeed, this dissertation intends to show that co-opting the power of OSS, while retaining a leadership role in special operations, was one of SOE's main objects in the Algiers region from 1942 to 1944.[12]

The end of the Cold War, and the accelerated declassification of OSS and SOE materials, produced a new flowering in intelligence history. Historians expanded old themes and introduced a few new ones. One recurring issue, exemplified by the work of Ernest May, is the use and misuse of intelligence by wartime policymakers. Another, recently outlined by John Keegan, is what he believes is an exaggerated understanding of the utility of intelligence in war. At the turn of the century, and especially after the 11 September 2001 atrocity in America, this critical approach received new impetus. Some historians complained that the agencies' affinity for hype and hyperbole, which Troy's work had helped uncover, was hurting their effectiveness. Especially in America, Donovan's legacy, which OSS imparted to the CIA, came under attack like never before.[13]

Since the 1970s, historians have been able to probe the history of British and American intelligence during the Second World War. Their findings suggest that

special operations may have been over-emphasized, that Allied leaders were not always able to use intelligence effectively, and that the secret 'special relationship' was often defined by competition for authority. This dissertation, and its comparative approach involving the Algiers networks, allows for the exploration of each of these concepts in detail.

The View from Algiers

Regional intelligence histories are rare. As outlined above, most focus on the impact of intelligence on high policy in London and Washington, clandestine activity in a single country, or the exploits of individual agents. Yet the case for regional history is compelling, particularly one that comparatively explores the differing fortunes of the Anglo-American intelligence campaigns in Italy and France during the Second World War.

To emphasize its regional approach, and highlight common themes in the Algiers area of operations, this study is divided into thirds: two chapters on North Africa, three on Anglo-American intelligence in Italy, and another three on the exploits of the Algiers networks in the south of France. The intent is to connect high policy, the priorities of the secret agencies and the tensions of the 'special relationship,' with the practice of intelligence in the field.

The first third of this study (chapters 1-2) explores why OSS and SOE deemed North Africa to be a vitally important theatre for intelligence – particularly special operations – and fought to establish their primacy in the region. Thanks to Franklin Roosevelt's policy of engagement with Marshal Petain's government at Vichy, and the exclusion of British interests after the naval engagement at Mers el Kebir in the summer of 1940, the Americans established the first large-scale clandestine network in French North Africa. What began as a mainly diplomatic mission to the French resident general at Algiers in mid-1941 evolved into a large-scale espionage operation controlled by Donovan's OSS. The success of this enterprise surprised everyone, including the Americans themselves. It helped lay the groundwork for the Anglo-American invasion of the Maghreb (Operation 'Torch') in November 1942 by securing vital secret intelligence, establishing an effective radio network, and staging an abortive coup. Chapter One describes how Donovan sought to parley the prestige he gained through these activities into a permanent OSS base in the region – a stepping stone that he hoped would lead to an independent American espionage

network in Europe. The chagrin that followed Donovan's discovery that SOE had beaten him to the punch by establishing its own major secret base (code-named 'Massingham') outside Algiers in the aftermath of 'Torch' is the subject of chapter two. British-American ructions followed, as both sides jockeyed for position in North Africa during the winter of 1942. This rivalry continued until a combination of operational failure, limited resources, and increasing French political assertiveness forced the two sides to reconcile their differences. Although the OSS-SOE struggle for control never entirely subsided, officers in the region developed a cooperative, *ad hoc* special operations regime during the first half of 1943. Local comity between the secret warfare agencies eventually became the basis for their merger in May 1944. It also transformed Algiers into the administrative, training, and communications hub the Allies needed to support secret inroads into the countries of southern Europe.

The scene then shifts to Italy (chapters 3-5), which became the subject of Allied – particularly British – attention as Axis forces were being driven from North Africa during the winter and spring of 1942-1943. In the aftermath of operation 'Torch,' SOE was solicited for help by highly placed anti-Mussolini plotters within the Italian government – including Marshal Pietro Badoglio, the man who eventually deposed the Duce in July 1943. The personal and political motives behind the refusal of London and Washington to permit these contacts, and the consequences for Allied war plans on the Italian peninsula, are explored in chapter three. The decision to impose 'unconditional surrender' in Italy, taken abruptly at the Anglo-American Casablanca conference in January, touched-off a six-month campaign by officials at General Eisenhower's headquarters in Algiers to get the decision reversed. They eventually succeeded, but the Allies were out of time. SOE's eleventh-hour scramble to secretly secure Rome's capitulation before the Allied invasion of mainland Italy came too late to ensure effective cooperation with the Italian Army. The Allied political leadership's failure to appreciate the possibility that Germany might reinforce its military position in Italy, and the necessity of securing the surrender of the Italian Army before the Salerno invasion in September, is a textbook intelligence debacle. Poor analysis, an over-reliance on one source of intelligence (in this case, 'Ultra' intercepts) and bad luck almost led to military disaster. Thanks to SOE's last-minute efforts, the Salerno attack was a tactical success rather than a fiasco, but a chance to avoid the subsequent war of attrition against the Wehrmacht was squandered.

During the waning months of 1943 the Italian campaign evolved into a bloody quagmire. The British and American secret services discovered that they faced a working environment every bit as hazardous as the trench warfare consuming their conventional forces. Bad weather and poor parachuting conditions in the Apennines made inserting agents behind enemy lines by air a losing proposition. In desperation, SOE and OSS sought to continue their clandestine activities by slipping men into northern Italy by sea, and experimenting with new tactics. On the American side this spurred the creation of new, almost platoon-sized, OSS Operational Groups (or 'OGs'). Donovan's attempt to emulate the British Commandoes anticipated the creation of the US Army Special Forces. Deployed in Italy, however, these paramilitary groups accomplished little. Their uniforms made them easy to apprehend, and Nazi summary 'justice' was swift. The failure of the OG gambit in Italy, and the inability of Anglo-American intelligence to achieve military relevance there, is described in chapter four.

The US response to German counterinsurgency tactics, stepped up security and counterintelligence, was more effective. Chapter five features new research on the methods adopted by OSS X-2 'counterintelligence' units in Italy. James Jesus Angleton, an OSS subaltern who later rose to become the dark eminence of counterintelligence at the CIA, was a key player in the new game. The growth of Angleton's influence, to the point where he wielded an effective veto over all OSS special operations and secret intelligence operations in Italy, hint at the outsized role he would come to play at CIA. It also heralded the decline, to near irrelevance, of the Algiers networks there.

The final section (chapters 6-8) of this study rewinds the clock to mid-1943, and picks up the story of the other, more successful, branch of the Algiers intelligence network: missions to occupied France. Chapters six and seven seek to explain a strange dichotomy that developed in secret 'special relationship.' While OSS and SOE moved towards merging their special operations forces in the western Mediterranean theatre, the OSS secret intelligence branch and SIS were increasingly estranged. With his eye on postwar Europe, Donovan insisted that the US must have its own, independent network of spies in France. In the teeth of strong opposition from SIS, Donovan's secret intelligence chief in Algiers, Henry B. Hyde, set about building this capacity. With the collusion of sympathetic British SOE officers, and the success of a daring operational gambit, Hyde realized Donovan's vision. By late

1943, America was well on its way to becoming an independent intelligence power. To circumvent British interference, however, Hyde was forced to sacrifice the relevance of his French spies to the Allied War effort. Chapter seven uses newly declassified information to describe Plan 'Medusa,' the OSS scheme to smuggle stolen documents and secret messages from its French network over the Pyrenees to the US embassy in Madrid. Hyde resorted to this complicated, low-tech expedient solely to avoid sharing a radio network with the British. Thus in the area of secret intelligence, where OSS had earned a relatively creditable record in North Africa and Italy, efficacy was sacrificed in France to further what Donovan believed to be the national interest – and the parochial grandeur of OSS. The secret 'special relationship' would not serve as a check on American power.

In situations where Allied assistance could serve as a balm for US weakness, however, OSS was more than happy to work hand-in-glove with its British partners. Clandestine operations in France, which were plagued by failure and disappointment until 1944, are a striking example. Under a merged system called the Special Projects Operations Center (SPOC) British, American and Gaullist forces secured one of the few large-scale secret warfare triumphs of the conflict. Operating out of London and Algiers, OSS and SOE supplied and bankrolled increasingly powerful resistance movements in France. In the weeks leading up to the Anglo-American invasion of Normandy on 6 June 1944 (Operation 'Overlord') and the Riviera landings on 15 August ('Anvil/Dragoon') Allied agents and indigenous French forces sabotaged hundreds of high-value targets. After the invasion, these 'secret armies' harried German reinforcements and helped prevent the Wehrmacht from stemming Allied advances. Chapter eight explores why this clandestine campaign worked where previous efforts, like the Italian debacle, had ended in frustration and tragedy.

The story of British and American intelligence in Algiers does not encompass all the important themes that emerged during the secret war against Nazism. The Soviets had only a minor presence in French North Africa. Since the military campaign was largely over in the region after December 1944, the Algiers networks had no role to play in the postwar settlement or the confrontation with the USSR. Nor is the monograph presented here comprehensive. Most of SIS's secrets are still kept under lock and key by the British government; the agency's role must be inferred through its interactions with OSS and SOE. But the history of the Anglo-American

intelligence networks based in Algiers does offer new perspectives on the utility of intelligence and the influence of the 'special relationship' on the secret war.

Using its comparative approach and drawing on ongoing trends in the historiography of intelligence, this dissertation comes to three main conclusions. First, the universal application of special operations, regardless of the political conditions or tactical setting of the target country, was ill-judged. Special operations were only effective, in military terms, in rare conditions. British and American intelligence knew this was the case, but pursued special operations across the board anyway. Sometimes this was to maintain Resistance morale during months and years of otherwise inactive tedium. But often it was as an exercise in bureaucratic 'point scoring' or due to the pressures of the 'special relationship.' Second, the British and American intelligence agencies were engaged in a constant struggle for authority and leadership. A cooperative approach was usually favored by the stronger power; the weaker party viewed 'cooperation' as a euphemism for subordination. Finally, Allied policymakers sometimes ignored or misinterpreted intelligence that did not fit their political priorities. To be meaningful in war, even accurate data needs to be effectively analyzed and integrated into political policy and military strategy. But the human capacity for hope or fear can prevent dispassionate analysis, and leaders can reject sound advice. As this study of the wartime secret networks in Algiers will demonstrate, intelligence agencies do not win wars, they merely give policymakers some of the tools they need to do so.

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[1] Martin Thomas, "The Massingham Mission: SOE in French North Africa, 1941-1944," *Intelligence and National Security* 11/4 (1996); Jay Jakob, *Spies and Saboteurs: Anglo-American Collaboration and Rivalry in Human Intelligence Collection and Special Operations, 1940-1945* (London: Macmillan, 1999); Arthur Layton Funk, *The Politics of TORCH: The Allied Landings and the Algiers Putsch* (Lawrence, KS: The University Press of Kansas, 1974).

[2] Michael Howard, *The Grand Strategy: August 1942-September 1943*, Vol. IV (London: HMSO, 1972); Charles F. Delzell, "The Italian Anti-Fascist Resistance in Retrospect: Three Decades of Historiography," in *The Journal of Modern History* 47/1 (March 1975) pp.66-96.

[3] M.R.D. Foot, SOE in France: An Account of the Work of the British Special Operations Executive in France, 1940-1944 (London: HMSO, 1966); Arthur Layton Funk, *Hidden Ally: The French Resistance, Special Operations, and the Landings in Southern France, 1944* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1992).

[4] Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, "The Stirrings of a New Revisionism," *North American Spies: New Revisionist Essays,* Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones and Andrew Lownie, eds. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1991) pp.1-6.

[5] Wesley K. Wark, "Introduction: The Study of Espionage: Past, Present, Future?" *Intelligence and National Security* 8/3 (July 1993) pp.1-13; Frederick W. Winterbotham, *The Ultra Secret* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1974); John Cecil Masterman, *The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939-1945* (London: Yale, 1972); for more on the inaccessibility of SIS records see Gill Bennett, "Declassification and Release Policies of the UK's Intelligence Agencies," *Intelligence and National Security* 17/1 (Spring 2000) pp.21-32.

[6] Jeffreys-Jones, "New Revisionism," pp.1-6. One of those oral historians, Harris Smith, used his contacts to interview scores of OSS veterans. This makes his book on OSS a valuable trove of information. But as a disgruntled former CIA officer with an axe to grind, his analysis is suspect. See R. Harris Smith, *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Intelligence Agency* (New York: Delta, 1973).

[7] Bradley F. Smith, *The Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins of the CIA* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1983) p.xv; Ernest R. May, *Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000).

[8] David Stafford, *Britain and European Resistance, 1940-45: A Survey of the Special Operations Executive* (London: Macmillan, 1980) pp.30-32; Churchill quoted in William J. M. Mackenzie, *The Secret History of SOE: The Special Operations Executive, 1940-1945* (London: St. Ermin's Press, 2000) p.84, 413.

[9] For Churchill's view on enlisting the Americans see Roy Jenkins, *Churchill: A Biography* (New York: FSG, 2001) p.611; Thomas F. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency* (Frederick, Maryland: Aletheia Books, 1981) p.62; OSS's structure is described in Kermit Roosevelt, ed. *War Report of the OSS* (New York: Walker and Company, 1976) pp.48-59, 70-82; for more on Stephenson's role see *British Security Coordination: The Secret History of British Intelligence in the Americas, 1940-45* (New York: Fromm International, 1999) pp.1-11; Thomas F. Troy, *Wild Bill and Intrepid: Donovan, Stephenson, and the Origin of CIA* (London: Yale, 1996) pp.21-29, 34-47, 58-59.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid; The second chapter of this dissertation contains a version of the argument in a forthcoming article. See T.C. Wales, "The 'Massingham' Mission and the Secret 'Special Relationship': Co-operation and Rivalry Between the Anglo-American Clandestine Services in French North Africa, November 1942 – May 1943," *Intelligence and National Security* 20/1 (Spring 2005).

[12] Cecil quoted in David Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the 20th Century, Second Edition* (London: Longman, 2000) pp.142-143; for more on the strains of alliance politics see Martin S. Alexander, *Knowing Your Friends: Intelligence Inside Alliances and Coalitions from 1914 to the Cold War* (London: Frank Cass, 1998).

[13] The declassification of Mackenzie's *History of SOE* in 2000, a work that was written between 1945 and 1947, helped signal the final release of most British government files on SOE; May, *Strange Victory*; John Keegan, *Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda*, (New York: Knopf, 2003); on the powerful legacy of Donovan's OSS within the CIA after its foundation in 1947, see Arthur B. Darling, *The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government to 1950* (London: Penn State University Press, 1990) pp.178-179, 186; Rhodri-Jeffreys Jones has long been the authority on the hyperbolic excesses of American intelligence, as in Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, *Cloak and Dollar: A History of American Secret Intelligence* (London: Yale University Press, 2002); post 9/11, his attacks on Donovan's legacy have been joined by former members of the US intelligence community, particularly former NSA director William Odom. See William E. Odom, *Fixing Intelligence: For a More Secure America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003).

Chapter 1, No Innocents Abroad: The American Intelligence Network in French North Africa, 1941-1942

The Myth of American Innocence

In June 1867 Mark Twain sailed from New York aboard the *Quaker City*, a vessel hired to conduct 26 Americans on a pilgrimage to holy sites in the Levant. For the young Twain, an avowed skeptic, it was journey of personal, rather than spiritual, discovery. He was fascinated by interactions between the naïve, earnest Americans in his party and the worldly, comparatively cosmopolitan foreigners they encountered. In his dispatches home the cultural imbroglios that resulted were played up for comic, or satirical effect – especially once the pilgrims reached the true orient, the "uncompromisingly foreign," at Tangier in the sultanate of Morocco. In his subsequent book, *Innocents Abroad*, he created a lasting image of Americans overseas as fish out of water: ignorant, bumbling, slightly intimidated rubes. However well intentioned, they were doomed to confusion, misapprehension, and ineffectuality.[1]

Ever the iconoclast, Twain would have been disturbed to see how his irreverent portrait of the *Innocents Abroad* evolved into an enduring caricature of the ignorant American overseas. The rise of the United States as a global power in the twentieth century, and the nearly universal spread of American influence have not dented this image. During the Second World War and after, America was often seen as the colossal baby of international politics: keenly conscious of its own needs, while blithely unconcerned, or confused, by the aspirations, desires and interests of other nations. Like any stereotype, there are elements of truth to the idea of American innocence. For the most part, however, it is a fallacy that successfully masquerades as a truism.[2]

American tourists may be as naïve as their counterparts during Twain's era – but American policymakers are not. Indeed, historian Frank Ninkovich notes that while critics sometimes deride US foreign policy as overly idealistic, it is often singularly effective. Whether couched in Wilsonian ideals or naked power, most of the time US policy seemed to "pass the test of experience." In other words, those American 'innocents' are often surprisingly devious, worldly, and competent overseas. This observation also holds true for the checkered history of US foreign

intelligence. The Office of Strategic Services' first large-scale intelligence network during the Second World War is a case in point.[3]

American Spies – 'Innocents Abroad?'

It began as a diplomatic mission under Robert Murphy, a middle-ranking State Department official who President Roosevelt dispatched to Algiers during the winter of 1940. As part of his engagement policy with the Vichy regime, which retained nominal sovereignty over 'unoccupied' France and the overseas empire, the President hoped to recruit the French Delegate General for the Magreb, Maxime Weygand, and the strategic territory he controlled out of the Axis camp. Murphy won the General's favor, and in early 1941 an agreement was reached whereby imports of American humanitarian aid were exchanged for the admission of several US intelligence agents to the Magreb (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia). The hope was that these agents would help encourage anti-German sentiment in the region, and work to counteract the activities of Axis spies. Weygand, who fell under suspicion for his frequent contacts with Murphy, was forced into retirement by the Vichy regime. But his efforts were not in vain. The initial group of 12 American agents created a large anti-German network, built a system of clandestine radio communications, and was responsible for secret intelligence and special operations work that helped facilitate the Allied invasion of French North Africa in November 1942 (Operation 'Torch'). Throughout this process, the Americans' tradecraft, sophistication and cunning was underrated by their German, Italian, and French opponents. In the end, these supposedly naïve and amateurish operators achieved many of their goals.[4]

Yet some revisionist historians have suggested that the contribution that the American intelligence network made to the Allied cause was negligible. The most radical critique asserts that the Americans' failure to predict the generally hostile reaction of French forces to the 'Torch' invasion "had dire consequences for the future of the Allied war effort." It suggests that the French Army's efforts to resist the Anglo-American invaders retarded the Allies advance into Tunisia, allowed the Germans to reinforce their positions there, and enabled the Wehrmacht to stave off final defeat in North Africa for another seven months. This delay, in turn, precluded an Allied cross-channel invasion of France in 1943. The entire disaster is blamed on the American intelligence network's allegedly blanket conclusion that the French would offer no resistance. The fighting that ensued supposedly came as a surprise to

Allied military commanders, whose plans were dependent on unopposed landings in North Africa.[5]

But this counterfactual edifice is without foundation. America's intelligence agents included reservations in their assessments of French intentions. Based on their cautious outlook, Allied commanders planned for a range of scenarios when the expeditionary force reached North Africa; their troops were prepared for everything from ferocious resistance to a complete French capitulation. The Murphy network worked hand-in-glove with Anglo-American military officers throughout this process. This joint effort succeeded in neutralizing or subverting a large portion of the French Army in North Africa prior to the 'Torch' landings. Finally, a cross-channel invasion of metropolitan France in 1943 was impossible for reasons that had nothing to do with 'Torch' or American intelligence: British opposition to the scheme and lack of the required landing craft.[6]

While recent assessments of the American intelligence network's work in North Africa have been overly harsh, criticism of William Donovan's role in the process is apposite. Donovan's COI (later OSS) organization, which had assumed operational control over the Murphy network during the summer of 1941, was eager for a spectacular success that would help fortify its position against competitors within the wartime bureaucracy in Washington. Both before and after 'Torch,' Donovan chose to hype the most sensational aspects of the OSS mission in North Africa – areas that he hoped would capture the President's imagination. Thus, American special operations – the least successful element of the clandestine campaign – received top billing. The Murphy network's secret intelligence work, which furnished Allied commanders with boring essentials like suitable landing beaches, French troop dispositions, and the political backgrounds of French generals, was underemphasized in Washington. Although this discrepancy of emphasis had no impact on the 'Torch' operation, it had a malign influence on the development of the American intelligence community.[7]

The activities of the American intelligence network in French North Africa from April 1941 to November 1942 were well planned, competently executed, and a boon to the Allied cause. The US Army lauded its contribution to Allied military operations. Through a narrative incorporating newly declassified government documents and the personal accounts of the agents involved, however, we shall see how these successful operations were used to justify the expansion of the American

intelligence system in ways that had little to do with the North African experience. American agents surprised their opponents in the field with their skilled tradecraft, and OSS bureaucrats used these accomplishments to sell their own vision of what the US intelligence community should be. Whether at work in the medieval souks of the Magreb or the corridors of power in Washington, these Americans were no *Innocents Abroad.*[8]

The Midwesterner: How Robert Murphy Became the President's Man in French North Africa

When the American legation in Paris received word that the French army faced defeat in May 1940, their first reaction was disbelief. The news was devastating for Ambassador William C. Bullitt. A lifelong Francophile, Bullitt had lobbied tirelessly for increased US aid to the country where he spent much of his childhood. Now he and his chief political officer, Robert Murphy, were reduced to facilitating the negotiations whereby Paris was declared an 'open city' and spared destruction by Luftwaffe bombers. The French government departed on 10 June, and the great metropolis was eerily deserted until the first German troops entered a week later. On 13 June, Murphy, out for his morning walk, found the Arc de Triomphe, normally the epicenter of the most chaotic motor roundabout in Europe, completely devoid of traffic. "The only living creatures in sight were three abandoned dogs."[9]

If the Americans were caught off-guard by the magnitude of Germany's victory, for the French it was an unparalleled catastrophe. What followed was a sense of utter dislocation. In part this feeling was physical, as hundreds of thousands of families fled south before the Wehrmacht's precipitous advance. The psychological effect was even more powerful: one refugee recalled that "we had lost all points of reference, all our habits and all the rules of life were floating." A small number of non-conformists continued to hew tightly to their old republican ideals in the face of this monumental adversity; many of these would eventually gravitate toward Charles de Gaulle. The vast majority, however, sought security and some return to relative normalcy. This was the promise of Marshal Petain and the new regime established in his name at Vichy, a spa-town in the south of France. The United States joined most other nations in recognizing the new entity. Britain, fearing for its security if Germany managed to lay hands on the French fleet, chose to rupture relations by destroying several warships anchored at Mers el Kebir on the Algerian coast.[10]

Ambassador Bullitt returned to Washington for instructions shortly after Franco-German armistice. Murphy remained at Vichy as the American charge d'affaires; the tall, rangy and polished Midwesterner established a rapport with the regime's principal figures. These included: Vice Premier Pierre Laval, Minister of the Marine Admiral Jean Darlan, the Minister of Defense General Maxime Weygand, and the old Marshal himself. With the exception of Laval, he found them all committed to making the best of a disastrous situation for France – though this might involve a "new relationship" with Germany. In the aftermath of the Mers el Kebir attack much invective was directed at Winston Churchill, but Murphy found solace in the "patriotic" political attitudes of Weygand and Darlan. The latter, he claimed, was "even more anti-Nazi than he was anti-British." The Midwesterner's conservative personal ethos probably made this easier for him to believe.[11]

For Murphy, maintaining US relations with Vichy was an obvious imperative, whatever Petain's authoritarian tendencies. America could use humanitarian aid to alleviate the suffering of the defeated populace; it might also serve as a check against German influence and dissuade the government from putting its fleet in the hands of the Kriegsmarine. Alternatives did not exist: de Gaulle had little popular support in 1940. Franklin Roosevelt clearly saw the situation in similar terms. Murphy was recalled to Washington in September, where he was stunned to learn that the President had seized upon him – a middle ranking diplomat – as the agent of his next great enterprise.[12]

When Murphy was shown into the Oval Office, he found the President had a complete map of French possessions in Northwest Africa spread over his desk. Roosevelt believed the Armistice had left the Vichy government and French Empire in "a German cage." Yet the relative freedom the Nazis had allowed the disarmed French Army in North Africa might allow the United States to quietly encourage dissent. If Murphy could gain Petain's assent for an informal "inspection tour" of the region, he might nurture anti-German sentiment. Vichy was at Hitler's mercy, but perhaps the French Empire could be freed from his embrace. The President viewed General Weygand, Petain's new Delegate General in North Africa, as a receptive figure for these US overtures; Murphy agreed. Then, according to Murphy's account, FDR casually imparted one additional instruction as he rose to leave: "If you learn anything in Africa of special interest send it to me. Don't bother going through State Department channels." This was one of Roosevelt's favorite ploys. Like Harry Hopkins or William Donovan, Murphy found himself deputized as the President's personal "eyes and ears."[13]

FDR knew Hopkins and Donovan well – through personal friendship or political reputation – before he assigned them important missions overseas. Murphy was a comparatively unknown quantity. Yet Murphy's appointment was not the product of an impetuous whim. The President knew that his new deputy was a man of conservative views – someone who moved comfortably among the political-military elite of the new 'French State.' This quality was a key factor in his selection. De Gaulle, who met Murphy in 1943, thought he was "skilful and determined, long familiar with the best society and apparently inclined to believe that France consisted of the people he dined with in town." Although Murphy's reactionary outlook later caused problems, it allowed him to develop convivial relationships with French military governors and powerful colonial businessmen in North Africa. Murphy was, in many ways, the right man for the job the President wanted him to do.[14]

The Murphy-Weygand Accord and the Beginning of the Covert Struggle in North Africa

With this extraordinary commission in hand, Robert Murphy returned to France and secured permission to tour the Magreb. He arrived in Algiers on 13 December 1940 and began a whirlwind survey of the French political-military establishment. In three weeks, he visited every major military installation in the region, and initiated a dialog with Weygand. Murphy conveyed the essence of FDR's strategic thinking to the Delegate General. Weygand was receptive, albeit unwilling to betray Petain's trust. The General was torn. Like Petain and Darlan, Weygand was an archconservative with little love for the Third Republic. But he had no stomach for 'collaboration' with the Nazis: a policy that was being pursued with increasing vigor by Pierre Laval – a man he hated – and the opportunistic Darlan, who had lulled Murphy with patriotic blandishments. Weygand would not embrace the Americans openly, but loathed Nazism.[15]

In the course of these discussions, however, Murphy learned that the British blockade had left French North Africa desperately short of certain staple commodities: principally oil, machinery and sugar. In return for these supplies – which the French needed to avoid native unrest – Weygand would allow 12 American "observers" into the region to assure that none of this material reached the Germans. Both men knew that these individuals would also be intelligence agents. With a dozen subordinates, Murphy realized that he could establish contacts with important

French officials in every major city – carefully blunting German initiatives while fostering greater sympathy toward the Anglo-American powers. The deal, which became known as the Murphy-Weygand Accord, was sealed in February 1941.[16]

President Roosevelt was pleased, and Murphy-Weygand became an essential element of his policy of engagement with the new 'French State.' The Accord gave his new Ambassador in Vichy, Admiral William Leahy, a useful carrot he could use to blunt German influence and Weygand seemed open to future American overtures. The American intelligence agents – masquerading as special 'vice-consular officials' – might help protect US interests against unexpected eventualities. Indeed, almost immediately the President's policy faced two looming problems: Weygand's irreplaceable position in North Africa, and the possibility of German intervention.[17]

The very qualities that made General Weygand so attractive to Murphy – his prestige, his anti-German bent, and his command of the entire Magreb – also made his continuance in office increasingly untenable. As 1941 wore on, Hitler subjected the Vichy authorities to a steady drumbeat of demands for Weygand's removal. Yet the President remained determined, in the words of Secretary of State Cordell Hull, to use Weygand as "a cornerstone around which to build a policy of resistance toward Germany." The problem of what to do if Weygand were recalled was never properly addressed, and would cause huge difficulties for the Allies during the summer of 1942. This was a failure of policy, not intelligence – but a serious one, nevertheless.[18]

The other weakness in the Murphy-Weygand Accord was its vulnerability to German countermeasures. In January Murphy dined with Theodore Auer, the new German Consul-General in Casablanca. The two men had known, and liked, each other when they served as diplomats in Paris during the pre-War years, so Auer was candid. "Murphy," he quipped, "I came here for one purpose only, to convince that prize ass in Berlin, our Fuehrer, of the importance of the Mediterranean and Morocco in particular." This exchange inaugurated a continuing obsession for the American contingent in the Magreb: the prospect of German military intervention, abetted by Franco, through Spanish Moroccan territory. What Auer did not know at the time was that those who favored a German 'southern strategy,' – including General Heinz Guderian, one of the principle architects of the blitzkrieg victories in France – had already lost their argument in Berlin. Hitler was fixated on the Soviet Union and Operation 'Barbarossa.' Nevertheless, Roosevelt's plans for North Africa remained vulnerable to a German attack through Spain. Then Auer dropped a second

bombshell on Murphy: the German Armistice Commission in the Magreb, which had been established to ensure French compliance with the armistice conditions imposed by Germany in 1940, was due for a major expansion in 1941. Admiral Leahy discovered that this amounted to some 140 men. Many would undoubtedly be intelligence agents. Supplemented by the large Italian presence in the region, the enemy element would seriously outnumber the Americans.[19]

The task facing the initial group of 12 US 'vice-consuls' was formidable. Their overt job, to monitor the influx of American supplies under the Murphy-Weygand accord and prevent any re-export to the Axis, was demanding enough. Their covert directive, cultivating anti-German elements in North Africa while outnumbered more than ten to one by hostile agents, was numerically daunting. The American spies would need to be good – very good.

'The Apostles'

When the State Department sought recruits for its North Africa project in early April, it asked the War and Navy Departments to provide suitable men. They refused, on the grounds that many of the activities the 'vice-consuls' were expected to perform required civilian cover stories – subterfuge that would endanger their officers by violating the laws of war. The Vichy government had also expressed unease about openly allowing American soldiers into North Africa. A direct military role in the operation was out. Donovan's Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI), the civilian intelligence agency that begat OSS, was not founded until the summer of 1941. Thus State, assisted by the military services, was forced to scrounge for spies on its own.[20]

British assistance was available in the person of David Eccles, who represented the Ministry of Economic Warfare (and SOE) at the British Embassy in Washington. Although Britain had originally scoffed at the idea of inserting US agents into North Africa, and was uncomfortable with the Murphy-Weygand accord, its position had softened. During the second week of April 1941, Murphy, Eccles, Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, and the head of the US Military Intelligence Division (MID), General Sherman Miles, developed an operational plan. This included selecting suitable 'choke-points' for monitoring exports from the Magreb, detailing 'areas of interest' for American espionage, and designating suitable men for the task.[21]

The men they chose and dispatched, alone or in pairs, to North Africa over the next three months had certain common traits. Most were highly educated, middle-aged professionals: businessmen, labor organizers, academics. They were a cosmopolitan group – several had spent considerable time in Asia. Yet with the exception of Gordon Browne, who was appointed US 'vice-consul' in Tangier, none of them had much familiarity with the Magreb. Kenneth Pendar, the only member Murphy's original 12-man contingent to publish his memoirs, might have spoken for them all when he wrote:

> I was… deeply and gloriously ignorant of the job we were assigned to do. I did know France, had many friends among British and French political and military figures, and spoke French without too much of my original South Dakota accent.... But North Africa was a closed book for me.[22]

It is possible to interpret Pendar's statement as an admission of incompetence – perhaps like Twain's *Innocents* he found himself out of his depth. But this was far from the case. Although Pendar was, at 35, the second youngest member of the group and probably the least experienced, the Harvard librarian had spent many years in France and understood the conservative mindset of the colonial elite. This made him an excellent assistant to Murphy in Algiers and liaison to the other 'vice-consuls.'[23]

The men who were given the most dangerous tasks had more exotic backgrounds. During the next 18 months David W. King, Leland L. Rounds, John H. Boyd, and John C. Knox were entrusted with the most critical missions undertaken by the Murphy network. They well placed in French circles, and experienced in the tradecraft of espionage. King, Knox and Boyd, who would eventually play major roles in a coup attempt prior to operation 'Torch' in November 1942, had served in the French Army. They were Americans, but also French patriots. King had joined the Foreign Legion in 1914, fought for France on the Western Front for four years, earned the Croix de Guerre, and absorbed the ethos of the French officer class. After the war he spent several years in India as a sales representative for a small US manufacturer, while secretly serving as an intelligence agent for General Miles. Knox, another veteran of the Legion, had attended Saint Cyr, bastion of the French officer class. Boyd had logged less time in a French uniform, but worked during the postwar years for the American Red Cross in Syria, where he established contacts with colonial officials. Rounds severed as a volunteer flyer for the famous Lafayette

Escadrille during the Great War, and had spent many years doing counterintelligence work for Miles. These men had credibility in the eyes of the French establishment in the Magreb. This made recruiting French contacts relatively easy. America did not have a civilian intelligence service until the creation of COI, but it did have experienced spies. The 'Apostles,' as Murphy's 12 men became known, were no *Innocents Abroad.*[24]

The Apostles' first several months on the job were regionally focused. The Americans took the political temperature in the cities where they were assigned, established contacts with French officials and local dissidents, and identified enemy agents. Murphy acted as both political controller and operational director for the group from his station in Algiers. Intelligence reports were dispatched via diplomatic pouch from US consulates where the agents were stationed to Foggy Bottom in Washington. Murphy also dispatched summaries, supplemented with his own observations, to Secretary Hull. The analysis of this raw data seems to have taken place within the State Department and the military intelligence services. There was little traffic between 'vice-consuls' that operated in different cities. The network operated on a relatively crude, hub and spoke basis. It did not have an integrated system of communications or operate in a coordinated fashion.[25]

Most of the 'Apostles' operated in teams of two or three in each city, informally led by the agent with the most experience. Rounds and Ridgeway Knight – the youngest 'vice-consul,' born and raised in Paris – were dispatched to Oran, the westernmost major port in Algeria. Harry A. Woodruff, John E. Utter and L. Pittman Springs, businessmen with long experience in France, traveled to Tunis. Boyd, Knox and Pendar joined Murphy in Algiers. Brown, who had previous experience in Morocco, was initially stationed alone in the internationally administered city of Tangier. King and his understudy, the businessman and Yale graduate W. Stafford Reid, set up shop in Casablanca.[26]

The first order of business was to identify the enemy: agents of the Gestapo, the Service d'Ordre Legionnaire (SOL), and the Italian Secret Service. Thanks to the presence of Auer's expanded contingent, Casablanca was a veritable hothouse of Axis activity. King and Reid could hardly sit down in a café without tripping over members of the German Armistice Commission. Fortunately for the Americans, overconfidence and numerical superiority lulled the Germans into a serious mistake. Shortly after his arrival in town, two 'clerks' from the Armistice Commission

approached Reid. They claimed to be Austrian dissidents with no love for Hitler and offered to sell him information. After conferring with King, Reid decided the men were obvious double agents, but elected to engage their services as a means of spreading disinformation. In doing so, he used the stereotype of the innocent American bumpkin to his advantage.

> In using the services of these two agents, I determined upon behavior that would always put me before them…[as] extremely naïve and gullible…. The object was to… invite their contempt for bungling, amateur American operators. This procedure… would lead to a later opportunity to "plant" some vital misinformation in the enemy camp.[27]

Reid's scheme succeeded, and the Gestapo contingent in Casablanca thought they had the American agents well in hand. "[The US spies] are totally lacking in method, organization and discipline," the German Armistice Commission cabled Berlin. "We can only congratulate ourselves on the selection of this group of enemy agents who will give us no trouble." They could not have been more wrong. While Reid played dumb to his German contacts, King contacted sympathetic officers in the French Army, investigated the great battleship, *Jean Bart*, moored in Casablanca harbor, and met with the small Gaullist element in the city.[28]

Having successfully engaged the 'enemy,' the Americans' next priority was to survey opinion among those with political power in the Magreb: namely the Army, the paramilitary organizations (like the SOL), and the colonial elite. These groups were generally very conservative, supported Petain's 'national revolution,' and thought that some kind of accommodation with Germany was inevitable. "[They] seem to take it for granted that France as an independent entity is finished," Rounds noted after discussions with some SOL members in Oran. Yet after some time in North Africa, it became apparent that even the conservative, pro-Petain elite was uncomfortable with the notion that France's destiny was out of her hands. Therein lay Charles de Gaulle's hidden appeal – a condition that Rounds, at least, had diagnosed by mid-1941. "During the first month we were here no one mentioned De Gaulle," he wrote.

> Now it appears that among the people we know… there are at least a dozen who have relatives, fiancés or friends in England with the De Gaulle Forces.

Rounds' notes contain the earliest suggestion from the 'vice-consular' network that some Frenchmen in North Africa would welcome an Anglo-American intervention. Yet he, like most of the 'vice-consuls,' was cautious. Rounds knew that anti-Vichy opinion was weak among those in positions of authority, and offered no optimistic forecasts.[29]

By the summer of 1941, Murphy's 'Apostles' had established a rudimentary intelligence network, confused their German antagonists, and earned the appreciation of the Army's intelligence division (MID) and the State Department. They had proven to be competent and efficient spies, confounding the expectations of the Gestapo and doubters within the US government. But the battle was far from over. The arrival of autumn in the Magreb heralded a major challenge to American policy in North Africa – a challenge that nearly sank the Murphy network.[30]

The Role of William Donovan and British Intelligence

General Weygand was detained and forced into 'retirement' by Petain and the Vichy premier, Admiral Darlan, on 18 November 1941. Weygand had been increasingly cozy with the United States; in his farewell letter to Petain he recommended that France's overseas empire associate, as closely as possible, with the British and the Americans. The final straw, however, came after Berlin complained that Weygand was failing to assist to General Erwin Rommel's ongoing campaign in Libya and Egypt. His dismissal was a blow to the opponents of 'collaboration' in France, and a setback for President Roosevelt's North African policy.[31]

Weygand's fall surprised no one. Murphy, Ambassador Leahy, and the 'vice-consuls' had anticipated it for months. Yet Hull and Roosevelt failed to consider policy alternatives, mostly because there seemed to be no prospect of prying North Africa away from 'collaboration' without Weygand. Only Weygand had the seniority and prestige to directly challenge Petain. His subordinates, the military governors of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, commanded the army in his stead, but did not enjoy his political standing. These men – General Charles Nogues in Casablanca, General Alphonse-Pierre Juin in Algiers, and Admiral Jean-Pierre Esteva in Tunis – had followed Weygand's lead after the disaster of May 1940 and seemed less capable of carrying off a rebellion against Vichy authority. Moreover, Nogues and Esteva were crypto-fascists who generally favored 'collaboration.' Winning any of these men to the Anglo-American cause seemed doubtful.[32]

Despite this setback, Roosevelt continued to support a policy of engagement with Vichy, and the provisions of the Murphy-Weygand accord in North Africa. Murphy would remain in Algiers and court Juin, while the 'vice-consuls' attempted to recruit lower-ranking French officers elsewhere. The President's decision was partly the result of policy inertia – too much American prestige had been committed to the North African project for an about-face. It also dovetailed with the increasingly belligerent, anti-German stance the United States had adopted in the Battle of the Atlantic. If the French Army in Africa could not be coaxed from Vichy control, perhaps it could be forced to break away.[33]

Weygand's departure complicated the situation for Murphy's agents, but the waning months of 1941 brought succor from other quarters. British intelligence was increasingly active in the Magreb and aided the 'vice-consuls.' SOE had assembled a flotilla of grimy, inconspicuous fishing feluccas. Operated out of Gibraltar by a group of Polish intelligence agents, the boats were initially used to smuggle Polish soldiers to Great Britain who had been interned in North Africa under the terms of the 1940 Armistice. As SOE's 'fishermen' gained confidence, they began to ferry arms and men to North Africa for the Americans. The disguised feluccas were a key conduit for weapons as American policy became hostile to Petain's regime. SIS had suffered from the sudden rupture of relations with France after Mers el Kebir, which had forced many of its British case officers to flee the Magreb. A few of its agents, however, had been successfully turned over to the Murphy network, which continued to finance them in return for information. SIS also maintained a representative in the international city of Tangier. He worked closely with COI on secret intelligence when the organization arrived in North Africa.[34]

President Roosevelt's decision to establish COI under the leadership of William Donovan on 11 July 1941 was a more mixed blessing for the 'vice-consular' network. COI helped manage relations with the British intelligence community, began building a clandestine radio network between to connect the 'vice-consuls,' and promised greater resources in men and war materiel. Yet Donovan also had his own agenda. COI was a small animal in Washington's bureaucratic jungle, and was in danger of being snapped up by one of the larger predators. COI owed its autonomy to Donovan's personal relationship with the President, which was in decline. To retain the President's ear, Donovan chose to emphasize the paramilitary potential of the

Murphy network, rather than the boring, but essential, intelligence work it did for MID.[35]

Colonel William Eddy, whom Donovan dispatched to Tangier to serve as operational controller of the 'vice-consular' network, personified the double-edged impact of COI's new role. Eddy, a former professor of literature at the American University in Cairo and world-traveler who spoke Arabic fluently, was a competent administrator. He worked well with Murphy and was generally liked by 'the Apostles.' Yet he was still every inch the bullheaded Marine officer who had lost a leg on the Western Front during the Great War: He followed orders and brooked no dissent. Eddy was Donovan's man and, for good or ill, he set out to remake the 'vice-consuls' in his master's image.[36]

Thus, at the beginning of December 1941 the American espionage network in North Africa was in a state of flux. The primary target of its mission had been removed, it operated under a new regime, and it was learning to deal with the British. On 7 December 1941, the situation changed again.

Carleton Coon and the New Emphasis on Special Operations

The American entry into the war after Pearl Harbor increased the importance of the intelligence network in North Africa, but complicated its mission. During the strategic conference with Prime Minister Winston Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff in Washington ('Arcadia'), which began on 22 December, it became clear that the President favored occupying French North Africa. COI, Murphy and the 'vice-consuls' would need to prepare the ground for the possibility of an Anglo-American invasion, and help mitigate or eliminate French resistance. Yet the US Army's concern about the possibility of German intervention through Spanish territory complicated the picture for America's spies. Instead of simply attempting to recruit support and agents within the French elite, planning for the Spanish contingency meant that the 'vice-consuls' had to broaden their appeal to include Arabs and Berber tribesmen. These native Moroccans, who occupied strategic positions in the Rif Mountains along the border between Spanish and French Morocco, despised their colonial masters. Organizing the tribes to resist a German invasion required undermining French authority – the very authority they hoped to win over to the Allied cause.[37]

To handle this sensitive mission to the tribes 'vice-consul' Browne recommended his old Harvard anthropology professor, Carleton S. Coon. Coon had visited the Rif lands on research trips in 1924, 1926 and 1939, claimed to speak several tribal languages, and was acquainted with officials in the local Spanish constabulary. These skills appealed to Donovan, and Coon was dispatched to join Eddy and Browne at the US consulate in Tangier on 27 May 1942.[38]

Initially, Coon's arrival seemed an unmitigated boon to the 'Apostle' network, but problems soon emerged. The Professor had a huge number of contacts, among all social classes, in Tangier and Spanish Morocco. His former 'head digger' on an archaeological excavation brought him detailed reports on Spanish military positions, a friend in the prison system offered information on new political detainees, and a Moorish tanner helped arrange meetings with tribal officials. Yet his prominence, reputation, and Harvard-professorial 'God complex,' also made him stick out like a sore thumb. Driving down the road on a scouting expedition, he was instantly recognized by Spanish soldiers: "No potentate's passage was more heralded… no ambassador swept on with more pomp and courtesy," he recalled.[39]

Coon's celebrity became an even greater liability when he met with Arab and Berber members of the Moroccan Nationalist movement. The precise nature of these discussions is still unclear – the relevant documents remain classified at the US National Archives. Nevertheless, we can infer that a quid pro quo was offered: greater autonomy in exchange for help against hypothetical German invaders. The content of the negotiations is less important that their consequences, however. The French discovered the general thrust, if not the details, of Coon's Riffian gambit, which undermined the Murphy network's standing in their territory.[40]

One of David King's most valuable agents, General Nogues' chief of security in Morocco, had warned Murphy about contacting the nationalists. "Ask [your agents] not to indulge in any native propaganda, for that is a dangerous bomb for newcomers to play with." When Coon did so, he undermined Herviot's position. The Colonel was reprimanded and later cashiered by the Vichy authorities only days before the Anglo-American invasion of North Africa in November, where he might have provided valuable assistance.[41]

In retrospect, Coon's mission to organize tribal elements in Morocco was a mistake because it hampered the Apostles' first priority: courting French officials. Yet it represented only the leading edge of a larger problem. COI was on its last legs

as an independent agency. During the spring and summer of 1942, Donovan battled in Washington to prevent its dismemberment by inventing new, grandiose schemes for the North African network, the Agency's most successful component.[42]

Donovan heavily emphasized reports of German activity in Spanish Morocco to sell COI's plans for special operations. In a memorandum for the President on 1 April, Donovan highlighted a small section from Eddy's intelligence briefing nine days earlier, which reported that some French commanders were concerned about the possibility a German invasion through Spanish territory. Donovan inflated this possibility into a near-certainty and requested that "20,000 landmines, 20,000 sub-machine guns and 500,000 hand grenades" be dispatched to the French army and US sponsored irregulars in North Africa. Fortunately, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) denigrated the request, or some of this equipment might have been turned against the Anglo-American invasion force eight months later. Nevertheless, a trend had developed. Special operations missions like Coon's dubious gambit and the request for half a million grenades would be Donovan's weapon in the Washington bureaucratic wars.[43]

Donovan's hyperbolic antics did not win shiploads of war material for the 'Apostles' but may have helped preserve his agency. Instead of being abolished, on 13 June 1942 COI was reconstituted under the authority of the JCS as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Donovan, who became Director of OSS, remained faithful to his showman's instinct. As Allied war leaders developed their plan for intervention in French North Africa, the Director's attitude affected the 'Apostle' network's performance. America's spies were skilled at intelligence gathering and subversion, but their leader continued to emphasize special operations.[44]

The 'Torch' Decision

The President gave his formal assent for operation 'Torch,' the Anglo-American invasion of French North Africa, on 24 July 1942. It came despite vigorous objections from the US JCS, who favored launching cross-channel attack on the German Army in France (code-named 'Sledgehammer') before the year was out. The Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, was also concerned that a major Mediterranean commitment would retard the assembly of Allied troops in Britain for an invasion of France in 1943. Yet by early July 'Torch' plan had assumed an air of inevitability in London and Washington. 'The ['Torch'] decision,' Secretary of War

Henry Stimson recalled, "was the result of two rulings, one by the British, the other by the President." The British flatly refused to contemplate a cross-channel operation, due to concerns about the strength of the German army and lack of available shipping. FDR was determined to see US troops fighting in the European theatre before the year was out. He feared that Stalin would be furious, and the morale of the American public would plummet, if the British and Americans spent the year in apparent inertia.[45]

OSS had no influence on London's position, and very little impact on Roosevelt's strategic calculus. The British vetoed 'Sledgehammer' simply because they thought a premature clash with the German Army was foolhardy. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Alan Brooke, was blunt in his assessment of both the plan and its author: "[General Marshall was] a very great gentleman, who inspired trust, but did not impress me with the ability of his brain." FDR favored 'Torch' over 'Sledgehammer' for both practical and political reasons. French forces in North Africa were weak, the British were eager to open another front against Rommel's troops, and the American public hungered for a swift blow against Axis forces in Europe. Stalin was also pushing hard for a European 'second front' before the year was out; North Africa was the next best thing. "Not only is our presence in France and North Africa the last bridgehead to Europe," FDR wrote Ambassador Leahy, "but it likewise helps to hold the Iberian Peninsula in line." According to historian Robert Dallek, the President relied on his own judgment and did not solicit anyone, including OSS, for advice.[46]

Donovan, to be sure, welcomed military intervention in North Africa. During the summer, OSS had convinced SOE that it could take the lead in special operations work in the Magreb; apart from China, French North Africa was the only important area of the world were the American service did not operate under British supervision. 'Torch' gave Donovan a golden opportunity to burnish the independent credentials of his agency in Washington by emphasizing special operations (as opposed to secret intelligence), where OSS had sole responsibility. Yet Roosevelt's longstanding interest in French North Africa, and implacable British opposition to the JCS's alternative cross-channel scheme, meant it was unnecessary for Donovan to pitch 'Torch' to the President by promising that OSS could deliver the Magreb without a struggle. FDR was already 'sold' on invasion, regardless of the French reaction.[47]

In fact, while Donovan certainly hyped OSS's prowess in special operations, at no time did he, Murphy, or 'the Apostles' suggest that the agency could transform 'Torch' into a military cakewalk. OSS pledged to minimize French resistance, not eliminate it. Even under Weygand's relatively pro-American regime, America's spies had been doubtful about the prospect of inducing French officials to mutiny en masse against Vichy authority. Throughout 1942 they remained cautious, particularly regarding the prospect of inducing Juin and his fellow Resident-Generals to desert Petain.[48]

The US Army heeded OSS's warnings about French intransigence – intelligence that proved to be remarkably accurate. After reviewing a report from Colonel Eddy on 10 August, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had been selected to lead Operation 'Torch,' concluded: "we will encounter very considerable resistance from certain sections of the French Forces," particularly in Morocco. OSS's data also led him to estimate that the Allies' chances for capturing "Tunis before it can be reinforced by the Axis, are considerably less than 50 percent." This assessment anticipated the French response to the 'Torch' invasion three months later, and helped to ensure that Allied forces were sufficiently powerful to quickly overcome any resistance. It was a credit to the 'Apostle' network's adept secret intelligence work.[49]

OSS Subversion

The 'vice-consuls' did not abandon their efforts to undermine the French Army by subverting high-ranking officers, including Juin, even if they were skeptical about their ultimate prospects for success. On 10 June, while Donovan was in the midst of his London negotiations with SOE, his roving representative in the region, Colonel Robert Solborg, reported that he and Murphy had discovered what he called a new "white hope" – a dissident French General that might have the prestige to command the loyalty of Juin and Nogues. His name was Henri Giraud.[50]

When Solborg revealed his contacts with the group of anti-German conspirators in Algiers associated with General Giraud, Murphy thought OSS had identified an ace. Giraud was nominally senior to all the French commanders in the Magreb, he was an implacable foe of collaboration, and he was brave: the General had used a wire rope embedded in a pot of jam to escape over a wall from his internment in Germany. After fleeing to unoccupied France, Giraud was given sanctuary by Petain – but refused to join the Vichy government. Murphy's interlocutors, a group of

right-wing conspirators known as "The Five," felt that Giraud could be induced to serve as the military figurehead for an anti-Axis coup in North Africa. The leader of the plotters, a vegetable oil magnate named Jacques Lemaigre-Dubreuil, used his business as a pretext to travel between the Magreb and France carrying messages to the General.[51]

"The Five" were an unsavory lot. The group had connections with the 'Cagoule,' an ultra-rightwing, racist, anti-Republican secret society. But this was not an offer OSS could afford to refuse. "The Five" would ensure the cooperation of two powerful division-level French generals: Emile Bethouart, Nogues' chief of staff, and Charles-Emmanuel Mast, chief of staff for the XIX Corps around Algiers. These were significant figures that could provide detailed intelligence on the disposition of French forces, and might be able to cause a certain amount of chaos prior to the Allied landings. Bethouart and Mast were not at the top of the chain of command, but they were the best the Americans had; as August wore into September, they and Giraud became an increasingly important part of OSS's plans for subversion during the 'Torch' operation.[52]

Historians sometimes use the Giraud episode, and its inability to secure an unopposed landing for Allied forces during operation 'Torch,' to suggest that OSS's North Africa mission was a failure. This is a misreading of the evidence, for two reasons. First, Allied commanders did not depend on Giraud's intervention to secure a rapid military victory in North Africa. They planned for a fight. The success of Giraud's intervention might have saved lives on both sides, but it had little bearing on the outcome of military operations. Second, OSS's contact with Giraud and the French conspirators who backed him paid secret intelligence dividends. The 10 June report predicting stiff French resistance to any Allied landing in North Africa was derived from Giraudist sources.[53] OSS's association with Giraud may not have worked miracles, but it did help the Allied cause.

Yet Giraud and "The Five" were hardly the sole focus of OSS's pre-'Torch' special operations work. Most English-language accounts of the 'Apostle' network's activities assume that Murphy's conservative predisposition meant that the Americans mostly recruited agents from a narrow band of the political spectrum. This was far from the case. As we've seen, OSS made (counterproductive) overtures to Moroccan nationalists. In Casablanca most of King's subversives, apart from Bethouart, were leftist malcontents. They included a well-organized group of Spanish republican

refugees, workers on the Moroccan railroad system, and local communists. Even a cadre of prostitutes was on the OSS payroll: As Eddy recalled, their job, which they executed to good effect, was to distract border policemen with oral sex while American agents smuggled men and material between the Spanish and French Zones. There were similarly inclusive patterns of recruitment elsewhere in the Magreb, with certain local variations. Algiers, for instance, had a particularly large Jewish community. Having suffered from discriminatory Vichy legislation, they would contribute a substantial share of OSS's pre-'Torch' guerilla manpower.[54]

Another common misconception is that the 'Apostles' avoided recruiting Gaullists. In fact, OSS attempts at sabotage and subversion prior to 'Torch' enjoyed substantial assistance from Gaullist groups. Murphy avoided involving de Gaulle's headquarters in London, so the 'Vice-Consuls' worked directly with local organizations in North Africa. These groups retained their "independence" from the OSS chain-of-command, but coordinated their activities with the Americans. Although their influence in the upper echelons of the French Army was slight, they seem to have been a source of particularly good order-of-battle intelligence.[55]

Thus by the first of October 1942, OSS had created a large, politically heterogeneous, subversive organization that could be activated during the 'Torch' landings. Its excellence as a source of secret intelligence was well established: there was little about the topography, political situation, or military disposition of French North Africa that the Allies did not know. But its ability to prevent bloodshed during 'Torch' landings by subverting, capturing, or overpowering the French Army was in doubt. OSS's success in this endeavor hinged on three unpredictable variables: how the high command would react to General Giraud's orders to cooperate with the Allies, whether Bethouart and Mast could neutralize their superiors, and the British capacity to supply the American guerilla network with weapons. Working closely with General Eisenhower's staff, OSS raced to address each of these issues before 'D-Day' (8 November) put an end to the preliminaries.

The OSS and Operation 'Torch,' October - November 1942

Ultimately, the 'Apostle' network was unable to facilitate the bloodless occupation of the Magreb. It is difficult, however, to identify any obviously inadequate aspects of the American subversion program. Using Coon to approach Moroccan nationalists was counterproductive, Donovan's obsession with Beltway

salesmanship did not help, and Giraud proved to be a poor figurehead during the attempted pre-'Torch' coup. It is unlikely, however, that alternative decisions by Murphy and Eddy would have produced a different outcome. Complete success – a 'velvet revolution' in North Africa – was probably, as the 'vice-consuls' themselves predicted, out of the question. OSS confronted too many obstacles with limited resources. The logistical challenges alone were extreme: the landings were spread across a coastline some 1500 kilometers long.[56]

The greatest barrier to peaceful accommodation, however, was the brittle, demoralized, proud ethos of the French Army. The defeat of 1940 had humbled this once mighty institution, but did not end its cohesion or loyalty to the duly constituted government. General Juin spoke for many of his fellow officers when he observed: "I incline towards the struggle against Germany, but I will obey orders." Like most of the Army, Juin was personally committed to Petain in November 1942, even though he had no love for the 'national revolution' and went on to become a commander for the Gaullist French Forces of the Interior (FFI). Others, like Nogues, were actively pro-German. These men saw British involvement in 'Torch' as an insult to their honor. The 'Apostles' understood that the French Army was hostile toward the British due to Mers el Kebir and the failed attempt to capture Dakar with Free French forces in September 1940. But America's late entry into the war meant that more than half of the 'Torch' invasion force would consist of British troops. The French were itching for a fight, and the Anglo-American soldiers that confronted them would be perceived as the enemy.[57]

OSS did an excellent job appraising the Anglo-American invasion force of the French Army's likely hostility; indeed, there was little Eddy could have done to improve coordination with Eisenhower's headquarters. With assistance from British intelligence, the clandestine 'vice-consular' radio network was connected, via Gibraltar, with the invasion fleet. This would allow Allied commanders to ensure their arrival coincided with the launch of OSS's guerilla campaign. It also enabled certain 'apostles,' like Leland Rounds, to drive out to the beaches and provide the disembarking troops with a personal escort. Rounds was issued a pass empowering him to cross the battle lines for this purpose. Eisenhower's staff designated other important tasks for the 'Apostles.' Browne was to use a direction-finding device provided by the British to designate the drop point for Allied paratroopers near Tafarouaoui, in western Algeria. In late September, Knox was detailed to the staff of

General Charles W. Ryder in London, who was slated to command the eastern task force landings around Algiers. Knox would personally guide the ships to the appointed beaches in the sector. Finally, the most important members of "The Five" agreed to a plan of action with Eisenhower's deputy Major General Mark Clark. During the nighttime hours of 21-22 October Clark had a secret meeting with Mast outside the town of Cherchell on the Algerian coast. After some wrangling, they devised a plan to smuggle Giraud into the Magreb. Giraud would issue a proclamation ordering the French Army to stand down its arms and fly into Algiers, while Allied troops stormed ashore. OSS, assisted by Mast, Bethouart and "The Five," would simultaneously attempt to arrest, disrupt, or otherwise neutralize the French high command. General Eisenhower's headquarters, OSS, and a diverse group of North Africa-based conspirators had a well-prepared, collective plan of action during the 'Torch' operation.[58]

Despite this preparation, many things went wrong when the blueprint was executed on 8 November 1942. OSS's most optimistic hopes were not realized – too many men died on both sides. Yet the 'Apostle' network's intelligence gathering and guerilla operations also undoubtedly saved lives. And the failure of the 'Torch' assault's principle military objective – seizing Tunisia before the Germans send reinforcements – was the fault of Eisenhower's military strategists, not Donovan's secret agents.

When the first Anglo-American troops stormed the beaches of the Magreb on 8 November 1942, Eisenhower and OSS had contingency plans in place to deal with ferocious French Army resistance ('War Plans') or complete capitulation ('Peace Plans'). The eventual outcome lay somewhere between these two extremes. Against all odds, it initially seemed that the 'Vice-Consul' network's unlikely coup might succeed, and that French North Africa would fall without a shot fired in anger. This happy scenario did not come about for three reasons: OSS's conspirators within the French Army were reluctant to kill their fellows, many of the insurgents lacked weapons due to the failure of an SOE supply mission several nights earlier, and the political complications caused by Admiral Darlan's unanticipated presence in Algiers.[59]

On the evening of the invasion, at a quarter to eight, Stafford Reid was hunched over his secret W/T set at the US consulate in Casablanca, cradling two Army .45s while he chain-smoking his way through a huge pile of cigarettes. A

minute later the waiting was over. The crucial code-phrase, 'Allo Robert, Franklin arrive,' had cracked over the BBC frequency. In response, Reid sent a brief coded acknowledgement to Eddy in Tangier, and dispatched a courier to inform David King that "the show was on." Across the Magreb, various elements of OSS's guerilla force executed their part of the putsch program. The two most crucial parts of the plan were entrusted to King in Casablanca and Murphy in Algiers. They and their French co-conspirators were charged with arresting Nogues and Juin.[60]

The gambit was briefly successful. Bethouart drove to Nogues' headquarters at Rabat, dismissed the General's guards, and surrounded the residence with a platoon of dissident French soldiers. When this was accomplished, Bethouart roused Nogues from bed (it was now 0200 hours) and presented him with a note explaining that at the behest of General Giraud, he was assuming command of all French forces in Morocco. A large "American" force (the substantial British contribution being intentionally omitted) was even now landing along the coast. Meanwhile, Murphy was having a similarly awkward conversation with Juin at the Resident General's estate in Algiers. Operating in several large cadres under a French military officer, bands of guerillas had fanned out across the city to seize communication centers, police stations, and other centers of authority – including Juin's headquarters. Murphy tried desperately to convince the General, who was striding around irresolutely in his "pink striped pajamas," that he should second Giraud's order to assist the Allied invaders. Juin offered his support in principle, but claimed that the matter was "out of his hands." Darlan, in Algiers to visit his ailing son, was temporarily the supreme military authority on the scene.[61]

Darlan's introduction into the political-military equation ended OSS's chance for a bloodless coup. Although the Admiral had been an active 'collaborator' with the German New Order in France, he was also a cynical opportunist. Some historians believe that if Murphy had been able to provide definitive proof that a large-scale invasion was under way – rather than a reprise of the British-Gaullist Dakar raid – he might have cooperated sooner. But Giraud's plane was late and the size of the Allied force was impossible to determine. Darlan decided to hedge his bets and offer resistance. In Rabat, Nogues came to the same conclusion, for roughly the same reasons. He ordered Bethouart to surrender and stand down his insurgents, or face the consequences.[62]

General Bethouart faced a dilemma: he knew that capturing Nogues was vital for the coup to succeed in Morocco, but he did not want to be responsible for a bloodbath. He surrendered. In Algiers the OSS guerillas were more numerous, better organized, and more desperate (their number included Jewish civilians). They held out into the next day, took casualties, and caused substantial chaos. Equipped with modern weapons, the guerillas might have succeeded in defending their positions for longer. But they'd failed to rendezvous with the SOE trawler *Minna* along the coast two nights before; most of their guns were antique 1899-1900 bolt-action rifles. In less than 12 hours, the bulk of the OSS irregulars – including Murphy, Pendar, and Reid – were in French custody.[63]

Yet the remnant of the 'Apostle' network continued to assist Allied forces. King, who escaped Nogues' dragnet with the help of friends in the French Army, continued to organize sabotage missions and radio intelligence to Eisenhower's commanders from a bolt-hole in Casablanca. (His first message, a warning to expect tough resistance from the French, and similar signals from Rounds in Oran, were not relayed effectively to Eisenhower's task force.) Rounds, Knox and Boyd helped guide Allied officers to their objectives. Browne had a gun-battle with French sentries, but succeeded in 'painting' the correct landing area for British paratroopers. Their efforts, the general chaos created by the failed putsch, and the overwhelming material superiority of the Anglo-American forces meant that the fighting, with few exceptions, ended quickly. Less than 16 hours after the initial landings, the French Army position in Algiers was hopeless; Darlan decided to surrender the city. Oran fell to the Anglo-Americans a little more than two days later. By then Major General George S. Patton's men had effectively surrounded Casablanca, and threatened to bomb the city unless Nogues capitulated. Significantly, in areas where OSS's guerilla network was extensive (Algiers, Oran) the fighting had ended sooner than in regions (Morocco) where it was less well developed.[64]

In the space of a single day, Darlan had been a prisoner of the OSS insurgents, the goaler of the insurgent leader (Murphy) and many of his confederates, and finally a POW in the hands of the Anglo-American invaders. But Nogues' prolonged resistance in Morocco gave him one last card to play. Facing defeat at the hands of the Allied forces, freed from his ostensible loyalty to Petain by Hitler's decision to occupy Vichy France on 11 November, Darlan decided to negotiate a settlement with Eisenhower's deputy, Mark Clark. Darlan's objective was to retain political power

and limit the Allies' influence over policy in the Magreb. Clark, who flew to Algiers to Gibraltar, was interested in only one thing: ending the fighting, so that Allied troops could dive on Tunisia before the Germans reinforced and occupied the country. After frantic negotiations, a deal was finalized the next day. In exchange for his appointment as French High Commissioner for North Africa, Darlan ordered all French forces to cease-fire. To appease "The Five," Giraud was named Commander-in-Chief of all French forces in North Africa, under Darlan's political authority. The critical phase of OSS's involvement with operation 'Torch' was over.[65]

In retrospect, the Clark-Darlan agreement was both unnecessary and futile. The fighting between French forces and the Allies was nearly over; it is unlikely that the agreement saved many lives. Clark also did not know that his primary objective – ensuring a rapid occupation of Tunisia – was already out of reach. The Germans had begun the process of airlifting troops from Italy to Bizerte, north of Tunis, on 9 November. Even if the 'Apostles' had succeeded in their 'mission impossible' and brought off a bloodless coup, Allied forces could not have reached Tunisia in time to stave off Nazi reinforcements. The 'Torch' planners had recognized this problem in their original blueprint for the invasion, and allocated a strong force to land in Bone (in eastern Algeria near the Tunisian border) and seize Bizerte and Tunis. But Eisenhower felt that spreading his forces over a nearly 2000-kilometer long front was unduly risky, and vetoed the idea of landing any troops east of Algiers. This cautious strategic decision, weeks before the invasion, is what cost the Allies the chance to end the war in North Africa quickly.[66]

Conclusion: Partial Success, Ominous Portents for the Future

America's clandestine campaign in North Africa from the spring of 1941 to November 1942 was far from perfect. Yet the crucial political-strategic decisions that have attracted criticism from historians – to prosecute the 'Torch' operation, avoid landing troops east of Algiers, and conclude the Clark-Darlan agreement – were out of OSS's hands. For better or worse, these choices were solely within the purview of top-level policymakers and general officers. Where the 'Apostle' network did have primary responsibility, its record was respectable. Even the aborted putsch had created a valuable diversion that probably saved many lives. Four hundred seventy-nine Allied soldiers and 1,346 Frenchmen died in the fighting. But *more than two-thirds* of the Anglo-American casualties – some three hundred men – were killed in a

pair of unnecessary, ill-judged, naval commando assaults on the ports of Oran and Algiers that were last-minute additions to the operational plan. Neither of these stunts was OSS-supported. Casualties on the beaches selected by the 'Apostles' were light. On the special operations front, the 'Vice-Consular' network emerged with some credit and little blame.[67]

On secret intelligence OSS's record was excellent. Its information of the French order-of-battle was nearly perfect, and the landing sites selected for Allied troops were effective. The 'Apostles' also had a strong grasp of the political situation in the Magreb, and warned Eisenhower that the French would likely resist an invasion. The Anglo-American military establishment listened, and appreciated the accuracy of their information. In the aftermath of 'Torch,' the US Army found much to fault in its own planning and execution of the mission – even the behavior of green American troops under fire. Indeed, historian Bradley Smith notes that "Army investigators found much to criticize about virtually every aspect of the invasion operation except intelligence." Conflicted French loyalties and Allied leaders' political imperatives had led to the tragic deaths of hundreds of soldiers on both sides. But 'Torch' intelligence was a triumph for OSS.[68]

American agents in French North Africa, once dismissed by their Gestapo opponents as "incompetent," performed well. The German intelligence services had, to their astonishment, been dealt a serious blow. They had been embarrassed by the 'Apostle' network's skilled tradecraft, missed preparations for the abortive coup, and completely surprised by the arrival of Allied troops in the Magreb. The Americans had little in common with Twain's *Innocents*, although they affected a superficial naiveté to fool their opponents.[69]

Yet there was one ominous fly in the ointment. Although the US intelligence mission in North Africa was a success, the reaction at OSS headquarters in Washington portended future failure. In his rush to earn credit with the JCS for the Magrebi triumph, Donovan attempted to export the special operations setup in North Africa to other theatres wholesale. In a letter to Bill Eddy, Donovan's Deputy Director for Operations, Ellery C. Huntington, noted that OSS was "setting up an organization [in the European theatre of operations] similar to that we devised in Algiers." There was no recognition that the 'Apostle' network had operated under unusual conditions that would not prevail elsewhere. The semi-permissive

environment of the French North African Empire was nothing like Hitler's *Festung Europa.*[70]

Unlike the US Army, OSS did not perform an "after-action analysis" to discover what aspects of its clandestine program had succeeded or failed, and how these "lessons" might be applied in the future. Instead, Donovan seems to have simply concluded that the North Africa model could be applied everywhere. This politically expedient decision was somewhat understandable, given the serious sniping that OSS continued to suffer from rival organizations in Washington. To justify its continued existence, it was convenient for OSS to promise that it could repeat the 'Apostle' network's success in other theatres. A failure to examine its experiences with a critical eye, however, meant that OSS was slow to adapt to vicissitudes of geography, politics, and battlefield conditions. Donovan's salesmanship also inflated the expectations policymakers had about what covert action could accomplish.[71]

During the winter of 1942-1943, Donovan's instinct for hyping and hogging credit for special operations created serious tension with SOE, which built a substantial presence in the Magreb after 'Torch.' (This dispute, and its eventual resolution, is the subject of the next chapter.) In the long run, however, the 'Apostle' network marked the emergence of one of the US intelligence community's perennial leitmotifs: competent field-agents undermined by self-promoting leaders enamored of spectacular special operations. American agents, like their political masters in Washington, were no *Innocents Abroad.*

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[1] Mark Twain, *Traveling with the Innocents Abroad: Mark Twain's Original Reports from Europe and the Holy Land*, Daniel Morley McKeithan, ed., (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1958) pp. vii-ix, 26-27.

[2] If the American outlook was ever defined by naïve innocence, this was certainly destroyed by the Great War. See Henry May, *The End of American Innocence: A Study of the First Years of Our Time, 1912-1917* (New York: Knopf, 1969) pp.387-398; Randolph S. Bourne, *War and the Intellectuals: Collected Essays, 1915-1919* (Cambridge: CUP, 1999) pp.53-64. Harold Macmillan's views on the naiveté of American policymakers are representative, see Alistair Horne, *Harold Macmillan, Volume I 1894-1956* (New York: Viking, 1989) p.347. For some illustrations of misperceptions of American innocence and parochialism see John Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After* (London: Macmillan, 2001) pp.13-14.

[3] Frank Ninkovich, *The Wilsonian Century: US Foreign Policy Since 1900* (London: University of Chicago Press, 1999) pp.11.

[4] Robert Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors* (New York: Doubleday, 1964) pp.63-64.

[5] David A. Walker, "OSS and Operation Torch," *Journal of Contemporary History* (London: Sage, 1987) pp.670-674; David A. Walker, "Democracy Goes to War: Politics, Intelligence and Decision Making in the United States in 1942," *North American Spies: New Revisionist Essays*, Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones and Andrew Lownie, eds. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1991) pp.79-101; Rhodri

Jeffreys-Jones, *Cloak and Dollar: A History of American Secret Intelligence* (London: Yale, 2002) pp.147-148.

[6] A memorandum issued prior to the invasion by General Eisenhower's executive officer Walter Bedell Smith postulates several different scenarios based on the level of resistance French troops offered to the Allied invaders. This proves that Allied military commanders' plans did not rely on success of OSS special operations or an unopposed landing. See "SO Operation Instructions to Lieutenant Colonel W.A. Eddy from W.B. Smith, Section 9 – 'Initiation of Plans,'" Leland Rounds Papers, Box 1, Hoover Institution Archives. Also see Keith Sainsbury, *The North African Landings, 1942: A Strategic Decision* (London: Davis-Poynter, 1976) pp.144-148; Arthur L. Funk, *The Politics of TORCH: The Allied Landings and the Algiers Putsch* (Lawrence, KS: The University Press of Kansas, 1974) pp.214-215, 224-225; Matthew Jones, *Britain, the United States and the Mediterranean War, 1942-1944* (London: Macmillan, 1996) pp.18-21.

[7] Walker, "OSS and Torch," p.668; Jeffreys-Jones, *Cloak and Dollar*, p.39.

[8] The Army's appreciation for OSS's accomplishments in French North Africa is detailed in the secret citations issued to the agents who served in the Murphy network. See "US Department of State Confidential Future Release for Publication [Award of Medals of Merit]," 13 March 1946, David W. King Papers, box 1, HIA.

[9] Murphy, *Diplomat*, pp.40-43.

[10] Julian Jackson, *France: The Dark Years, 1940-1944* (London: Oxford, 2001) p.120.

[11] Murphy, *Diplomat,* pp.62-64.

[12] Murphy, *Diplomat,* pp.65.

[13] Murphy, *Diplomat,* pp.70-71; Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945* (New York: Oxford, 1995 [1979]) p.263.

[14] Dallek, *FDR*, pp.362-363; Charles de Gaulle quoted in R. Harris Smith, *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Intelligence Agency* (New York: Delta, 1973) p.38.

[15] Murphy, *Diplomat,* pp.72-75; Jackson, *Dark Years,* pp.118-119, 139-140.

[16] Murphy, *Diplomat,* pp.80-83; Jackson, *Dark Years*, p.177.

[17] See "The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to The Secretary of State, Vichy, 30 April 1941," in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Volume II*, (Washington: US Dept. of State, 1959) pp.321-322.

[18] Hull quoted in Jackson, *Dark Years*, p.177.

[19] Auer quoted in Murphy, *Diplomat,* p.79; Heinz Guderian, *Panzer Leader* (London: Michael Joseph, 1952) pp.142-144; "The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State, Vichy, 18 April 1941," *FRUS, 1941, Vol. II*, p.295.

[20] "Memorandum of Conversation by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Villard), Washington, 18 April 1941," *FRUS, 1941, Vol. II*, pp.312-313. This evidence disproves Walker's claim that the US military intelligence services (MID, ONI) could have performed the secret intelligence work undertaken by State Department, COI, and OSS civilian intelligence agents in French North Africa. See Walker, "OSS and Torch," pp.669.

[21] Ibid; Murphy, *Diplomat,* pp.88.

[22] Pendar, Kenneth, *Adventure in Diplomacy: The Rise of Charles De Gaulle* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1945), p.10.

[23] Ibid.

[24] "[Award of Medals of Merit]," David W. King Papers, Box 1, HIA; "Letter to Colonel Bruce Smith," 6 March 1951, David W. King Papers, box 1, Hoover Institution Archives; R. Harris Smith, p.69.

[25] "Memorandum by the Chief of Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)," *FRUS, 1941, Vol. II*, pp.315-316.

[26] W. Stafford Reid, *Triumph of Secrecy* (Unpublished memoir, circa 1950), p. 19 – W. Stafford Reid Papers, box 1, Hoover Institution Archives.

[27] Ibid, p.39 – W. Stafford Reid Papers, box 1, HIA.

[28] Ibid, pp.29-39 – W. Stafford Reid Papers, box 1, HIA; German cable quoted in R. Harris Smith, *OSS*, p.39.

[29] "Intelligence Notes, circa 1941," Leland Rounds Papers, box 1, HIA.

[30] "Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles W. Lewis, Jr. of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs," *FRUS, 1941, Vol. II*, pp.420-421.

[31] Jackson, *Dark Years*, pp.182-183.

[32] Martin Thomas, *The French Empire at War, 1940-*1945, (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1998) pp.40-43; "The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy), Washington, 6 December 1941," *FRUS, 1941, Vol. II*, pp.493-494.

[33] Ibid.
[34] F. Brooks Richards, *Secret Flotillas* (London: HMSO, 1996) pp.347-452. The most notable SIS agent transferred to American control was a Moroccan-English man from Fez named Mohammad Gusus. Mr. Gusus, a hedonist, threw wild parties at his estate and pumped drunken German guests for information. This cocktail banter seems to have been highly rated by both COI-OSS and the British services, but Gusus' lavish lifestyle led to a funding flap near the end of the war. See "Mohammad Gusus," undated report, NARA RG 226, Entry 97, Box 28, Folder 489.
[35] Thomas F. Troy, *Donovan and CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency* (Frederick, MD: Aletheia Books, 1981) pp.140-147.
[36] R. Harris Smith, *OSS*, pp.41-58.
[37] Dallek, *FDR*, pp.262, 266, 318-319; George R. Howe, *The US Army in World War II, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West*, (Washington, DC: US Army, 1957) pp.5, 7.
[38] Carleton S. Coon, *A North Africa Story*, (Ipswich, MA: Gambit, 1980) pp.x-xi; Carleton S. Coon, *Adventures and Discoveries: The Autobiography of Carleton S. Coon, Anthropologist and Explorer* (Inglewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1981) pp.161-164.
[39] Coon, *Autobiography*, pp.25-28.
[40] Coon, *North Africa Story*, pp.20-23; "Letter from DW King to Whom it May Concern re/ Colonel Herviot," 7 March 1944, David W. King Papers, box 1, HIA; Mohamed Khenouf and Michael Brett, "Algerian Nationalism and Allied Military Strategy and Propaganda During the Second World War," in *Africa and the Second World War* David Killingray and Richard Rathbone, eds. (London: Macmillan, 1986) pp.260-261.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Troy, *Donovan and CIA*, pp.149-150, 172-173.
[43] "Letter to Colonel William J. Donovan from W.A. Eddy," 1 April 1942, M. Preston Goodfellow Papers, Box 3, HIA; "Memorandum for the President," 10 April 1942, Goodfellow Papers, Box 4, HIA; "Colonel Eddy's Priority List of Equipment," 15 August 1942, Goodfellow Papers, Box 4, HIA; "Memorandum for the Joint Intelligence Committee," 14 August 1942, Goodfellow Papers, Box 4, HIA.
[44] Troy, *Donovan and CIA*, p.150.
[45] Stimson quoted in Sainsbury, *North African Landings*, pp.116-117.
[46] Lord Alanbrooke, *War Diaries, 1939-1945* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2001) pp.246-248, 255; Dallek, *FDR*, p.321; "Letter from President Roosevelt to Leahy," undated, *FRUS, 1942, Vol. II: Europe*, p.139.
[47] Ibid; William J.M. Mackenzie, *The Secret History of SOE: The Special Operations Executive, 1940-1945* (St. Ermin's Press, 2000) p.405.
[48] "Memorandum of Conversation," 28 August 1941, *FRUS, 1941, Vol. II* pp.420-423; "Murphy to the Secretary of State," 15 May 1942, *FRUS, 1942, Vol. II*, pp.300-301.
[49] Eisenhower quoted in Funk, *TORCH*, pp.93-94.
[50] "Note from Bob [Solborg] to Preston [Goodfellow]," 10 June 1942, Goodfellow Papers, Box 2, HIA.
[51] R. Harris Smith, *OSS*, pp.40-41; Funk, *TORCH*, p.165.
[52] Funk, *TORCH*, pp.35, 50-53, 90-91.
[53] Funk, *TORCH*, pp.93-94.
[54] "Memorandum for Colonel W.A. Eddy, from Vice Consul King," 22 June 1942, NARA RG 226, Entry 97, Box 9, Folder 122; "Bill Eddy to 'Fellow Tangerines' Eleven Years After," 9 May 1954, Rounds Papers, Box 1; Funk, *TORCH*, p.174.
[55] "W.A. Eddy to Percy G. Black, with attachment," 26 August 1942, NARA RG 226, Entry 222, Box 3. Also note that one of 'The Five,' Lieutenant Henri d'Astier, was the brother of French Air Force General Francois d'Astier, who had joined de Gaulle in London. Another brother, Emmanuel d'Astier, headed the Resistance group Liberation-Sud. See Jackson, *Dark Years*, pp.403-404.
[56] Estimated using the CIA World Factbook, 2001, http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/
[57] Jackson, *Dark Years*, pp.220, 224; "Intelligence Notes, circa 1942," Rounds Papers, Box 1, HIA.
[58] Richards, *Secret Flotillas*, p.576; "Landings in North Africa," Rounds Papers, Box 1, HIA; "[Award of Medals of Merit]," David W. King Papers, Box 1, HIA; Funk, *TORCH*, pp.149-151.
[59] "SO Operation Instructions to Lieutenant Colonel W.A. Eddy, Section 9 – 'Initiation of Plans,'" Rounds Papers, Box 1, HIA.
[60] Reid, *Secrecy*, pp.225-228 – Reid Papers, Box 1, Hoover Institution Archives.
[61] Howe, *US Army in Northwest Africa*, pp.94-95; Murphy, *Diplomat*, pp.127-128.

[62] Jackson, *Dark Years*, pp.224-225; Funk, *TORCH*, pp.208-209; Howe, *US Army in Northwest Africa*, pp.94-98.
[63] Ibid; Richards, *Secret Flotillas*, p.582.
[64] "[Award of Medals of Merit]," and "Career Notes," King Papers, Box 1, HIA; Funk, *TORCH*, pp.231-235; Rick Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943* (London: Abacus, 2003) p.72.
[65] Jackson, *Dark Years*, pp.224-225.
[66] Albert Kesselring, *The Memoirs of Field-Marshal* Kesselring, Lynton Hudson, trans. (London: William Kimber, 1953) pp.142-144; Howe, *US Army in Northwest Africa*, pp.27-29; Funk, *TORCH*, pp.92-11, 235; Atkinson, *Army at Dawn*, pp.163-167.
[67] Jackson, *Dark Years,* pp.224-225; Funk, *TORCH*, pp.223-224. Observers of the Anglo-American intelligence community have long noted policymakers' penchant to foist blame on the spies for the mistakes of the political leadership. See Thomas Powers. *Intelligence Wars: American Secret History From Hitler to Al-Qaeda*. (New York: NYRB, 2002) p.265
[68] Bradley Smith, *The Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins of the CIA* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1983) p.156.
[69] Kesselring, *Memoirs*, pp.142-144
[70] "Letter from Huntington to 'Bill' [Eddy]," 10 March 1943, NARA RG 226, Entry 97, Box 8, Folder 118.
[71] Bradley Smith, *Shadow Warriors*, pp.156-158; For many examples of poor feedback and self-evaluation in the modern US intelligence system see William E. Odom, *Fixing Intelligence: For a More Secure America* (New Haven: Yale, 2003).

Chapter 2: The 'Massingham' Mission and the Secret 'Special Relationship' in French North Africa, November 1942 – May 1943

Background and Context

In the aftermath of operation 'Torch,' OSS Director William Donovan believed that he would be able use the agency's incumbent status in French North Africa to collect intelligence and perform special operations in south-western Europe, without reference to the British. The origins of this misconception, the consequences of Donovan's disillusionment and the uneasy partnership that developed between the Anglo-American clandestine services in Algiers are discussed in this chapter.

Recent archival releases – and discoveries – now allow for a case study of cooperative enterprise at 'Massingham', the principle Allied 'dirty warfare' base in the Western Mediterranean after November 1942. Housed for the bulk of its existence in a former French 'adult play area' 20 kilometres west of Algiers, 'Massingham' served as the main command, communications, supply and training centre for clandestine operations into southwestern Europe from the North African 'Torch' landings in November 1942 to May 1945. It was one of the most conspicuously successful Allied special ops (OSS-SO and the British Special Operations Executive – SOE) field stations of the war and one of the few that eventually achieved a complete merger of Anglo-American operations. By the autumn of 1944, 'Massingham' had played a major role in the liberation of Corsica, facilitated the secret armistice negotiations that led to the Italian surrender in September 1943, helped pave the way for the 'Anvil' landings in the south of France, and instigated several massive guerrilla uprisings behind Axis lines. In France alone it airdropped more than 400 agents, 14,000 crates of arms and 7,500 miscellaneous supply packages. Colonel Douglas Dodds-Parker, the senior SOE officer at 'Massingham' for most of its history, estimates that his base accounted for 40% of all the material secretly infiltrated into France over the course of the war. Although this latter number may be somewhat exaggerated, it is still an amazing figure for an establishment that is barely mentioned in the official histories.[1]

Since the publication of M.R.D. Foot's groundbreaking *SOE in France* in 1966 historians have lamented that little documentary evidence of the base survived the war – Dodds-Parker and his associates were assiduous in carrying out their orders

to burn the record of their activities. Some recent determined digging in the UK and abroad has unearthed a small trove of new information, however. Jay Jakob, a former staff member of the US House of Representatives' Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, turned up considerable extant cable traffic between 'Massingham', SOE's London headquarters in Baker Street, and British intelligence in North America. Martin Thomas provided a fine introduction to the history of the base in an article for *Intelligence and National Security* – particularly regarding how the Giraud/De Gaulle political controversy stoked tensions between OSS and SOE. The author's own research has discovered that prior to the destruction of the operational record a fairly comprehensive synopsis of Allied activities at 'Massingham' was recorded by a member of the base's First-Aid Nursing Yeomanry (FANY) contingent, Captain Jacky Porter. Porter's piece was subsequently misfiled at the PRO, where it languished for 60 years.[2]

The aim of this chapter is to synthesize these new discoveries through a study of the mission's fractious first six months: from the chaos of the British-American invasion of the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia) in November 1942 until Charles de Gaulle's May 1943 arrival in Algiers heralded an end to political instability. During this period three wide-ranging disputes – precipitated by organizational self-interest, the French political situation and cultural irritants, respectively – strained relations between the Anglo-American secret warfare agencies. Initially, cooperation looked neither possible nor desirable, particularly from the OSS perspective. The near-total integration that eventually developed was the product of a determined effort by a few individuals who recognized that an overall convergence of vital interests outweighed short-term irritants.

Martin Thomas is correct when he suggests that Franklin Roosevelt's decision to prop-up the Darlan/Giraud regime in Algiers against the challenge to its legitimacy by the Fighting French, and the requirement that SOE cooperate with OSS, initially stymied British efforts to make 'Massingham' an effective staging area for European resistance. As we shall see, however, despite this policy senior officials at SOE made a conscious decision to sacrifice short-term operational effectiveness in order to aid the US clandestine service. During the winter of 1942/1943 OSS faced a serious attempt to dissolve the agency in Washington. Its flamboyant Director, William Donovan, desperately needed to prove OSS was capable of staging independent operations. The SOE leadership agreed to temporarily cede a lead role in North

Africa to their US counterparts, correctly assuming that they could eventually reclaim *de facto* primacy in the region. Their ploy worked perfectly: OSS was given cover against its bureaucratic rivals, and SOE's grand ambitions for 'Massingham' were not cancelled, but merely postponed until later in 1943. In the interim, Dodds-Parker and his colleagues established a strong working relationship with their American counterparts – the foundation of the mission's eventual success. The quasi-mystical, sentimentalised sense of pan Anglo-Americana that occasionally bedazzles some contemporary political scientists clearly had little influence with the men who made these practical wartime calculations.[3]

The Establishment Controversy – November 1942

Until late 1942, SOE had played an unusual second-fiddle role to OSS in French North Africa. After 1940 Britain was excluded from the region due to political tensions with the French government at Vichy, while the United States parleyed continued diplomatic relations with Petain's regime into an effective informal intelligence network of 'vice-consuls' in the Magreb. Run jointly by Colonel William Eddy, OSS Director William Donovan's representative in Tangier, and Robert Murphy, President Roosevelt's personal plenipotentiary in French North Africa, the consular web became the most effective Allied intelligence gathering operation in the region. By November 1942 it was sophisticated enough to provide Allied military planners with vital geographical, logistical and French order of battle data prior to the 'Torch' landings. It also touched off an abortive coup in Algiers that, while mostly unsuccessful, earned OSS considerable credit with Allied army commanders and the American Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).[4]

For OSS Director William Donovan, this success came at a crucial time. In Washington, a series of midwinter bureaucratic challenges to OSS's existence came within a whisker of precipitating Donovan's resignation and the absorption of his overseas operations by the US Army's Military Intelligence Division (MID, or 'G-2'). Donovan's record of operational success in the Magreb – and the ammunition this gave him against the institutional enemies of his organization – invested OSS's presence in the region with vital importance.[5]

'Torch' also re-ignited Britain's – particularly SOE's – interest in French North Africa. It opened up the possibility of realizing the War Office's favoured strategy, an advance north into the 'soft underbelly' of Europe through Italy or the

Balkans. SOE would certainly have a role fomenting native 'fifth columns' ahead of the advancing Allied armies; the Magreb could also serve as a forward staging area for clandestine work into France. With 'Torch' in prospect, SOE's then-Assistant Director Brigadier Colin Gubbins drew up plans to address these possible opportunities in August 1942. By late October, General Eisenhower had been successfully petitioned on the subject; he had assented to the establishment of an 'advanced operations base' for SOE outside Algiers following a successful Allied landing. This base, code-named 'Massingham', would serve as a training centre, holding area and launch pad for secret agents slated for insertion into a vast swathe of fascist Europe: Spain, Italy and France.[6]

Unfortunately for inter-Allied comity, the Americans believed SOE had already ceded them an exclusive franchise in French North Africa. At a secret London meeting in June 1942, SOE and the Office of Strategic Services-Special Operations Branch (OSS-SO) had agreed to split their global responsibilities. Donovan and Sir Charles Hambro (Director of SOE or 'CD') divided the world into spheres of 'primary', 'secondary', and 'joint' control. The only significant regions where OSS secured primary responsibility for special operations were China and French North Africa. The former became a great disappointment: Chiang Kai-shek did not co-operate effectively with the Americans on intelligence matters. The latter proved fertile ground for Eddy, Murphy and his 'apostles' (as the vice-consuls became known). Ambitious OSS expansion plans were in the works; Eddy had picked out a large pseudo-Moorish mansion overlooking Algiers called the Villa Magnol as his new headquarters. More importantly, the OSS 'success' in North Africa became an effective wedge Donovan used to pry money and support from the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and a mantra he used to fend off his bureaucratic foes at MID.[7]

When the dust had settled after TORCH, and OSS learned of the British ambitions in North Africa – its area of 'primary responsibility' – there were predictably serious high-level ructions. Donovan had staked OSS's prestige on North African-based ops and was unwilling to cede the region to the British; but the Magreb was also an integral part of SOE's plans for French resistance.

Bickham Sweet-Escott, acting as part of SOE's liaison mission in the United States, found himself in the eye of the ensuing storm. Summoned before the Director in Washington on 10 November, the British bank executive found Donovan in a

'towering rage'. Having read the Baker Street telegram informing OSS that the British were, with Eisenhower's permission, establishing a major clandestine base in the Magreb, Donovan "was convinced he had been double-crossed." Sweet-Escott, who confessed to having "a good deal of sympathy for him" rushed off to inform the head of the SOE mission in Washington, Barty Pleydell-Bouverie. After a quick huddle, they decided that the only solution was to try to get Bill Stephenson to come down from New York and mediate.[8]

William Stephenson was the Canadian millionaire who headed British Security Co-Ordination (BSC) – the proxy for all British intelligence agencies in the Western Hemisphere. An esoteric character even for a spy, Stephenson had become a close associate of his US counterparts; indeed, despite the outlandishness of the 'quiet Canadian's' later claims to fame, Thomas Troy has presented convincing evidence that Stephenson had a major hand in fostering OSS within the US government bureaucracy. Therefore, cognizant of the political pressure Donovan faced, he regarded the young American agency with a vaguely paternal instinct.[9]

Stephenson's involvement produced a flurry of telegrams between Washington, BSC headquarters in New York, and Baker Street. These exchanges, principally in the form of personal messages between Hambro and the BSC Chief from 8 to 20 November, brought Baker Street up to speed on the weakness of OSS's position in Washington. While this ultimately led to a compromise on SOE/OSS cooperation in French North Africa, it also exposed Baker Street's frustrations with the 'teething trouble' experienced by the new US agency.[10]

Setting aside his regular duties in New York, Stephenson decamped to the capital. After a briefing from his colleagues, he had a long talk with Donovan. Although no detailed record of their conversation exists, it's clear that it made Stephenson very angry. Having spent countless hours encouraging the growth of an American central intelligence organization, cultivating Donovan, and helping stave off the jealousies of established agencies in the American bureaucracy, Stephenson was not about to let bungling at Baker Street jeopardize the relationship. OSS offered a useful means of augmenting British power; he would not allow it to go under.

These sentiments were expressed in the cipher telegram he dispatched that day to Hambro in London. Noting that both Donovan and the OSS-SO chief Ellery Huntington were incensed, Stephenson described his own distress:

> I find it difficult to understand why arrangements [with Eisenhower] were completed in [London] without either ourselves [BSC] or [Donovan] being informed. …We received no communication from you…
>
> As regards [the] question of operations [into Europe] based [in North Africa] it was I think obvious from my [earlier communications] that [OSS] expected to operate in this area at least on an equal basis….

The entire SOE liaison staff in Washington shared Stephenson's sentiments. Stung after being cut out of the loop on negotiations for a North African base with Eisenhower, station chief Pleydell-Bouverie asked to be recalled. Discussing the debacle years later, Sweet-Escott was equally blunt: "I was never quite clear whether [OSS] suspected our integrity or our competence. Whichever it was it did not help us."[11]

Faced with a rebellion by its representatives in America, SOE took a conciliatory line; and did what it should have done long before – ask its officers in the US for advice about OSS's concerns. Hambro, however, informed Stephenson that he was unwilling to abandon plans for 'Massingham', which was absolutely essential for future subversion in occupied Europe. Furthermore:

> The door is wide open for OSS co-operation if they will come in and work with us: the quicker the better for all concerned.

The need for haste became one of the major themes in Hambro's debate with the Stephenson, which continued in this vein for another week. CD emphasized that SOE could not dawdle while OSS put its house in order: "we… cannot be inactive, but must sail with the tide."[12]

Yet CD also accepted the validity of Stephenson's concerns, and sent a statement of regret to Donovan on 11 November. There was a lively discussion within Baker Street about how to accommodate OSS's wish for its own autonomous base in North Africa given what SOE saw as an imperative need for joint activity to ensure 'efficiency' – a euphemism for British leadership. Anticipating, correctly, that "the Allied Commander [Eisenhower] will… insist on dealing with one authority for Special Operations," Hambro felt that OSS and SOE would be thrown together regardless of Donovan's objections. If this occurred, the good of the overall war effort dictated that SOE must assert controlling authority. Brigadier Colin Gubbins

summarized the British attitude when he wrote that "I feel strongly that until OSS can produce men with experience, the head [of the North African mission] should be from SOE."[13]

Yet compromise was unavoidable. A memo from the SOE Washington office convinced Baker Street that OSS was in dire straights:

> For a considerable time Donovan has occupied a unique position [vis-à-vis the President] and a number of people have long been anxious to dislodge him from it.... Now...it is necessary for Donovan to justify [OSS and] one of the ways he intends to do it is to create an impression in the minds of his adversaries that he... is responsible for a big SO organization...[in] North Africa.

Stephenson was not the only one who viewed the possible demise of OSS with horror; it was the last thing anyone in SOE wanted to see happen. A proprietary instinct prevailed: they had helped to make OSS and Donovan was 'their man'. Thus, Hambro allowed that OSS should have separate facilities in North Africa – for now. Ultimately, however, no one at Baker Street expected this situation to last: the "facts on the ground" would "force" OSS "into some form of joint mission" controlled by the British. Donovan and Stephenson were ceded a pyrrhic victory.[14]

In time it would become clear that Donovan's differences with the British were less significant than they seemed. He had no objection to joint operations at 'Massingham' – although it was irritating to accept a subordinate position in the field to SOE. As long as OSS *appeared* to be independent and strong, thereby solidifying its political position in Washington, Donovan allowed his commanders to operate as they saw fit in the theatre. It was up to Colonel Eddy and his British counterparts in the field to make 'Massingham' an effective cooperative enterprise.

Operational Frustration and the Assassination of Jean Darlan, December 1942

While the 'Massingham' wrangle played out during the first three weeks of November, 'Torch' fighting in the Maghreb between the Anglo-American invaders and French forces loyal to Marshal Petain ended in an awkward truce. Robert Murphy's OSS plotters had hoped that the exhortations of General Henri Giraud – a pliant officer untainted by association with the Vichy government – would induce the defending troops to assist the Allies. When this plan failed, Murphy turned to Admiral Jean Darlan, who was serendipitously visiting Algiers. Darlan had served as

Vichy premier under Petain from February 1941 until Pierre Laval's return to power in April 1942, when he assumed command of all French military forces. During his stewardship of unoccupied France, Darlan had bent over backwards to accommodate the Germans, at one point offering to provide major aid to Rommel's campaign in Libya. The conspirators OSS recruited for its partially successful Algiers putsch loathed him. Murphy, however, felt his authority could salvage the situation for the Allies. The French high command in North Africa would defer to the 'little Admiral's' orders.[15]

Darlan's self-interested pragmatism made him receptive to the idea. Having ascertained the size of the Anglo-American invasion force and the ultimate hopelessness of resistance, he decided to cooperate. In exchange for his appointment as French High Commissioner for North Africa, Darlan ordered all French forces to cease-fire. Although the military effect of his intervention was relatively limited, it avoided prolonging the bloodshed. In the end 479 Allied and 1,346 French soldiers died during the TORCH operation: a toll that would have been higher without the OSS-sponsored subversion around Algiers.[16]

The agreement with Darlan was formalized on 12 November. Major General Mark Clark, who had flown from Gibraltar to help Murphy negotiate with the French, signed on behalf of General Eisenhower. With the agreement the US military got a pledge of full cooperation from the French political and military bureaucracy in North Africa: aid that it hoped would facilitate a quick strike at the rear of Rommel's Afrika Corps through Tunisia. In return, the Vichy status-quo was essentially preserved. Opponents of the regime remained imprisoned in desert camps, anti-Semitic legislation stayed on the books, and Darlan – a man who had abetted the creation of Hitler's 'New Order' in Europe – became the most important French figure.[17]

At the time of the Clark-Darlan accord the Americans did not appreciate how seriously it damaged their ambition to support 'fifth column' resistance in metropolitan France. Murphy tried to placate the supporters of OSS's Algiers putsch by stipulating in the agreement that Darlan would appoint General Giraud commander of all French forces in Africa. While this may have mollified some right-wing French opinion-makers in the Maghreb, it ignored Charles de Gaulle's growing stature within the French underground. This oversight would plague all OSS and SOE activities for the next seven months.

In the interim, the 'Massingham' plan went forward. On 17 November SOE's first representative entered Algiers. Lieutenant Colonel J. Keswick, RA, the executive officer for the new 'advance base', bore a letter of introduction from Hambro to General Eisenhower. His first stop was the Hotel St. Georges, the large second empire-vintage structure where Eisenhower had established Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ) after the Clark-Darlan agreement. CD's missive reminded the General of his commitment to an SOE redoubt in the region, and sketched its mission parameters: carrying out subversive activities in southern France, Corsica, Sicily, Sardinia and mainland Italy.[18]

After noting that these activities would be carried out while working "as closely as possible" with OSS, it concluded by soliciting permission to requisition a headquarters somewhere in the near environs. Keswick and AFHQ agreed that the new clandestine base would be formally assigned the banal moniker Inter-Services Special Unit 6 (ISSU 6). Its informal code-name was 'Massingham'.[19]

With Eisenhower's assent, Keswick selected Cap Matifou, a rocky peninsula that jutted out into the Mediterranean east of the capital, as the site for 'Massingham'. A platoon of radio operators, the vanguard of a field large staff Gubbins had organized in Baker Street, joined him on 20 November. Although they were somewhat sullen from their stormy, U-Boat plagued sea passage Keswick put the men to work building radio 'masts', designed to amplify weak radio signals transmitted by SOE agents in occupied Europe.[20]

Over the course of the next three weeks the rest of the 'Massingham' officer corps flew into Algeria: including the commander, Colonel James Munn, and Major Douglas Dodds-Parker, the head of operational plans. Munn, fresh from a long stint working with OSS at SOE's top-secret training area near Oshawa, Ontario, was ideally suited for his demanding new job. It was his subordinate, however, who would play a more significant role in the history of 'Massingham'.[21]

Dodds-Parker was the son of an Oxford surgeon of modest means. Though no intellectual, the elder Dodds-Parker had an old Oxonian's taste for the scholarly milieu. His father's son, Douglas also enjoyed the routine of life in a college town; he remembered a childhood "enriched by the annual influx of the young, especially the Rhodes Scholars." Influenced, perhaps, by the Rhodesian political outlook, he became a lifelong friend of the United States, convinced that America was indeed the "arsenal of democracy" and future "guarantor" of Britain's "freedom." "The most

deplorable date in the history of Western Civilization was 4 July 1776," he once quipped. In Algiers this attitude helped disarm his OSS counterparts and – coupled with an even temper – prevented many small disputes from getting out of hand.[22]

Soon after their arrival, Munn and Dodds-Parker convinced Keswick that Cap Matifou was hardly an ideal spot for 'Massingham'. In late December the Colonel's attention was drawn to a secluded site 20 kilometers up the coast west of Algiers. Located amidst a copse of pine trees was a charming cluster of buildings called the Club des Pins – a former French beach-club. With its secluded beach, nearby verge with large sand dunes, and belt of luxurious villas, the Club seemed designed for sea-borne operations, parachute training and a large staff. The presence of the airfield at Blida three kilometers to the southwest was an added bonus. Shifting from Cap Matifou took time – but 'Massingham' had found its home.[23]

With the base established, Munn's next task was to achieve an effective parley with the Villa Magnol. Contrary to expectations, Eddy was more than willing to consider an informal merger of OSS and SOE operations – so long as the agencies retained separate headquarters. Writing to explain the relationship between the Anglo-American services to a member of Darlan's intelligence section on 10 December, Eddy noted:

> ...The Office of Strategic Services [in French North Africa] is part of a *joint Anglo-American mission*... to prepare for advance... operations in future theatres of war outside North Africa [italics added].

In one stroke, Eddy gave away the principle that Donovan had spent weeks fighting for: OSS autonomy. Yet from Washington's perspective, OSS's mission remained independent – as the Director intended.[24]

Under this *ad hoc* arrangement, the Anglo-American sabotage services settled down to business, only to confront serious new difficulties. There was a dire shortage of transport. In order to make contact with the resistance in occupied Europe, SOE and OSS needed dedicated airplanes or the use of submarines. In December 1943 they had neither; indeed, OSS did not even receive official sanction from the JCS for post-'Torch' operations until late December. (This was a by-product of MID's continued obstructionism and anti-OSS campaign.) SOE had been promised a RAF squadron, but it would not arrive until the New Year. In the interim, the Anglo-

Americans might have been stymied completely were it not for the appearance of the submarine *Casabianca*.[25]

The submarine's captain, an eccentric French patriot named Jean L'Herminier, had been interned with his ship in Toulon after the collapse of 1940. Under the nose of the Italian Armistice Commission, however, he and his crew managed to illegally hoard fuel in the forlorn hope of effecting a breakout. When the Germans occupied Vichy in the wake of the 'Torch' operation, Petain ordered the French fleet to scuttle itself. Instead, L'Herminier cut his moorings, steamed into the Gulf of Lyons, and crash dove in order to avoid an attack by Luftwaffe dive-bombers. When the Germans gave up the chase, Herminier slipped away to join the Allies in Algiers. Despite this heroic display, Darlan's authorities refused to clear the *Casabianca* for patrol duty due to some of its officers' ideological leanings. Seizing the opportunity this presented, SOE approached L'Herminier while OSS paid off Darlan's cronies for the use of the submarine.[26]

This deal – whereby the *Casabianca* would carry men, arms and explosives to Europe – facilitated the beginning of the OSS/SOE campaign in Corsica. In mid-December, OSS set up a 'listening post' code-named 'Pearl Harbor' in the north of the island. Manned by several of Darlan's intelligence agents and an OSS officer, it monitored shipping off the Gulf of Lyon and Italian troop movements. Although 'Pearl Harbor' served as an effective bolt-hole and intelligence gathering station, it did not become a regular contact point for funneling arms to the local Resistance. Its failure in this respect was caused by the growing international backlash against the Clark-Darlan agreement: many Corsicans viewed the 'Pearl Harbor' agents' connection to Darlan with distaste. This attitude was a harbinger of further strife. The British-French-American political wrangle that developed in Algiers played even greater havoc with OSS and SOE's 'fifth column' ambitions than the inter-Allied controversy that had gone before.[27]

It was vital for European resistance movements to believe that collaborationist regimes would be overthrown by the Allied armies, otherwise – as events in North Africa soon demonstrated – they would be liable to reprisals. The moral hazard to the Allied cause was extreme. Lord Selborne (the minister responsible for SOE) reported that the Darlan agreement: "produced violent reaction among all our subterranean organizations in enemy occupied countries, particularly in France." Although these sentiments were widely shared by others within the British foreign policy

establishment, AFHQ – particularly Robert Murphy – had decided that Darlan was the indispensable linchpin between Allied Headquarters and the colonial bureaucracy that ran civil affairs in the Maghreb. The chorus of anti-Darlan voices were ignored; AFHQ warned that any Allied agency caught plotting to liquidate the Admiral would be expelled from North Africa.[28]

This decision increased political tensions in the region throughout December, hurt Massingham's nascent program in Corsica, and failed to protect the Admiral. On Christmas Eve, Darlan was accosted and shot to death at close range while returning to his office at the Palais d'Ete in Algiers. The assassin, a young, Gaullist, French Army officer named Fernand Bonnier de la Chapelle, had received weapons training from both OSS and SOE; although neither agency has ever been directly implicated in the assassination scheme. Bonnier, who expected to be hailed as a hero, was summarily executed by a French Army firing squad.[29]

Eisenhower and de Gaulle: A New Landscape for Clandestine Operations, January 1943

Darlan's removal did not lead to a more convivial political atmosphere for the Anglo-American intelligence services in North Africa. At Murphy's suggestion, Roosevelt approved General Giraud's elevation to High Commissioner. Untainted by service in Vichy, Giraud might have chosen to help reconcile anti-German French opinion. As a vain man of reactionary views and little political acumen, however, he was incapable of regarding de Gaulle as anything other than a dissident officer junior to himself. Rejecting friendly overtures from the Free French, Giraud elected to retain Darlan's cadre of Vichy administrators; fascist legislation remained on the books. Tainted by association, the Anglo-American clandestine services – particularly OSS – lost standing with the Resistance.[30]

In the near term, there were even more pressing concerns. General Eisenhower intended to make good on his threat to expel the Allied espionage agencies (both OSS and SOE had given weapons to Bonnier); but it was discovered that the pistol used to kill Darlan had come from a third party. Instead, he was merely enraged: Colonel Munn was declared *persona non grata* and directed to leave North Africa, while Donovan and Brigadier Gubbins were forced to plan personal trips to Algiers in January for damage control.[31]

In early January, General Eisenhower convened a joint meeting with representatives from the Club des Pins and the Villa Magnol. Eddy and Dodds-Parker (who replaced Munn as the Algiers SOE chief) were joined by Donovan and Gubbins for a long *ad hoc* session at the Hotel St. Georges. Eisenhower, who had much more important things on this mind (namely the fierce struggle with Rommel's troops in Tunisia), was tired of the inter-service wrangling. OSS and SOE, he declared, bringing his hands together forcefully for emphasis, must 'work together 100 percent'. OSS was ordered to place its entire organization under 'Massingham' at the Club des Pins.[32]

Donovan was not resigned to the situation. In late January, he arranged for a private repast with Dodds-Parker. After sharing a cordial meal, the Director told Massingham's commander that he had no intention of obeying General Eisenhower's orders. As Dodds-Parker recalled:

> Donovan told me that if he went to the President and told him that he was merely supporting another half a dozen British operations he wouldn't get the support that he would have to get... I fully agreed with that and said that I would do my best to help him to find methods of having wholly American operations...although I realized that I would have to 'carry the can' if things went wrong.

With this agreement, Donovan formalized the understanding that Munn had established with Eddy. There would be an effective pooling of resources under British command. From Washington's perspective, however, OSS would appear to run its own, independent show at the Villa Magnol.[33]

Dodds-Parker acceded to this extraordinary request for personal and practical reasons. He was philosophically inclined to support an increased role for the United States in world affairs, and the younger man revered General Donovan. Yet it was also a rational compromise designed to put 'Massingham' on firmer footing. It reduced OSS/Baker Street friction and promised an increased ability to tap American sources of men, material and expertise.[34]

Bureaucratic infighting drove Donovan's appeal to the 'Massingham' commander. In late December MID's General Strong had officially demanded that JCS fold OSS into his outfit; OSS had barely survived. Now Elmer Davis, head of the Office of War Information (OWI), was manoeuvring to appropriate OSS's foreign propaganda function; Strong waited in the wings to snap-up the remaining 'carcass'.

This new power-play represented a serious political threat to OSS's existence: Davis was a Democrat intimate with many leading figures within FDR's New Deal establishment. As a Republican, Donovan felt threatened. Only by proving that OSS had an effective, independent organization in North Africa could he avoid partisan vultures.[35]

Shortly after Donovan's return to Washington from North Africa in early February, rumours circulated that the President had issued a directive dissolving OSS. Donovan drafted a letter of resignation. The note was never submitted, thanks in part to Dodds-Parker's compromise with OSS. Once again, SOE had defended the short-term interests of 'their man.' In the long run, however, the effectiveness of the Anglo-American secret agencies in the Maghreb depended on how well the Allies could work together in the field.[36]

In this however, they were severely hampered by the on-going conflict between Giraud and General De Gaulle. While Eisenhower brought OSS and SOE together in Algiers, Roosevelt and Churchill had failed to secure similar comity between the French factions during the Allied Casablanca conference. Giraud, who had little understanding of politics, agreed to talk, but de Gaulle was considerably more reluctant, fearing that he might come under pressure to accept a compromise with the Vichyite administration in North Africa. He also objected in principal to discussing purely French matters "in a barbed-wire encampment surrounded by foreign powers." This stance caused the British authorities considerable embarrassment, as Harold Macmillan, His Majesty's political representative in the Magreb, recalled: "Here was our great hero, the winning horse that we had bred and trained in our stable; and when the great day came it refused to run at all." It was only under British pressure that de Gaulle agreed to fly to Casablanca on 22 January, shake hands with Giraud and pledge solidarity. Yet privately "the temperamental lady de Gaulle… [showed] no intention of getting into bed with Giraud" and no real accord was reached.[37]

FDR blamed the whole fiasco on de Gaulle's rampant egoism. "Yesterday he wanted to be Joan of Arc – and now he wants to be a somewhat more worldly Clemenceau." Giraud thus remained entrenched in Algiers with US support. Seemingly chastened, de Gaulle returned to London.[38]

General de Gaulle, however, realized that he had never been in a stronger position. In the darkest days of 1940 he had possessed the imagination to see a future

Europe free of Nazi dominion. This inspirational vision, coupled with a total rejection of the dubious moral compromise represented by Petain, had earned the Free French movement considerable esteem within the Resistance. Initially, a demoralized public in metropolitan France had little sympathy for such idealism. By mid-1942, however, when Laval dispatched the first mass consignment of forced laborers to Germany, sentiment had begun to change. De Gaulle's envoy to the Resistance Jean Moulin – who had been transported to France by SOE – found a receptive audience when he offered guns and guidance through SOE's RF section.[39]

This shift in public opinion, coupled with his rejection of British control at Casablanca, greatly enhanced the legitimacy of his movement. Vichy might have *de jure* authority, but it had become a creature of Germany. Giraud commanded the loyalty of the army in the Maghreb, but he was an American stooge. If the Resistance rallied collectively to the Free French, de Gaulle's movement could claim to legitimately represent the interests of the people. This would allow France a much more powerful voice at Allied councils and perhaps enable her to retain the trappings of great power status during any post-war settlement.[40]

Thus, when de Gaulle returned to London after Casablanca, he immediately made plans for a united resistance council. Writing to former French premier Leon Blum on 10 February 1943, the General claimed that such a body would undermine "attempts at division and confusion attempted by some among the Allies [the United States] with the assistance of French clients [Giraud]." The council would encompass both representatives of the Resistance movements themselves and extant political parties. These new instructions were entrusted to Moulin, who returned to France on 19 March, and conducted a series of clandestine negotiations from late March to mid May 1943. Moulin's efforts convinced the entire spectrum of dissident bodies in France to form a National Resistance Council (CNR) under de Gaulle's leadership. Although the Gestapo captured Moulin shortly afterward in Lyon, he had ensured de Gaulle's gamble paid off. After the CNR's first meeting on 27 May, the Council began to speak for the Resistance; the Resistance had become France.[41]

In the long run, de Gaulle's triumph strengthened the French Resistance and aided the OSS/SOE 'fifth column' effort. During the first four months of 1943, however, his gambit seemed rash and irresponsible. It produced high-level tension between Britain and the United States and further destabilized the political landscape in North Africa. Recruiting French intelligence agents became extremely difficult. In

this context, the increasingly intimate cooperation between OSS and SOE in the field was remarkable. The mutual dependency created by de Gaulle's play reinforced the Anglo-American secret alliance in Algiers.

A School for Spies: The 'Massingham' Mission at the Club des Pins, February-March 1943

By late January 1943 the Club des Pins had shed its frivolous trappings and prepared to host the players of a much deadlier game. The upheavals that followed Admiral Darlan's murder and Munn's expulsion delayed SOE's move from Cap Matifou; at the end of the month only one of the villas was occupied. Captain Michael Gubbins – who had contacts with the Admiral's assassin Bonnier – taught weapons and 'methods of killing' to a small group of potential French recruits.[42]

By February, this sprinkling of men was subsumed in an eclectic deluge of humanity. Dodds-Parker, Keswick and the rest of the SOE command were joined by veteran radio operators from Cap Matifou, representatives of the Giraudist intelligence service and a team of technical sergeant-instructors from Baker Street. Reinforcements also included an initial detail of 12 British First Aid Nursing Yeomanry (FANY) officers that had been personally recruited by Brigadier Gubbins for their W/T skills. They were the vanguard of an increasingly important element at 'Massingham': women would ultimately comprise more than a quarter of the permanent staff – nearly 250 FANYs.[43]

Eddy retained the Villa Magnol as his headquarters, but Donovan's 'understanding' with Dodds-Parker led to a substantial OSS presence at the Club des Pins. A Parachute training company under the command of Major Lucius O. Rucker was in the American vanguard; they claimed the largest chalet adjacent to Dodds-Parker's Villa. Many of the 'apostles' also moved into the base as they followed their agents' progress in training. With the arrival of a large group of Spanish Republican security officers (newly 'liberated' from Darlan's old desert concentration camps by OSS officer Donald Downes), the Club des Pins reflected the diversity of the world coalition against fascism.[44]

Pluralism, however, can also breed discord; cultural misunderstandings often flared at 'Massingham'. That they did not get out of hand was partially attributable to the commandant's sure touch: Dodds-Parker had cut his teeth as a political officer in the Sudan and knew how to deal with obstreperous sniping. Yet real tolerance was

mostly a product of time and shared experience. Even as their leaders jockeyed fiercely for power and political position, the men and women of 'Massingham' laid the foundations for future success in their growing mutual trust and esteem.[45]

The Culture Clash at 'Massingham'

As the officer corps at the Club des Pins underwent a major expansion in February-March, the new arrivals from London and Washington produced a strained atmosphere. Major Peter Murray Lee was dispatched from Baker Street by Gubbins to serve as Massingham's security chief. As soon as he alighted from his jeep in the camp's focused chaos, he was confronted with the distasteful prospect of commanding Downes' escaped "Spanish communists." Lee thought they were like "tiny hens" because they "saluted with a closed fist" and "none of them were more than five feet tall." Now he was expected to turn these exotic, politically suspect midgets into proper British security guards![46]

Lee's biggest headache, however, was dealing with the Americans. Like many of his fellow SOE officers, he was appalled by "the extraordinary agents" recruited by the Villa Magnol, "who had absolutely no chance of survival [behind enemy lines] at all." He attributed these shortcomings to the "terribly green" OSS officer corps – conveniently forgetting the poisonous political conditions the Americans operated under and the enormous advantage SOE enjoyed with long-established agent networks in France (F and RF sections).[47]

The disdain that Lee and other British officers had for OSS was rooted in cultural misunderstanding. One particular incident is telling: in order to establish a convivial social atmosphere between the British and American contingents, Dodds-Parker arranged for a joint soiree at a nearby French restaurant. As Lee remembers it:

> We had this… drunken orgy, but I don't think it really did very much [for inter-service solidarity] because American ways of amusing themselves are not quite the same as English ways [and the Americans] were really rather an unsophisticated lot.

Not all OSS officers were tarred with the same brush. Anglophiles escaped censure, as did exceptional individuals who manifested traditional 'English' traits – a dry sense of humor, appreciation of "classical virtues," respect for authority. Douglas Fairbanks, Jr. (the famous actor) and a few other 'worldly' OSS personnel at

'Massingham' made the standard; but initially the British officer corps functioned as a private club that only a select few were allowed to join.[48]

Many of his American counterparts repaid Lee's scorn in kind. Lieutenant Max Corvo, who came to the Club des Pins as part of the planning team for future Italian operations, was very suspicious of the British. Their controlling instinct was "intolerable" given that this malign influence prevented OSS from establishing a service that "would reflect the principals expressed by [the American] way of life."[49]

If relations within Massingham's Anglo-American officer corps were initially strained, at least the bad blood usually remained hidden beneath the surface. Among the enlisted men a rather *opera bouffa* rivalry developed. Again, cultural crossed-wires played a role; ignorance, drink and youthful naiveté exacerbated the ill will. The young men who did yeoman's tasks at 'Massingham' – construction, maintenance, basic radio (W/T) operations, chauffeur duty – were from working class backgrounds. They had very little experience outside their home countries. Thrust into an exotic land, expected to operate 'hand-in-glove' with foreigners, they were subject to many new temptations – including the urge to lash out at the unfamiliar.

For Harry Hargreaves, a private from the Midlands who had just turned 19, assignment to SOE 'Massingham' offered all sorts of potential diversions. Although there was an occasional German bombing run on Algiers, in the paradisiacal way station of the Club des Pins it was difficult to believe that the war lurked just over the horizon. Hargreaves and many other British soldiers, including his principal mate William Pickering, would amuse themselves by 'pinching plastic explosive' and using it to fish in the cove. The security chief, Major Lee, who feared the ruckus might attract German U-Boats, did not look kindly on this little hobby.[50]

Algiers' ancient Casbah quarter also offered many charms to the nascent orientalist. The strange traditional music of the Magreb and the seductive Arab-Berber women were the subject of much attention; Hargreaves and his credulous confederates were as mesmerized by the North African ephemera as any Victor Hugo or Jean-Leon Gerome. Yet while they shared the fascination of their great European predecessors, they lacked their experience: the ordinary SOE soldier's greatest weakness was not woman or song, but wine. During the early 1940s the nectar of Bacchus was not the common commodity it is today; until his arrival in Algeria the only wine Hargreaves had ever experienced was his mother's Christmas tipple, "Whiteway's English sherry." Algeria, however, was the home of an "easy-sipping"

viniferous tincture the men dubbed 'red bidet'. It was too much for the young Englishmen:

> [I was fond of] that horrible red Bidet. We got our bellyful of this and needless to say, the ones that we picked on was [sic] always the Americans. There was a deadly feud between the British and the Americans as far as being out on the 'razzle' and Algiers was quite a place.

In the hothouse environment of the camp these nocturnal ructions frequently spilled over into the working day. The chief problem was that early in Massingham's history, before the British and Americans had much experience with each other, any little quibble could rapidly spin out of control. Even a silly dispute between soldiers over the proper name for an undershirt – the American 'T-shirt' or British 'vest' – could generate trouble.[51]

Finally, Dodds-Parker had enough. Serious hotheads like Hargreaves and Pickering were thrown in the brig – Harry drew 28 days in the 'cooler' for his various international misdemeanors. The commandant could present carrots with as much aplomb as he wielded the stick, however. When he went out of his way to help assuage tension and clear-up misunderstandings, Dodds-Parker's skill at empathy told. "Douglas' political service… and tact made him a marvelous pourer of oil on troubled waters," Lee observed. William Donovan would have certainly agreed.[52]

As the winter wore on and activity at the Club des Pins settled into a semblance of routine, Dodds-Parker's sure diplomatic touch became less essential. Working together on missions where failure could be deadly, petty rivalries were forgotten. This was well, for the patience of their political masters was not infinite.

Corsica in the Stars: Operational Success at Massingham, March 1943

By early March the Anglo-Americans at 'Massingham' faced great pressure from London and Washington to produce results quickly. France was the most important theatre for subversion and the failure to establish a viable network there from North Africa was both conspicuous and humiliating. In late February the Italians had broken up OSS's small outpost in Corsica, 'Pearl Harbor'. SOE's attempts to establish a viable presence on the island had failed completely; its case officer had committed suicide in prison to prevent the fascists from extracting information under torture.[53]

Just when the Corsican guerilla campaign seemed destined for total disaster, aid arrived via a highly unusual source – an Arabic seer. The commandant of the Algiers gendarmerie, a native Corsican by the name of Paul Colonna d'Istria, had a superstitious streak. Prior to the 'Torch' operation in November he had gone to an astrologer in the city's old quarter for his annual reading. The stargazer informed him that he was destined to make dangerous journeys to his native land during the coming year. At the time this seemed a ridiculous prediction – the island was an easy ferry ride from Algiers. Only after 'Torch', when the Germans occupied Vichy France and the Italians seized Corsica, did the seer's meaning become apparent. In March, the credulous gendarme offered his services to SOE.[54]

Colonna d'Istria was uniquely suited for his self-appointed task. Although no Gaullist (indeed, his position as a police captain under Giraud would have otherwise been untenable) he had small ties with the military regime in the Maghreb. This apolitical stance, coupled with his status as the scion of an old and respected Corsican family, gave him automatic currency with the islanders. Furthermore, his standing as a gendarme and contacts within the Corsican police establishment gave him a superb official cover. At least initially, it would be possible for him to move around relatively freely – and carry weapons openly.[55]

In late March the British submarine *HMS Trident* was detailed to take Colonna to a prearranged estuary on the east coast of Corsica. Met by representatives of the fragmented resistance movement, he disappeared into the rocky, *maquis*-covered hills. Over the course of the next several months, the former lawman forged a powerful 'fifth column' on the island. As the strongest extant Resistance cadre, the communist *Front National* initially served as the movement's hard core. Over time, however, Colonna brought together *maquisards* from across the entire political spectrum – including the indigenous criminal Mafia. The former gendarme became SOE's godfather for the Corsican underground.[56]

OSS played an important role in the campaign. Colonel Robert Pflieger, Eddy's newly appointed deputy for special operations, worked closely with SOE's Jacques de Geulis to ensure Colonna's men had all the arms, money and supplies they needed. It was a tricky task. The island's small size and mountainous terrain made air drops dangerous and the Italian Army was vigilant. *Casabianca*, *Trident* and other British submarines made frequent 'milk runs' for the guerillas. One evening Colonna's party was spotted offloading guns on a beach and only escaped after a wild gun battle with the

carabineiri. On another occasion a patrol flushed Colonna out into a field – only to lose the commandant when he crawled through a herd of goats on his belly. The Anglo-American intelligence services had scored their first major success.[57]

The Corsican campaign became the prototype for effective OSS/SOE operational cooperation in an uncertain political environment. During the early months of 1943 – as the French struggled to contain their bitter divisions, operations in Italy were delayed by the slow Tunisian campaign and Donovan tried to ensure OSS's viability in Washington – cooperation between regional commanders played a key role in fostering the Anglo-American secret alliance. A pragmatic attitude toward cooperation by Eddy and Dodds-Parker helped to contain high-level disputes and finesse political considerations.

Training Agents, Winning Trust

With a transportation shortage and the serious difficulties they faced recruiting prospective agents crippling operations beyond Corsica, necessity forced Dodds-Parker's men to focus on Massingham's other main directive – training men and women for 'fifth column' activities in occupied Europe. Many individuals with the skills to teach this 'tradecraft' were on hand and an increasing number of raw recruits turned up at the base from late March onward. Initially this 'new meat' was composed of Downes' former concentration camp inmates and returnees from SOE's 'Brandon' mission in Tunisia. They were followed by groups of Italian-Americans in April and increasing numbers of Frenchmen from May-June. By chance, the instructors with the greatest expertise in the subjects that would compose the 'curriculum' were divided relatively evenly between OSS and SOE. Thus, cooperation became obligatory.

An informal division of labour emerged. As the dominant military presence in the theater, there were many US personnel available to teach weapons and guerilla tactics; OSS's Major Rucker handled parachute training. SOE had men with years of experience running small boat missions from Gibraltar and infiltrating operatives into German-controlled territory via submarine, so naval instruction came under its purview. Clandestine experience in France and elsewhere in Europe also gave the British an edge vis-à-vis an agent's stock in trade: explosives, 'silent killing', and clandestine communications.

OSS Major Lucius Rucker was the earliest and most enthusiastic proponent of a joint effort on the American side. When the parachute school at the Club des Pins

began operating in February, Rucker worked side by side with his SOE counterpart Major Wooler to produce a viable jumping program. Modeled on the US Army airborne infantry school at Fort Benning, Georgia, it involved ground exercises where the students familiarized themselves with the equipment, learned technique, and otherwise worked to overcome their fear; three live jumps followed. To facilitate the first segment of training, several old aircraft fuselages were dragged into camp. Rucker had the recruits simulate jumps by throwing themselves out of the cabin door utilizing the 'tumbling roll' – designed to help them avoid hurt if they landed on uneven ground. The actual jumps took place from DC-3s based at RAF Blida; the students aimed for sand dunes on the outskirts of the Club des Pins, which were less punishing on the novice paratrooper. Practice drops at night and over water were scheduled for trainees whose missions might require special skills.[58]

Perhaps influenced by Wooler, Rucker adopted a semi-British marking system for his students: first class, second class, or third class (failed). Assessment was based upon formal criteria including technical skill, a written exam and attitude aboard the airplane. The forthright American did not stop there, though. He also went out of his way to critique the men's more ephemeral qualities: capacity for leadership, courage, resourcefulness and determination. Rucker's 'report cards' to Colonel Eddy were sometimes laced with caustic comments on a student's laziness, stupidity, fear, or inability to connect with the rest of the team. "Untrustworthy" was the ultimate opprobrium. Conversely, he went out of his way to cite those with a special "capacity for leadership" or an otherwise beneficial effect on the rest of the team. These additional observations, designed to weed out men unsuited to the exigencies of life as a secret agent, were soon adopted by the other 'Massingham' trainers.[59]

Rucker's outfit became the most conspicuously successful OSS training section at the Club des Pins. The Americans also contributed several instructors in weapons and irregular warfare. Classes addressed the efficient use of knives, effective ambush techniques, and how to use captured German or Italian firearms. When prospective operatives had mastered several disciplines their knowledge was tested through war games.[60]

On the night of 18 March the entire camp was rousted from bed by a massive explosion. Fortunately for Major Lee, the bedlam was not caused by shells from a German submarine: a training operation had 'attacked' the Club des Pins. At dusk a combined British-American team had parachuted into Massingham's dune perimeter,

gone to ground until nightfall, and then advanced to screen the "enemy" camp from its "ammunition dump" (a large piece of scrap metal hidden in some trees). A two-man patrol was then dispatched to destroy the target – to spectacular effect. The password-exchange the "agents" used to mark their return to base was a whispered 'VIVRE' answered by 'LA FRANCE'.[61]

The SOE course in "small boat landings" completed a new recruit's basic training. Founded by the ubiquitous Michael Gubbins and refined under Captain Andrew Croft, it involved learning to pilot small boats from an offshore ship or submarine to a beach without attracting enemy attention. This sounds much easier on paper than it was in practice. The collapsible canoes (or folboats) that were kept for this purpose by the Royal Navy's submarines were awkward, unsteady little tubs and the containers of arms the men carried with them weighed hundreds of pounds. Moreover, the presence of shoals often meant the supply submarine had to disgorge the men several miles from shore; none of the folboats carried outboard motors because of the noise. Croft emphasized to his students how hazardous this made landing in the face of tide, rocks, or bad surf; efficient paddling and teamwork could mean the difference between successful contact with the Resistance's "reception committee" on the beach and a watery grave.[62]

Trainees who survived the Rucker-Croft gauntlet of technical assessment and close personal evaluation were given advanced instruction in special operations by SOE. British Army Captains Milner and Hoggart established themselves at another of the vacant chalets in camp. Adjacent to this structure (where classes were conducted under conditions of maximum security) a Nissen hut was erected, dubbed 'The Museum', and endowed with a collection of spy paraphernalia. This included displays of itching powder for distracting Nazi guards and a silenced, single-shot .22 caliber pistol that could fit under the ring finger. When the victim leaned forward to shake hands with the agent, the 'stinger' would be discharged into his heart.[63] The Milner-Hoggart team also handled formal training in explosives. Students were taught how to handle the standard tools of sabotage: limpet mines designed to destroy ships and plastic explosive that could be molded into railroad tracks. Much time, however, was also spent teaching how to improvise bombs from ordinary ingredients. If OSS and SOE had difficulty supplying their agents in the field, these crude explosives might allow the men to complete their missions.[64]

Exotic weapons, stealthy forms of transport and bomb-making skill are renowned aspects of a spy's 'tradecraft'. Yet as Sun Tzu realized 2500 years ago, simple information is the most vital element of espionage. Thus, the largest SOE training section was devoted to cipher communications with agents in the field – and many of the instructors involved were FANYs.

An agent's lifeline was his portable radio. With it he could report on the status of his mission, request additional supplies (via submarine or air-drop), or abort and request 'extraction' from enemy territory. Without it he was essentially helpless; barring aid from indigenous resistance forces it was unlikely his comrades would ever see him again. Operating a radio from Nazi occupied Europe was an incredibly dangerous task. By 1943 the Gestapo had sophisticated direction-finding equipment, which meant that broadcasting from the same location for too long invited capture and death. Messages to 'Massingham' had to be brief and unobtrusive: furtive transmissions on prearranged frequencies at odd hours. They also had to be powerfully enciphered to befuddle eavesdroppers.[65]

The task of receiving, rapidly deciphering and replying to these often desperate communiqués fell upon Massingham's cipher corps at the Club des Pins. This tight-knit group included some men, but was mostly composed of a dedicated, meticulous group of FANY technicians. It was arduous work. Incoming messages had to be received in Morse code, decrypted, analyzed, and reported to the responsible country section officers for action. Any reply would then be broken down, enciphered, translated back into Morse and transmitted to the field. Error or delay could mean the loss of many lives. During periods when incoming radio traffic was intense FANYs would sleep next to their radios.[66]

Mastering the technical aspects of enciphered Morse code was difficult enough; but the art of recognizing an agent's personal coding was also crucially important. When the Gestapo overran a SOE unit 'in country' they would usually attempt to 'turn' the W/T operator (through torture) or have one of their own officers use the captured cipher-key books to simulate the agent's presence. Additional men and supplies that were sent to a network 'gone bad' met a gruesome fate. In this case, only the skill of the radio operator could avert disaster. Former SOE FANY officer Peggy Widgery recalled that the idiosyncrasies of an operative's individual Morse messages were almost "like a style of writing." If something 'didn't seem quite right' about an agent's "signature" their responses would be "tested" to make sure there

wasn't a German fly in the ointment. Eventually the need for W/T FANYs adept at this advanced technique became so great that a special advanced class was created at the Club des Pins.[67]

Partners?

Several months of close proximity, determined work and shared hardships produced a sea change in Massingham's environment. Old squabbles between the Anglo-Americans were forgotten as both sides faced up to the enormity of the collective task. The Club des Pins had a unique capacity to foster solidarity in this respect: it was the only area in the world where OSS and SOE members underwent training, planned missions, and communicated with their colleagues in the field as an integrated unit. One particularly striking incident recalled by Major Lee is illustrative.

> I remember one appalling evening when all the FANY wireless operators, and quite a lot of the male staff of all ranks were watching practice jumps. One wretched chap…did what they called a 'roman candle' – the slipstream [made] a [mess] of the parachute cords and the parachute…[knotted] in the cords. You go straight down. Even though he was going straight into the sand dunes he was killed outright. It was… pretty grisly, that.

In such an atmosphere it became nearly impossible to maintain extraneous cultural or social animosity. Even American peanut butter began to taste better to the SOE contingent. By early May Massingham had become a *de facto* joint operation.[68]

Shortly thereafter William Donovan formally recognized a new, openly collaborative approach to Anglo-American clandestine operations from North Africa. The trigger came from OSS Special Operations chief Ellery Huntington, who complained on 5 May that SOE had failed to ensure that to "*all outward appearances*, at least, we would have the semblance of [independently] handling and directing certain small organizations on the continent [from North Africa]." This was, in fact, the same issue that Donovan and Stephenson had fought over with Hambro. Huntington wanted to know if he should "force the issue" again with Baker Street. The Director said no. In his reply to Huntington he emphasized that "I don't think that we want to keep stressing these questions with [SOE] indefinitely. Besides, we can take it up directly with Bill Stephenson and not conduct ourselves so that it would

create suspicion in the minds of our [British] colleagues." The desire to secure operational independence for OSS was still there, but Donovan had moderated his hard-line stance against a subordinate role for his agency in the near term. Instead he would bide his time, and look for a more opportune moment in which to make a bid for independence and authority.[69]

Donovan's change of heart on this issue was attributable to OSS's firmer political standing in Washington. In late April he had emerged victorious from his internecine battles with MID and OWI. The position of OSS within the JCS structure had been regularized; the Director had been promoted to Brigadier General in early March. From this stronger position, Donovan could compromise with the British on joint operations without giving the appearance of weakness within the Washington bureaucracy.[70]

The new American policy came at an auspicious time. In May 1943 de Gaulle was in the final stages of uniting the French Resistance under his banner; the General would arrive in Algiers himself on the 30th. With his return, the Anglo-American clandestine services began to have a much easier time dealing with the *Maquis* from North Africa. Likewise, the deluge of Italian-American recruits that flooded the Club des Pins offered the possibility of fostering subversive activities in Italy.[71]

More than any other single factor, however, it was the experience of OSS/SOE relations since 'Torch' that laid the groundwork for the future success of Anglo-American work with the European 'fifth column.' The Hambro-Stephenson decision to help foster OSS through its difficult winter teething period in Washington; and Donovan's pragmatic understanding with Eddy and Dodds-Parker help to get the relationship up on its feet. The true basis for cooperation, however, was forged through many individual friendships at Massingham.

Conclusion

The secret 'special relationship' between the United States and Great Britain was inaugurated at the highest political levels – through a personal understanding between the President and the Prime Minister over the sharing of signals intelligence in August-September 1940. The two chief executives later broadened this collaboration to encompass special operations and took a personal hand in fostering the early stages. Yet, close cooperation in a field as sensitive as intelligence requires more than a simple directive from on high: the overall relationship had to be built

through a series of small steps, as people connected to each other and began to establish an individual rapport with colleagues.[72]

Activities in French North Africa were an essential part of this process for OSS and SOE. During the six-month period from operation 'Torch' (November 1942) through de Gaulle's arrival in Algiers (May 1943) the Anglo-American secret warfare agencies experienced one frustrating failure after another. Martin Thomas rightly points out that SOE's 'Massingham' officers – particularly Major Keswick – initially resented having to cooperate with OSS because America's alliance with Darlan hurt their standing with the French underground. Indeed, as we have seen, these differences went deeper than an overt dispute over policy – there were also strong undercurrents of cultural friction. OSS and SOE were able to overcome these issues and transform 'Massingham' into a success because, as Jay Jakob's work reveals, the top brass at Baker Street decided that preserving Donovan's political viability in Washington was worth sacrificing short-term operational efficiency in Algiers. Charles Hambro's intelligent compromise on this issue, and Douglas Dodds-Parker's diplomatic leadership on the ground, helped to ensure that near-term political tension did not jeopardize Massingham's eventual success. The close personal contacts that began in this often-poisonous environment eventually provided a fertile ground for trust – over time it blossomed into an effective partnership.[73]

In May 1943, when Donovan gave his blessing to closer OSS/SOE integration in the field and the French began to escape from their political quagmire, the framework of confidence that had been established at 'Massingham' was put to the test. While the number of secret operations launched from the Club des Pins during the preceding six months can be calculated on one hand, over the course of the next year 'Massingham' became perhaps the most active OSS/SOE base in the world outside Britain. By the autumn of 1944, the Algerian 'Club' had played a major role in the liberation of Corsica, facilitated the secret armistice negotiations that led to the Italian surrender in September 1943, helped pave the way for the ANVIL landings in the south of France and instigated several massive guerilla uprisings behind Axis lines. Moreover, it set the precedent for the increasingly close Anglo-American secret intelligence relationship that developed on a global scale. It is difficult to imagine that the 'Jedburgh' program of 1944 – where integrated commando teams composed of American, British and French officers were parachuted into France prior to the invasion of Normandy – would have been possible without the North African

experience of 1943. Amicable personal relationships on the ground helped relieve tensions created by subsequent OSS-SOE competition for authority.[74]

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[1] In May 1944 'Massingham' and other regional OSS elements were merged to form the Special Projects Operation Centre (SPOC). See M.R.D. Foot, *SOE in France: An Account of the Work of the British Special Operations Executive in France, 1940-1944* (London: HMSO, 1966) p.32; Captain Jacky Porter, FANY, *The History of MASSINGHAM* (Unpublished: 15 September 1945), part I, p.3, HS 7/169 – Mistakenly filed as the *History of SOE in Corsica*, with cover letter, notes, and appendices; Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker, Reel 2, SOE Oral History Collection, Imperial War Museum, Lambeth, London (hereafter abbreviated IWMOH).

[2] Jay Jakob, *Spies and Saboteurs: Anglo-American Collaboration and Rivalry in Human Intelligence Collection and Special Operations, 1940-1945* (London: Macmillan, 1999) pp.74-79; Martin Thomas, 'The Massingham Mission: SOE in French North Africa, 1941-1944', *Intelligence and National Security* 11/4 (1996) pp.696-721; Porter, *Massingham*, HS 7/169.

[3] Thomas, 'Massingham,' p.717; John Dumbrell outlines a strong case in this regard, as in John Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After.* (London: Macmillan, 2001) p.2.

[4] Bradley F. Smith, *The Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins of the CIA* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1983) pp.165-167.

[5] Thomas Troy, *Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency* (Frederick, Maryland: Aletheia Books, 1981) pp.179-199.

[6] William J.M. Mackenzie, *The Secret History of SOE: The Special Operations Executive, 1940-1945* (St. Ermin's Press, 2000) pp.391-392; Porter, *Massingham*, part I, p.1, HS 7/169.

[7] Mackenzie (note 11) p.405; R. Harris Smith, *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Intelligence Agency* (New York: Delta, 1972) p.242.

[8] Bickham Sweet-Escott, *Baker Street Irregular* (London: Methuen, 1965) pp.138-139.

[9] Thomas Troy, *Wild Bill and Intrepid: Donovan, Stephenson and the Origin of CIA* (London: Yale, 1996) pp.62-132.

[10] Jakob, *Spies and Saboteurs*, pp.74-79.

[11] Cipher Telegram from New York to London, G [Stephenson] to CD [Hambro], 10 November 1942, HS 3/56; Cipher Telegram from Washington to London, GM [Pleydell-Bouverie] to CD [Hambro], 10 November 1942, HS 3/56; Sweet-Escott, *Baker Street*, pp.139-140.

[12] Cipher Telegram from London to New York, CD [Hambro] to G [Stephenson], 11 November 1942, HS 3/56.

[13] Ibid; Cipher Telegram from London to New York, CD [Hambro] to G [Stephenson], 14 November 1942, HS 3/56; Letter from D/CD(O) [Gubbins] to CD [Hambro], 23 November 1942, HS 3/56.

[14] Jakob, *Spies and Saboteurs*, p.79; Letter from AM [unidentified] to D/CD(O) [Gubbins], circa 23 November 1942, HS 3/56.

[15] Julian Jackson, *France: The Dark Years, 1940-1944* (Oxford: Oxford, 2001) pp.178-180; Robert Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1964) p.128.

[16] Jackson, *Dark Years*, pp.224-225.

[17] Arthur Layton Funk, *The Politics of TORCH: The Algiers Landings and the Allied Putsch, 1942* (New York, Kansas University Press, 1969) pp.246-248.

[18] Porter, *Massingham*, part I, p.2, HS 7/169.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid. p.6.

[21] For more on Munn's experiences at the secret camp in Oshawa see David Stafford, *Camp X: Canada's School for Secret Agents, 1941-45* (London: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1986).

[22] Douglas Dodds-Parker, *Political Eunuch* (London: Springwood Books, 1986), p.xiv, 25, 33; Interview with the author, 7 January 2002.

[23] Sweet-Escott, *Baker Street*, pp.138-140; Porter, *Massingham*, part I, p.6, HS 7/169. Cap Matifou continued to serve as an administrative centre until all SOE facilities were moved to the Club des Pins on 17 February 1943.

[24] Ibid. part I, p.4.

[25] JCS 170 and JCS 155/4/D, HS 3/56.

[26] Sir F. Brooks Richards, reel 9, SOE Oral History Collection, IWMOH.

[27] F. Brooks Richards, *Secret Flotillas: The Clandestine Sea Lines to France and French North Africa 1940-1944* (London: HMSO, 1996) pp.598-607; Arthur Layton Funk, 'The OSS in Algiers,' in *The*

Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II George C. Chalou, ed. (Washington, DC: NARA, 1992) pp.168-169.
[28] Lord Selborne quoted in Arthur Layton Funk, "American Contacts With the Resistance in France, 1940-1943," *Military Affairs* vol. 34, issue 1 (February 1970) p.18; David Stafford, *Churchill and Secret Service* (London: Abacus, 2000) p.292.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Jackson, *Dark Years*, p.448; Porter, *Massingham*, Part III, p.1, HS 7/169
[31] R. Harris Smith, *Shadow Warriors*, p.64.
[32] Jakob, *Spies and Saboteurs*, pp.78-79.
[33] Quoted in ibid. p.79.
[34] Douglas Dodds-Parker, *Setting Europe Ablaze: An Account of Some Ungentlemanly Warfare* (London: Springwood Books, 1984) p.124.
[35] Troy, *Donovan and CIA*, pages 196-199.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945* (Oxford, 1995) p.377; Harold Macmillan, *The Blast of War 1939-1945* (Macmillan, 1967) p.248.
[38] Dallek, *FDR*, p.378.
[39] Maurice Agulhon, *The French Republic 1879-1992* trans. Antonia Neville (Blackwell, 1990) p.287; Jackson, *Dark Years*, pp.442-446.
[40] Agulhon, *French Republic*, p.259.
[41] Ibid. pp.455-456.
[42] Porter, *Massingham*, part I, p.6, HS 7/169.
[43] Ibid; Peter Wilkinson and Joan Bright Astley, *Gubbins and SOE* (London: Leo Cooper, 1999), p.96; Dodds-Parker, reel 2, IWMOH.
[44] Porter, *Massingham*, part VI, p.3, HS 7/169.
[45] Dodds-Parker, reel 2, IWMOH.
[46] Major Peter Murray Lee, reel 6, SOE Oral History Collection, IWMOH.
[47] Ibid. reel 7.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Max Corvo, *The OSS in Italy, 1942-1945, A Personal Memoir* (New York: Praeger, 1990) p.18, 39, 49.
[50] Timothy Pickering, reel 2, SOE Oral History Collection, IWMOH; Lee, reel 7, IWMOH.
[51] Harry Hargreaves, reel 2, SOE Oral History Collection, IWMOH.
[52] Ibid; Lee, reel 7, IWMOH.
[53] Richards, *Secret Flotillas*, pp.629-630.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid. Richards, reel 9, IWMOH; Dodds-Parker, *Ablaze*, pp.152-155.
[56] Richards, reel 9, IWMOH.
[57] Funk, 'OSS in Algiers,' p.169; Richards, reel 9, IWMOH.
[58] Porter, *Massingham*, part VI, pp.3-4, HS 7/169; Hargreaves, reel 2, IWMOH.
[59] Training Report on Tenth Parachute Course [to Eddy and Dodds-Parker] 28 May 1943, NARA RG 226, Entry 210, Box 128, Folder 1.
[60] During the summer Rucker requested an official 'parachute school' syllabus from the US Army and formalized the process. By the end of 1943 he was instructing up to three groups of 20 men *per week*. Syllabus of Parachute School for The Director, Office of Strategic Services, Washington, DC [for Algiers] 28 July 1943; Subject: Aircraft for Operations, from Rucker to Eddy, 4 August 1943, NARA RG 226, Entry 190, Box 90, Folder 26.
[61] Night Exercise, Thursday, 18 March [1943], NARA RG 226, Entry 190, Box 90, Folder 26.
[62] Report on Boat Training Carried out on Behalf of OSS [by Captain Andrew Croft] 18 August 1943, NARA RG 226, entry 97, box 12, folder 221.
[63] OSS Weapons Manual 1943, NARA RG 226, entry 97, box 12, folder 211; Porter, *Massingham*, part VI, pp.1-2, HS 7/169.
[64] Ibid.
[65] SOE and OSS used a 'one-time pad' cipher system. See David Stafford, *Camp X: Canada's School for Secret Agents, 1941-45* (London: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1986).
[66] Dodds-Parker, reel 2, IWMOH; Peggy Widgery, interview with the author.
[67] Porter, *Massingham*, part VI, pp.5-6, HS 7/169; Margaret Harvey-Cope (Peggy Widgery), reel 2, SOE Oral History Collection, IWMOH.
[68] Lee, reel 7, IWMOH; Audrey Rothwell, reel 1, SOE Oral History Collection, IWMOH.

[69] Huntington to Director: Handling of Agents in the Field, William Donovan, Director's Files, box 13, reel 97, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge; Donovan to Huntington: Interoffice Memo, 7 May 1943, Director's Files, box 13, reel 97.
[70] Troy, *Donovan and CIA*, pp.207-208.
[71] Jackson, *Dark Years*, p.458.
[72] Bradley F. Smith, *The Ultra-Magic Deals: And the Most Secret Special Relationship, 1940-1946* (New York: Presidio, 1993) pp.46-47; Stafford, *Secret Service*, p.234.
[73] Thomas, 'Massingham' p.708.
[74] Porter, *Massingham*, parts I-V.

Chapter 3, The Armistice 'Monkey' Business: British Intelligence and the Surrender of Italy, November 1942 - September 1943

Anglo-American Policymakers, Intelligence and the Reluctant Move toward Armistice with Italy

The Anglo-American intelligence agencies based around Algiers had a significant role in the collapse of the Mussolini regime and the subsequent surrender of the Badoglio government. These events allowed the leaders of 'Massingham' to play a prominent part in a high political controversy. Tracing the history of these events from their perspective helps shed new light on the power and limitations of intelligence. In particular, the circumstances that led to the Italian 'secret surrender' show how easy it is for policymakers to ignore or misinterpret good intelligence when it does not fit their political agenda.

The Allies' twenty-month campaign in Italy from 1943 to 1945 has little standing in the Anglo-American popular consciousness. In Britain, the struggle of the "few" against desperate odds in 1940 dominates public memory and mythos. In America 'D-Day' – the 1944 invasion of Normandy – occupies a similar position. The fighting that followed the Allied landings on mainland Italy in September 1943 is a neglected stepchild: remembered, but hardly celebrated. It was a slow, bloody slog in a secondary theatre, a throwback to the siege warfare of the Western Front from 1914-1918. Among scholars, however, this incongruity has inspired a bleak fascination.

Revisionist historians have long questioned the strategic necessity of the campaign. Of late, the scramble to conclude an armistice with Rome prior to the Anglo-American landings at Salerno on 8 September has become the focus of critical attention. Richard Lamb argues that the near-failure of invasion Salerno (operation 'Avalanche'), the confused eleventh-hour armistice, and the Allies' inability to coordinate their battle plans with the Italian government, surrendered the tactical initiative to Germany. With this advantage, the Wehrmacht transformed the Apennines into a crucible of death for Allied forces.[1]

Until now, intelligence historians have contributed little to the debate over the War in Italy, and no official history of British clandestine activities there has been published. Yet, poor intelligence analysis played a role in the Allied failure to secure

an early armistice with Italy, which hindered the subsequent campaign. Newly released British and American archival sources suggest that the British Foreign Office and Whitehall's senior intelligence body (the Joint Intelligence Committee, or JIC) share much of the responsibility for the armistice fiasco.[2]

The Foreign Office was guilty of an overweening, unrealistic determination to make Rome accept a punitive peace. Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden pushed for the imposition of "unconditional surrender" in Italy, long after it became obvious that the Allies lacked the military means to force the issue. Eden's policy was rooted in an understandable desire to avoid provoking the Soviets by treating with Marshal Badoglio's government (which ousted Mussolini on 25 July 1943). Yet, by leading the War Cabinet to assume an inflexible stance on armistice terms with Rome – against the better judgment of Winston Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff – he may have paved the way to a bloody stalemate on the peninsula.

There were other options. The Foreign Office could have co-ordinated Mussolini's ouster through the Special Operations Executive's (SOE) high-level Italian contacts, and offered a successor government the prospect of lighter armistice conditions in exchange for military assistance. Instead, Eden clung to the "unconditional surrender" doctrine after the Duce's fall and ignored Rome's initial attempts to reach an accommodation with the Allies in August 1943.[3]

Eden's Italian policy was abetted by the JIC. In late April the JIC predicted that the German Army was "likely to abandon Italy to her fate and hold defensively on the Brenner" (i.e., along Italy's old border with Austria). The JIC maintained this latter assessment throughout the summer of 1943; as late as 3 August it advised the War Cabinet that the Germans were materially incapable of occupying Italy south of the River Po. If the JIC was correct, it was unlikely that the Wehrmacht would intervene, and Eden could afford to ignore peace feelers from Rome.[4]

But the JIC was wrong about Hitler's plans for Italy. The Germans never considered abandoning Italy in the face of an anti-Mussolini coup or Allied invasion; by mid-May they had developed a plan to seize control of the country. The human intelligence resources of SOE and the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) uncovered evidence to this effect, and were ignored. Instead, the Committee based its assessments on ambiguous – and frequently contradictory – signals intelligence gleaned through the 'Ultra' system. Historians often depict 'Ultra' intelligence as a

virtually infallible, war-winning Allied resource. The JIC's failure to understand the Wehrmacht's plans for Italy in 1943 shows this was not always the case.[5]

The British government's Italian policy did not go unchallenged. Opposition to the Foreign Office line was led by two groups who favored a negotiated settlement with Rome: SOE (particularly SOE at 'Massingham') and General Dwight Eisenhower's Anglo-American planning staff at Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ) in Algiers. SOE and AFHQ used their own intelligence sources to attack the JIC's assessments. Confronted by competing versions of the truth, Roosevelt and Churchill hesitated, lost a crucial opportunity to come to an understanding with the new Badoglio regime in early August, and thereby ensured that 'Avalanche' would not produce a strategic breakthrough.

The consequences of Allied policy paralysis might have been much worse if SOE and AFHQ had not improvised last-minute secret negotiations with the Badoglio government. The story of this operation – code-named 'Monkey' – is told in second half of this chapter. 'Monkey' ensured that the Carabinieri did not fight alongside the Wehrmacht at Salerno and produced the bloodless surrender of the Italian fleet. Yet it did not bring about near-term military cooperation with the Italian Army or prevent the Germans from occupying most of the peninsula. The frantic 'Monkey' effort, led by the Anglo-American intelligence establishment outside Algiers, came too late.[6]

Through a narrative of the ten-month policy debate that preceded the armistice agreement in September 1943, this chapter will show how an unwieldy political compromise and poor intelligence analysis combined to hinder the Allied invasion of Italy. The "unconditional surrender" doctrine became a political luxury in the face of changing military conditions. Powerful individuals and agencies with a stake in the armistice issue marshaled intelligence to support their preferred policies. Contradictory information was ignored – or suppressed.

The View from Whitehall: Allied War Aims, SOE-sponsored Subversion and Italy, November 1942 to January 1943

In August 1942, SOE made contact with a group of high-ranking Italian military officers and anti-fascist civilians, including Marshal Pietro Badoglio, a First World War hero who retained some popular esteem. SOE channels, which involved occasional secret meetings in Bern through the auspices of agents code-named 'Volp' and 'Brown,' offered the possibility of coordinated action with a nascent anti-

Mussolini coalition. These subversive groups were potentially useful tools – but by late November sentiment in Whitehall ran against their use.[7]

Powerful members of the Government were opposed to encouraging subversive activities in Italy or offering the Italian people the prospect of a separate peace. Opposition to these schemes was strongest within the Foreign Office. Many, including Eden, had vivid memories of the humiliation Italy inflicted on Britain during the late 1930s and the perfidy of its behavior in the spring of 1940. They were not inclined toward a compromise armistice, even if this concession could help topple Mussolini. Others objected to the idea on practical grounds, convinced that the Duce's position was still too strong for a coup to succeed. Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Foreign Office's powerful Permanent Secretary, confided as much to his diary on 14 November.

> Talk with A. [Eden] and others about 'getting Italy out of the war.' This, as much as 'getting Turkey into the War' (P.M.'s pet scheme), a complete chimaera.

The Prime Minister's own opinion was more equivocal. In late November Churchill told the War Cabinet that Allied propaganda should encourage an "internal convulsion" in favor of a new government and emphasize to the Italian people "one man is the cause of your sufferings – Mussolini." Yet the Allies "had no obligation to offer terms to the vanquished" and should eschew making "promises" to Italian dissidents in return for future aid against Germany.[8]

During early December resistance to SOE's Italian plots strengthened due to political fallout from the Anglo-American invasion of French North Africa (operation 'Torch'). In order to bring the fighting between Allied troops and French forces loyal to Marshal Petain to a halt, on 12 November US Major-General Mark Clark had agreed to a deal with the Vichy Commander-in-Chief (and former premier) Admiral Jean Darlan. In exchange for a cease-fire and a pledge of co-operation against German forces, Darlan was named High Commissioner for French North Africa. While this compromise prevented many senseless casualties on both sides, it caused widespread public revulsion in Britain and the United States. The notion that Darlan, a man guilty of abetting the creation of Hitler's 'New Order' in Europe, should retain power under the aegis of Allied authority was difficult to justify. The prospect of a similar bargain with fascist-tainted Italian officials, regardless of the military dividends that might follow, was greeted with great distaste.[9]

In this inauspicious environment, SOE continued to nurture its Italian agents, confident of an eventual breakthrough. At the close of the year this patient approach paid off: Marshal Badoglio informed his British contact that he was prepared to send an emissary to discuss secret co-operation with the Allies. The man selected, a staff officer named General Pesenti, would fly to Africa for a secret conference with Anglo-American representatives. SOE's executive director (or 'CD'), Sir Charles Hambro, and the chief of its Italian Desk, Major Roseberry, thought the operation (code named 'Izzara') would constitute a major blow to Mussolini's authority. Among other schemes, Badoglio envisioned recruiting an anti-fascist army from the enormous mass of Italian prisoners captured by the Allies in North Africa.[10]

Hambro could not give 'Izzara' the green light, however, without permission from his political masters. Stifling his personal dislike for what he deemed to be the Foreign Office's propensity for bureaucratic obfuscation, Hambro submitted the 'Izzara' proposal on 7 January. The plan, so promising in Baker Street, was greeted coldly in Whitehall. The political entanglements it promised were unwelcome, and its timing was terrible. Most importantly, it threatened to derail Eden's hard line on non-negotiation with the Italians.[11]

While professing an open mind to CD, the Foreign Secretary maneuvered to have 'Izzara' quashed. Although he received notice of the plan from SOE in plenty of time for the War Cabinet's scheduled meeting on 11 January, and plainly understood its import, he chose to sit on the document. The Foreign Office informed Hambro's deputy Brigadier Colin Gubbins that for the moment it was "physically impossible" to present 'Izzara' to the Cabinet. Yet 'Izzara' was under urgent time pressure and did not involve any commitment to the Italians beyond a pledge not to shoot down General Pasenti's plane on its way to Cyrenaica. The Prime Minister might have seen the plan as a free opportunity to encourage resistance to Mussolini. When SOE's proposal was finally given a delayed hearing ten days later, Churchill was conveniently absent. 'Izzara' was "emphatically" rejected. The War Cabinet declared that Pasenti was welcome to surrender to the Allied authorities in Libya, but travel there would be "at his own risk."[12]

The Foreign Secretary's hostility to 'Izzara' was rooted in his personal antipathy toward negotiations of any kind with Italy. Other Whitehall mandarins questioned its necessity. With the British government consumed by preparations to pitch its preferred Mediterranean military strategy to the Americans at the upcoming

Casablanca conference, this indifferent response to SOE's schemes was understandable. If the United States dedicated enough men and material to a prospective invasion of Italy and the Balkans, a negotiated settlement with Rome would be rendered unnecessary. The Allies could simply impose their political will by force of arms. Ensuring America shared Britain's military priorities was essential for the success of the Foreign Office's hard-line Italian policy.

An Imperfect Compromise: the "Unconditional Surrender" Doctrine and Italy

From 14 to 24 January, the Prime Minister and Chiefs of Staff met with Franklin Roosevelt and the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) at Casablanca to discuss military strategy. The British were determined to forestall American plans that favored a massive cross-channel invasion of France. To this end, General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), deployed a three-pronged argument.

> I wanted first to ensure that Germany should [continue to have priority over the war against Japan]. Secondly that for the present Germany can best be attacked through the medium of Italy in the Mediterranean, and thirdly that this can be best achieved with a policy directed against Sicily.

Brooke and his cohorts, who had spent weeks assembling evidence to prove that a full-scale landing in France would be impossible in 1943, won the day. The political fallout from this decision formalized the Foreign Office's hard-line stance on negotiations with Italy: the doctrine of "unconditional surrender."[13]

Roosevelt and Churchill knew that Stalin would be enraged to discover that the Anglo-Americans were postponing the establishment of a major second front, and might suspect treachery – perhaps even a "separate peace" with Germany along the lines of the Darlan deal. To mollify the Soviets, the two leaders committed themselves "to pursue the war to the bitter end, neither party relaxing its efforts until the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan had been achieved." Churchill, as we have seen, did not favor the application of this policy to Italy, and sought permission from the War Cabinet for an exception aimed at encouraging "a break-up there." They advised against it. Lacking support from either FDR or his Cabinet colleagues, the Prime Minister compromised. The doctrine was left off the final Casablanca press release, but on 24 January the President made a "spontaneous"

declaration to the press that peace could only be achieved through the "unconditional surrender of Germany, Italy and Japan."[14]

FDR's formulation precluded all negotiation with the enemy powers; 'Izzara' seemed well and truly buried. Yet the American commitment to the application of "unconditional surrender" in Italy was less than ironclad. The President's views were more malleable than they seemed and some members of the administration – particularly the Secretary of State – were resolutely opposed to the policy. In Britain, SOE lobbied against "unconditional surrender" and Churchill was uncomfortable with the political straightjacket it created.[15]

The most significant threat to the Foreign Office's tough stance on Italy, however, was embedded in the strategic compromise between the Allied top brass. While the Americans had agreed to give precedence to Mediterranean operations for the time being, they retained plans for a major assault on France. The build-up of forces in Britain for this audacious enterprise continued and the JCS did not consent to an all-out assault on Italy beyond Sicily. Without the total commitment of the US military, it would be difficult for the Allies to impose their political will in Italy by force – particularly if the Wehrmacht took a hand. There was a real danger that the Foreign Office's political goals – particularly the application of "unconditional surrender" in Italy – might become hostage to military priorities.[16]

In this context, accurate intelligence on the state of the Mussolini regime and German intentions in Italy became all-important. Even if Mussolini fell, the Italians might not be capable of surrender if the Germans intervened militarily. Therefore, after Casablanca the forum for debate over Italian policy shifted from the Anglo-American political leadership to the intelligence community.

The Secret Debate: Signals Intelligence, Human Intelligence and the Dispute over Britain's Approach to Italy, February to May 1943

During the six-month period preceding Mussolini's fall in late July, the British government found itself in an increasingly awkward position. The Casablanca declaration apparently disavowed a compromise peace with Italy. Yet the US JCS was reluctant to divert men to the Mediterranean from the pool of troops earmarked for cross-channel operations in France. This made the Anglo-American commanders who were plotting the Italian campaign uneasy: without overwhelming force it would be difficult to dictate terms to Rome. If the Germans chose to defend the peninsula, it

might become impossible. Therefore, as Allied forces consolidated gains in North Africa, pushed into Tunisia, and prepared for the invasion of Sicily, military leaders demanded a more pragmatic policy on negotiations with the Italians. Meanwhile the Foreign Office, conscious of its commitment to the Americans and Soviets on "unconditional surrender" and pleased by the public reception of its hard-line policy in Britain, was equally determined to enforce the ban on talks. Timely, properly interpreted intelligence might have tipped the political balance away from Eden's line, but it was not forthcoming. Instead, the British Intelligence establishment became mired in a dispute over German intentions and the attitude the government should take toward the Italians. The debate may have cost the Allies a chance to avoid the bloody campaign that ensued.

SOE fired the first shot in this internecine battle by refusing to allow 'Izzara' to die quietly. Most of the Baker Street brass thought that the government had made an honest mistake, but some officers in 'J' (Italian) Section nursed a deeper sense of resentment. Agents had risked their lives on mission that had been swept under the rug. One offended officer was certain that the plan had failed because "left wing members [of the War Cabinet] could not agree to negotiations with effete Italian aristocrats [Badoglio]." Such latent anger, and an appeal from Brigadier Gubbins, convinced Hambro to lobby the government for a second hearing.[17]

CD's petition was successful thanks to Winston Churchill's intervention. While the Prime Minister did not believe 'Izzara' would be the grand coup SOE hoped for, he thought it was folly not to give Badoglio a hearing. Listening cost the Allies nothing. On 16 February, shortly after his return from Casablanca, Churchill had Cadogan inform CD that he would work to get the War Cabinet to reconsider its decision; in the meantime, SOE should continue to nurture its Italian contacts. 'Unconditional surrender' might be the Allies' public policy, but the Prime Minister was willing to explore secret alternatives.[18]

The about-face proved to be a false spring for 'Izzara.' It took more than a month for Churchill to convince the other ministers to reverse their decision. By 20 March, when the go-ahead finally came through, SOE's secret channel to Badoglio had collapsed. The delay dangerously exposed the agent-courier 'Vulp,' who had been forced to make a prolonged, suspicious stay on the Swiss border while awaiting word. He was later arrested, Pasenti fled into hiding, and Badoglio retired

temporarily to his Piedmontese estate. After the war the Marshal claimed that the flap "seriously delayed the fall of fascism" in Italy.[19]

The setback did not phase 'J' Section. In early March it campaigned for a softer line on Allied propaganda toward Italy, in an effort to reinvigorate anti-Mussolini forces within the country. When the 'Izzara' channel closed, it attempted to use its other networks to reestablish contact with other Italian opponents of the regime. Indeed, from 'J' Section's point of view some good had come from the fiasco: it proved that the Prime Minister could be counted on for some support. It also revealed Sir Alexander Cadogan as possible ally within the Foreign Office. Cadogan had enjoyed a ringside seat on Eden's efforts to thwart SOE's plans, and was increasingly disinclined to take part. On 16 February he told his diary that "I feel we must soon abandon the quite mulish and ostrich-like attitude of O.S. [Deputy Undersecretary Sir Orme Sargent] and the Department" on negotiations with the Italians. By early April the opponents of applying the "unconditional surrender" policy to Italy were ascendant.[20]

Then the JIC's intelligence report of 28 April dropped on SOE's schemes like a bombshell. After examining the Allies' increasingly strong position in the Mediterranean, the Committee concluded that the Wehrmacht would risk major losses in Tunisia in order to shore up Italian morale: an Axis defeat in North Africa might presage a fascist "collapse" in Rome. This piece of analysis was remarkably accurate. The JIC stumbled disastrously, however, when it addressed the potential consequences of Mussolini's fall:

> If... Italy collapses, Germany, faced with a heavily increased commitment in the vital Balkan area and no longer able to prevent the opening up of the Mediterranean route, is likely to abandon Italy to her fate and hold defensively on the Brenner.

The Committee's prediction exuded confidence. It did not offer policymakers any alternative scenarios. This suggests that its assessment was the product of an Allied intelligence breakthrough: an 'ultra' decrypt of orders from the German high command, or a well-placed human "asset" high in Axis councils. Nothing could have been farther from the truth.[21]

There was no intelligence coup in April 1943. F. H. Hinsley, author of the official history of British Intelligence, suggests that the JIC's spectacularly mistaken attitude was the product of questionable 'ultra' analysis. In early spring several

intercepts recorded expressions of concern from Hitler on 'the wavering attitude of Italy' and a later decrypt revealed that the Japanese embassy at Bern shared the JIC's opinion that the Germans would withdraw if Mussolini fell. This was extremely flimsy support for the JIC's stance on Hitler's intentions.[22]

Meanwhile, the human intelligence resources of SOE and OSS painted a contrasting portrait. Reports coming out of Allan Dulles' Swiss station directly challenged the JIC line on German plans. Dulles was right. Two weeks after the JIC's report the German General Staff drafted plan 'Alaric,' which called for occupation of the Italian peninsula in the event of a coup in Rome. Before 'Alaric' the OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) had not officially considered contingency plans in Italy, and at no point did it *ever* contemplate withdrawing its forces from the country. The JIC's assessment of Hitler's intentions in Italy was a dangerous combination of poor analysis and wishful thinking. Yet it was mana from heaven for supporters of "unconditional surrender."[23]

The Clash Over the "Unconditional Surrender" Policy, May – July 1943

The JIC's report strengthened the Foreign Office's position at a crucial time. By late April General Eisenhower's AFHQ staff was planning the invasion of Sicily. To this end they floated a program designed to undermine the Italian will to resist. High-ranking POWs would make overtures to garrison commanders in Sicily while the Allies broadcast new, less strident, propaganda urging Italians to turn against Germany. The plan aligned Eisenhower's headquarters shoulder-to-shoulder with SOE's position. AFHQ was never convinced that the Wehrmacht would abandon Italy, and operated on the assumption that Germany would probably seize and defend the south in response to a coup in Rome. On 19 May the British Chiefs of Staff accepted that a more forgiving propaganda campaign de-emphasizing "unconditional surrender" might be useful insurance against this worst-case scenario. The AFHQ plan was opposed, and eventually blocked, by the Foreign Office, igniting an ongoing dispute between Eisenhower and the British government over the authority of the Supreme Commander.[24]

The Anglo-American military chiefs soon gave Eisenhower another reason to press for a more flexible political approach toward Italy. During the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) meeting in Washington from 12 to 25 May ('Trident') Allied military leaders hashed-out their differences and agreed an awkward compromise.

General Marshall and the US Chiefs were determined to finally secure British commitment to a date for the cross-channel invasion of France. The British COS were equally set on the continued pursuit of their preferred course in the Mediterranean, but realized that they might be forced to give way. The CIGS, General Sir Alan Brooke, thought that the Americans did not understand the necessity of forcing "a dispersal of German forces" through operations in Southern Europe (including Italy) prior to a major attack in France. "I am thoroughly depressed with the prospects of our visit," he confessed to his diary. When the negotiations were complete, both sides took their medicine with a spoonful of sugar. Marshall got his huge invasion, but not until the following spring. Brooke's campaign in the south would continue, albeit without additional Anglo-American reinforcements.[25]

The compromise put Eisenhower in a terrible bind. On the one hand he was still required to push for ambitious objectives. Visiting Algiers in late May, the Prime Minister told him the main thrust after Sicily should aim at Rome. On the other, he no longer had the forces necessary to realize these goals if the JIC's optimistic intelligence assessment proved to be mistaken. In this context accurate intelligence on enemy intentions and capabilities was vital. What strength would Germany bring to bear? Would the Italians turn against their Axis partners? These were questions that the Allied intelligence apparatus had failed to answer; the British COS was moved to complain that it "felt considerably handicapped by the inability of the Intelligence Services to obtain reasonably accurate and up-to-date information of the enemy dispositions." As the spring of 1943 drew to a close, OKW completed its contingency plans for Italy and AFHQ waited, blind to the enemy's designs, annoyed by the political constraints that bound its freedom of action.[26]

It was late June before Allied intelligence picked up the first hint that the Wehrmacht was hedging its bets on Mussolini. Swiss-based OSS and SOE intelligence chains had recorded growing German military strength and a persistent fear among Italians of outright occupation. Concerned, the Prime Minister began to devote personal attention to the issue. General Sir Hastings Ismay presented his chief with a full dossier on German forces in Italy on 21 June. It showed that the Wehrmacht deployed a weak hand: there were only three divisions stationed on the mainland. Nine days later, however, Churchill's daily basket of "golden eggs" – raw 'Ultra' decrypts selected by SIS director Sir Stewart Menzies – contained an unpleasant surprise. Two new German 'Stalingrad' divisions, reconstituted to replace

formations destroyed by the Red Army in January, were earmarked for Italy. The report was highly suggestive, but it was not enough to change government policy.[27]

AFHQ was alarmed by these new rumors of German strength. A general scramble by the headquarters staff to convince their chiefs of the need for either more resources or more political flexibility ensued. In mid-July the American AFHQ JAG, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Fairman, made a forceful case for modifying the "unconditional surrender" doctrine in a series of memos to Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, Major General Walter Bedell Smith. The current Allied position did not allow for any contingency planning in the event of a coup in Rome. Moreover, the possibility that a new regime would turn its forces against the Germans was too good to discount entirely. Indeed, the Allies might wish to keep the Italian military under arms if "there should be such an alteration in political orientation that the Italian Army could protect Allied lines of communication or otherwise… make a direct contribution to the prosecution of the war." Fairman anticipated the pragmatic approach the Supreme Commander would push for after Mussolini's fall. Before this watershed event, however, the AFHQ plea for less political interference had percolated up the chain of command. The British COS's Chief Planning Staff concluded on 15 July that:

> …the extent to which we can support our landing will depend… [on enemy] dispositions… and on an appreciation of the policy the Germans have decided to adopt on the Italian mainland. It will be a matter of fine judgment to assess the moment when it will be… best… to strike and this… can only be done by the Commanders-in-Chief on the spot.

The Planning Staff obviously believed Eisenhower deserved a freer hand, but the report also hints at a more profound change in thinking. The implication was that German policy might be the determining factor in the Italian campaign. If the Wehrmacht chose to fight, Eisenhower might need to work out an accommodation with Rome.[28]

Meanwhile, the Foreign Secretary, his eyes fixed on the political horizon, ignored flak from the military services. The Soviets were his primary concern. Eden believed they should be closely involved in the Italian capitulation and that the USSR would undoubtedly insist on enforcing "unconditional surrender." If Moscow's views were ignored, it might have a profound effect on the future of Europe. "If we refrain from bringing the Soviets in," the Foreign Secretary warned the War Cabinet on 19

July, "we shall run the serious risk of finding… [they] act on their own… when the time comes for imposing terms of surrender on Finland, Roumania and Hungary." Eden's reasoning contained one profound, albeit understandable, flaw: he put undue trust in Stalin's good faith. It's difficult to appreciate today how brightly the Soviet peoples' heroics at Stalingrad shone in the eyes of the world, and how thoroughly this reflected glory obscured their leader's maniacal qualities. Yet, given the rapidly shifting political and military winds in July 1943, Eden's well-intentioned policy was founded on an increasingly precarious assumption.[29]

The Foreign Secretary's effort to mollify Stalin by imposing "unconditional surrender" on the Italians only made sense as long as Mussolini headed a pro-German government in Rome. Given the Duce's precarious position, Eisenhower's limited resources and hints from human intelligence sources that the Germans were preparing to seize control of the country, the Foreign Office's failure to consider any contingency plans by July is troubling. Indeed, Eden was so committed to his preferred policy that he regarded even non-binding negotiations with discontented Italian elements with distaste, as the 'Izzara' experience demonstrates. Through faulty analysis of inconclusive signals intelligence and mistakenly discounting humint sources, the JIC abetted the Foreign Office line. In the waning days of July 1943 inflexible policy and poor analysis became mutually reinforcing.

Paralysis: Intelligence and the Failure of the Allies' Italian Policy, 25 July to 18 August

On 25 July 1943, at five-thirty in the afternoon, Benito Mussolini was bundled into the back of an ambulance and driven to the Military Police Barracks, Via Quintino Sella, Rome. Minutes later King Victor Emmanuel III appointed Marshal Badoglio to head a new caretaker regime. After the official radio announcement at 10:45 that evening, the world knew that the Duce of Fascism had fallen.[30]

The long-expected coup d'etat returned Italy to the center of attention in Allied circles. There was a universal appreciation that the new government in Rome would soon move to break from Hitler; but there was no consensus on how to respond to peace overtures. The crucial question was how Germany would react when the Italian worm turned. Lacking definitive intelligence on this issue, Allied leaders made assumptions designed to justify their own favored policies. The British Foreign Office, convinced that the JIC was correct in its assertion that Germany would

withdraw from Italy in the face of betrayal, pressed for the imposition of "unconditional surrender," total disarmament of the Italian forces, and the imposition of harsh armistice terms. AFHQ came to the opposite conclusion, and tried to convince policymakers that an early approach to Badoglio, offering lighter peace terms in exchange for military assistance, was the only prudent course. Roosevelt and Churchill were content to let this dispute simmer for several weeks, opting for compromise and inaction in the face of political pressure not to treat with Badoglio. It proved to be a costly delay.[31]

The instrument of surrender that the Allies would offer Italy became the initial bone of contention between Eden and AFHQ. A Foreign Office committee (the Ministerial Committee on Reconstruction Problems) had labored for months over a comprehensive document – covering everything from the use of Italian currency to purging fascist influence from local government – that was now in the hands of the CCS in Washington. The Chiefs referred the draft to their Combined Civil Affairs Committee, which was still tweaking the details in late July. Eden preferred this version, which became known as 'the Long Terms.' It was designed to involve the Soviets through an Allied armistice commission and precluded the possibility of coddling collaborators in the name of military expediency. Yet even some members of his own department found the draft needlessly cumbersome: on 28 July Cadogan complained that he'd spent the balance of his afternoon "trying to sort out the tangle in our Italian armistice terms produced by about 6 bodies of excellent bureaucrats writing square miles of minutes." This did not please AFHQ, which was struggling to stay abreast of the rapidly changing political and military conditions. Harold Macmillan, who was serving as the British Resident Minister in Algeirs, complained that the draft:

> Presupposes an Italian Government... being prepared to sign such severe terms without... argument. This obviously demands a military situation which leaves them no choice.[32]

After the Trident Conference in May, AFHQ knew that it probably lacked the resources to impose the 'Long Terms' by force – particularly if the Germans intervened.

Eisenhower wanted to establish a simple armistice agreement with the Italians and leave political considerations in abeyance until the Allies had the country under control. Therefore, AFHQ drafted its own surrender instrument (dubbed 'the Short

Terms') couched in strictly military language. By asserting the authority of the Allied Commander-in-Chief over the future of Italian affairs it was also capable of accommodating the Foreign Office's political concerns once the immediate crisis had passed. Eisenhower pleaded the case for AFHQ's draft in a coded cable to the Prime Minister on 27 July. The General emphasized that given the opacity of German intentions, he might need to solicit armed assistance from the Badoglio government. Furthermore, he did not want to wait for an approach from Rome: it might expedite affairs if he were permitted to make a radio broadcast from Algiers emphasizing the availability of an "honorable peace" if the Italian people ceased collaboration with Germany.[33]

Churchill duly consulted the War Cabinet. Having rejected similar suggestions from SOE, their response was predictable. Eisenhower was instructed that any negotiations would be inconsistent with "unconditional surrender" and if the Italians refused 'the Long Terms' "General Eisenhower should simply continue the fighting until the Italians are prepared to surrender unconditionally." The Foreign Office was more blunt in its explanatory telegram to Macmillan (via the Prime Minister) on 28 July:

> Military operations would not be delayed [by 'the Long Terms']... it is swiftness of military action which is important rather than attempts to make the Italian mob feel good about us.

These directives refused to acknowledge that help from both the Italian Army and the "mob" would be essential in the event of German intervention. Eden had won over a majority of the War Cabinet again.[34]

Roosevelt and Churchill were less sure about the wisdom of the Foreign Office position. Eisenhower's plea to the Prime Minister on 29 July got their attention: "All I ask is that the governments decide quickly what to do in a certain contingency and give me a... directive by which my actions may be guided." He acknowledged there were political "implications" that transcended the military field, but unless more leeway was given "military opportunity may slip through our fingers." FDR made the first move to accommodate these concerns, despite his previous declarations in favor of "unconditional surrender." Authorizing Eisenhower to use 'the Short Terms' might prevent "unnecessary and possibly costly" military action against the Italians, Roosevelt cabled the Prime Minister. The next day (30

July) the President completed a policy pirouette with a rousing telegram backing the AFHQ line.

> The Fate of the German troops in Italy… will probably lead to fighting between the Germans and the Italian Army. We should provoke this conflict as much as possible and should not hesitate to send troops and air support to assist the Italians…. In the struggle with Hitler… we cannot afford to deny ourselves any assistance that will kill Germans…. It is the time to dare.

Roosevelt's new position was congruent with the Prime Minister's desire to provoke conflict between the former Axis partners; but he was constrained by the policy framework agreed with Eden and the rest of the War Cabinet. A temporary compromise was agreed. Eisenhower would be allowed a single radio broadcast encouraging the Italians to capitulate on 29 July. If Badoglio's representatives asked for an armistice, AFHQ could present 'the Short Terms.' The Foreign Office retained a short leash on the Anglo-American contingent in Algiers, however – they were prohibited from actually negotiating with Rome. Eisenhower could not offer any *quid pro quo*s in return for assistance against Germany.[35]

This awkward compromise was necessitated by the War Cabinet's refusal to brave the political consequences of treating with the Badoglio regime. The pressure to refrain from making any "deals" with the Italians that smelled of Clark-Darlan was intense. On 3 August Aneurin Bevan made a speech in the House of Commons excoriating Eisenhower's radio peace overture. "In deciding to support Victor Emanuel [sic] and Badoglio," Bevan thundered, "we are, in fact, throwing away millions of potential allies in Europe, and in doing so, we are sacrificing our own people." Roosevelt was taking similar flak in the American press. The "same contentious element" that "made a fuss over North Africa" was "getting ready to make a row" in the event of a bargain with the House of Savoy, he cabled Churchill. The President reported that he was making a personal effort to convince the press that temporary cooperation with the regime might be necessary for "assurance against chaos." Churchill agreed and tried to prod his colleagues. For the moment, however, he favored a 'softly-softly' approach that would avoid exciting the public, Stalin and his Foreign Secretary. When Macmillan asked why further propaganda broadcasts offering 'an honorable peace' to the Italian people had been proscribed, the Prime Minister replied that they had caused "a lively disquiet in Moscow." Overt cooperation with the Italians could only arise through quieter – presumably

clandestine – contacts. "I am in favour of dealing with the House of Savoy or anyone else who can deliver the goods," he told the Resident Minister. "But it is not necessary to keep on saying so." At the same time, Churchill was determined not to entirely subordinate Britain's Italian policy to Soviet concerns. On 2 August he sent a note to Eden asking that the "lavish use of the term 'United Nations'" be avoided in 'the Long Terms' – a gentle hint that efforts to placate Stalin were overdone.[36]

The Prime Minister was also worried about a raft of disturbing new Intelligence on the Wehrmacht's plans for Italy. Between 26 July and 4 August 'ultra' intercepts disclosed that German troops were preparing to seize W/T stations and disarm Italian troops in the Balkans if Rome surrendered to the Allies. While these reports hinted that Hitler was intent on retaining Italian-occupied territory abroad, they did not address the situation in Italy itself. On 4 August, however, the Hut Three duty officer at Bletchley Park decoded an enemy cable that landed in Churchill's morning clutch of 'golden eggs.' It was a warning from the German military Intelligence (Abwehr) office in Rome to Berlin HQ that Badoglio had taken "serious military precautions" designed to thwart "German occupation" of the Italian capital. If the situation were not "clarified" it might lead to "incidents" given the "hostile attitude of the Italian population toward German troops." The message clearly implied that an Italian break with the Axis and German attempt to seize the country were immanent; the Allies might take advantage of a desperate struggle between the erstwhile friends. Churchill understood what this revelation portended: he underlined the critical passage in his accustomed blue pencil.[37]

Astonishingly, the JIC still refused to entertain the possibility that Hitler might subjugate Italy if it abandoned the Axis cause. On 3 August the committee maintained that the German attitude toward the Italians was similar to "[our] state of mind… in the later stages of French collapse in 1940." Although it was possible that "a limited number" of additional Wehrmacht units might be moved into northern Italy, they would only remain long enough to assist the "extrication… of formations from the south." The committee's new bout of wishful thinking was even wider of the mark than its April pronouncement. It was also less excusable, given that signals intelligence was confirming the sinister portrait of German intentions derived from human sources.[38]

The true situation confirmed AFHQ's worst fears: Germany was rushing reinforcements into the country. Plan 'Alaric' had been implemented only days after

the Duce's fall and the new Italian regime soon confronted its impotence. On 31 July General Vittorio Ambrosio, of the Italian General Staff, and Marshal Albert Kesselring, commander of German forces in south-central Italy, had an awkward conversation. In response to Ambrosio's enquiries about the seizure of railroad block posts south of the Brenner and the German divisions (including elite mountain troops) that were pouring over the pass, the Marshal explained that the situation was no longer Rome's concern.

> KESSELRING: ...it is not opportune to hold up a troop movement for ten or twelve days. This is no longer, one might say, only an Italian theatre of war. It has become an Axis theatre!
>
> AMBROSIO: ...Yes, but before bringing the whole German Army into Italy you have to talk to me.

Less than two weeks after Mussolini's arrest, the Germans had massed seven new divisions on the peninsula. Each passing day witnessed the arrival of more troops. After some hesitation, Rome concluded that in order to stem the tide it needed to reach an accommodation with the Allies quickly.[39]

In desperation, Badoglio dispatched a pair of envoys to the British. The first emissary, Marchese Lanza d'Ajeta, approached the British Ambassador to Portugal, Sir Ronald Campbell, in Lisbon on 3 August. D'Ajeta told Campbell that Italy's continuation of the war on the Axis side was merely a ploy to prevent the Germans from taking control of the country. He presented the Ambassador with the current Wehrmacht order-of-battle and claimed that the Germans intended to defend the entire peninsula. The d'Ajeta probe was followed on 6 August by the arrival of another Italian Foreign Office official, Signor Alberto Berio, in the international enclave of Tangier. Berio informed the British Consul-General that Badoglio was ready to make peace and that he was prepared to negotiate terms on behalf of his chief. He emphasized, however, that Rome's capitulation could not be made public until Allied troops landed on mainland Italy in force: otherwise the Germans would simply depose the Marshal and take control. The British government took the latter overture seriously; Badoglio's son, who served as the regular Italian consul in Tangiers, vouched for Berio's good faith. Yet it hesitated and did not reply to Berio for another week, ceding the initiative to Germany.[40]

Eden, now serving as Britain's point-man on Italy, was responsible for this delay and its consequences. Through a fluke of timing, the Prime Minister was out of

the country at the crucial moment: he had embarked on the *Queen Mary* for the 'Quadrant' Conference in Quebec immediately after the d'Ajeta overture. Churchill instinctively sensed that an important opportunity was at hand. "Don't miss the bus [on Italy]," he admonished the Foreign Secretary. Eden had other ideas. He had fixed upon the JIC's 3 August report as proof that the "unconditional surrender" policy was still viable. Italian pleas of powerlessness and growing German strength were seen as crude negotiating ploys – designed to fool the Allies into offering soft armistice terms. In a revealing exchange with the Soviets, the Cadogan explained that the Foreign Office position was that intelligence reports indicating a German buildup in Italy were deliberate misinformation emanating from the Badoglio regime. This assessment defied reason – particularly in light of the 'ultra' report of 4 August – and served as a last-ditch attempt to shore-up a failed policy. Berio's peace offer sat around for nearly a week before the government drafted a reply.[41]

The Foreign Office's response to these overtures caused disquiet in Whitehall. Cadogan, who had publicly defended the government's attitude for months, was losing patience. On 6 August he noted in his diary that Eden was "very frightened" by Berio's offer of negotiation and determined to force "unconditional surrender." After five more days of pointless obfuscation the Permanent Secretary's temper finally snapped.

> A [Eden] is very cagey about saying a *word* to the Italians, who are contacting us from all around. It's the old complex… that terrifies him and makes him see ghosts. How silly! I'd start talking to them at once. I haven't such lack of faith in our diplomacy that I daren't open up with friend or foe…. But I think Winston and FDR are too big to be frightened by this turnip.

After a failed attempt to have "some plain speaking" with his boss the next day, the Permanent Secretary played a civil servant's trump card – he subtly undermined the Minister. During "a gossip" with his colleague William Tyrell the latter expressed the view that applying "unconditional surrender" in Italy was "foolishness." "I'm afraid I let him see that I agree!" Cadogan confessed. Others were simultaneously chipping away at the JIC line. The War Office sent a report to the CCS in Quebec noting that it was possible the JIC report of 3 August contained an "underestimate" of the Wehrmacht's ability to reinforce its Italian position; if so, this might affect the "line which the Germans would try to hold [in the south]." Predictably, however, the most aggressive challenge came from AFHQ.[42]

Although Eisenhower's relationship with Whitehall was strained, he had confidence in the British contingent in Algiers, who shared his point of view on Italy. The General was also convinced that the Prime Minister would understand his concerns if they were explained by someone he could trust. Harold Macmillan was the man for the job.

The Resident Minister arrived on 8 August; in Churchill's absence he had several informal chats with the Foreign Secretary. Eden was both reluctant to see him and chary of any attempts to undermine the "unconditional surrender" policy. As Oliver Harvey, Eden's Assistant Under-Secretary recorded in his diary the next day (9 August):

> A.E. [Eden] wants to reply [to the Italian peace emissaries] that Badoglio must first offer unconditional surrender and after that we will communicate our terms. Macmillan over here. Also [Lord] Swinton [British Resident Minister in West Africa]. A.E. as usual most reluctant to see either… he won't share anything and he hates even discussing it with his colleagues, all of whom bore him![43]

Macmillan glosses over these discussions with Eden and a subsequent meeting with the War Cabinet in his memoirs, but his attempt to change attitudes failed. In an extraordinary meeting on 11 August with Deputy Prime Minister Clement Attlee, Eden, and Minister for War Sir James Grigg, Macmillan presented a document he dubbed "An Armistice Quiz." His most crucial query asked what the Italians were expected to do about the thousands of German troops in the country. In the event of an armistice, Macmillan noted, the Allies could demand a range of actions from the Italian army: from simply standing aside, to taking an active hand against their old Axis partner. The point was that to achieve even nominal cooperation, some sort of understanding with Rome was necessary. The War Cabinet dodged the question, noting only that it was impossible for the "instrument of surrender" to define the "appropriate method of dealing with the German Forces in Italy." This response missed the point: through its rigid adherence to the principle of "unconditional surrender" the War Cabinet had drastically narrowed the range of military options. Eisenhower would have to fight without Italian assistance, with limited forces, on the Wehrmacht's terms. Despite intelligence indicating that Hitler planned to occupy the country, AFHQ's insistent warnings, and desperate pleas from the Italian government,

Anglo-American policy was paralyzed by the political cost of negotiation with Rome.[44]

The price of hesitation soon became clear. On 12 August the Foreign Office informed Berio that negotiations were impossible – Italy must surrender unconditionally. Two days later, however, Eden's painstakingly constructed policy edifice collapsed in the face of an unambiguous intelligence breakthrough. Germany was up to something big on the Italian mainland.[45]

British intelligence (probably 'ultra' sigint) had intercepted the minutes of a meeting between Nazi Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and his new Italian counterpart Raffaello Guariglia. The exchange, which took place at Tarvisio on 6 August, was an attempt to preserve an outwardly united front while each side prepared itself for the double-cross. The accompanying German commentary, however, made it clear that Hitler was preparing to seize control of Rome. It was definitive proof that SOE and AFHQ had been right about the enemy's intentions; the Foreign Office acknowledged as much in a terse telegram to Macmillan, who had just returned to Algiers. The Tarviso revelation, coupled with the successful escape of four Wehrmacht divisions from the fighting in Sicily on 14 August, raised the prospect that the Allied invaders might face superior enemy forces if the Italians remained loyal to the Axis.[46]

The Foreign Office abandoned the JIC line and responded to the next Italian peace envoy with alacrity. On 15 August Italian General Guiseppe Castellano approached the British Ambassador in Madrid, Sir Samuel Hoare. Aside from a few personal particulars, the General's story was a reprise of Berio's presentation two weeks earlier: Italy was nearly in thrall to the German Army, Badoglio could do nothing until the Allies invaded the mainland in force, and Castellano was prepared to help coordinate Italian moves against Germany with the Anglo-American powers. Like Berio, he claimed that his government was prepared to surrender "provided we can join the Allies in fighting the Germans." Hoare thought the General was credible – a man of "weight and sincerity." The intelligence from Tarviso forced Eden to take Castellano seriously. Although he was still skeptical about the value of a military concord, the Foreign Secretary could no longer dismiss Italian overtures as the by-product of a misinformation campaign.[47]

Eden's softened stance heralded the end to three weeks of hesitation, procrastination, and obfuscation. The Foreign Secretary flew out to join 'Quadrant'

on 18 August, accompanied by Cadogan, Brendan Bracken (the Minister for Information) and a clutch of other mandarins. Their first assignment in Quebec was an interview with Churchill. "[The Prime Minister]... had nibbled at the Italian bait," Cadogan recorded, "and was determined to try and swallow it." With the President and CCS present, it was decided on the spot to contact Badoglio through Castellano. Eisenhower was authorized to send two of his officers to a secret assignation with the Italian envoy at the British embassy in Lisbon. The Allies' policy paralysis was over – but the 'Monkey' business had just begun.[48]

The 'Monkey' Business: SOE and the Secret Struggle for Armistice with Italy, 18 August to 8 September 1943

Although the Tarviso intercept shook the Anglo-Americans out of their policy torpor, they remained wary of antagonizing Stalin. AFHQ's representatives were officially prohibited from engaging in substantive "negotiations" or making any firm "commitments" to Castellano. The most they could do was offer to modify the surrender instrument later "depend[ing] on how far the Italian government and people... aid the United Nations." In effect, the plan was to bamboozle Badoglio into signing a quick armistice by offering him the 'Short Terms' and a vague promise of future leniency, but impose the harsh 'Long Terms' once the Germans were defeated.[49]

Nevertheless, from AFHQ's point of view the prospect of securing any cooperation from the Italians constituted a major concession to military reality. Eisenhower selected his best staff officers for the Lisbon mission: Major General Walter Bedell Smith and the British head of G-2 (Intelligence) Brigadier Kenneth Strong. Both men were keenly conscious of challenge they faced. Time was short – shipping requirements meant that the most audacious element of the assault on mainland Italy, the Salerno landings, was slated to commence in less than three weeks. As Eisenhower's representatives they also felt distrusted by their own governments – AFHQ's reputation was still marred by the Clark-Darlan debacle. Nevertheless, they made their lightning preparations with considerable enthusiasm. Strong noted that Bedell Smith, a future Director of Central Intelligence, "showed me how he had equipped himself for the adventure with four small pistols.... One was stowed under each armpit and one in each hip pocket." The General was prepared to go down in a blaze of glory one way or another.[50]

SOE was equally determined to make the most of its prescient support for talks with Badoglio. Baker Street maintained a close liaison with AFHQ through its clandestine training and communications base – code-named 'Massingham' – 20 kilometers west of Algiers. Massingham's commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas Dodds-Parker, leapt at the chance to supply the Lisbon team with the forged identity papers and inconspicuous clothes they needed for their secret rendezvous. SOE's collaboration with AFHQ did not end there and – much to the chagrin of its SIS counterparts – Baker Street became the principle facilitator of the armistice negotiations that followed.[51]

Utilizing their new cloak-and-dagger kit, Eisenhower's negotiators left Algiers as soon as the final go-ahead arrived from Quebec on 18 August and, flying via Gibraltar, arrived at the British embassy in Lisbon after sundown the next day. Ambassador Campbell introduced the pair to Castellano and his translator, Montanari, and they commenced negotiations. Strong found his "suave Sicilian" counterpart an intelligent, likeable interlocutor, though burdened by a weak hand. The Germans, Castellano reported, now had his government in an almost supine position; only massive Allied intervention could allow Italy to throw off Hitler's yoke. Badoglio would then be prepared to switch sides. Smith countered by explaining the relatively simple armistice requirements outlined in 'the Short Terms,' emphasizing that these provisions might be toned down if the Italians cooperated. The Italian General replied that he could not guarantee that his government could carry out all of the Allies' demands given German interference: Allied prisoners of war held by the Wehrmacht on Italian soil would be impossible to release. Smith glossed over these problems, emphasizing that the key was that Italy acted in good faith. He also chose to deliberately mislead Castellano about the size of the proposed Allied invasion force, how close to Rome it would make landfall, and when it was scheduled to hit the beaches. The existence of the 'Long Terms' went unmentioned. Given that Italy was still nominally an enemy power, such subterfuge was hardly surprising, but it would cause complications later. Smith's tactics succeeded, however, in convincing the Italian general to convey 'the Short Terms' to the Marshal in Rome – even though Castellano's original mission had been to secure an alliance, not offer to surrender. Unaware of the Allies' fumbled response to the Berio and D'Ajeta approaches, Castellano told Strong that he blamed this state of affairs on the indecision of the Badoglio government after Mussolini's fall.[52]

As the all-night parley moved into the wee hours of the morning, the intelligence team began work on plans for establishing a secret com link between Algiers and Rome. Brigadier E.E. Mockler-Ferryman, SOE's Assistant Director for Western Europe (AD/E) had wired Strong a list of potential options. Mockler-Ferryman's preferred method was to smuggle a pair of portable W/T sets into the embassy via diplomatic pouch and have the resident SOE specialist, J.G. Beevor, instruct a member of Castellano's entourage in coding. The 'J' Section chief, Major Roseberry, would arrive that evening to assist and iron out any problems. Alternatively, one of SOE's agents already 'in-country' could approach Castellano upon his return to Rome – though this would entail some risk of discovery by the Germans. As a last resort, Badoglio might attempt to communicate via courier through the SOE safe house in Bern. Crossing the Swiss frontier was a dangerous and slow enterprise (it had exposed 'Vulp'), and Mockler-Ferryman advised Strong that it should be discouraged. Castellano agreed that the first method was preferable. It also allowed him to make the most of an unfortunate delay that would hold him in Lisbon for another 48 hours. He was traveling on a "collective" passport with his "cover" party of Italian officials, and was forced to wait until their scheduled train left for Rome.[53]

Later that morning, while the discussions concluded and Roseberry prepared to fly to Portugal, Mockler-Ferryman gave Strong another option. One of J Section's 'Massingham'-based agents, a bilingual wireless operator named Sergeant C.R.D. Mallaby, had been dropped "blind" in Northern Italy on 13 August. 'Massingham' had heard nothing from their man for a week, and feared that he had been captured. Assuming that Mallaby was in Italian custody, however, this presented a unique opportunity: as a SOE-trained W/T operator, he was uniquely qualified to handle coding for the Italian government. Castellano's intervention would also save him from almost certain execution for espionage. Upon his arrival in Lisbon, Roseberry briefed the Italian general on the situation and provided him with the false name that Mallaby was traveling under. Castellano agreed to use the British sergeant if he could be found, but also accepted Beevor's W/T sets and training. Mallaby was not the crucial lynchpin of the communications scheme – but he did serve as a useful insurance policy.[54]

Meanwhile, SOE brought more of its resources to bear on the project, now code-named 'Monkey.' At 'Massingham' Dodds-Parker assembled a small team of

his best W/T operators, coders, and translators. They were put to work listening for signals at the arranged frequencies – on rotating 12-hour shifts. Some of the FANY (First-Aid Nursing Yeomanry) coders slept next to their equipment. Nervous tension also ran high among those in-the-know at Baker Street. Leo Marks, the whiz-kid who oversaw Mallaby's coding, was thrilled at the prospect stealing a march over SOE's rivals.

> 'Monkey's real significance, apart from shortening the war, was that 'C' (SIS) had been entirely excluded from the negotiations and it would be a major 'up yours' if we succeeded without them.

The instinct to circle the wagons was strong: SIS "might try to horn in on your end," Roseberry warned Dodds-Parker on 26 August. Charles Hambro shared these sentiments, and was working his high-level contacts to protect the project. He even had the Air Ministry halt Allied bombing along Castellano's train route to Rome. The 'Izzara' plan had been thwarted in January, but SOE was determined to make 'Monkey' a success.[55]

Yet the Foreign Office's Soviet fixation continued to complicate the armistice project. On 21 August Molotov demanded to be included in a broad-based "politico-military commission to examine" the Italian "terms of surrender." This exacerbated the Department's concerns about the consequences of excluding Stalin. The unexpected arrival of another Italian envoy in the Portuguese capital allowed Eden to give vent to these fears.[56]

Absent word from Castellano, who was en route back Rome by rail, Badoglio decided to send a final emissary to the allies. The new plenipotentiary, General Giacomo Zanussi, arrived Lisbon on 27 August. Ambassador Campbell received another frantic plea for help. This time, however, the Foreign Office instructed him to give Zanussi the 'Long Terms.' Unlike Castellano, who had been mollified by less stringent armistice conditions and sympathetic fellow officers, Zanussi was dismayed. Although Italy was desperate to make peace with the Allies, he knew that the Wehrmacht would made compliance with the 'Long Terms' impossible. Zanussi lamented that his government had failed to make a "previous arrangement with the Anglo-Americans" to expel the German forces and complained that the Allies' demands would lead to the collapse of the Badoglio regime. Nevertheless, he agreed to forward the instrument to the Marshal when flew back to Rome the next day.[57]

AFHQ greeted news of the Foreign Office response to Zanussi's overture with dismay. 'Ultra' and human sources confirmed the dire scenario outlined by Castellano: powerful German formations were positioning themselves in Italy. Kesselring had two Panzer Corps at his disposal in the south, and a new Army Group was forming under Erwin Rommel in the north. Algiers estimated that this meant the Salerno invasion force might eventually confront superior enemy ground forces – perhaps by as much as 1.5 divisions (circa 30,000 men). Even allowing for overwhelming Allied air-superiority, these were dangerous odds. Eden would make the situation infinitely worse if the Italian Armistice was delayed while Badoglio considered the nuances of the 'Long Terms.' "The risks attendant on 'Avalanche'… will be minimized to a large extent if we are able to secure Italian assistance," Eisenhower explained in a long telegram to the CCS on 28 August. "Even passive assistance will greatly increase our chances of success." Macmillan was much less politic in his own protest to the Foreign Office.

> At the present stage it is almost impossible to foresee the future. All we know is that we have at the same time to embark on one of the most perilous ventures in military history, the conquest of a country with inferior forces, opposed by formidable and ever increasing German armaments, and at the same time to impose upon the country we are invading unconditional surrender of arms.

His message was clear: if the Foreign Office continued to press for a punitive peace with Italy, it would defeat the Allies' military ambitions. After receiving what Macmillan called "a confused" reply from Attlee, who spoke for the War Cabinet in Churchill's absence, the Anglo-American staff at AFHQ became insubordinate – even slightly mutinous.[58]

The 'mutiny' began when General Zanussi's entourage was abducted by SOE. The Italian party, who expected to fly from Gibraltar to Rome, found themselves diverted to Algiers. Once on the ground they were whisked off to a comfortable internment at 'Massingham.' In the camp headquarters Macmillan, Strong, Bedell Smith and the American political representative, Robert Murphy, inaugurated a farcical second round of "negotiations." Before the talks began, Dodds-Parker cunningly offered to let the Italians use his bedroom for their private conferences. It was bugged; FANY translators provided typed transcripts to the Anglo-American team "with jugs of coffee." Through these devices it was ascertained that Zanussi

was sincere in his opinion that Rome would balk at the 'Long Terms;' AFHQ decided to hold him until they heard from Castellano.[59]

While Zanussi cooled his heels, Algiers waited anxiously for news via the 'Monkey' channel. On 30 August, 'Massingham' picked up the first signals from Rome. There was relief at AFHQ when it became apparent that Castellano had successfully delivered the 'Short Terms'; Badoglio signaled a willingness to confer in greater detail. SOE's 'J' Section was also overjoyed to hear that Mallaby had been rescued from the firing squad. Although the W/T team at 'Massingham' concluded that the Italian operators trained in Lisbon were handling most of the transmissions, the itinerant sergeant's coding skills proved invaluable. Most importantly, however, AFHQ still had a chance to conclude an armistice before the Salerno invasion. Smith arranged a rendezvous with Castellano in Sicily to work out the details.[60]

Now the "comic opera" – Macmillan's moniker for the armistice scramble – assumed an *allegro* pace. On 31 August Eisenhower's representatives – Strong, Smith, Murphy and Macmillan – flew directly to the appointed spot at General Sir Harold Alexander's headquarters at Cassibile, near Palermo. Before meeting the Italian delegation, the visitors from Algiers had a brief chat with Alexander, who would command the Allied armies in Italy. He agreed to join their little conspiracy against Whitehall interference. According to Murphy, "Alexander declared he would be willing to risk his reputation and, if necessary, retire from the army" if the British government disapproved of the decision to seek an immediate armistice with the Italians under the 'Short Terms.' Macmillan concurred, noting that he feared that if the invasion were repulsed it might have a devastating psychological effect on a war-weary public. Ensuring the success of operation 'Avalanche' was worth hazarding Stalin's ire.[61]

Having agreed its priorities, the AFHQ team joined the Italians, who awaited them in a tent artfully concealed within an olive grove. Much to their chagrin, they found that Castellano was not prepared to the terms. The General declared that his government would collapse under the force of German arms unless the Allies guaranteed to land at least 15 divisions in the vicinity of Rome. Strong knew that this was impossible. With limited resources, the American 5th Army would muster an initial spearhead of only 3-5 divisions; given the Wehrmacht's estimated strength an invasion north of Naples would be suicide. Casting about for a solution, he decided to let the Italians believe that the Allied assault would be large, and promised to land an

airborne division in the capital. Alexander endorsed the Roman adventure, and Eisenhower gave his imprimatur the next day. In the nervous, fractious environment that afflicted the Allied leadership in late August, it is difficult to believe that this offer was entirely genuine. Nevertheless, it was sufficient to keep the Italians committed to the process; they agreed to convey AFHQ's assurances to Badoglio.[62]

On 1 September the two sides reconvened at Cassibile. Castellano wanted to plan for the proposed airborne intervention in Rome, but the Anglo-Americans demanded acceptance of the 'Short Terms' as their pound of flesh. AFHQ knew that time was up: 'Avalanche' commenced in less than a week and General Montgomery would lead the British 8th Army across the Strait of Messina in two days time. To expedite the negotiations, Macmillan suggested to Alexander that he put on "a display of firmness" for the benefit of their guests. The General responded with aplomb, assembled a company of guardsmen, donned his parade ground uniform – pressed tunic, riding breeches, "high polished boots with gold spurs, and a gold-peaked cap" – and thundered down to the olive grove accompanied by the clashing of arms. Entering the negotiating tent with the bearing of a modern Wellington, Alexander proceeded to berate the Italians for their perfidy, suggesting that they were nothing more than "spies" if they did not accommodate the Allies' reasonable conditions. After their tormentor stormed imperiously away, the Italians reconsidered their position and agreed to radio Badoglio with the recommendation that he sign 'the Short Terms.' Macmillan's ploy had worked.[63]

Two days later Badoglio's sent a message to 'Massingham' via 'Monkey' authorizing Castellano to sign the armistice agreement. An ecstatic Dodds-Parker planted an impromptu kiss on one of his diligent FANYs, jumped on a motorcycle, and delivered the word to Smith in Algiers. The breakthrough came just in time: the War Cabinet was very unhappy about AFHQ's freelancing at Cassibile. Fortunately for the 'mutineers,' Churchill was following the negotiations from North America and lent his support. The Prime Minister cabled Attlee that the issue of "what other Powers [i.e., the Soviets] should… participate in these signatures" was relatively unimportant at this advanced stage. "The overwhelming need is to win the battle and get Italians fighting Germans." AFHQ's gambit was validated, and Algiers arranged for the BBC to make a coded broadcast signaling the Italian government when 'Avalanche' was immanent.[64]

Yet there were two remaining flies in the ointment: the Allied pledge to help secure Rome against German attack and the fate of 'the Long Terms.' Acting on instructions from the British and American governments, after the 'Short Terms' were signed Smith had presented Castellano with the full conditions that the Allies would eventually insist that the Italians observe – the 'Long Terms.' Although much of the document was left in abeyance pending the expulsion of German troops, these harsh measures were dismaying to the Italians who – understandably – felt misled. The story that Zanussi had to tell after his release only exacerbated this damaged trust. If the Allies did not make good on their commitment to defend Rome, Macmillan feared this act of "bad faith" might effect future cooperation – and perhaps even discourage the Italians from fighting the Germans after 'Avalanche.'[65]

The army was increasingly leery of the venture, however. General Matthew Ridgway, the commander of the US 82nd Airborne Division, did not relish the idea of dumping his men in the middle of a German army. At the behest of his political team, Eisenhower decided to send Ridgway's executive officer, General Maxwell Taylor, on a last-minute fact finding mission to Rome. On the evening of 7 September, little more than 24 hours before 'Avalanche,' Taylor and a few other staff officers were clandestinely inserted into the Eternal City. In conference with Badoglio, they learned that the Italians had done little to prepare their airfields for the influx of US troops. This omission was understandable. The regime had been mislead into believing that the Anglo-American attack would not come for several more days. But Badoglio was now having cold feet about the whole idea of an armistice: Germany was too strong. Taylor implied that American bombing would be more severe than German occupation, but Badoglio – much like Eden during the first ten days of August – was paralyzed by indecision. Taylor radioed AFHQ that the paratrooper plan had collapsed.[66]

Algiers faced more bad news the next morning. The Italians used 'Monkey' to inform AFHQ that an "immediate armistice" was now impossible due to the "strength of the German forces in the Rome area." Provocative moves might lead to the "occupation of the capital and violent assumption of the government." When Taylor returned from Rome, he was able to confirm the accuracy of this bleak assessment: the Wehrmacht maintained nearly 24,000 troops around the city and had immobilized the Italian forces by withholding fuel. Eisenhower, Murphy and Macmillan had overcome their own leaders' trepidation toward an armistice by forcing the issue; with

Badoglio vacillating they adopted the same tactic. At 6:30pm on 8 September, only hours before Allied troops hit the beaches at Salerno, AFHQ publicly broadcast the armistice declaration, and announced that the Italian regime had surrendered. With its political position compromised, Rome radio confirmed the armistice. Badoglio had capitulated – but the war in Italy was only beginning.[67]

The Armistice produced substantial military dividends for the Allies. The entire Italian fleet was captured without a shot. In the chaos that followed the surrender, some Italian units did fight the Germans. The resistance was particularly strong around Rome, where General Cadorna's armored 'Ariete' Division performed well against the German 3rd Panzer Division. These battles were an annoyance for Kesselring, who might otherwise have concentrated his forces more quickly against the Allied beachhead at Salerno. This was fortunate, because Mark Clark's 5th Army was nearly driven back into the sea by a Wehrmact counterattack on 12 September. Only massive air and naval bombardment saved the expeditionary force from destruction. Without SOE's 'Monkey' project, and AFHQ's decision to defy Whitehall, 'Avalanche' might have failed.[68]

Conclusion

Poor intelligence analysis and an inflexible commitment to the "unconditional surrender doctrine" paralyzed the Allies' Italian policy – and nearly produced a military defeat at Salerno. Marshal Badoglio's timid, vacillating leadership and the German Army's formidable capacity for battlefield improvisation contributed to the situation. Yet the Foreign Office's position, abetted by the JIC's mistaken advice about German military intentions, deserves much of the blame for the belated armistice and its consequences.

Historian Thomas Powers suggests that scholars need to ask a simple question when we critique strategic intelligence: "Why are the analysts so often wrong?" He suggests that one answer is that human beings are vulnerable to the emotional vicissitudes of the moment, especially during wartime. The Allied triumphs of late 1942 may have colored the JIC's assessments; its erroneous equation of German morale in 1943 with the British outlook in 1940 is telling. Given scanty raw data, fortified by the first blush of victory, the Committee indulged in inadequately supported speculation. Powers says that historically most intelligence failures are caused by a similar misreading of evidence, which he categorizes as "errors of fear

and errors of hope." By discounting the possibility that Hitler would occupy mainland Italy, the JIC substituted hope for dispassionate analysis.[69]

The Italian armistice fiasco also illustrates how dependent political leaders are on the timely, accurate interpretation of intelligence. According to historian Timothy Naftali, policymakers "rarely have the time or background to be good intelligence analysts (though that has not stopped most of them from trying)." Absent a clear picture of the situation "on the ground," it takes a great deal of self-discipline to avoid projecting politically convenient scenarios. One of the leitmotifs of modern warfare is the tendency of officials to discount intelligence that undermines government policy.[70]

Yet the perennial challenges associated with interpreting strategic intelligence cannot fully excuse those responsible for delaying the Italian armistice. The Foreign Office and the JIC had months to analyze the Italian situation and German intentions. A chance to make contact with anti-Mussolini plotters (plan 'Izzara') was dismissed out of hand. Intelligence that contradicted established findings or policies was deliberately ignored. Indeed, Anthony Eden's support for "unconditional surrender" actually hardened during the spring and summer of 1943, even as it became increasingly evident that the policy was militarily untenable. Whether these actions were motivated by a desire to avoid alienating Stalin, or by what historian David Ellwood calls Eden's "irrational, even psychopathic" anti-Italian feelings, the net effect was to jeopardize operation 'Avalanche' and endanger Allied troops.[71]

Thanks to Harold Macmillan, Dwight Eisenhower, and SOE's project 'Monkey,' the worst case scenario – a possible defeat at Salerno – was averted. The tactical consequences of the delayed armistice were severe, however. The Germans established powerful defensive positions (the 'Gustav' line) that delayed the capture of Rome until June 1944, and a Civil War broke out between Italian factions.[72]

SOE – particularly Dodds-Parker and his colleagues outside Algiers at 'Massingham' – were pleased with their role in the preceding events. They had stolen a march on SIS, outdone their OSS colleagues in Algiers, and earned credit with AFHQ.[73] Yet although it came at the beginning of their activities in Italy, in many respects the 'Monkey' project represented the high point for the Anglo-American intelligence services based around Algiers. Italian political divisions, challenging terrain, and SOE-OSS tensions hindered the subsequent clandestine campaign in Italy. The two greatest difficulties, however – especially in special operations terms – were

the reluctance of the American military to provide resources sufficient for a strategic breakthrough in Italy, and the bureaucratic infighting that went on at the start of the Italian campaign. As the next chapter suggests, without the military discomfiture of the Nazi and Italian police state, SOE and OSS had difficulty operating behind enemy lines. And in many respects, the Anglo-American secret agencies also undermined their capacity ability to prosecute the clandestine war on the Italian peninsula with unnecessary internal disputes.

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[1] Richard Lamb, *War in Italy 1943-1945: A Brutal Story* (London: John Murray, 1993) pp.12, 18-22; Lamb also cites the need for a new revisionist perspective on the conflict.
[2] Certainly, no one has produced an Italian companion to M.R.D. Foot's seminal work *SOE In France*. Christopher Woods has invested a great deal of effort in a project along those lines, but as of this writing only fragments have appeared in print. Thus, virtually noting has been written on the role of intelligence in the Allied policy wrangle over Italy during the first six months of 1943. Michael Howard's Volume IV of the official British history of the Second World War, *Grand Strategy*, does contain an accurate, if incomplete, account of project 'Monkey' – the clandestine armistice negotiations that began in late August 1943. But it does not discuss the role that 'ultra' intelligence played in policymaking, and says little about human intelligence provided by OSS. The ability to examine intelligence designated for the personal use of the Prime Minister (in the Public Record Office's HW 1 series) in the context of what we know from previously released Foreign Office documents is critical. Now we can compare what the government knew about German intentions, the Joint Intelligence Committee's analysis of those intentions and the policies pursued by the Foreign Office. This enables us to pass judgment on both the process of intelligence analysis and its impact on government policies.
[3] David W. Ellwood, *Italy, 1943-1945* (Leicester: LUP, 1985) pp.22-23; Albert Garland and Howard McGaw Smyth, *The United States Army in World War II, The Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1965) pp.12-17.
[4] JIC (43) 171, German Plans and Intentions During the Summer and Autumn of 1943, 28 April 1943, p.6, CAB 121/413; JIC (43) 324, German Plans and Intentions During Second Half of 1943, 3 August 1943, p.1, 2, 7, 11, CAB 121/413.
[5] F.W. Deakin, *The Brutal Friendship: Mussolini, Hitler and the Fall of Italian Fascism* (London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1962) pp. 287-288; F.H. Hinsley, *British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations*, Vol. II, part 1 (London: HMSO, 1984) pp.101-103.
[6] Michael Howard, *The Grand Strategy: August 1942-September 1943*, Vol. IV (London: HMSO, 1972) pp.533-534.
[7] SOE War Diary, pp.206-208, HS 7/263
[8] The Rt. Hon. The Earl of Avon, *The Eden Memoirs: The Reckoning* (London: Cassell, 1965) p.401; Alexander Cadogan, *The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan,* David Dilks ed. (London: Cassell, 1971) p.492; War Cabinet, Position of Italy, Note by the Prime Minister, 25 November 1942, CAB 121/571.
[9] Arthur Layton Funk, *The Politics of TORCH: The Allied Landings and the Algiers Putsch, 1942* (New York: The University Press of Kansas, 1969) pp.210-211, 213-214, 246-248, 251.
[10] SOE War Diary, pp.103-108, 207; Lamb (note 3) p.12, HS 7/263.
[11] David Stafford, *Secret Agent: Britain's Wartime Secret Service* (London: BBC, 2002) p.136; Lord Hambro, interview with the Author, 13 March 2002; Plans 425/588, Italian Anti-Fascist Parties, 7 January 1943, frame 79, PRO HS 6/824.
[12] PRO HS 6 824, frames 27 and 68: J/IT/4131, J [Major Roseberry] to D/CD(O) [Gubbins], 11 January 1943; CD/4279, to J [Roseberry] via D/CD(O) [Gubbins] from CD [Hambro].
[13] Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, *War Diaries, 1939-1945* Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman, eds. (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2001) p.367.
[14] Quoted in Robert Dallek, *FDR and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945* (London: Oxford, 1995) p.374.
[15] Ibid; David W. Ellwood, *Italy, 1943-1945* (Leicester: LUP, 1985) pp.22-23.
[16] Dallek, *FDR*, pp. 371-372.
[17] PRO HS 7/9: SOE 'J' Section War Diary [Apparently a Draft Version], p.10; PRO HS 6/824, frame 17: DCDO/703, D/CD(O) [Gubbins] to CD [Hambro], 4 March 1943.

[18] PRO HS 6/824, frame 19: Extract from Minute [of] D/CDO/591, from D/CD(O) [Gubbins] to CD [Hambro], 16 February 1943.
[19] PRO HS 6/824, frame 3: Cipher Telegram from Berne, 12 May 1943; HS 7/59: SOE 'J' Section War Diary [Draft], p.10.
[20] Ibid; Hinsley, *British Intelligence*, p. 102 [footnote]; *Cadogan Diaries*, p.514.
[21] Ibid; JIC (43) 171, German Plans and Intentions During the Summer and Autumn of 1943, 28 April 1943, p.6, CAB 121/413, p. 6.
[22] Hinsley, *British Intelligence*, p.103.
[23] CAB 121/413: Assessment of the German War Effort, p.164; F. W. Deakin, *Brutal Friendship*, pp. 287-288; RG 226, Entry 97, Box 19, folders 331, 333: German and Italian Intentions, 1 July 1943.
[24] Hinsley, *British Intelligence*, p. 102 [footnote]; Garland and Smyth, *Mediterranean Theater,* pp.12-17.
[25] Garland and Smyth, *Mediterranean Theater*, pp.22-23; Lord Alanbrooke, *War Diaries*, p.403,409.
[26] Garland and Smyth, *Mediterranean Theater*, p.24; Hinsley, (note 7) p.103.
[27] RG 226, Entry 97, Box 19, Folders 331, 333: German and Italian Intentions, 1 July 1943; HS 7/623, SOE War Diary: Italy, Switzerland and Mediterranean Section, pp.205-207; CAB 121/413, Most Secret, Prime Minister, [signed] H.L. Ismay, 21 June 1943: HW 1/1783, 30 June 1943.
[28] WO 204/2924: Fairman to Bedell Smith, 17 July 1943; Fairman to Bedell Smith, 22 July 1943; Stephen E. Ambrose, *Supreme Commander* (London: Cassell, 1969) p.253; CAB 120/600: J.P. (43) 253 (Final), 15 July 1943.
[29] CAB 120/597: GEN (43) (15)1, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 19 July 1943; Ellwood, *Italy*, pp.26-27.
[30] Deakin, *Brutal Friendship*, pp.471, 474-475.
[31] Howard, *Grand Strategy*, p.515.
[32] *Cadogan Diaries*, p.547; Howard, *Grand Strategy*, p.515-517, 519.
[33] Macmillan's biographer asserts that he was the motivating force behind the 'Short Terms' although he disclaimed such a role in his memoirs. See Alistair Horne, *Harold Macmillan, Volume I 1894-1956* (New York: Viking, 1989). PRO WO 204/2924: Telegram from Gen. Eisenhower to the Prime Minister, 27 July 1943; and for more on the AFHQ staff's plans for utilizing Italian forces against Germany see, memo from Brig. J.C. Holmes to Major-General Walter Bedell Smith, 28 July 1943; *Grand Strategy*, p.517.
[34] *Grand Strategy*, p. 518; PRO WO 204 2924: 'Eyes only' telegram from the Foreign Office via the Prime Minister to Macmillan, 30 July 1943.
[35] PRO WO 204/2924: Eisenhower to the Prime Minister, 29 July 1943; the President to the Prime Minister, 30 July 1943; *Grand Strategy* pp.517-520.
[36] *Hansard*, 3 August 1943, column 2211; CAB 120/597: President to the Prime Minister, 30 July 1943; Foreign Secretary from WSC, 2 August 1943; FO 954/13: Prime Minister to British Resident Minister in Algiers, 2 August 1943.
[37] Hinsley, *British Intelligence*, p.12; PRO HW 1/1920.
[38] PRO CAB 121/413: J.I.C. (43) 324, German Plans and Intentions During Second Half of 1943, 3 August 1943.
[39] Deakin, *Brutal Friendship*, pp.499-500, 503-504.
[40] *Grand Strategy*, pp.520-521; CAB 121/588: No. 1053 from Foreign Office to Moscow, 7 August 1943.
[41] *Grand Strategy*, p.521; CAB 121/588: No. 1055 from Foreign Office to Moscow, 7 August 1943.
[42] *Cadogan Diaries*, pp.550-553.
[43] Harvey quoted in Horne, *Harold Macmillan*, pp.194-195.
[44] Harold Macmillan, *The Blast of War, 1939-1945* (London: Macmillan, 1967) pp.377-378; CAB 121/588: War Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Armistice Terms and Civil Administration, 11 Downing Street, 11 August 1943; COS(43)232 Armistice terms for Italy, Note by Secretary, 14 August 1943.
[45] FO 660/360: Foreign Office to Resident Minister in Algiers, 14 August 1943.
[46] Ibid; Hinsley, *British Intelligence*, p.106; for more on Tarviso see Deakin, *Brutal Friendship,* pp.506-509.
[47] Castellano and Hoare quoted in Howard, pp.522-523.
[48] *Cadogan Diaries*, pp.552-553.
[49] *Cadogan Diaries*, p.553; PRO FO 954 13: Instructions from the Foreign Secretary to British Mission in Lisbon, 18 August 1943; Lord Halifax originally proposed the "'Short Terms' first, 'Long Terms' eventually" compromise in late July, see PRO CAB 120 597: Halifax to Foreign Office, 27 July 1943.

[50] Sir Kenneth Strong, *Intelligence at the Top: The Recollections of an Intelligence Officer* (London: Ginger/Cassell, 1968) p.106, 113.
[51] Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker, *Setting Europe Ablaze: An Account of some Ungentlemanly Warfare*, (London: Springwood Books, 1984) p.136.
[52] Strong, pp.105-107; Howard, p.524.
[53] HS 6/779: AD/E [Mockler-Ferryman] to HA [Strong via Beevor], 19 August 1943; J [Roseberry] to AD/E [Mockler-Ferryman], 22 August 1943. J.G. Beevor, *SOE: Recollections and Reflections* (London: Bodley Head, 1981) p.139.
[54] HS 6/779: AD/E [Mockler-Ferryman] and J [Roseberry] to AM [Dodds-Parker], 20 August 1943; J [Roseberry] to AD/E [Mockler-Ferryman], 23 August 1943; Christopher Woods, "A Tale of Two Armistices," in *War, Resistance and Intelligence: Collected Essays in Honour of MRD Foot*, Kenneth G. Robertson, ed. (Barnsley, UK: Leo Cooper, 1999) pp.1-3.
[55] Paddy Sproule, interview with the Author, 8 January 2002; Leo Marks, *Between Silk and Cyanide: A Codemaker's War, 1941-1945* (London: HarperCollins, 1998) p.359; HS 6/779: Letter from CD to Brigadier L.C. Hollis, 24 August 1943; J [Roseberry] to Massingham [Dodds-Parker], 26 August 1943.
[56] FO 954/13: Report from A. Clark Kerr [in Moscow] to the Foreign Office, 21 August 1943.
[57] Howard, p.527; FO 954/13: Sir R. Campbell to Foreign Office, 27 August 1943.
[58] Hinsley, *British Intelligence*, p.12, 107-108; Eisenhower quoted in Howard, p.226; FO 954/13: Macmillan to Foreign Office, 30 August 1943, Macmillan, p.385.
[59] Dodds-Parker, p.137; Imperial War Museum SOE Oral History Collection, Peter M. Lee, reel 7.
[60] HS 6/779: Massingham to Monkey, 30 August 1943; AD/E [Mockler-Ferryman] to AM [Dodds-Parker], 30 August 1943; Howard, pp.528-529.
[61] Robert Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors* (New York: Doubleday, 1964) p190.
[62] Hinsley, *British Intelligence*, pp.107-109; Howard, *Grand Strategy*, p.529.
[63] Macmillan, *Blast of War*, pp.390-392.
[64] Dodds-Parker, *Ablaze,* pp.137-138; Churchill quoted in Howard, *Grand Strategy,* p.528.
[65] Macmillan, *Blast of War*, p.389.
[66] Lamb, *Italy,* pp.17-19.
[67] Macmillan, *Blast of War*, p.395, Lamb, p.19.
[68] Keegan, *Second World War*, p. 352; Lamb, *Italy*, pp.20-21.
[69] Thomas Powers, *Intelligence Wars: American Secret History from Hitler to Al-Qaeda* (New York: NYRB, 2002) pp.222-226.
[70] Timothy Naftali, "Secrets of the Secret War," *The New York Times Book Review* 23 February 2003, p.13.
[71] Ellwood, *Italy,* p.9.
[72] John Keegan, *The Second World* War (London: Hutchinson, 1989) pp.349-355.
[73] Dodds-Parker, *Ablaze,* pp.137-138.

Chapter 4, *Maledetto*: The Anglo-American Secret War in Italy, September 1943 to December 1944

Introduction: Bravery and Maledetto

Maledetto – a 'cursed' or 'hexed' condition – is a recurring theme in Verdi's operas. For post-enlightenment composers like Verdi, a *maledetto* was not the product of malicious spirits or a fickle Providence: it was something human beings brought upon themselves. Overconfidence and lack of foresight were what led to disaster, not the caprice of heaven. Verdi's concept of *maledetto* serves as an apt leitmotiv for the Anglo-American secret war against fascism in Italy after the armistice with the Badoglio government in September 1943. Although the British and American clandestine services faced difficult operating conditions, many of their setbacks in Italy were self-inflicted. By refusing to alter ambitious plans when confronted by an unexpectedly challenging environment for covert action, they invited disaster. The individual bravery of the men involved could not rescue OSS and SOE from a *maledetto* of operatic proportions.

The Anglo-American secret services' failures had tragic consequences. These were rooted in banal issues of command authority, doctrinal experimentation, and the uniquely difficult operating conditions present in Italy. Although the OSS and SOE contingents based around Algiers had trained to infiltrate Italy throughout the first half of 1943 and made arrangements to establish forward bases on the mainland following the Salerno invasion in September, they were unprepared for operating conditions they faced, or the bureaucratic imbroglio that followed.

Unlike the establishment controversy at 'Massingham' in late 1942, and later during preparations for the secret war in southern France during the summer of 1944, these bureaucratic tensions were mainly intra-agency, rather than British-American. This is because the US and UK clandestine services never considered working together in Italy on a fully integrated basis, although they continued to share staging facilities outside Algiers. It was an arrangement that reduced Anglo-American tensions and jockeying for authority, but did not maximize the potential of Allied intelligence in Italy.[1]

The bureaucratic infighting was most severe within SOE. The SOE facility established west of Algiers ('Massingham') was originally envisioned as the

command, control and training center for all British special operations in the Western Mediterranean, including Italy. It had the advantage of proximity to the Supreme Allied Commander and Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ). After Allied forces seized control of southern Italy in September 1943 SOE created a forward base on the European mainland. Located at Monopoli, a small town outside Bari on the Adriatic Sea, this new establishment, code-named 'Maryland,' was expected to operate as an adjunct of the 'Massingham' system. But the leadership of the 'Maryland' enclave decided that unique local operating conditions, which could not be appreciated from distant Algiers, meant that Massingham's retention of day-to-day command authority was a hindrance. Although 'Massingham' had waged a similar struggle for autonomy with SOE executives in London during the winter of 1942 – 1943, it was initially unwilling to acknowledge the merits of Maryland's case. The result was a three-month period of bureaucratic infighting, further complicated by interference from SOE's London-based J (Italian) section, which had high-level contacts within the royalist government in Brindisi, and SOE Cairo, where the commanders of the British effort to supply Yugoslav partisans across the Adriatic were based. This unnecessary distraction undermined SOE's ability to come to grips with the complicated political, military, and geographic operating conditions in Italy.[2]

The OSS establishment, based initially in Algiers and outside Naples at Caserta, had a similar – albeit less acute – problem with bureaucratic infighting during the Italian campaign. In late 1943 there was a disagreement between the Special Operations (SO) and Secret Intelligence (SI) branches about how to work with the Italian resistance. Should OSS limit its aid to weapons and advice, or was it imperative to augment the partisans with American paramilitary forces? This dispute over tactics was not resolved until mid-1944, when a series of clandestine debacles and security breaches brought the OSS program in Italy into disrepute. Alarmed by these bloody failures, the Supreme Allied Commander for the Mediterranean, British General Maitland Wilson, stipulated that OSS adopt a more cautious approach to mission planning and agent vetting. This boosted the authority of the OSS counterintelligence organization (X-2) at the expense of SO and SI. By the end of 1944 X-2's young chief, James J. Angleton, effectively controlled most covert American activities on the peninsula. The audacious plan for sabotage, subversion and irregular warfare plotted by OSS Caserta and Algiers was shelved. This did not end the overall OSS campaign in Italy: Angleton allowed some meticulously planned

operations to continue, and in late April 1944 OSS Bern convinced German forces in Italy to surrender several days before the general European Armistice (operation 'Sunrise'). But it brought the covert effort run from OSS Algiers – and the forward station at Caserta – to an ignominious close.[3]

Yet even without the internal sniping, realizing the ambitious plans that OSS and SOE had devised for Italy would have been difficult. Harsh operating conditions – mountainous terrain that made dropping agents behind enemy lines difficult, effective enemy patrols along the coasts, a vicious civil war, and the fractious nature of the Italian Resistance – should have dictated caution. Instead SOE and OSS plunged ahead ambitiously and reaped the whirlwind. The OSS leadership was particularly irresponsible. Eager to earn prestige in Washington, it pursued its program for Operational Groups (OGs) even though the tactical situation in Italy was unsuitable for large commando formations. SOE was similarly inflexible in its policy toward the Italian resistance. Its initial insistence that all military aid to the partisans go through the Badoglio government, which was deeply unpopular with the non-royalist resistance, was a mistake. It encouraged more infighting within the fragile anti-fascist alliance. If OSS and SOE made it difficult for themselves with distracting internal battles, their tactics made the success of the secret campaign nearly impossible.

The Italian campaign from September 1943 through the winter of 1944 was more than a simple catalog of errors for the Anglo-American intelligence services, though. It also suggests the strategic limitations of special operations, a point that was overlooked by OSS and SOE leaders during the Second World War. Both agencies understood that in certain situations simple *coup de main* actions might be counterproductive. But more subtle tactics – encouraging partisan sniping and minor acts of sabotage – can also be self-defeating if they exacerbate political fissures in the resistance or precipitate massive enemy reprisals. Convinced of the near-universal applicability of guerrilla tactics and driven by an evangelical zeal to prove their worth to Allied commanders, OSS and SOE refused to believe that special operations were sometimes inappropriate. Unlike Verdi, they did not understand that even the noblest endeavors could be doomed from the start.

SOE's First Act, September 1943 to December 1943

During the waning months of 1943, the Anglo-American intelligence services scrambled to establish their credibility with the Italian Resistance – an ideologically diverse group that emerged after the September Armistice and German occupation of north-central Italy. Many of the first Resistance cadres were formed from units of the Italian Army stationed in German-controlled territory. Following the Armistice, these soldiers refused to lay down their arms or join the fascist forces loyal to Mussolini's puppet government at Salo, and turned against their erstwhile German comrades-in-arms. This spontaneous uprising was initially disorganized, and many of the competing factions refused to acknowledge any governing authority – least of all the vestigial royalist regime recognized by the Allies. Coordinating these squabbling resistance elements offered a stiff challenge. Instead of devoting their full attention to the problem, however, OSS and SOE were distracted by petty bureaucratic disputes over tactics and authority. This time the pettifogging was mainly internal – the establishment of 'Massingham' having taught the British and Americans that inter-Allied comity was necessary – yet it still undermined their plans for the resistance.[4]

The Allied armistice with the Badoglio government, which came only hours before the Anglo-American landings at Salerno on 8 September 1943, was the initial crisis that stoked the internal debate in OSS and SOE. The Armistice forged a political link between the Allies and the Italian King, Victor Emmanuel III – a man who had abetted Mussolini's fascist regime for two decades. The nascent resistance felt betrayed. For the Allies, it was a necessary evil. They lacked sufficient resources to fight both the German and Italian armies during their prospective drive from Salerno to Rome. The Armistice gave the offensive a chance to succeed. But the ham-fisted tactics of the American commander, Lt. General Mark Clark, and the alacrity of the Wehrmacht's riposte, brought the thrust from Salerno to a halt just north of Naples. Thus, the Anglo-Americans undermined their credibility with the resistance in exchange for a semi-alliance that proved barren in military terms.[5]

The outcome was especially frustrating for SOE. Since the previous autumn it had urged the British government to assist Badoglio in his attempts to undermine Mussolini. Yet Foreign Minister Anthony Eden had quashed the plan, limited SOE's contacts with other Italian dissidents and then dragged his feet on armistice negotiations after Mussolini's fall in May. These moves forced the Allies' eleventh-hour scramble to induce Badoglio to surrender, and eliminated the prospect of

meaningful military cooperation with the Italian army. Meanwhile, SOE had been left both discredited with the newly formed Italian Resistance, and out of touch with the suddenly heterogeneous political scene unleashed by the fall of the fascist dictatorship. To make matters worse, in late September the British government directed SOE to limit its assistance to Resistance cadres who failed to acknowledged the authority of Badoglio's Brindisi-based royalist government. SOE's J (Italian) Section in London thought this directive was a serious mistake – a reprise of the experience in Greece, where a similar policy had antagonized leftist guerillas and split the Resistance. But this was not a view shared by Whitehall or the SOE top brass in London, where, according to the official historian, W.J.M. Mackenzie, it was believed that "the vast majority of Italians looked to the king's government as the symbol of Italian patriotism." The 'Massingham' mission, near Algiers, accepted the official line, but the Monopoli offshoot, 'Maryland,' was with J Section. Political affinity was, if not the instigator, at least a contributing factor in the developing SOE schism.[6]

The first bone of contention between SOE Italy's competing factions, however, had less to do with high policy than more mundane issues of ambition, personality, and individual prestige. Lieutenant Colonel C.L. Roseberry, the head of J Section, had been involved in the approaches to Badoglio during early 1943 (plan 'Izzara'), and felt personally slighted by Whitehall's failure to make the most of these opportunities. Now, with a full-scale covert campaign in the offing, Roseberry was counting on CD's (Colin Gubbins') promise to make him "king in Italy" to remove this unwelcome interference. By dint of his greater experience in Italy, distinguished pre-war career at SIS (Section D) and political connections, Roseberry thought J Section should have full autonomy. 'Maryland' and its leader, Lieutenant Commander Gerard ('Gerry') Holdsworth RNVR, sympathized with this view, insofar as it promised a free hand for local commanders. But Holdsworth was wary of increasing Roseberry's influence. Maryland's billet involved helping SOE Cairo infiltrate men and materiel to guerillas in northern Italy and Yugoslavia; unlike 'Massingham,' J Section was relatively inexperienced outside the political sphere. Holdsworth was willing to bide his time, and gradually push 'Massingham' to relax its hold on Italian operations. Thus, while neither of the SOE senior officers in Italy was eager to accept direction from Algiers, they shied away from working together. Throughout the month of September they bided their time, and hoped that events would allow them to seize control of the situation. This ceded the initiative to the

'Massingham' commander, Colonel Douglas Dodds-Parker. He had a brief chance to establish an effective *modus operendi* with his fellow officers in Italy before the dispute spiraled out of hand.[7]

Colonel Dodds-Parker was no stranger to controversy. He had been at the forefront of the OSS-SOE dispute over 'Massingham' and regional primacy in North Africa after the 'Torch' operation of November 1942. During the summer of 1943, he circumvented the authority of the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) to help the Americans establish their own independent intelligence network in France (see chapter 7). At the same time, he and 'Massingham' had been instrumental in the clandestine negotiations that preceded the Italian Armistice. In each case the tall Coldstream Guards officer demonstrated a gift for improvisation, facility for building consensus, and iconoclastic streak that set him apart from his peers. But this time his judgment failed him.[8]

Dodds-Parker had good reasons for fighting to retain command authority over Italian operations in Algiers. 'Massingham' was close to Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ), so he could coordinate SOE activities with the Eisenhower's replacement as Supreme Allied Commander for the Mediterranean, General Maitland Wilson. 'Massingham' had the only large-scale facilities for storing supplies and training operatives in the region. Its FANY coders and radio operators made it capable of handling huge volumes of enciphered radio traffic from the field. Most importantly, however, Dodds-Parker did not think Holdsworth and Roseberry were ready for independent command. He thought the former was a great sailor and commando leader, but a political neophyte. Roseberry, for his part, was hotheaded, transparently ambitious, and – in Dodds-Parker's view – personally despicable. These assessments were possibly quite apt – particularly concerning Roseberry, who had a habit of blaming everyone but himself for setbacks. Yet Dodds-Parker lost sight of the most vital factor: the urgency of the developing crisis between SOE and the Italian Resistance. SOE needed someone who could assess and react instantly to events on the ground, rather than waiting for hours or days for instructions from abroad.[9]

The Resistance crisis was becoming acute. Representatives from six Italian anti-fascist parties had met in a bombed-out house in Milan on 9 September and agreed to form a *Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale* (National Liberation Committee, or CLN). The founding members of the CLN – the Liberal, Democrat, Action Party, Christian Democratic, Socialist and Communist factions – clearly intended to emulate

their French counterparts in Algiers. Unlike the French Resistance, however, they lacked a unifying, charismatic figure like de Gaulle. (Churchill, unimpressed by the leadership qualities of the liberal Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce, who SOE had rescued from the Germans, was fond of calling him the "dwarf professor.") Without a center of gravity, the Resistance began to fragment. Competing CLNs with different agendas sprang up in each region of the country. Some CLNs practiced responsible consensus decision-making, some were run like mini-Soviet politburos, and mafia bandits who cared more about profit than freedom dominated a few provincial committees. The British government encouraged the Resistance to accept Badoglio's leadership as long as the wartime emergency lasted, but the various CLNs objected vigorously. The six parties involved had been brutally repressed by the royalists during the so-called 'forty-five days' between the fall of Mussolini and the September Armistice. SOE would need to walk a delicate diplomatic tightrope to reconcile the CLNs, the Brindisi-based royalists, and the policy of the British government. Ensconced near Algiers, Dodds-Parker was ill-placed to track these issues. Yet each passing moment spent feuding over the SOE chain of command was another lost opportunity to build bridges to the Resistance.[10]

By mid-September the animus between Dodds-Parker and Roseberry had become so vicious that operations became nearly impossible. Their differences, which had smoldered throughout a pre-Armistice SOE summit at 'Massingham' on 1 September, exploded into the open after Dodds-Parker's visit to Brindisi two weeks later. Roseberry was openly contemptuous of his superior officer's lack of preparation for Italian operations, and accused him of withholding trained personnel from J Section out of spite. It was an inaccurate charge. SOE as a whole suffered from a shortage of native Italian-speakers, so there were no trained men available. Various attempts to rectify the situation by recruiting from the large pool of POWs taken in North Africa were rejected by the British government. Without men it was impossible to accomplish the Supreme Allied Commander's directive to impede German logistics on the peninsula, establish effective liaison with the partisans, or promote unity among the competing Italian CLNs. Roseberry was unwilling to wait for more resources. In late September he dispatched a radio operator from Brindisi to make contact with Resistance figures in Rome (operation 'Rudder'). Without air transport, however, J Section's man had to pass through enemy lines with the aid of a suspicious Italian guide and a surprisingly fleet "one-eyed horse." Amazingly, this

quixotic entourage made it to Rome, contacted the Resistance and began broadcasting. But Baker Street and 'Massingham' were sure that the whole story was too good to be true, and considered J Section "blown" to German intelligence. Roseberry did not give up, but his schemes during the remainder of 1943 were ineffectual. Embittered, he blamed Dodds-Parker.[11]

Elsewhere in Italy, the picture was almost as bleak for SOE. Holdsworth, with his more pragmatic approach toward issues of command, had worked with Dodds-Parker to ex-filtrate escaped Allied POWs from northern Italy via the Adriatic. There were other small successes. Captain Charles Mackintosh, Holdsworth's operations officer, established half-a-dozen small missions to the partisans. But without a large cadre of trained, Italian speaking agents, SOE felt relatively helpless to shape events or earn credit with the CLNs. Dodds-Parker blamed himself for these shortcomings, citing the distraction created by project 'Monkey' – the secret Armistice negotiations from July to September.[12]

Yet it is unlikely that more trained personnel would have resolved SOE's difficulties in Italy. Dodds-Parker thought that with SOE operatives to nurture and direct the Resistance – abetted by more Special Air Service (SAS) commandoes, who had only a small presence in Italy – he could have created a unified Italian Resistance force as effective as the French networks became during the summer of 1944. But the Civil War in Italy, its attendant political divisions, and widespread networks of fascist informants, made it easy for the Wehrmacht to locate and destroy large Resistance formations behind German lines. Without the pressure created by a massive conventional Allied offensive – present in France during the summer of 1944, generally absent in Italy during the period under review – German military, paramilitary and fascist forces were able to crush significant Resistance activity. As we have seen, SOE also had huge political (strained relations with the CLNs) and internal (disputes over policy and the chain of command) problems. These issues were not adequately addressed until January 1944. Even then, however, SOE found it difficult to prosecute its secret war. Its tactics were less than effective in an area defined by static battle lines, an ideologically fractured Resistance movement, and a savage civil war. By then, OSS – which had the trained men and resources that Dodds-Parker lacked – had already tasted defeat.[13]

The OSS Program in Italy, September to December 1943

News of the Armistice and simultaneous Allied assault on the Italian mainland on 8 September found the OSS contingent in Algiers aquiver with activity. It had been preparing to infiltrate Italy since the previous spring. Scores of highly motivated Italian-Americans were trained in the rudiments of subversive warfare and equipped from a large store of carefully stockpiled equipment. OSS had a dedicated, enthusiastic – albeit somewhat inexperienced – leadership contingent that was initially free of the personal feuding that plagued SOE. Most promisingly, it had developed a new plan for large-scale paramilitary warfare, utilizing squads of highly skilled operatives. These 'Operational Groups' (OGs) would be America's answer to Britain's commandos – men who had the brains to tackle the complex ideological issues involved in liaison work with the CLNs, and the brawn to surprise and overwhelm stronger enemy formations. Finally, OSS had escaped political micro-management from Washington. It was initially free to deal with all parties involved in the Italian Resistance, including the Communists and other anti-royalist elements. All in all, it was a picture that would have inspired envy in SOE counterparts like Dodds-Parker. But as OSS was soon to discover, even the best-laid plans are vulnerable to unexpected conditions.

OSS-SO (Special Operations Branch) had prepared to conduct a generic guerrilla campaign under favorable conditions. What it found in Italy was the same mess that hampered SOE operations: a politically fragmented Resistance movement, a sometimes ambivalent – even hostile – populace, an enemy capable of the most savage reprisals, and a static battlefront that limited the usefulness of large-unit tactics in enemy-controlled territory. Senior OSS officers in Italy were too slow to adapt or abandon ineffective tactics. The eventual result was tragedy.

The OG program is a case in point. Launched long before Allied military planners had plotted the invasion of Italy, the OGs were created in order to satisfy OSS's paramilitary ambitions, rather than to address particular operational conditions in Italy. Indeed, as originally outlined in a memo from SO boss Lt. Colonel Ellery C. Huntington to William Donovan in March 1943, the OGs were seen primarily as a means of stealing thunder from SOE/OSS/Free French 'Jedburgh' program, which Huntington thought "did not go far enough." The Jedburghs were three-man teams – two officers and a radio operator – designed to contact and direct resistance groups prior to a full-scale Allied assault on Nazi-occupied Europe. Huntington's OGs

would be "sufficiently large to operate alone in the event that contact" with the resistance "is not made." Heavily armed and trained the relevant local language, they would be "self-contained and powerful" enough to "carry out a mission without the aid of local sympathizers." These very strengths, however, created one glaring weakness for prospective OG units: as company-sized, uniformed formations, they would be relatively conspicuous to the enemy. Huntington acknowledged as much when he suggested that their principal use would be "at or near" an Allied invasion or massive offensive. Under pressure from a precipitous Allied advance, the Germans would not be able to concentrate on locating and destroying OGs in the rear. Yet at some point between the planning and execution stage, this vital caveat was forgotten. OGs became the backbone of OSS's special operations campaign in Italy, even though they were never designed to operate behind a static battlefront.[14]

But this oversight seemed insignificant in September 1943. During the first several months of the campaign, OGs had only a small role as OSS concentrated on building bases in Italy, cementing its relationship with the Resistance, and providing tactical intelligence to the Allied armies.

After a somewhat rocky start under Donald Downes – the Yale graduate, Spanish ops officer, and bane of Vichy bureaucrats in North Africa (see chapter 3) – OSS's SO branch had a few small, but politically important successes. Downes' successor, Lt. Colonel Russell Livermore, was more pragmatic on ideological issues than his leftist predecessor. Livermore was also committed to Huntington's OG scheme and worked with Colonel Edward F. Glavin – William Eddy's replacement as chief of OSS's regional operations in Algiers – to make OGs the centerpiece of SO-Branch's Italian effort. Their efforts seemed to pay off on 13 September when a team under the peripatetic White Russian émigré Colonel Serge Obolensky parachuted into Sardinia and 'liberated' the island from a large German garrison (operation 'Gilda'). In fact, 'Gilda' was a negotiation, not a guerilla action – the Germans had planned their withdrawal to France before Obolensky's arrival. But the Sardinia mission seemed to validate the OG concept. An OG team had dropped 'blind' into enemy territory, contacted friendly Italians, and achieved a result. The failure of subsequent SO schemes to supply partisans hunkered down in northern Italy during the winter months (operations 'Enterprise' and 'Valentine') did little to dampen their enthusiasm for the OG scheme.[15]

The Americans' Secret Intelligence (SI) Branch had a more troubled initiation in Italy. Under a pair of Italian-Americans, Vincent Scamporino and Max Corvo, SI worked hard to set up a pair of radio decryption bases at Caserta and Brindisi, gather useful intelligence for Allied commanders, and contact the Resistance. But a lack of regular communication with the most important CLNs in northern Italy hampered SI's effectiveness. Although their network of observers behind enemy lines became fairly proficient, and was praised by the US Army for its useful tactical intelligence, SI's strategic intelligence was woeful. On 27 September, for example, SI advised Clark's Army that, "the German defense line is largely bluff and consists of a few scattered fortifications." The assessment was wrong. The Nazi commander, Field-Marshal Albert Kesselring, had prepared a series of defensive positions, culminating in a strong redoubt between Garigliano and Cassino – the soon-to-be infamous 'Gustav Line' through the Cassino monastery. To bolster their deficient coverage in northern Italy, Scamporino and Corvo planned to insert nine SI teams along a line extending from the Alpine lakes along the Swiss border in the west, to the area abutting the Veneto and Trieste in the east. It was a risky scheme. SI's parachutists would be exposed to winter weather, on uneven mountain terrain, and four of the nine drops were 'blind' – without a 'reception committee' from the Resistance. Perhaps fortuitously, these missions were postponed by high winds in mid-December, and then scrubbed entirely when an intelligence coup by Allen Dulles in Switzerland made them redundant.[16]

From his office in Bern, Dulles had made contact with the main Italian CLN in Milan. In November Dulles and SOE's Swiss Bureau Chief John McCaffery began talks with non-Communist representatives of the Resistance. Through the delegation from the Milan CLN, which included the socialist future Prime Minister Ferruccio Parri, Dulles and McCaffery learned of suitable airdrop points for contacting and supplying the partisans. (The first OSS-SOE arms delivery was successfully carried out on 23 December.) They also encouraged the Resistance to work for greater political and ideological unity, a suggestion that bore fruit in January.[17]

OSS Italy was both pleased and slightly chagrined by these developments. Both SO and SI could use the Swiss conduit to coordinate their activities with the Resistance. The Italian partisans seemed serious about making a bid for political unity. But OSS Italy, which was based in Algiers, Caserta and Brindisi, was also leery of involvement by Dulles' Swiss Section. SI, in particular, had long seen Dulles

as a rival operator in the region, and was concerned that he might nose-in on their turf.[18] Still, with the nascent OG program on track and negotiations progressing with the Milan CLN, Scamporino and Corvo thought 1944 was shaping up as a banner year. Potential claimants on their time and authority, like Bern station and X-2 Branch, were reassuringly quiescent. Yet a storm was brewing just over the horizon.

Disaster and Consequences, January to June 1944

The calamitous setbacks suffered by OSS and SOE in the spring of 1944 struck the Anglo-American intelligence community like a bolt from the blue. The Nazi secret services identified several important missions, and many agents and Resistance fighters were killed. Allied intelligence chiefs were baffled at how an Italian campaign that looked promising in January could go so horribly wrong a few months later. For the most part, they ascribed their failures to sheer bad luck. But OSS and SOE had hurt themselves with poor tactical planning and petty bureaucratic infighting. An inherently difficult operating environment in Italy, especially relatively static battle lines that allowed the Nazis to devote attention to counterintelligence and counterinsurgency tactics, left the Anglo-Americans vulnerable. Moreover, concerned observers in the US Army and OSS X-2 (counterintelligence) Branch recognized the incipient danger and provided warnings, to no avail. To a large degree, the failures of OSS and SOE during the first half of 1944 were self-created, identifiable, and avoidable.

OSS Italy's ambitious agenda, greater resources and coherent leadership structure exposed the organization to more staggering reverses than its British counterparts. These came just as the climate for clandestine warfare in Italy appeared to improving. In January the Milan CLN, recognizing that the Italian Resistance needed a stronger central authority, restyled itself as the Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy (CLNAI). Although it was still hostile to the royalists, the new Committee was willing coordinate some of its activities with the Badoglio regime. By March, even the communists had accepted this pragmatic arrangement. It suddenly became easier for the Allies to work with the partisans. The weather cleared, improving the prospects for parachute drops. OSS even acquired the use of an Italian submarine, which it used to infiltrate 16 agents and radio sets into German-controlled territory. But like a cloudy red nimbus in the morning sky, there were some signals of a storm in the offing.[19]

An abrupt increase in the detection and apprehension of Allied agents behind enemy lines was the first hint of a problem. Scamporino's staff, assisted by X-2, determined that the enemy was zeroing in on SI's clandestine radios. The Gestapo had augmented the massive, random searches carried out by Italian Fascist militia with their own, more sophisticated techniques. In addition to radio triangulation from fixed listening stations, a few mobile direction-finding vehicles had arrived in Italy. Skilled veterans of the counterintelligence effort in France staffed these sinister black lorries as they trolled the countryside. The well-honed terrorist methods of the Nazi Party's security arm (the *Sicherheitsdienst* or SD), which had cowed the other captive nations of Europe, were beginning to have an effect on the Italian citizenry. Fewer Italians were willing to hazard their lives, and the lives of their families, for the Allied cause. Most ominously, Scamporino's staff detected an increase in the enemy's efforts to penetrate OSS missions. They recommended tightening the security procedures applied to Italians recruited by American intelligence – a precaution that had been ignored in SI's haste to expand its Italian network.[20]

The German counterintelligence offensive stimulated questions in Washington about the wisdom of OSS's ambitious Italian plans – particularly regarding the use of OG units. The OSS personnel division in Washington cabled Colonel Glavin in early February to report that the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) was concerned about the OGs. In their view SO Branch and the theatre commanders (Wilson and British General Harold Alexander) had "a tendency to assign [the OGs] tactical missions which, while important, could nevertheless be done by other troops." This was creating confusion about the tactical role of the OGs and how they were to be employed. The OGs were specialist units, meant to be used behind the lines in strategically critical situations – like prior to a massive Allied assault – not as ordinary patrol or sabotage teams.[21]

In other words, OSS resources were being squandered and OG squads endangered on assignments that were not worth the risk. Although Donovan's Personnel Division implied that the theatre commanders were to blame for misusing the OGs, OSS Italy was ultimately responsible. Huntington's original blueprint for OSS's OG formations was perhaps partly at fault for its vague, optimistic vision about the impact that large, "self-sustaining" guerilla groups could have behind enemy lines. But he had been absolutely clear on one point: OG units should only be deployed to abet a massive Allied invasion, not behind a static battlefront. The consequences of

inserting conspicuous, uniformed paramilitary units behind the lines in Italy – into the arms of a prepared, undistracted enemy counterintelligence service – were potentially dire.[22]

For a few months the Italian OG program survived its flirtation with disaster. Livermore's command staged a dozen small-boat raids along the Tyrrhenian coastline during the first quarter of the year. The object was to stoke German fears of another amphibious landing and force the Wehrmacht to garrison the Mediterranean beaches instead of concentrating its troops against the Allies in the south. (The Germans were on heightened alert after the Allied assault on Anzio, south of Rome, in January.) But the plan did not work; Kesselring continued his stubborn defense of Cassino. Without this strategic justification, Livermore's campaign was little more than a series of *coup de main* sabotage missions, unsupported by the Italian Resistance, against German-controlled railroads – a tactic that SOE had abandoned in France by the end of 1940. Apart from cementing a solid working relationship with North Africa-based French commando units, who sometimes accompanied the OGs, the raids were pointless pinpricks that had no effect on the Nazi war machine.[23]

This growing sense of futility made it more difficult for morale at OSS Italy to recover when its good luck finally ran out. On 21 March an OG sabotage mission, code-named 'Ginny,' was launched against a railroad tunnel along the Spezia-Genoa line in northern Italy. The plan was to insert a team (two officers and thirteen Italian-American men from the New York area) by PT (torpedo) boat at 2300 hours, give them three hours to destroy the nearby tunnel, and extract them by 0230 at the latest. But OSS had staged a similar, unsuccessful, operation in the same area several weeks earlier, and the Germans were waiting for them. The commander of the PT boat crew, Captain Al Materazzi, was the first to notice something was amiss. Materazzi and his crew remained in the boat while the OGs went ashore. At 2345, right after the OGs radioed in to report reaching the target, the lights at the nearby Framura train station were suddenly switched off. Materazzi heard shouts and the sound of moving vehicles from the darkened shoreline, before a green flare shot into the air above his PT boat. Deprived of cover, Materazzi and his sailors retreated. When they tried to return the following night and search for the OGs, a Nazi E-Boat patrol chased them out to sea. OSS feared that 'Ginny' had been captured. The true story was much worse. Hitler had issued a directive at the beginning of 1944 ordering his troops to execute any "commando vermin," whether they wore uniforms (and thus came under

the protection of the Geneva convention) or not. On 26 March the local Wehrmacht divisional commander, General Anton Dostler, had every member of the 'Ginny' team shot and buried in a secret mass grave. "Vinny Russo [the OG leader for 'Ginny'] and I were like brothers," Materazzi recalled. "When the German officers responsible were brought to trial after the war, I asked if I could command the firing squad." Many other SO Branch members felt the same way, but faulty OSS tactics might have also been a contributing factor.[24]

Meanwhile, the OSS-SI campaign also experienced severe reverses. In late April X-2 and British intelligence (SIS) discovered that an SI operative, Princess Maria Pignatelli, was a German double agent. When she had presented herself to Scamporino's outfit earlier in the year, her enthusiasm for espionage, high-level fascist contacts, and pre-war relationship with William Donovan's law firm persuaded SI to offer her employment with few questions asked. After winning her way deep into SI's confidence, she stole important classified documents and absconded behind enemy lines. At first both SI and Donovan refused to believe that Pignatelli had gone over to the enemy. Using 'ultra' decrypts, however, X-2 and SIS's Special Counterintelligence (SCI) units proved that she was guilty. Dulles added insult to injury when one of his German agents revealed that Pignatelli had spoken directly to Kesselring and Mussolini "about the secret Fascist and military organization which has been organized by her husband in southern Italy." SI had been duped. Worse, an OSS-SI network with the Italian Resistance in Rome was rounded up and destroyed at the same time. X-2 and SCI scrambled to contain further fallout from the Pignatelli affair.[25]

SOE managed to avoid the major disasters that struck OSS Italy during the first half of 1944 – but only because its leadership structure was still too disorganized to mount operations on the same scale. SOE had setbacks, to be sure, but given its almost impotent position in early January, simply avoiding any serious calamities was something of an accomplishment. There were two key factors in this small success. First, the struggle over authority in Italy had been somewhat resolved. At Dodds-Parker's request, CD (Gubbins) named Major John Anstey to replace him as commander at 'Massingham,' leaving Dodds-Parker as SOE's liaison to General Wilson's staff in Italy. This gave Dodds-Parker a great deal of influence at AFHQ in Caserta, and ended his responsibility over operational planning. Holdsworth's authority was correspondingly increased (although his attentions were now firmly

focused on the clandestine campaign in Yugoslavia), while Roseberry's was diminished. The backbiting was under control. Second, Harold Macmillan, whose powers as British Resident Minister in Algiers now encompassed Italy as well as French North Africa, prodded the British government to assume a more pragmatic policy on supplying arms to leftist elements of the Resistance. Although Macmillan shared Whitehall's concern that these guns might eventually be used for "revolutionary and political rather than military" purposes, he thought that underutilizing the Resistance while the Wehrmacht remained dangerous was foolhardy. On this issue, once again, Macmillan's principal antagonist was Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden – but for much of 1944 the Resident Minister's view prevailed. Macmillan's influence, and Holdsworth's leadership, allowed SOE to get its program in Italy off the ground. The results were very modest, at best. But the reduced scale of SOE's ambitions in Italy was a blessing in disguise. Dodds-Parker's recollections make it clear that if SOE had enjoyed the same resources as its OSS counterparts, it would have embarked on a similar, large-scale guerilla program – which might have been vulnerable to the same reverses experienced by the OGs.[26]

Thus, SOE's minor achievements in the context of a hostile operating environment were somewhat lucky. The strongest areas of improvement were in logistics, communications and training, which mainly benefited operations in other theatres (e.g., Yugoslavia). In May, an SOE observer from London was impressed by Holdsworth's parachute-packing facilities at Brindisi and Monopoli, which could handle up to 1,000 'packages' (caches of munitions and other supplies) per day. During the previous month 'Maryland' and its satellite bases had produced some 30,000 'parcels' for airdrop behind enemy lines. But these were mostly bound for Yugoslavia and Greece. Within Italy itself – the only area where 'Maryland' enjoyed authority over operational planning – progress was more halting. Collectively, the various CLNs operating in north-central Italy were beginning to annoy the Germans with their constant raids and acts of sabotage. At General Alexander's headquarters, the Allied Armies in Italy (AAI) staff took note. An AAI report on the military utility of the Resistance in May concluded that…

> If anyone is heard saying 'Those Partisans are just an infernal nuisance' or 'What do the Partisans do, anyway, beneath all this swagger' he might be asked 'Have you thought just what it would be like if we had them to cope with instead of the enemy?'

The AAI's message here – that the Italian Resistance was not useless – might have been gratifying to SOE. But the implication that such aspersions were common among the Anglo-Americans hints at a lack of progress in the clandestine war in Italy. This puts SOE's accomplishments in perspective.[27]

Yet the same SD net that had dogged OSS caught some of SOE's best men. During the spring of 1944 two of its most promising Resistance circuits, 'Balaclava,' based in Genoa, and 'Franchi,' in Milan, were either destroyed or seriously compromised by Nazi counterintelligence. While SOE could boast that it had avoided reverses on the same scale as the Americans, it had hardly proved that special operations could make a significant strategic contribution in Italy.[28]

The consequences of the Anglo-American intelligence community's springtime setbacks were far-reaching. OSS was severely censured by AFHQ. Maitland Wilson's chief of staff, Lt. General J.A.H. Gammell, sent a stinging memo to Donovan and Alexander on 7 May. Referring obliquely to the Pignatelli and 'Ginny' disasters, Gammell noted, "these cases show faulty training methods, lack of proper supervision and failure to investigate the bona fides of agents." Henceforward, X-2 and British SCI (Special Counterintelligence Units) would have a major role scrutinizing the agents and methods employed by OSS. Otherwise the Army would be forced to withhold its "facilities... now available for placing agents in enemy-occupied territory." Gammell's penalty, if implemented, would have effectively ended the American clandestine campaign in Italy. Although SOE was neither faulted nor warned by Gammell, his memo still had an impact on the British service. SOE and OSS operated autonomously in Italy, but they had many overlapping, mutually dependent missions behind the lines. SOE needed its American partner.[29]

Thus, Gammell's memo came as a body blow to both services. It heralded the rapid ascent of the Anglo-American counterintelligence sections in Italy: OSS's semi-autonomous X-2 Branch and British SCI (a creature of SOE's deadly rival, SIS). X-2's position was particularly enhanced. Under the leadership of Andrew Berding and then (after October 1944) James Angleton, X-2 began to assert effective operational control over many SI and SO missions (see chapter 5). The other major beneficiaries of Gammell's new regime in Italy were the OSS and SOE commands in Switzerland. After May 1944, Dulles and McCaffery played increasingly large roles in organizing

the Italian Resistance, while the OSS and SOE commands that had migrated to Italy from Algiers after the September 1943 Armistice experienced a relative decline in authority.

Decline to Irrelevance, June to December 1944

During the second half of 1944, OSS and SOE attempted to restore their Italian operations after the blows they had suffered earlier in the year. On a strictly numerical basis, they succeeded: the Anglo-American intelligence community sent more missions behind German lines and supplied the Italian partisans with more war materiel than ever before. But these figures do not tell the whole story. The OSS and SOE organizations that were incubated in Algiers during the summer of 1943 lost much of their influence in Italy after the summer of 1944. The troubled history of the clandestine campaign in Italy had a role in their decline. Rivals within the Allied intelligence system – like Allen Dulles in Bern and James Angleton at X-2 Italy – used it as a pretext to claim more authority over Italian operations. Yet it was the British/American/French invasion of the south of France in August (Operation 'Anvil' or 'Dragoon') that signaled the beginning of the end for the secret war in Italy. In the wake of 'Dragoon,' the Italian theatre lost its strategic relevance in the context of the overall military campaign against Hitler. Political concerns – particularly the ideological character of the postwar Italian government – came to the fore. The Anglo-American allies, always chary of tipping the political balance to the left, became reluctant to supply the Resistance with weapons that might end up in the hands of communist revolutionaries, and invented the excuses they needed to end unconditional cooperation with the Italian partisans. Time had run out on the clandestine campaign in Italy.

OSS Italy experienced the first, and most severe, decline in authority. Even as more operations were being plotted at Caserta and Bari, control was migrating to the Dulles organization in Switzerland. On 19 August the Reports Office (RO) for OSS Italy in Algiers described this trend in a memo to its commander, T.S. Ryan. Over the previous six weeks the RO had logged 213 "intelligence items" submitted by 14 SI and SO networks in northern Italy. Yet only "approximately 52% [of the 'intel' reports] came directly from [OSS Italy to Algiers]… the remaining 48% via Bern or Bern and London." In other words, Dulles was now acting as reporting center and controller for roughly half of the American clandestine network in Italy. The Algiers-

based networks of OSS Italy, and their forward bases at Caserta and Brindisi, were fading in importance. Even these figures overrated OSS Italy's importance compared to its competitors. As the summer of 1944 wore on, Berding and Angleton exerted increasingly direct control over all SI and SO operations. When it could, X-2 informally superceded Scamporino, Corvo and Livermore and ran its own covert penetration missions. By the end of 1944 Angleton and Dulles, not the OSS staff at Caserta and Brindisi, effectively ran much of the American intelligence effort in the country.[30]

Meanwhile, SOE's work was also declining in importance even as it expanded operations in the Italian theatre. Seventeen British missions, including some 37 SOE officers, were inserted behind the lines between June and September. William Mackenzie suggests that the presence of British operatives may explain the Italian partisans' increased military effectiveness during the period. But good weather and the May Allied offensive that led to the capture of Rome in June (Operation 'Diadem') were greater boons to the Resistance than SOE. By distracting the Wehrmacht, the summertime fighting allowed the partisans to raid and sabotage unmolested. Once the Germans had reached their secure winter fortifications along the Pisa-Rimini ('Gothic') Line, the counterstroke against the guerillas was furious. It fell heaviest against the so-called 'Free Domodossola Republic,' a mountainous area near the Swiss border where communist-dominated guerillas had routed the German garrison in August. Yet in October 1944 a small mixed force of SS and Italian Fascist militia reclaimed the area and carried out brutal reprisals. Italian Resistance leaders felt that OSS and SOE had abandoned them in their hour of need, perhaps because the local communist partisans had refused to take direction from Badoglio's government. What they could not know was that, for policymakers in London and Washington, the Resistance had already outlived its usefulness.[31]

The British government had long been leery of its dealings with the Italian left, and with the war drawing to a close the United States adopted a similar view. Robert Murphy, who had moved from North Africa to become President Roosevelt's political plenipotentiary in Italy, thought "Allied support of the Communist guerillas... helped make Communism respectable again in Italy." Murphy's rightwing leanings led him to this predictable epiphany. But support for the hardening US position on cooperation with the Resistance quickly was pervasive throughout the OSS ranks. According to OSS-SO Major William White,

> The partisans I was working with were 20 per cent for liberation and 80 per cent for Russia. We soon found they were burying arms to save them for use after the war was over and the Americans had pulled out.... As a result of my frequent protests, I discovered that the local communist political commissar was plotting to have me murdered.

British suspicion of communist intentions in Italy, already high, skyrocketed in December after the outbreak of a civil war in Greece led by communist guerillas. Thus, OSS and SOE were forced to pursue a less ambitious cooperative program with the Resistance. Large-scale partisan bands, like those of the short-lived 'Domodossola Republic' would be discouraged. The Resistance would henceforward confine itself to minor acts of sabotage and subversion. On 13 November General Alexander brought the point home to the partisans during a broadcast over radio '*Italia Combatte*.' With the Allied offensive halted until spring, the Resistance – to use one SOE officer's colorful paraphrase – "might as well pack up and go home."[32]

The Anglo-American allies continued to gather intelligence and engage in special operations in Italy after the Alexander broadcast. Clearly, however, the opportunity for clandestine warfare to influence the conflict in military terms was over. A campaign that seemed to offer such promise in 1943 had ended in *maledetto*.

Conclusion

The OSS/SOE sponsored secret war in Italy, conducted from Algiers, Brindisi and Monopoli, was largely a failure: it had no significant impact on the enemy's capacity to wage war, and was de-emphasized by AFHQ five months before the official cessation of hostilities. Responsibility for this debacle mostly rests with the agencies themselves. Poor planning, petty squabbles over authority, and an inability to tailor operations to local conditions undermined the OSS and SOE missions that had migrated to Italy from Algiers during the summer of 1943. Not all the challenges posed by the Italian theatre were caused by internal faults in the Anglo-American intelligence community, however: bad weather, mountainous terrain (which impeded parachute drops), and a politically fractious Resistance movement all contributed to failure. Even so, planning officers at SOE, OSS could have recognized these potential pitfalls, and adjusted their program of action accordingly. A modest clandestine program might have more successful and led to fewer losses. Instead, the secret warfare agencies adopted tactics that were more appropriate for other theatres: the

setbacks of the OSS-OG force in Italy serve as a case in point. Large-scale guerrilla warfare is more appropriate in some situations than in others, as OSS learned to its cost. While OSS and SOE were struggling through the Italian campaign during the latter half of 1944, the same agencies, using almost identical tactics, were experiencing their greatest triumphs in France.

Not all segments of the Anglo-American intelligence community struggled during the Italian war, however. The OSS and SOE chiefs of station in Bern, Allen Dulles and John McCaffery, were responsible for establishing a working understanding with the Italian Resistance that lasted for most of 1944, and ran large operations in Italy. But the greatest success story of Italian war was the experience of James Angleton and OSS counterintelligence (X-2). His tale, and the sometimes-antagonistic X-2 relationship with the OSS Algiers offshoots in Italy, is the subject of the next chapter.

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[1] William J.M. Mackenzie, *The Secret History of SOE: The Special Operations Executive, 1940-1945* (London: St. Ermin's Press, 2000) pp.545-549; Allied counterintelligence, as the next chapter explains, did operate on a integrated Anglo-American basis, and probably benefited accordingly.

[2] Mackenzie, *SOE*, p.547; Peter Wilkinson and Joan Bright Astley, *Gubbins and SOE* (London: Leo Cooper, 1993) pp.151-152.

[3] Angleton's accretion of authority in Italy at the expense of OSS Algiers is explained in the next chapter.

[4] Luciano Casella, *The European War of Liberation: Tuscany and the Gothic Line*, Jean M. Ellis D'Alessandro, trans. (Florence: La Nuova Europa, 1983), p.43; Philip Cooke, "Introduction," in Philip Cooke, ed. *The Italian Resistance: An Anthology* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997) p.4.

[5] Cooke, Resistance, p.6; C.J.C. Molony, The History of the Second World War: Vol. V, The Mediterranean and the Middle East (London: HMSO, 1973) pp.326-329; John Keegan, The Second World War (London: Pimlico, 1989 [1997]) pp.293-294.

[6] SOE Italy War Diary, [Lt. Colonel Roseberry], p.20, HS 7/58; Mackenzie, *SOE*, pp.460-467, 545-546; Cooke, *Resistance*, p.6; Richard Lamb, *War in Italy, 1943-1945: A Brutal Story* (London: John Murray, 1993) pp.203-203, 217. Note: this chapter includes citations from two different SOE Italy war diaries. They represent the views of competing SOE factions in the dispute over tactics and command authority during the autumn and winter of 1943. The first was framed by Lt. Colonel Roseberry, commander of J Section, who operated out of the Badoglio government compound in Brindisi and at SOE headquarters in London. The second document was created by Lt. Commander Jerry Holdsworth's 'Maryland' section at Monopoli. To avoid confusion, the appropriate faction leader's name is indicated in brackets following each citation of his version of events. Mackenzie, *SOE*, pp.546-548; Douglas Dodds-Parker, *Setting Europe Ablaze: An Account of Some Ungentlemanly Warfare* (London: Springwood, 1983) p.142; SOE Italy War Diary, [Lt. Commander Holdsworth], p.65, HS 7/58.

[7] Gubbins had replaced Charles Hambro as CD at the end of summer, 1943. Gubbins quoted in SOE Italy War Diary, [Roseberry], pp.17-19, 23; SOE Italy War Diary, [Holdsworth], p.66, HS 7/58.

[8] Wilkinson and Astley, *Gubbins*, pp.145-146.

[9] Mackenzie, *SOE*, pp.547-548; Dodds-Parker, *Ablaze*, pp.144-145; *SOE* Italy War Diary, [Roseberry], pp.17-19

[10] Factional infighting and the lack of a generally acknowledged leader plagued the Italian Resistance throughout its history. Charles F. Delzell, "The Italian Anti-Fascist Resistance in Retrospect: Three Decades of Historiography," in *The Journal of Modern History* 47/1 (March 1975) pp.73-74; Basil Davidson, *Scenes From the Anti-Nazi War* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1980) p.36; Mackenzie, *SOE*

History, p.549; Churchill quoted in Cooke, *Resistance*, p.6; Casella, *Liberation*, p.50; SOE Italy War Diary, [Roseberry], pp.17-18, HS 7/58; Dodds-Parker, *Ablaze*, p.145.

[11] Minutes of a Meeting Held at Club des Pins ['Massingham'] at 1000 Hours, 1 September 1943, NARA RG 226, entry 97, box 41, folder 714; OSS/SOE Activities in the NORTH AFRICAN Theater [including Italy] and in SOUTHERN FRANCE, 18 August 1943, RG 226, entry 97, box 39, folder 665; Dodds-Parker, *Ablaze*, p.147; SOE Italy War Diary, [Roseberry], pp.15-17, HS 7/58.

[12] SOE Italy War Diary, [Holdsworth], p.70, HS 7/58; Charles Mackintosh, *From Cloak to Dagger: An SOE Agent in Italy* (London: William Kimber, 1982) p.30; Dodds-Parker, *Ablaze*, pp.145-147.

[13] Dodds-Parker, *Ablaze*, p.145.

[14] Memo from Huntington to Donovan: Auxiliary Operations Groups, 6 March 1943, RG 226, entry 97, box 3, folder 26.

[15] Max Corvo, *The OSS in Italy, 1942-1945: A Personal Memoir* (London: Praeger, 1990) pp.105-107, 114-115; Robin Winks, *Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War* (New York: William Morrow, 1987) pp207-209; Report on OSS Activities in Corsica and Sardinia, 23 November 1943, RG 226, entry 97, box 6, folder 89; Air Transport Operations Report, 30 November 1943, RG 226, entry 97, box 45, folder 791. Also note that Glavin's appointment was a consequence of the creation of SPOC (the Special Projects Operations Center) and reorganization of OSS Algiers during the summer and fall of 1943. Chapter VIII had more details; also see Bradley F. Smith, *Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins of the CIA* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1983) p.228.

[16] Review of Situation in Italy, 27 September 1943, RG 226, entry 97, box 15, folder 270; Albert Kesselring, *The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Kesselring* (London: William Kimber, 1953) pp.186-187; OSS Operations, 6 December 1943; Minutes of Meeting – Intelligence Operations into Northern Italy, 8 December 1943, RG 226, entry 97, box 40, folder 710.

[17] Bradley Smith, *Shadow Warriors,* pp.203-205.

[18] Corvo, *OSS in Italy*, pp.32-33, 185.

[19] Lamb, *Italy*, pp.204-206; Memo on Clandestine Transportation, 12 January 1944, RG 226, entry 97, box 6, folder 88.

[20] Report and Summary History: Services Existing in North Italy Up to July 1943 for the Discovery of Parachutists and Clandestine Radios, undated, RG 226, entry 190, 6/4/03, box 179, folder 1394. For more on SS/SD techniques of control, psychological terror, and punishment see Ian Kershaw, *Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis* (London: Allen Lane, 2000) pp.233-252; Robert O. Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism* (London: Allen Lane, 2004) pp135-157.

[21] Memo from Huntington to Donovan: Auxiliary Operations Groups, 6 March 1943, RG 226, entry 97, box 3, folder 26; Memo to Colonel E.J.F. Glavin: Industrial Sabotage in NATO, 8 February 1944, RG 226, entry 97, box 41, folder 716.

[22] Memo from Huntington to Donovan: Auxiliary Operations Groups, 6 March 1943, RG 226, entry 97, box 3, folder 26.

[23] Anthony Cave Brown, *The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan* (London: Michael Joseph, 1982) p.474; Mackenzie, *SOE History,* p.84; Kesselring, *Memoirs*, pp.194-195; Report of BALKIS II Operation, 18-19 March 1944, RG 226, entry 97, box 6, folder 89.

[24] Report of the Ginny Operation, 27 March 1944, RG 226, entry 97, box 2, folder 9; Brown, *Last Hero*, pp.476-483; Ian Dear, *Sabotage and Subversion: Stories from the Files of SOE and OSS* (London: Arms and Armour, 1996) p.173; Materazzi quoted in Russell Miller, *Behind the Lines: The Oral History of Special Operations in World War II* (London: Secker and Warburg, 2002) pp.198-199.

[25] Notes on Co-Operation Between CIC and X-2(SCI) in Italy, 14 August 1944, RG 226, Entry 126A, 190/B/6/6, Box 2; Brown, *Last Hero*, pp.499-503.

[26] Wilkinson and Astley, *Gubbins*, pp.164-167; SOE Italy War Diary, [Roseberry], pp.19-20, HS 7/58; Harold Macmillan, *War Diaries: Politics and War in the Mediterranean* (London: Macmillan, 1984) pp.470-471, 584; Dodds-Parker, *Ablaze*, p.145

[27] Memo: AM1 [Bickham Sweet-Escott?] to AM144, 2 May 1944, RG 226, entry 97, box 38, folder 651; AAI report quoted in Lamb, *Italy*, p.208.

[28] Mackenzie, *SOE History*, pp.550-551.

[29] Security of Agents Memo, Lt. General J.A.H. Gammell, 7 May 1944, Entry 126A, 190/B/6/6, Box 2; SOE Italy War Diary, [Roseberry], pp.119-120, HS 7/58.

[30] Memo to T.S. Boyle – Reports Officer, 19 August 1944, RG 226, entry 97, box 30, folder 515; Notes on Co-Operation Between CIC and X-2(SCI) in Italy, 14 August 1944, RG 226, Entry 126A, 190/B/6/6, Box 2; Corvo, *OSS in Italy,* pp.262-263; for more on X-2's rise see Chapter VII. Although beyond the scope of this survey, Timothy Naftali details Angleton's tug-of-war with Scamporino over the infamous 'Vessel' hoax in "Artifice: James Angleton and X-2 Operations in Italy," in George C.

Chalou, ed. *The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II* (Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration, 1992) pp.230-234.

[31] Mackenzie, *SOE History*, pp.551-552; Matthew Jones, *Britain, the United States and the Mediterranean War, 1942-44* (London: Macmillan/St. Antony's, 1996) pp.186-189; *Lamb*, *Italy*, pp.215-220.

[32] Robert Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors* (New York: Doubleday, 1964) p.216; White quoted in Miller, *Behind the Lines*, p.197; Davidson, *The Anti-Nazi War*, pp.239-240.

Chapter 5: The Angletons, OSS Counterintelligence, and the Decline of the Algiers-based Networks in Italy, 1943-1944

Why was American Counterintelligence Relatively Effective in Italy?

The previous chapter detailed OSS's misadventures in Italy from the lost opportunity of project 'Monkey' in September 1943, through the winter of 1944. During this period, both major field branches of the American espionage agency experienced reverses. OSS Secret Intelligence (SI) had difficulty recruiting and maintaining reliable Italian agents due the vicious civil war waged by irregulars behind the lines. Rugged terrain and the dense population of northern Italy complicated the insertion of agents by boat or parachute. The OSS Special Operations Branch (SO) had all of these problems and more: its experiment with OG (Operational Group) commandos in Italy went horribly wrong. Men died as a result. By late 1944, these setbacks and the resulting clampdown by AFHQ sent the Italian offshoots of OSS Algiers, based at Caserta and Brindisi, into steep decline.

The problem was that while Donovan's organization had a genius for improvisation, it was poor at self-examination. In the intelligence world this is known as the "feedback response:" analyzing which methods are appropriate in a given situation, separating what works from what does not. Instead of performing this analysis, and tailoring its tradecraft to local conditions – including a generally static front line – OSS blamed most of its troubles on poor security. A large-scale expansion of the British-American counterintelligence (CI) effort in Italy ensued. Eventually, X-2 gained *de facto* control over most OSS SO and SI activities in Italy that had formerly been the province of the Algiers networks. This chapter explains how the Algiers-legacy networks in Italy were commandeered by X-2.[1]

OSS's X-2 (counterintelligence) branch enjoyed a relatively successful Italian campaign, although its efforts did not alleviate the problems that beset the rest of OSS Italy. This was, in part, because the very conditions that hampered SI and SO were a boon to counterintelligence work. The civil war and relatively static battle lines gave X-2 the time it needed to work. The primary object was to deceive the enemy – by 'turning' its agents and generating a plausible stream of false information – while protecting Allied covert operators from a similar fate. While X-2 could not prevent the capture of many SO/SI agents, its deception program was broadly successful.

This result, according to the surviving records, was the product of favorable conditions, X-2's capacity (unusual in OSS) to learn from mistakes, the confidence of the US Army, and close cooperation with British intelligence.[2]

Indeed, excellent personal relations between American counterintelligence officers and their British counterparts were probably the most important component of X-2's Italian campaign. Like SOE and OSS-SO in France (see chapters 6 and 8), closely integrated Anglo-American CI operations in Italy allowed for significantly improved time and resource management. More importantly, however, the trust that developed on both sides was essential for the most secret, sensitive aspect of their work: checking whether intelligence agents in the field had been 'turned' by using 'ultra' material to verify their reports. 'Ultra' was a powerful tool: if a 'doubled' agent was identified, he could be fed false information that would deceive the enemy. But misusing this resource might jeopardize the Anglo-American CI program in Italy – even the integrity of the 'ultra' project itself. SIS needed to have absolute confidence in the ability and discretion of the Americans involved in X-2.[3]

British intelligence did come to trust X-2, possibly because OSS's CI branch was filled with Anglophiles from its Chief, James Murphy, on down. The man who assumed control of the Italian desk at X-2's London headquarters in late 1944, eventually commanded all of its Italian operations, and went on to become a legendary (and infamous) figure in CIA counterintelligence, was perhaps the greatest Anglophile of all. His name was James J. Angleton. With help from his father, the OSS X-2 officer Major James H. Angleton, he made the relationship with the British work, learned the techniques of deception from SIS tutors, and applied them effectively in Italy. The history of OSS counterintelligence in Italy is largely the story of the Angletons, father and son.

X-2, 'Ultra' and the 'Doublecross' System

Historians, relying upon official sources, assumed for years that X-2's high degree of autonomy relative to the rest of OSS was doctrinally inspired. The CI branch's separate communications system, insulation from the regular OSS chain of command, and power to veto SI/SO missions without explanation were seen as the product of good information management and counterintelligence practice. Recent US government disclosures, however, paint a different picture. X-2's operations were ring-fenced from the rest of OSS primarily because the British SIS insisted that it

would not share 'most secret' material (i.e., 'ultra' product from Bletchley Park) unless American security was airtight. The British built the 'Chinese walls' between X-2 and the rest of OSS – including the Algiers-based networks in Italy.[4]

Donovan and X-2 chief James Murphy went along with SIS because they realized their organization had much to learn from the British about counterintelligence theory and tradecraft. Unlike special operations, where SOE enjoyed only a two year lead on OSS-SO in experience, and secret (human) intelligence, where brilliant case officers like Henry Hyde (see chapter 7) were rapidly closing the gap with SIS, British counterintelligence was superior to the American equivalent in most respects. The British command of 'deception' theory was particularly advanced. 'Deception' reached its apogee during the War with SIS and MI5's masterful manipulation of German intelligence in the British Isles. This was the fabled 'Double-Cross' system.

'Double-Cross' involved the capture and manipulation of Nazi agents. Through the use of deception tactics, MI5 and SIS were able to round up the Nazi spy network in Britain, intercept incoming agents, and thereby control the content of the intelligence product received in Berlin. This gave the Allies a powerful card to play during crucial strategic gambits like the invasion of Normandy in 1944. 'Double-Cross' allowed British intelligence to use German agents to further its own ends: like giving the Wehrmacht false information on the timing and location of the D-Day invasion of France. These tactics saved the lives of countless Allied soldiers and civilians.[5]

Yet in order for 'Double-Cross' to work, MI5's chain of Nazi double agents in Britain had to establish a reputation for reliability within German intelligence, the Obercommando des Wehrmachts (German Army High Command, or OKW) and the mind of the Fuehrer. A good portion of its reporting needed to be accurate: to tell a few big falsehoods, the 'Double-Cross' system had to lull Berlin with a steady stream of small truths. In wartime, however, giving accurate information to the enemy could get people killed. This created a serious moral dilemma. Who would be charged with making this starkly utilitarian calculus, and decide what objects (and lives) to sacrifice for the greater good?

With Winston Churchill's blessing, a body known as the W (i.e., Wireless) Board was established in October 1940 to deal with the problem. Although staffed by senior Whitehall figures (including SIS chief Stewart Menzies and the head of MI5's

counterespionage section, Guy Liddell) it operated separately from the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and seems to have lacked close ministerial oversight. This gave its actions a level of what would later be dubbed 'plausible deniability': if anything went public, the government could disclaim responsibility. The high-level mandarins on the W Board had many other duties, so their deputies handled the day-to-day business. The regular deputies meeting became known as the 'Twenty Committee,' which may have referred to the Latin numeral twenty (XX), or 'double-cross.'[6]

The W Board's task was a complex one. It had to determine how much accurate information would be needed to inspire false confidence in the enemy's British secret intelligence network. It had to decide when and how that data would be delivered – in a way that maximized Nazi gratification but minimized the damage it might do to Allied interests. Most of all, the Board had to convince Berlin that it had a veritable window on the British war effort, and not simply a mirage of London's projection. Deception was much more of an art, couched in empathy, than a science. 'Ultra' was a great help. Although signals intelligence has its limits – it cannot predict decisions that the enemy has yet to make (see chapter 3) – it can provide clues about what the enemy knows, or thinks he knows. The British learned how to use this knowledge to create images that confirmed the enemy's fears and desires, while departing significantly from reality. James J. Angleton later referred to successful deception as the creation of "a wilderness of mirrors." Searching for the enemy everywhere, you see only yourself. The British were the acknowledged leaders in this esoteric field, but X-2 was eager to learn.[7]

The Angletons Go to War

The Angletons, father and son, became important figures within the OSS X-2 branch almost from its inception. In order to help allay British concerns over the security of 'ultra' material shared with OSS, William Donovan authorized the creation of X-2 in March 1943. A leadership nucleus, under Donovan's close friend James Murphy, was established in London by the end of the month. This was an unusual procedure. Although OSS's existing branches, R&A, SI and SO, grew with help from Britain's covert establishment (especially BSC boss William Stephenson in New York), they were built by Americans in Washington. X-2 was incubated within the

bosom of Whitehall. To expand, it needed to recruit Anglophile Americans of cosmopolitan experience and proven competence. James H. Angleton fit the bill.[8]

The elder Angleton was a tall, tough, self-made businessman of seemingly boundless confidence. Like Donovan, he served as a young cavalry officer in General John Pershing's invasion of Mexico prior to the First World War. While pursuing the elusive Pancho Villa, he met and married a teenage beauty named Carmen Mercedes Moreno. Their eldest son, James Jesus Angleton, was born on 9 December 1917.[9]

Following the Armistice, Angleton became a salesman for the National Cash Register (NCR) Corporation in Idaho, where his success brought him to the attention of top-level management. Dispatched on a survey mission of NCR's operations in Europe, he uncovered serious mismanagement and offered to turn the struggling Italian franchise around. NCR agreed, and Angleton moved his young family to Italy. By the end of the 1930s, his gambit paid off and he had enough money to purchase the Italian business outright. As a result, he became perhaps the most prominent American businessman in northern Italy. Through his contacts within the 'NCR family,' among other business tycoons (like his friend Thomas Watson, founder of IBM), and fellow members of the Masonic order, Angleton developed a detailed understanding of industry within the European Axis countries. From 1939 to 1941, he appears to have placed this knowledge at the service of the US government as an "informal" spy. Just before Pearl Harbor, he left Italy with his family for the United States, and eventually joined OSS. There he became an assistant to William Vanderbilt, the executive officer at SO-Branch.[10]

His son, James J. Angleton, was already in the US, finishing his undergraduate degree at Yale. Young James was quite unlike his father. Whereas the elder Angleton was bluff and physical, with an industrialist's mind of metal and wheels, his son was an intellectually inclined aesthete. Many of his peers (and, later, colleagues at CIA) thought that James had a brilliant mind, but he was a poor student – an easily distracted dilettante. On those rare occasions when the young Angleton developed a fascination with something, however, he dedicated his entire being to comprehending it. Everything else faded in importance: women, friends, even sleep. Poetry, particularly the cantos of Ezra Pound, was one such fascination. While his academic work went by the board, Angleton spent hours arranging and composing poems for *Furioso*, a campus literary magazine. He was fascinated by the hidden symbols and multiple meanings that could be layered beneath simple language. Pound, with his

ambiguities, his hatred of simple allegory, was Angleton's idol. Through sheer dogged persistence, he convinced the great man to visit Yale in 1939, where Angleton served him as a sort of fawning batman.[11]

Young Angleton's other salient feature was a strong aversion toward his own part-Mexican heritage. His Yale roommate, Reed Whittemore, recalled, "Jim was kind of embarrassed by both his Mexican heritage and his middle name."

> I can only remember one occasion when one of his professors, Arthur Mizener, got mad at him in class and said 'Hey, James Jesus!" Jim took this as an insult. It suggested he was not an upper-class Englishman, which was then the image he was trying to project.[12]

Angleton saw himself as a suave, sophisticated, English gentleman: a true scion of Malvern College, in Worcestershire, where he had been a boarder, prefect and member of the Officers Training Corps during the early 1930s. Indeed, his ardor for England greatly exceeded the admiration for the United States that was current among a minority within the British clandestine services (like Colonel Douglas Dodds-Parker of SOE). To escape his own uncomfortable identity, Angleton did not just idolize England – he wanted to be an Englishman.[13]

When America entered the conflict in December 1941, the Angletons' facility with the Italian language, personal and business connections in Europe, and contacts with the US intelligence community drew them to OSS. Drawing on his civilian experience, the elder Angleton became an administrator skilled at organizing new units. His son was attracted to the intellectual maze of counterintelligence work. Although their motivations were very different, they eventually ended up in the same place: X-2. James H. Angleton joined OSS first, and became the executive officer for the first X-2 contingent in Italy in October 1943. Thanks to his father's influence, young James soon joined him in counterintelligence; by December 1943 he manned X-2's Italian desk in London.[14]

X-2 Italy's Formative Period: October 1943 to July 1944

New archival research proves that the elder Angleton had a more important role in the formation of X-2 Italy than previously suspected. Historian Robin Winks understandably assumed that Angleton was only "carried on the rolls of X-2" for a month before a reassignment to US General Mark Clark's staff. In fact, he served as the second-ranking officer at X-2 Italy throughout the winter of 1943-1944, was

instrumental in getting the organization off the ground, and provided administrative assistance throughout 1944. His skills helped prepare the unit for a period of rapid expansion and increasing responsibility.[15]

In its initial form, X-2 Italy was little more than a small security section headed by four officers: the commander, Major Andrew H. Berding, the executive officer, Major Angleton, Lieutenant Robinson O. Bellin and Lieutenant Paul J. Paterni. From their headquarters at the Banco di Napoli building in central Naples they worked on "educating" the Army about the nature and importance of their mission. The process took some time. Certain Army elements, like the counterintelligence corps (or CIC) – which was in charge of interrogating prisoners – were jealous of their prerogatives. X-2 had to make it clear that they had neither the inclination nor the resources to take over debriefing most enemy POWs. Detainees of 'special interest' – possible enemy agents – were to be flagged immediately for X-2, however.[16]

Over time Berding and Angleton expanded the unit's activities. They were particularly eager to try their hand at what the Germans had dubbed the *funkspiel* (or 'radio game') – the process of 'deception.' In March 1944, four Italian fascist spies, including a radio operator, were captured outside Naples and interrogated by X-2. Berding wanted to use them as double agents and broadcast false information to their German handlers, but his scheme was rejected by the British contingent at Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) "on grounds that the deception material required for the operation would be difficult to provide." In other words, the British did not trust him to use information derived from 'ultra' with discretion. Eventually, however, the Americans devised an ingenious compromise. The captured agents would be directed to broadcast with their 'security check' (distress signal) given, indicating to the Germans that they were being controlled. They would deliver intelligence that contradicted information the Abwehr was receiving from a British-controlled double agent. Thus X-2's prisoners, who the Germans knew were under duress, would indirectly lend credence to the British double agent's reporting. The Americans did not need 'ultra' to tailor their deception to the enemy's expectations, because the British were already managing German perceptions. X-2 was still not an equal partner in the *funkspiel*, but it did have its hand in the game.[17]

Although it was not yet a full partner in 'deception,' Berding and the elder Angleton tried other CI gambits in early 1944. These included a macabre

psychological warfare operation designed to hinder Germany's ability to recruit Italian agents. On 1 May, 140,000 leaflets detailing the harsh treatment spies could expect in Allied hands, with several photographs of recently executed agents, were air-dropped on Florence and Rome. While X-2 claimed that the effect on their target audience was "gratifying," the effect of such gruesome imagery on ordinary Italians went unrecorded. It may have backfired.[18]

Yet without the complete trust of its British counterparts, X-2 played second fiddle to SIS's Special Counterintelligence (SCI) units in Italy. By mid-May this situation began to change, for two reasons: military necessity and young Jim Angleton. Ironically, the former was driven largely by the embarrassing failure of several OSS SI and SO operations. The revelation that two trusted SI agents, Prince Valerio Pignatelli and his wife Maria, were working with the Germans, coupled with the Gestapo's roundup and execution of several hundred Italian resistance fighters outside Rome after an SO indiscretion (see chapter 4),[19] indicated to AFHQ that OSS's Italy's security procedures were seriously flawed. General Maitland Wilson's Chief of Staff, Lt. General J.A.H. Gammell, created a committee of X-2 and British SCI experts to vet the "bona fides" of every agent dispatched behind enemy lines. "Such inquiries," Gammell commanded,

> ...will be designed to obtain positive information as to [an agent's] suitability, and not merely to act as a negative check, viz. 'nothing known against.'[20]

Although Italy was in the midst of a civil war, OSS officers sometimes forgot that fascist sympathizers were common on both sides of the battle lines. Gammell's directive gave X-2 Italy a role at AFHQ and ensured cooperation with British SCI units.

Meanwhile, the younger Jim Angleton ascended the ranks of X-2's Italian section in London. His rise – from a lowly OSS corporal and file clerk in December 1943, to the chief of X-2's Italian desk in June, to the officer commanding all US counterintelligence activities in Italy by November – was meteoric, if not quite unprecedented in Donovan's still unregimented organization. While his father's position certainly did not hurt his cause, Angleton was mostly the author of his own success. A fascination with 'deception' theory, an obsessive – almost fanatical – work ethic, and a capacity for ingratiating himself with British officials propelled his advance. From the moment he arrived at X-2's cramped offices in Ryder Street he

literally immersed himself in SIS's ocean of files on enemy espionage. Angleton developed an almost childlike thrill with each new discovery. "It was," as he wrote James Murphy, "like rolling over a rotten log to view the teeming life beneath." He lived and breathed the secret world. He brought his army cot into the office. He neglected correspondence with his beautiful young wife. He seemed to subsist on cigarettes. His zeal earned him a reputation among his colleagues as a tortured genius. Like his calling, this supposed intellectual prowess might have been illusory. But it was enough to impress Angleton's colleagues in SIS.[21]

Angleton's timing was also fortuitous. The British were less than eager to make X-2 a full partner in their Italian SCI operations, but General Alexander, the theatre commander, was pushing for integration. SIS was only willing to share "ultra" product with a tiny, select group of Americans. Angleton managed to make the grade. In this he had the backing of the OSS 'brass': David Bruce, the OSS station chief in London, gave him his blessing. His chief mentor, however, was Norman Holmes Pearson, a young Yale professor who headed X-2 branch in London for Murphy. Pearson's intervention put Angleton on the select 'most secret' security clearance list, giving him access to 'ultra' decrypts. As SIS prepared to share the CI burden more equally with the Americans, Angleton became a key player.[22]

Young Jim Angleton's June elevation to chief of the Italian desk at Ryder Street and access to 'most secret' material signaled the end of X-2's probationary period. X-2 Italy was officially made a coequal partner with British SCI on 18 July 1944, when Alexander's Allied Armies in Italy (AAI) command renamed the unit "SCI Unit Z."[23]

SCI/Z's Italian Campaign

X-2 Italy's integration into the British SCI system paid dividends in operational effectiveness: more enemy agents were apprehended, OSS security improved, and the Anglo-American 'deception' program expanded. These changes aided the Allied war effort, and were commended by AFHQ and AAI. Yet Unit Z's apparent success obscured several negative tendencies that developed during the remainder of 1944. The most serious issue was a counterproductive elitism vis-à-vis the rest of OSS – especially the Algiers-based Italian networks. The SCI/Z leadership – particularly Berding and young Angleton – became quite disdainful of the other branches of the "organization." In part, this attitude was a by-product of SCI's job,

relatively small size and operational independence. Unlike the rest of OSS Italy, which continued to operate with substantial supply, training and command elements in Algiers, Unit Z reported directly to the top in London and Washington. It relied on the AAI command for its material needs, rather than OSS channels. Its close relationship with the British also engendered a certain level of jealousy and suspicion toward Unit Z within other OSS branches: much like the way a class resents the 'teacher's pet.' Finally, a few members of SCI/Z, like young Angleton, began to think that they could do OSS-SI's business better than the 'experts' within the Branch. Fortunately, none of these tendencies had a serious effect on the Unit's operational proficiency during the War. (SCI/Z's postwar legacy, when Angleton and other veterans came to dominate the CIA counterintelligence service, was more mixed.)[24]

But these concerns were for the future. During the second half of 1944 SCI/Z expanded and damaged the Nazi cause in Italy and beyond. After the fall of Rome on 4 June, Berding moved his growing unit (now numbering more than 100 officers and enlisted men) from Naples to new quarters in the Via Sicilia. From this new headquarters SCI/Z began the task of apprehending, interrogating and (sometimes) executing fascist 'stay behind' agents in the capital. This was not Berding's strong suit. Berding was capable, ambitious and outgoing – a natural leader – but incapable of the mental heavy-lifting necessary in many 'deception' operations. During his tenure several dozen enemy spies were identified during his three-month tenure at Unit Z, versus more than a thousand after young Angleton took over in November. Nor was he as adept at manipulating double agents as his successor – perhaps because he lacked Angleton's intuitive understanding of how to use 'ultra' to simultaneously reassure and mislead the enemy. But he was handsome, charismatic and persuasive – traits Berding used to talk several fascist sympathizers and erstwhile sources for German intelligence into supporting the Allied cause.[25]

Berding's most important recruit was a former radio operator for the Italian Air Force named D'Onofrio. Activated by the German Abwehr as a 'stay behind' agent in January, D'Onofrio was apprehended and 'turned' by Berding shortly after the Americans entered Rome. Monitoring the German reaction to D'Onofrio's reports via 'ultra,' Berding and Angleton realized that the Abwehr rated him highly as a source. SCI/Z decided to invest time enhancing D'Onofrio's credibility with the enemy. In early August, the Unit used him to spread disinformation on the timing and location of the Allied invasion of the south of France (operation 'Anvil/Dragoon').

There is evidence suggesting that the Abwehr was fooled by D'Onofrio's broadcasts, although the effect of SCI/Z's deception operation on the disposition and effectiveness of the Wehrmacht itself is less clear (see chapter 8). Nevertheless, the affair was Unit Z's most successful marriage of 'ultra' information and 'deception' tactics under Berding's leadership.[26]

Berding also increased the authority of SCI/Z relative to the other OSS branches in Italy, particularly those with ties to Algiers. He was abetted both by the reaction to sensational SI/SO disasters among the AAI brass, and the regional OSS commander in Algiers, Colonel E.J.F. Glavin. Glavin was increasingly focused on the 'Anvil' operation, and wanted to avoid further Italian foul-ups that could jeopardize his command's role in southern France (see chapters 4, 7 and 8). Therefore, he tightened the procedural checklist that SI and SO officers had clear with SCI/Z before they sent agents behind enemy lines. The new rules went far beyond AFHQ's stipulation in May that X-2 certify each OSS agent's bona fides: officers were to give X-2 the "complete details of all operations" in the field, including "locations, code-names, and cover stories." Instead of simply approving or rejecting a covert action, Unit Z used Glavin's directive to manage SO and SI operations directly. If other OSS leaders failed to give SCI/Z a lead role in commanding and planning their missions, the unit would cancel their operations.[27]

For young James Angleton, who took over as the commander of SCI/Z in November when Berding left to join X-2's penetration program in Germany, this was an irresistible temptation. While Angleton's tenure at Unit Z followed Berding's example in most respects, the 27 year old ex-corporal was much more aggressive. Although X-2 had achieved a powerful position within OSS Italy, he was convinced that SI and SO were still not sufficiently forthcoming about their operations. He wanted more control.[28]

Almost from the moment of his arrival in Rome, Angleton's personality dominated not just SCI/Z, but most OSS activities in southern and central Italy. (Operations in the north were run by Allen Dulles at OSS Bern, not the Algiers-legacy networks, and remained outside Unit Z's purview.) Angleton's close relationship with the British SCI commanders, status as the only US non-General officer in Italy cleared to read raw 'ultra' intercepts,[29] and fanatical work ethic gave him the tools he needed to attack the Nazi secret services and accrete power within OSS. In the

process, he established the considerably exaggerated reputation as a counterintelligence "genius" that he exploited after the war.

As a leader, Angleton's greatest strength was his ability to elicit wholehearted cooperation from other organizations within the Anglo-American intelligence community in Italy, while ensuring that SCI/Z retained the leading role. In particular, he went out of his way to strengthen the ties that Berding had established with the US Army CIC. Unit Z had grown rapidly throughout 1944, and now included almost 500 men – but it had nothing like the manpower necessary to interview the masses of enemy sympathizers that the Allies encountered in newly liberated territories. Angleton transformed CIC into an effective adjunct of his organization. At SCI/Z's prompting, CIC did preliminary interviews with POWs and ambushed enemy agents – allowing Angleton to concentrate his resources where they could be most effective. As ever, deception operations had the highest priority. To this end Angleton convinced Max Corvo, Chief of SI Italy, to cede control of any radio operators that he suspected were being manipulated by the Gestapo. Corvo had previously been reluctant to cooperate with SCI – perhaps due to his antipathy toward the British – but Angleton was persuasive. In his autobiography, Corvo claims that Angleton stole credit for a number of SI's intelligence coups. Given that he had effectively given partial authority over SI to the young Lieutenant, these retrospective protests smack of sour grapes.[30]

SCI/Z growing influence and effective methodology spelled trouble for German intelligence in Italy. Angleton skill at using 'ultra' material to inform his operations – unmatched within OSS – was the key. Surveying raw 'ultra' intercepts at X-2's Italian desk in London, Angleton had noticed two nascent trends in enemy intelligence. First, the Nazi secret police Sicherheitsdienst (SD) were absorbing the functions of the German military intelligence service (Abwehr). (Indeed, Heinrich Himmler had ordered the SD to merge with the Abwehr in June; several former Abwehr leaders were subsequently implicated in the July plot against Hitler's life and executed.) Second, the SD's security procedures were exceptionally good. In a long report that Angleton composed for James Murphy in late 1944, he noted that of the 289 enemy agents apprehended through 1 September, only two "have any intimate knowledge as to the actual organizational structure of the German intelligence service." Most prisoners were even unaware of their "technical connection to the Abwehr or SD." Angleton recognized that strong German security measures

represented an opportunity for SCI/Z. If the SD was overconfident about the impenetrability of its security procedures, Unit Z could exploit it through expanded deception operations. If the SD was sure that Allied counterintelligence could not glean its intentions and desires through captured agents, it would be more willing to swallow deception material derived from 'ultra.'[31]

Angleton's aggressiveness paid immediate dividends: moving into newly-liberated cities like Florence, SCI/Z and the Army CIC apprehended hundreds of enemy 'stay behind' agents. By 'turning' these men for use as Allied double-agents and employing 'ultra'-assisted deception tactics, Unit Z devoured the fascist intelligence apparatus in Italy. By the end of the European war in May, it had uncovered more than 1,200 enemy spies. The US Army decorated young Angleton. His obvious success and idiosyncratic qualities – like a penchant for stalking about with his trench coat collar turned-up – created the Angleton legend.[32]

Yet, as Angleton himself recognized, the American counterintelligence program in Italy benefited from several unique conditions. The slow Allied advance up the Italian peninsula allowed SCI to build a dossier on the enemy intelligence setup in each city before its capture. He enjoyed the trust, and sound advice, of experienced British CI officers. Above all, 'ultra' gave SCI a priceless window on the enemy's secret perceptions and desires. It was a powerful tool – one that Angleton would try in vain to replicate in his decades-long campaign against the KGB. In the postwar world, he could never be sure that the images he encountered in the 'wilderness of mirrors' were of the enemy, and not artificial reflections of his own hopes and fears. The uncertainty eventually made him bitter, paranoid, and – many believe – mentally unbalanced. As his erstwhile idol, Ezra Pound, wrote in the poem *On His Own Face In A Glass*: "Jest, challenge, counterlie, / I? I? I? / And ye?"[33]

The Legacy of the Secret War in Italy

The American clandestine campaign in Italy was largely a failure. The evidence reviewed in chapter 4 shows that, at best, most OSS activities on the peninsula from September 1943 through the winter of 1944 were an only marginal benefit to the progress of Allied arms. OSS operation 'sunrise' – which secured the surrender of German forces in Italy on 2 May 1945, five days ahead of general European armistice – certainly saved the lives of many Italian civilians. But this minor contribution to the Allied war effort was handled exclusively by Allen Dulles'

OSS station in Bern; the Algiers-based SI and SO organizations in Italy were hardly involved.[34] The Italian campaign's relegation to a strategic backwater after the 'Overlord' and 'Anvil' landings in France also prevented it from securing a prominent place in the institutional memory of America's intelligence community.

James J. Angleton's counterintelligence exploits were the exception to the rule. Although some of his success was the product of good fortune and favorable operational conditions, most was self-generated. In particular, he became expert at exploiting signals intelligence to support his human agents and double agents on the ground. This facility, which the British had perfected through the 'Double-Cross' system, was otherwise neglected in US intelligence circles. Indeed, Angleton loomed so large over the rest of the US clandestine service in the country that after the CIA's foundation in 1947, it became difficult to operate in Italy without his assent – even if the activity in question lay outside his remit as CIA counterintelligence chief. In the messy, often murderous, milieu of postwar Italian politics, Angleton became the hidden hand behind most US intrigues.[35]

This unbalanced legacy may help explain why a proper analysis of the failures of the Algiers-based SO and SI networks in Italy was not performed. It was an unfortunate oversight. Many of the conditions that prevailed during the Italian war – a limited conventional military campaign, divided public opinion, and rough terrain that made parachute drops difficult – were similar those encountered during the postwar era. Instead, the triumphant 'lessons' of the intelligence campaign in France were grafted into the DNA of the US intelligence establishment – even though the main features of the enterprise, the deployment of overwhelming conventional force in an environment when the ordinary citizenry was increasingly sympathetic to the Allied cause – was never a feature of the Cold War environment. These political and military advantages were major themes as the British and American intelligence services prepared to penetrate France from the Mediterranean. The next chapter begins to explain why France was different, and how the British and American intelligence networks based in Algiers achieved the success that eluded them in Italy.

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[1] Here I am again using General Odom's definition of the "feedback response" in intelligence theory. William E. Odom, *Fixing Intelligence: For a More Secure America* (New Haven: Yale, 2003) pp.12-13. The new emphasis on security was the result of both OSS's own initiative and the intervention of General Sir Harold Alexander's Chief of Staff, J.A.H. Gammell, in response to OSS-SI's messy failures during the spring of 1944 (see previous chapter). "Security of Agents Memo, Lt. General J.A.H. Gammel," 7 May 1944; "Security of Agents Memo from CB001 [Maj. Andrew Berding] to Washington and London," 19 May 1944, NARA RG 226, Entry 126A, 190/B/6/6, Box 2.

[2] "Speech by Major Andrew Berding," 11 September 1944, p.2,6, RG 226, Entry 126A, 190//B/6/6, Box 2.
[3] *The Office of Strategic Services: America's First Intelligence Agency* (CIA: Washington, DC, 2001) p.29.
[4] Ibid; This corrects a misleading account published in the declassified official history (*OSS War Report*) during the mid-1970s. It claimed that X-2's strict information management was to protect Britain's "comprehensive and current registry on hostile and suspected persons." It was a crude, but effective, smokescreen designed to cover for the role of 'ultra' in X-2's setup. *War Report of the OSS* (New York: Walker and Company, 1976) pp.89, 189.
[5] David Stafford, *Churchill and Secret Service* (London: Abacus, 1997) pp.213-216. The classic description of how the system worked is in J.C. Masterman, *The Double-Cross System*, (New York: Lyons Press, 2000).
[6] Stafford, *Secret Service*, pp.214-215; Thaddeus Holt, *The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2004) p.148. Holt suggests that they name may also have been derived from the 'Twenty Club,' a club at Christ Church College, Oxford, where the 'Twenty Committee chairman, J.C. Masterman, had been a don.
[7] Ibid; Tom Mangold, *Cold Warrior: James Jesus Angleton, the CIA's Master Spy* (London: Haynes Publications, 1993) p.15.
[8] *OSS War Report*, pp.189-190.
[9] Mangold, *Cold Warrior*, p.10.
[10] Ibid. pp.10-11; Robin W. Winks, *Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War* (New York: William Morrow, 1987) pp.328-330.
[11] Mangold, *Cold Warrior*, pp.10-15; In 1943 Angleton repaid his idol by writing a dossier for X-2 on Pound's fascism and sympathy for Mussolini, see Winks, *Cloak and Gown*, pp.334-336.
[12] Whittemore quoted in Mangold, *Cold Warrior*, p.12.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid. pp.16-17; Winks, *Cloak and Gown*, pp.339-341.
[15] Ibid. p.333; "From EF022, To EF001," 20 December 1943; "Report of Activities, X-2, Italy," April 1944, RG 226, Entry 126A, 190, B/6/6, Box 2.
[16] "Issuance of Passes [Santa Maria Jail]" 11 April 1944, RG 226, Entry 190, B/6/6, Box 2; "SCI Unit in Italy [War Diary]," RG 226, Entry 210, 295, Box 3.
[17] Ibid; "Report of Activities, X-2, Italy," April 1944, RG 226, Entry 126A, 190, B/6/6, Box 2.
[18] "Speech by Major Andrew Berding" 11 September 1944; "SCI Unit in Italy [War Diary]," RG 226, Entry 210, 295, Box 3.
[19] Anthony Cave Brown, *The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan* (London: Michael Joseph, 1982) pp.485-502; "Security of Agents Memo, Lt. General J.A.H. Gammell," 7 May 1944; "Security of Agents Memo from CB001 [Maj. Andrew Berding] to Washington and London," 19 May 1944, NARA RG 226, Entry 126A, 190/B/6/6, Box 2.
[20] "Security of Agents Memo from CB001 [Maj. Andrew Berding] to Washington and London," 19 May 1944, RG 226, Entry 126A, 190/B/6/6, Box 2.
[21] Mangold, *Cold Warrior*, pp.19-22; "Memo, Angleton to Murphy," undated [circa late 1944], RG 226, Entry 126A, 190/B/6/6, Box 2.
[22] Winks, *Cloak and Gown*, pp.264, 345-346.
[23] "Speech by Major Andrew Berding" 11 September 1944; "SCI Unit in Italy [War Diary]," RG 226, Entry 210, 295, Box 3.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid; "War Diary: SCI Unit in Italy," RG 226, Entry 210, Box 3, Folder 295.
[27] "Coordination of Section and Branch Activities with X-2," 26 June 1944, RG 226, Entry 97, 31, Box 531.
[28] "Memo, Angleton to Murphy," undated [circa late 1944], RG 226, Entry 126A, 190/B/6/6, Box 2, p.5.
[29] Mangold, *Cold Warrior*, p.20. In his brief case study of some Angleton-supervised operations from 1944-1946, Timothy Naftali notes that Angleton's access to "ultra-class intelligence" was the key to his success. See Timothy Naftali, "ARTIFACE: James Angleton and X-2 Activities in Italy," in George C. Chalou, ed. *The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II* (Washington, DC: NARA, 1992) pp.219-221.

[30] Ibid; "Notes on Co-Operation Between CIC and X-2(SCI) in Italy," 14 August 1944, RG 226, Entry 126A, 190/B/6/6, Box 2; Max Corvo, *The OSS in Italy, 1942-1945: A Personal Memoir* (New York: Praeger, 1990) pp.262-263.

[31] "Memo, Angleton to Murphy," undated [circa late 1944], RG 226, Entry 126A, 190/B/6/6, Box 2, p.5; R. Harris Smith, *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency* (New York: Delta, 1972) pp.220-221; Ian Kershaw, *Hitler, 1936-1945: Nemesis* (London: Allen Lane, 2000) pp.666-669.

[32] Mangold, *Cold Warrior*, pp.19-22.

[33] "Memo, Angleton to Murphy," undated [circa late 1944], RG 226, Entry 126A, 190/B/6/6, Box 2, pp.1-2; Winks, *Cloak and Gown*, pp.350-352; for one take on Angleton's eventual mental collapse see Thomas Powers, *Intelligence Wars: American Secret History from Hitler to Al-Qaeda*, (New York: NYRB Press, 2002) pp.114, 118-123; Ezra Pound, *A Lume Spento and Other Early Poems* (London: Faber and Faber, 1965) p.53.

[34] The best account of 'sunrise' is in Bradley Smith and Elena Agarossi. *Operation Sunrise: The Secret Surrender.* (New York: Basic, 1979).

[35] See John Prados, *Lost Crusader: The Secret Wars of CIA Director William Colby* (New York:: Oxford, 2003) pp.56-59.

Chapter 6: SPOC and the Merger of British-American Special Operations in France, May 1943 to April 1944

Introduction to the French Campaign of 1944 – The Strange Efficacy of Special Operations

Historians have speculated for years about a unique feature of the intelligence campaign in France: why were special operations there during the spring and summer of 1944 so effective? After all, as this study has shown, Allied special operations elsewhere in the western Mediterranean during the same period were generally costly failures, or had little significance in military terms. This was especially true in Italy, where special operations made little contribution to the progress of Allied arms. Even in the pre-'Torch' Maghreb, where conditions seemed ripe for subversion, American efforts to support the Anglo-American invasion in November 1942 were of limited use. What produced the spectacular successes of June, July and August 1944, when French, American, and British guerillas provided crucial support to the Allied landings in Normandy and on the Riviera? M.R.D Foot, perhaps the most respected historian of special operations, cites no less of an authority than General Eisenhower when he claims these activities may have shortened the war by several months.[1]

Historians have suggested a number of reasons for this incongruous special operations triumph and the effectiveness of Resistance guerillas and saboteurs. Possible explanations include the Compulsory Labour Service Law (*Service du travail obligatoire* or STO) instituted in France by the Vichy government on 16 February 1943, the relatively unified nature of the Anglo-American-French program of clandestine operations, the increasingly favorable French political environment, and the fortuitous ability of certain officers on the ground. Yet while we acknowledge that each of these factors played an important, necessary role in the secret war for France, they are not sufficient – even collectively – to explain why it ended in success. After all, many of these same conditions – large numbers of potential recruits, competent officers, and a political trend favouring Resistance – were present in Italy, too.

The human penchant for confusing necessary with sufficient causes is by no means limited to historians.[2] In the case of the French clandestine campaign of 1944 it is easy to overlook the simplest explanation for the Allied success: they were

fighting a different type of war. Italy and North Africa were limited conflicts; the campaigns there were no more than precursors to a general assault on Hitler's *festung Europa*. In France, the Allies had made an unequivocal commitment to total war. The manpower and resources they brought to bear put pressure on the German armed forces. Distracted by two massive Allied invasions, desperate to hold along what became increasingly fluid battle-lines, the *Wehrmacht*, SS, Gestapo, and other instruments of Nazi tyranny could not deal effectively with the Resistance. This allowed special operations to have an exceptionally strong impact on the French campaign.

Had it not been for these special conditions, clandestine warfare in France would have been at least as futile an exercise as it was in Italy. Indeed, without the cover generated by a gigantic conventional military campaign, OSS and SOE experienced some of their most appalling special operations disasters of the entire war in France, just prior to their most comprehensive triumph. The roundup of SOE's giant F Section circuit *Prosper*, during the summer of 1943, and OSS's involvement in the premature Vercors rising in June-July 1944 offer further evidence that stand-alone special operations, unaccompanied by conventional forces, were usually a recipe for failure.[3]

This last, French, section of this dissertation focuses on the origins, meaning and memory of the French puzzle: the wartime significance of the successes in intelligence and special operations there, and their effect on postwar attitudes toward the clandestine services. Chapter 6 discusses some of the preconditions for success in France – particularly the combination of growing French political solidarity behind Charles de Gaulle, and Franco-British-American unity in special operations. Without the creation, over OSS objections, of the Special Projects Operations Center (SPOC) in May 1944 – the military clearinghouse for all special operations to France via the Mediterranean – and the growing power of the Gaullist-inspired political consensus in favor of Resistance, the Allied clandestine campaign might have withered on the vine. Indeed, chapter 7 will illustrate the fragility of Allied unity in the secret world. It describes how OSS chief William Donovan, chafing at the restrictions imposed on his ambitious expansion plan for America's clandestine service, moved to create his own independent secret intelligence network in France. This network, code-named 'Medusa,' operated separately from the British and Gaullist systems in France. It had its own, limited, coding and W/T protocol; in order to sequester itself from a

communications network dominated by its 'allies' at Britain's Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), OSS instituted a dangerous intelligence smuggling operation from France, over the Pyrenees, into Franco's Spain. 'Medusa' indicates that Donovan and OSS were willing to sacrifice operational efficiency to create an independent American clandestine service. However, in the case of SPOC, military imperatives prevailed. Chapter 8 shows how facilitating the priorities of the Allied invasion forces was the root cause of SPOC's success: first in slowing the progress of Nazi reinforcements detailed from the south of France to Normandy in June 1944, then in setting the stage for the 'Anvil/Dragoon' invasion of the Riviera in August. Drawing on our previous studies of North Africa and Italy, this last chapter describes the uniquely advantageous conditions for special operations that existed in France from June to September 1944. It analyses how shrewd OSS and SOE commanders took advantage of the Nazis' military disarray to wreak havoc behind the battle lines. Finally, it shows how some – not all – of the same Allied leaders misinterpreted the significance of their success, and came to believe that special operations could change the political landscape of a country outside the context of a conventional military campaign. The success of British and American special operations in France during the summer of 1944 came about only because of the huge Allied military campaign. Clandestine warfare had a more limited political and military utility than some OSS and SOE leaders thought.

For years, historians have sought to explain why the Allies' decidedly mixed record in special operations suddenly became golden in June 1944. It was almost as if someone flicked a switch, and where there had been only gloom and failure, many of the same men, using the same techniques, experienced success in France. Why? Interviewed by a young journalist, M.R.D. Foot provided a helpful hint. "The first rule of a historian," he said, "is that if there are two explanations, one simple and one complicated: go with the simple one."[4] Although there were many complex factors that led to the triumph of Allied secret warfare in June 1944, the simplest explanation is often overlooked. Instead of a conflict defined by limited conventional resources and strategic objectives, as in Italy or North Africa, the Anglo-American powers launched a series of massive invasions aimed at the enemy heartland. During the summer of 1944 these powerful Allied thrusts, coupled with a heretofore unprecedented degree of political and military cooperation, allowed Allied special operations to play an outsized role.

From 'Massingham' to SPOC: The Road to Anglo-American Unity in Mediterranean Special Operations

The road to Anglo-American unity in Mediterranean special operations was a long and treacherous one. The main obstacles were power, operational control, and bureaucratic standing in London and Washington. OSS Director William Donovan, in particular, was desperate to preserve the independence of his office under the aegis of the US Army. He was especially sensitive toward charges by his opponents in the American government that OSS was a British stooge that served as a cash cow for his UK counterparts at SOE and SIS. Maintaining the appearance of American leadership in certain theatres – like North Africa – where he had been promised a "primary" role by SOE after the establishment of OSS in the summer of 1942, was a particular concern. When SOE appeared to renege on its pledge after the 'Torch' Operation in November 1942 by establishing its own secret training and communications facility west of Algiers (code-named 'Massingham') Donovan was "convinced he had been double-crossed." SOE and SIS already controlled all the special operations networks operating from Britain to the continent; now OSS would be denied a lead role inserting agents into southern France and Italy over the Mediterranean. To assuage Donovan's pique, SOE's leader CD (then Charles Hambro) agreed to tolerate a separate, parallel OSS mission based in downtown Algiers at the Villa Magnol. Hambro assumed that while the Americans might enjoy *de jure* independence, better training, experience, communications networks and transportation would result in *de facto* British control.[5]

Events soon proved that SOE's Baker Street Mandarin was correct. In January, General Dwight D. Eisenhower mandated that OSS and SOE set aside their parochial interests and "work together 100 percent." Cognizant of the pressure that Donovan faced in Washington to produce uniquely 'American' success stories in the clandestine world, SOE decided not to demand complete compliance with Eisenhower's decision. OSS would officially maintain a separate presence in the Mediterranean, but otherwise pool its resources with 'Massingham.' Donovan was appeased, but Baker Street held the whip hand in North Africa and the Western Mediterranean.[6]

The task of guiding this relationship through the exigencies of warfare fell to the 'Massingham' commander, Douglas Dodds-Parker. He proved an inspired choice. Dodds-Parker earned the trust of the OSS leadership in North Africa. He was

esteemed by both US Marine Colonel William Eddy, who headed the American contingent until September 1943, and his successor, Colonel Edward F. Glavin. During Eddy's suzerainty, Dodds-Parker earned the confidence of his Yankee counterparts by sharing SOE's vastly superior training and communications facilities, in exchange for help in areas where the Americans had more resources in Algiers – like Lucius Rucker's parachute jumping school. The symbiotic relationship centered on 'Massingham' continued after Glavin's arrival in the theatre. Donovan had dispatched the wily US Army veteran to create closer links between OSS, the Allied military authorities in London and Algiers, and SOE. Upon his arrival, Glavin found that these ties already existed, in an informal sense, with 'Massingham' acting as *primus inter pares.*[7]

By the autumn of 1943 Hambro's astute 'deal' and Dodds-Parker's diplomacy had set the stage for merging OSS-SOE special operations in the western Mediterranean. At the instigation of Eisenhower's newly-established headquarters in London (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, or SHAEF), this became a priority during preparations for operation 'Overlord' the following year. In the interim, Charles de Gaulle's success rallying anti-Vichy political parties and Resistance forces in France provided a crucial boon to the Allied cause, and added momentum to the cause of unity in special operations.

Uniting the French Resistance: Charles de Gaulle, the FFI and Allied Special Operations

After the disaster of 1940, many observers, both inside and outside metropolitan France, thought the nation was finished as a world power. US President Franklin D. Roosevelt was one of them. According to historian Mario Rossi, in the aftermath of the Battle of France the President was "morose, as though France had let him down personally." As the war proceeded, and the collaborationism of the new Vichy government was revealed, Roosevelt's priority became the swift restoration of democratic government to France. Until then, however, no French political figure – inside or outside the Vichy bubble – would be allowed to exploit the war to further his own political agenda. France was finished. One day, she might rise again; but until then French patriots had to make defeating Germany their sole priority.[8]

This attitude was the root of the President's conflict with Charles de Gaulle. For General de Gaulle had never accepted defeat, the new primacy of Germany in

Europe, or the legitimacy of the Vichy government. He was blind to the cowed state of most of his confederates in 1940, their demoralization, and the popular appeal of Petain's 'National Revolution.' In short, he denied reality. But this fantasy of uninterrupted French grandeur eventually became the foundation of his political appeal, and the root of his own greatness. When the tides of war shifted, and an indefinite state of German domination no longer looked certain, many of his countrymen grasped his creed as if it had always been theirs. The small minority that had shared his bind optimism, courage and determination from the beginning – the Resistance – gradually adopted him as their figurehead in 1943. By the end of May, when the great Gaullist patriot Jean Moulin had established the National Resistance Council (CNR) – which theoretically united most Resistance factions under the General – the trend was plain. By late August, most members of the London and Algiers-based National Committee of French Liberation (CFLN) had switched their loyalty from America's 'apolitical general,' Henri Giraud, to de Gaulle. With the support of a new "consultative assembly" in Algiers, by November de Gaulle was named sole President of the CFLN and his erstwhile rival was forced off the Committee. The French were increasingly united, and de Gaulle was at the forefront.[9]

The question for the Anglo-American Allies was what to do about it. The British, despite Winston Churchill's misgivings, recognized the new power of de Gaulle and the CFLN first, on 26 August. With British backing, the CFLN became the provisional government in most Allied-controlled French overseas territories. Roosevelt, however, was still suspicious of the General's motives. De Gaulle's political activities seemed to threaten FDR's "wartime and postwar goals." In de Gaulle's egoism, the President saw not the stuff of a French patriot or visionary, but the makings as a dictator. He delayed recognition of the CFLN.[10]

For the OSS Algiers and the US Military, however, the President's policy was increasingly at variance with the facts on the ground. Maximizing allied manpower meant using French troops, and these were beginning to become unavailable without the imprimatur of the CFLN. Eisenhower, writing US Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall from Algiers on 18 June 1943, asked for "some latitude in negotiation [with the Gaullists]. [It] should be advantageous in maintaining our position and in keeping the vast majority of local Frenchmen as our firm friends." Admiral Harold R. Stark, a former US Chief of Naval Operations who had been appointed liaison to the Free French in July 1942, also advocated a more pragmatic approach to de Gaulle. He

warned his superiors in Washington that "the French would surely never forgive any ungrateful handling of General de Gaulle." Stark denied that the General disliked Anglo-Americans and observed his "high-handed attitude" was because "he feels France's defeat so deeply... that almost anyone who has not gone through the same experience is open to some resentment." Eisenhower and Stark were hardly alone in their feeling that FDR's hostility to legitimate French political aspirations was hurting the war effort. Harold Macmillan, the British Resident Minister in Algiers, thought the President would get a "rude shock" if he knew how much American Army commanders in North Africa "despised" his policy. The US military was in the vanguard of those pushing for change.[11]

Although his motives were more complex, OSS Director William Donovan eventually became a strong supporter of closer ties with the CFLN. Throughout 1943, Donovan had fought against the British-dominated cooperative regime that he believed was hindering OSS's capacity to develop independent clandestine networks in Nazi-occupied Europe. In the spring he had authorized the creation of an independent American secret intelligence (SI) network in France, circumventing SIS objections. This network, initially known as 'Penny-Farthing' (later 'Medusa') drew manpower from the French Army through a deal that William Eddy struck with the Giraudist Secret Service (*Service de Renseignements* – SR) in May. With the creation of the CFLN, however, this source of recruits was choked off, and it took heroic measures to keep 'Penny Farthing' from withering on the vine. By the end of the year, Donovan realized that a totally independent, US-only approach to special operations (SO) in France was impossible. OSS's ambitious plans for guerilla warfare required more expertise and manpower than the Americans could muster alone. The former was available through SOE, and the latter was eventually provided through the Forces *Françaises de l'Intérieur* (French Forces of the Interior, or FFI).[12]

The FFI was the name given to the authority, under the CFLN, that merged control of the French military and command of the Resistance. Although the FFI was not established by the CFLN until February 1944, the intellectual groundwork for its creation had been undertaken much earlier. Indeed, the idea of merging elements of the French Army that survived the disaster of 1940 with the Resistance, thereby boosting the political standing of the former while increasing the military utility of the latter, was at the heart of de Gaulle's creed. By beginning the process of uniting the Resistance under the CFLN in the spring of 1943, Moulin had been midwife to the

FFI. He and de Gaulle believed that by bringing together the political and Resistance groups that had opposed accommodation with the Nazis, they could create a fighting force that would restore France's pride and dignity. With the credit this earned them with the Allies, they could then see off Anglo-American attempts to control postwar French political developments, and restore the nation to glory. To this end, the Gaullists had received a tremendous boost through enactment of the Vichy STO, the law requiring young Frenchmen to register for compulsory labor in Germany. Enacted under German pressure in February 1943, it inspired many draft dodgers to join the *Maquis* (guerilla resistance forces). Although exact figures are unreliable, conservative estimates suggest that the number of Maquisards more than tripled during late 1943 and early 1944. The FFI would help regularize the command structure and focus the efforts of this new tide of Resistance.[13]

This huge new source of manpower was particularly exciting for OSS. Its French special operations schemes required the assistance of the Resistance and the Gaullists now held the keys to the kingdom. It is no coincidence that Donovan became an open convert to the idea of political recognition for the CFLN, and of closer ties with the British and French on SO work, after the creation of the FFI in February 1944. In the spring, he informed the American Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) that:

> ...the various Resistance Groups... offered by far the greatest immediate possibility for... carrying on the other activities within the scope of the OSS [e.g., special operations], provided proper contact and lines of communications could be established with them.... *Close collaboration* with the British and Free French Services would assist us in maintaining and developing the line and operations of our *independent service*, as well as give us an additional source of original intelligence material through the Fighting French [italics added].[14]

At least in special operations, OSS's manpower needs forced Donovan to consider openly pooling resources with SOE and the FFI. Although he continued to classify OSS-SO operations as the product of an "independent service," the stage was set for the unification of Allied special operations in the Mediterranean. After May 1944, OSS's only truly independent networks were run by SI Branch.[15]

The growing political clout of the CFLN in Algiers and its ties to the Resistance in France – cemented through the FFI – created a powerful incentive for a

collaborative approach in Allied special operations. This strengthened SOE's hand, as it pushed for a unified SO command.[16] Donovan and OSS were forced to bow to the inevitable. Nevertheless, one final hurdle confronted any attempt to consolidate Allied SO run from Algiers under a single authority: coordinating the array of (mostly SOE) existing special operations networks in France, with the dizzying number of OSS and Gaullist SO schemes planned for early 1944.

The Tactical Muddle

By the close of 1943, the drive for operational efficiency and the growing influence of Gaullism in Resistance circles provided powerful incentives to unite the Allied special operations commands in Algiers. But an obstacle remained: the muddle of overlapping British, American and French schemes to mobilize the Resistance and conduct guerilla warfare in France. These plans involved separate, sometimes incongruent tactical approaches to using Allied agents in concert with Resistance fighters. Some anticipated parachuting in large groups of agents to fight the Germans alongside, but separate from, the Resistance. Others sought to use small squads of two or three men to organize *Maquisard* irregulars in the hills just before D-Day. Finally, SOE's networks were designed to arm and muster 'secret armies' months or even years before Allied forces stormed ashore. Most of these schemes, developed separately by OSS, SOE and the French, already operated in France or were in the advanced stages of training and development. They could not be cancelled without dealing a serious blow to the prestige of the agency involved. Resolving this tactical muddle, and reconciling the result with the larger strategic question of how irregular warfare should be used to facilitate the Allied invasion of France, was a vital prerequisite for unity – and success – in Allied special operations.

SOE's special operations networks in the south of France were the largest, the best organized and the most competently led in the command region surrounding Algiers. Like all SOE networks in France, they were divided into two distinct entities: RF Section, operated jointly with the Free French in London and Algiers, and F Section, which functioned separately from (and was resented by) the Gaullists. In mid-late 1943, after SOE secured reliable air transport and CFLN support in Algiers, the networks grew rapidly in the south. By the end of the year they employed hundreds of French sub-agents and were reliably delivering tons of arms to the

Resistance.[17] But it was the exceptional quality of the officers involved that made SOE's SO networks special.

The quality of SOE's French section officers in Algiers was remarkable, for two reasons. First, by dint of good fortune, 'Massingham' and its dependant networks boasted leaders who were at least as skilled at diplomacy and tradecraft as their Baker Street superiors. Second, these officers were themselves a 'second string' or backup team: the new Gaullist authorities in Algiers refused cooperate with SOE agents who had dealings with the SR under Darlan or Giraud. A whole slate of early 'Massingham' standouts – including Jacques de Guelis and Paul Cononna d'Istria, the main architects of SOE's Corsican campaign – had to be cashiered or restricted to F Section duties. But their replacements proved to be equally competent: particularly the new Chief of the Algiers French Desk, F. Brooks Richards.[18] The finest officers, however, were in the field in southern France.

Through a Darwinian winnowing process, those SOE agents in France who survived the Gestapo crackdowns of 1943 had to be good – very good. George Starr, head of the circuit code-named 'Wheelwright' in Gascony and southwest France, and Francis Cammaerts, commander of the 'Jockey' circuit operating in the Riviera, Rhone Valley, Vercors and southeast, were perhaps the most able of all. Through a combination of luck, skillful vetting of French subagents, and paranoid genius at security, the pair had survived the Abwehr's annihilation of 'Prosper,' SOE's largest circuit in France, earlier in the year. Although Starr's own brother, John, had been caught in the Nazi dragnet, 'Wheelwright' and 'Jockey' survived. This left 'Massingham' and SOE's F Section in the strongest position of all the Allied services operating from Algiers to southern France.[19]

R/F Section was also rapidly expanding its contacts with the Resistance in southern France, and had quickly recovered from the arrest of its (London-based) British liaison officer, Squadron Leader "Tommy" Yeo-Thomas. Unlike F Section it had enormous potential manpower reserves. R/F catered directly to existing French Resistance groups and did little recruiting. (Although it did help the CNR equip, train and organize STO resisters and other *Maquisards* for guerilla warfare.) R/F Section's problems were primarily political. There were frequently tensions among its Resistance 'clients,' who ranged from bourgeois nationalists to Communists, and between the CNR and the CFLN in Algiers. Although internecine French squabbling was frequent – and threatened to create an outright break between the Resistance and

Algiers in early 1944 – it never produced the chaotic fragmentation and competing centers of authority that bedeviled SOE's Italian campaign. Instead, political infighting coexisted with an ethos of mutual dependence that simultaneously strengthened the CFLN, de Gaulle, and the Resistance. This gradually made R/F section's task easier.[20]

OSS Algiers made an energetic attempt to match SOE's progress in French special operations throughout 1943, without much success. Although dozens of OSS agents were operating in France by the end of the year, almost all were attached to SOE networks. These included several that would achieve lasting fame among OSS's (and later CIA's) pantheon of wartime heroes. Some, like the redoubtable Virginia Hall, who served as SOE's chief agent in Lyon from September 1941 through November 1942, returned to France during the winter of 1943/1944 under OSS auspices. But most of these agents stayed in place: American links in Britain's clandestine chains. A shortage of transportation was at the root of OSS Algiers' dependence on SOE, a problem that Donovan struggled mightily to alleviate. He succeeded in April 1944 – with an unintentional assist from General de Gaulle – but by then it was impossible to boost OSS's SO footprint in France before the Allied invasions. In the interim, Donovan tried a different tack.[21]

During the latter half of 1943, OSS's ambitious plans for expanding its SO element in France relied heavily on its Operational Group (OG) scheme. The OGs were uniformed, self-sufficient combat squads designed to operate behind enemy lines – with or without help from the Resistance. Created in March 1943 by Donovan's SO deputy, Ellery Huntington, a small number of OG units were deployed in the Algiers theatre by the last quarter of the year. These formations served under Colonel Russell Livermore. From Corsica, Livermore's command inserted OG sabotage squads by boat along the northwest coast of Italy and the French Riviera. Italy was the first, disastrous, proving ground for the OG concept. In early 1944 several OG squads were annihilated on tactically dubious sabotage missions along the Italian coast. Their uniforms and numbers drew unwelcome attention from Italy's Wehrmacht occupiers. Despite these setbacks, however, Donovan and Huntington continued to support the OGs and thought that, in the right conditions – namely during and after a massive Allied invasion – OGs could create chaos behind enemy lines. The splendid performance of OSS OGs in France from June to August 1944 eventually validated their assessment. But OSS was not content to wait that long.

Glavin, Livermore and Donovan wanted to put OSS's strongest SO card, their only scheme unencumbered by Allied cooperation, into play immediately. In Italy this was a mistake that cost lives. In France, the conspicuous presence of large, uniformed squads of Allied irregulars in a probable invasion zone might have proven disastrous from a security standpoint. A German counterstroke against prematurely deployed OGs could have netted other clandestine Allied operatives as well. Eventually General Eisenhower's prevented OSS from implementing its pre-'Overlord' OG plans – but the danger was there in late 1943. The air transport shortage may have been a blessing in disguise for Donovan's men.[22]

OSS's imprudent scramble to deploy the OGs was partly in response to another imminent Allied tactical experiment in special operations: the 'Jedburgh' program. As originally conceived by SOE operations chief (and future CD) Colin Gubbins in May 1942, the 'Jedburghs' (or 'Jeds') were three-man British liaison missions to the Resistance that would parachute behind enemy lines just prior to the Allied invasion of France. Each team, composed of a commander, a wireless operator, and a courier, would make contact with the *Maquis* and provide leadership, organizing skills, and deliveries of arms. Over time, the concept mutated somewhat; by the winter of 1943/1944 Baker Street saw the 'Jeds' as a "strategic reserve" that could provide leadership to Resistance groups that were as yet unincorporated into F Section, R/F Section or FFI networks. In this capacity they might be deployed well before D-Day – even though 'Jed' training had heretofore emphasized guerilla warfare rather than building clandestine networks or spy-craft. The program was therefore modified in January 1944, and a special 'Jedburgh School' was created at Milton Hall, near Peterborough, to broaden the 'Jed' curriculum.[23]

OSS's initial reaction to Gubbins' new gambit was hostile. Indeed, Huntington's memo outlining the OG plan in March 1943 was written in response to SOE's first large-scale 'Jed' simulation ('Spartan') earlier in the month. He and Donovan thought it was yet another British attempt to present OSS with a *fait accompli*, before enlisting American cooperation in a subordinate role (as in the establishment of 'Massingham' in November 1942). If this was Gubbins' intent, he succeeded: first by establishing the 'Jedburghs' as a viable SOE program, then by expanding it to include OSS and Gaullist officers. Eventually, the American and French contribution became so large that the 'Jedburghs' became a truly inter-Allied

enterprise. Yet, as in the case of 'Massingham' and the Anglo-American special operations headquarters in Algiers, SOE remained the dominant partner.[24]

Yet the OG plan had also gotten off the ground, and OSS was in the process of training hundreds of new recruits. Thus, by the end of 1943, the tactical muddle created by several different clandestine schemes added to the rationale for Allied unity in special operations. Without a central authority to arbitrate how, when and where these various plans might be employed, the potential for inter-Allied confusion and battlefield disaster was great. OSS and SOE had been jockeying for position in the Algiers region for more than a year; it was time for a final reckoning. In January 1944, the debate over SO tactics was subsumed into the larger strategic question what part special operations would play, alongside conventional forces, in the liberation of France.

SPOC and the Final Push for Allied Unity in SO, January 1944 to May 1944

In January 1944, OSS Director William Donovan traveled to Algiers, reprising his trip a year earlier. During his stay in Algiers in January 1943, Donovan's main concern had been to ensure that cooperation with SOE did not relegate OSS to a junior, subordinate role in the Allied secret war. In an interview with the 'Massingham' commander, Douglas Dodds-Parker, he had agreed to share men and resources with SOE on an informal basis, as long as he could preserve the formal independence of his SO organization. This agreement had allowed the two agencies to share their training facilities around Algiers, develop personal friendships, and overcome cultural irritants. Operationally, the results were less satisfactory. Apart from some minor successes in Corsica and Sardina, in military terms special operations in the western Mediterranean region had been ineffective in 1943. OSS and SOE had failed to take advantage of the window of opportunity between the fall of Mussolini in late July and the Armistice with Badoglio in September to establish an effective SO regime in Italy. Their subsequent, independent SO efforts had a negligible impact on the Allied campaign there. Donovan knew that for the sake of both his own organization and the overall war effort, a different approach was necessary in France. He had come to Algiers to make a deal. But OSS and SOE were not the only parties with a vital interest in French special operations anymore. The French were uniting under the CFLN, the CNR and de Gaulle, and had a compelling political stake in the Resistance. But the ultimate power to decide the role that special

operations would play during the French campaign lay with the military commanders: General Maitland Wilson and General Dwight Eisenhower. The form that any unified clearinghouse for Mediterranean-based SO took would have a direct bearing on the place special operations assumed in their military strategy. And, as Donovan knew, OSS and SOE Algiers would only have a major role to play in the Allies' French campaign if they pooled their SO resources.[25]

Donovan's trip was also spurred by the Allied Conferences at Quebec and Tehran during the latter half of 1943. At Quebec in August, Donovan had seen Roosevelt and Churchill commit their armies to a major cross-channel invasion of France in 1944 ('Overlord'). The Anglo-American strategy had also incorporated a provision for "operations against southern France" in the "Toulon and Marseilles area" (plan 'Anvil/Dragoon'). Over stern protests from the British Chiefs of Staff (COS) who favored a continued emphasis on the Italian campaign, the Riviera assault was confirmed at Tehran. Donovan knew that the OSS-SO establishment in Algiers was in a prime position to exploit this new plan, provided that it worked closely with SOE, the French, and the top brass at Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ). These were the top items on his agenda in January 1944.[26]

In a series of meetings, Donovan discussed the future of SO work in the region with Dodds-Parker, Jacques Soustelle (Algiers delegate for de Gaulle's Director General for Special Services, or DGSS, the new moniker for Colonel Passy's BCRA), Harold Macmillan, and AFHQ Chief of Staff Lt. General James Gammell. They agreed to coordinate most special operations directed at southern France through 'Massingham' and to Italy through 'Maryland.' In the latter case coordination proved more nominal than real, but at 'Massingham' British and American commanders had built an amicable, symbiotic relationship over the previous year. Unlike their counterparts in Italy, OSS and SOE Algiers quickly established a more formal basis for their partnership; the joint establishment was called SOE-SO. Soustelle detailed one of his men, Guillaume Widmer, to act as his liaison officer at the Club des Pins, the former compound of beachfront villas that housed 'Massingham' west of Algiers. For the first time, the French were also invited to regularly participate at the weekly SOE-SO meeting, usually held at the Club des Pins or AFHQ.[27]

Convincing AFHQ to assign special operations a significant role in the invasion of France proved more problematic. Allied headquarters was in the midst of a command shakeup. Eisenhower had recently been named Supreme Allied

Commander of the 'Overlord' campaign, and left Algiers to assume his new post at SHAEF, in London. His replacement, British General Maitland Wilson, assumed responsibility for all military activities in Italy and the western Mediterranean. In the run up to 'Overlord,' however, Eisenhower had sole authority over all Allied special operations in France, including those that had their command, control, and supply functions based in Algiers. Thus, while Gammell could offer the support of AFHQ on Wilson's behalf, only Eisenhower could determine the role SO would play in his French strategy. And Eisenhower had his doubts about the plans SOE-SO had for southern France.[28]

General Eisenhower was reluctant to allow an expanded SOE-SO presence in southern France prior to 'Overlord.' His hesitation was rooted in political concerns and security fears. Initially, Eisenhower's hands were tied by President Roosevelt's non-recognition policy toward de Gaulle and the CFLN. "Tripartite Intelligence," – sharing US intelligence with the French – had been banned by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). As it became increasingly clear that French troops would participate directly in 'Anvil' and that coordination with the Resistance was essential, this prohibition became an embarrassment. By March, Eisenhower convinced the JCS to quietly abandon it. But Eisenhower's security concerns could not be so easily dismissed. During the 'Torch' operation of November 1942 and its immediate aftermath, Eisenhower had witnessed the chaos special operations could create behind enemy lines. At the time, he had commended OSS for its subversive activities in the Maghreb. But in 1944 the Allies intended to confront the full might of the Wehrmacht head on, rather than the confused, demoralized, partially disarmed French Armistice Army. Anything that gave the Germans the ability to infer the timing and location of 'Overlord' could deal the Allies a staggering blow. Eisenhower decided that allowing OG and 'Jedburgh' teams – who would wear regular army uniforms – into France prior to D-Day was too great a risk. Existing SOE networks, given sufficiently non-specific information about the invasion, could activate their members and quietly prepare the Resistance. But the new SOE-SO guerilla schemes would have to wait.[29]

Eisenhower's delay was wise, on a number of different levels. It prevented OSS from repeating the tactical blunder it had committed with the OGs in Italy. The OGs were designed to operate during or immediately prior to an Allied invasion, not months in advance. They were essentially uniformed commandos, not 'secret armies'

or resistance organizers. Despite their new clandestine training at the 'School' outside Peterborough, the 'Jedburghs' had the same potential weakness. A delay made tactical sense. Second, in OSS-SO's subsequent scramble to sell a large-scale OG deployment in France prior to 'Anvil,' it was finally compelled to abandon any pretext of independence and work to achieve a complete operational merger with SOE. OSS-SO's "autonomous, cooperative" relationship with its British counterpart in Algiers was already anomalous: OSS and SOE had merged their London operations into an integrated Special Forces Headquarters (SFHQ) that worked closely with SHAEF. By March 1944, a new title for the SO empire centered on 'Massingham' was circulating in Algiers: the Special Project Operations Center (SPOC). SPOC would bring the British, American and French SO regimes in Algiers together under one authority, and give Eisenhower the ability to exercise his authority there as effectively as he did at SFHQ. In May, SPOC became a reality.[30]

SPOC was no mere bureaucratic window dressing. Like the British and American armies, SO commanders now lived and worked together in Algiers. Agents were billeted together. Facilities, like the Club des Pins and Villa Magnol, were fully shared. Tactical planning for the insertion and retrieval of SO mission in France was vastly improved. The FFI and the Resistance were an essential part of the new structure. Most importantly, Eisenhower could now integrate special operations in southern France into his military strategy and timetable for 'Overlord' and 'Anvil.' This degree of coordination between regular and irregular forces had been non-existent in Italy prior to 'Avalanche' and relatively minor before operation 'Torch.' The creation of SPOC did not guarantee that special operations during the French campaign would be successful, but without it the chance of failure would have been greater.[31]

For William Donovan, however, the formation of SPOC was a personal defeat. The OSS Director had fought for more than a year to maintain the independence of his operation in Algiers, to no avail. The rise of the FFI, SOE's superior organization and communications, and Eisenhower's reluctance to approve the early deployment of OSS's principal SO gambit in southern France – the OGs – made the rationale for SPOC too compelling to resist. Donovan finally had to abandon the pretence that he maintained an independent SO capability in Europe. But his determination to strengthen his Agency's position in Washington and endow the United States with its own clandestine assets during the postwar era was not so easily thwarted. Even after

the creation of SPOC in Algiers and SFHQ in London, Anglo-American unity was more fragile than it seemed. As the next chapter demonstrates, Donovan was simultaneously creating a secret intelligence (SI) network in France that deliberately excluded the British.

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[1] M.R.D. Foot, *SOE in France: An Account of the Work of the British Special Operations Executive in France, 1940-1944* (London: HMSO, 1966) p.153; Rita Kramer, *Flames in the Field: The Story of Four SOE Agents in Occupied France* (London: Penguin, 1996) p.233.

[2] Although when it comes to causal confusion, historians have been serial offenders in the past. David Hackett Fischer calls this conflation of necessary and sufficient factors the "reductive fallacy." The error occurs, he says, "in causal explanations that are constructed like a single chain and stretched taut across a vast chasm of complexity." Major historical events rarely spring from a single cause, but some factors, as Fischer reminds us, are more important than others. David Hackett Fischer, *Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought* (New York: Harper, 1970) pp.172-173.

[3] Arthur Layton Funk, "OSS in Algiers," in George C. Chalou, ed. *The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II* (Washington, DC: NARA, 1992) p.176; William J. M. Mackenzie, *The Secret History of SOE: The Special Operations Executive, 1940-1945* (London: St. Ermin's Press, 2000) pp.618-619; for more on the 'Prosper' affair and the Vercors disaster, see Chapter 8.

[4] Kramer, *Flames*, pp.284-285.

[5] See chapter 2 and Bickham Sweet-Escott, *Baker Street Irregular* (London: Methuen, 1965) pp.138-140; Cipher Telegram from London to New York, CD [Hambro] to G [William Stephenson], 14 November 1942, HS 3/56; Letter from D/CD(O) [Colin Gubbins] to CD [Hambro], 23 November 1942, HS 3/56; Jay Jakob, *Spies and Saboteurs: Anglo-American Collaboration and Rivalry in Human Intelligence Collection and Special Operations, 1940-1945* (London: Macmillan, 1999) pp.74-79; Letter from AM [unidentified] to D/CD(O) [Gubbins], circa 23 November 1942, HS 3/56.

[6] Jakob, *Spies and Saboteurs*, pp.78-79.

[7] Captain Jacky Porter, FANY, *The History of MASSINGHAM* (Unpublished: 15 September 1945), part VI, p.3, HS 7/169 – Mistakenly filed as the *History of SOE in Corsica*, with cover letter, notes, and appendices; Funk, "OSS in Algiers," p.170; for a more detailed study of the early history of 'Massingham,' see chapter 2.

[8] Mario Rossi, "United States Military Authorities and Free France, 1942-1944," *The Journal of Military History*, Volume 61, Issue 1 (January 1997), p.49.

[9] Jean Lacouture, *De Gaulle: The Rebel, 1890-1944*, trans. Patrick O'Brian, (New York: Norton, 1990), pp.493-494; Maurice Agulhon, *The French Republic 1879-1992* trans. Antonia Neville (Blackwell, 1990) p., 259, 287; Julian Jackson, *France: The Dark Years, 1940-1944* (Oxford: Oxford, 2001) pp.456-460.

[10] Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945* (Oxford, 1995) pp.377-378; 406-407.

[11] Eisenhower, Stark and Macmillan quoted in Rossi, "US Military and Free France," pp.51-52, 57-59.

[12] See chapter 7; Anthony Cave Brown, *The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan* (London: Michael Joseph, 1982) pp.316-340; "Memo: On Battle Order and Other Military Information on France Distributed to AFHQ Algiers By 2677 Headquarters Co," author unknown [Hyde, Schoonmaker?], 12 November 1943, RG 226, Entry 97, Box 33, Folder 576. OSS Algiers made several detailed reports to Washington on de Gaulle's purge of Vichyite and Giraudist officers. See "PPF – SOL Purge," 5 August 1943, RG 226, entry 97, box 19, folder 337.

[13] Jackson, *Dark Years*, pp.449-456, 518-523; Agulhon, *French Republic*, p.508.

[14] Donovan quoted in Rossi, "US Military and Free France," p.60, 63. 64.

[15] See chapter 7.

[16] OSS thought SOE was pushing for closer ties so it could get its hands on the Americans' superior monetary resources. There were ongoing OSS-SOE tensions over what OSS paid its agents in the field. SOE could not match their salaries. See Paul Mellon [OSS London] to Paul van der Stricht [OSS Algiers], "Establishment of a Standard Rate of Pay and Allowances for SO Agents (1) in Training and (2) in the Field," 12 August 1943, RG 226, entry 97, box 40, folder 711.

[17] Mackenzie, *History of SOE*, pp.564-598.

[18] Funk, "OSS in Algiers," pp.168-169.

[19] Mackenzie, *History of SOE*, pp.569, 581-583; Kramer, *Flames*, pp.149-150; Arthur Layton Funk, *Hidden Ally: The French Resistance, Special Operations, and the Landings in Southern France, 1944*

(Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1992), pp.23-25; for more on the Cammaerts, Starr and the fall of 'Prosper,' see chapter 8.

[20] Thomas' personal exploits are recounted in Mark Seaman, *Bravest of the Brave: The True Story of Wing Commander "Tommy" Yeo-Thomas, SOE, Secret Agent, Codename "White Rabbit"* (London: O'Mara Books, 1998); Mackenzie, *History of SOE*, pp.590-591, 597; SOE's Italian campaign is critiqued in Chapter 4.

[21] OSS's lack of air transport relative to SOE was a constant irritant at weekly meetings held by Eddy and Dodds-Parker during the summer of 1943. See "Minutes of 4th Special Operations Weekly Meeting," 31 August 1944, RG 226, entry 97, box 19, folder 339; Arthur Funk goes into some detail about the superiority of SOE's French networks. See Funk, *Hidden* Ally, p.29; Mackenzie, *History of SOE*, pp.252-253; Funk, "OSS in Algiers," p.169, 171-172.

[22] Memo from Huntington to Donovan: Auxiliary Operations Groups, 6 March 1943, RG 226, entry 97, box 3, folder 26; for more on the OSS experience with OGs in Italy, see Chapter 4; Report on OSS Activities in Corsica and Sardinia, 23 November 1943, RG 226, entry 97, box 6, folder 89; Air Transport Operations Report, 30 November 1943, RG 226, entry 97, box 45, folder 791.

[23] Ian Dear, *Sabotage and Subversion: Stories from the Files of SOE and OSS* (London: Arms & Armour, 1996) pp.181-183; Mackenzie, *History of SOE*, pp.603-609;

[24] Huntington claimed that the OGs would be better than the 'Jedburghs.' See memo from Huntington to Donovan: Auxiliary Operations Groups, 6 March 1943, RG 226, entry 97, box 3, folder 26; Chapter VI. Huntington wrote a memo later that month outlining other means SO Algiers could maintain its independence. This included establishing an overland supply route through Spain, the method eventually adopted by Henry Hyde and the 'Medusa' team. See Huntington to Paul van der Stricht [Algiers], 12 March 1943, RG 226, entry 97, box 3, folder 26; chapter 7. Mackenzie, *History of SOE*, pp.603-604; for more on the OSS-SOE tensions surrounding the establishment of 'Massingham,' see chapter 2.

[25] See chapters 2 to 4. Dodds-Parker, Keswick and SOE's 'Massingham' leadership convinced several important OSS officers that merging Anglo-American SO resources in Algiers was vital long before Donovan gave his assent in 1944. See Major Robert P. Pflieger [OSS Algiers] to Lt. Commander R. Davis Halliwell [OSS Washington], "SO Set-up in Algiers," 6 August 1943, RG 226, entry 97, box 42, folder 731.

[26] Matthew Jones, *Britain, the United States and the Mediterranean War, 1942-1944* (London: Macmillan, 1996) pp.166-168; Funk, "OSS in Algiers," pp.169-171.

[27] "Report to General Donovan on Meeting of SOE, OSS and BCRA Committee," from Lt. Col. Robert P. Pflieger, 16 January 1944, RG 226, entry 97, box 29, folder 509; "Minutes of Meeting held in Room 143, AFHQ at 1700 hours 17 January 1944 to discuss future of OSS/SOE in MEDITERRANEAN," RG 226, entry 97, box 7, folder 98; "Minutes of 22nd Special Operations Weekly Meeting," 15 February 1944, RG 226, entry 97, box 7, folder 98; "SOE/OSS in the Mediterranean," 17 January 1944, RG 226, entry 97, box 39, folder 667; Funk, "OSS in Algiers," p.170.

[28] Funk, "OSS in Algiers," p.174.

[29] The ban on "tripartite intelligence" prevented the Americans from sharing their intelligence with the French, but OSS never objected to using material provided by the BCRA or DGSS: see "France, Aviation," RG 226, entry 97, box 16, folder 282; Rossi, "US Military and Free France," pp.60-61; Mackenzie, *History of SOE*, pp.613-617.

[30] Funk, "OSS in Algiers," pp.174-176.

[31] Funk, *Hidden Ally*, pp.32-33; Funk, "OSS in Algiers," p.175.

Chapter 7, 'Plan Medusa': The American Bid for Independence from Britain in Secret Intelligence, 1943-1944

Introduction

During the course of the Second World War, the impulse to rationalize special operations (SO) by improving efficiency and coordinating irregular warfare with the conventional Allied campaign led to increasingly close cooperation between Britain and the United States. By mid-1943, experience had taught the Anglo-American powers that secret warfare was ineffective, even counterproductive, when pursued outside the strategic context of the wider European war. Thus, in planning what they hoped would be the decisive thrust against Hitler's fortress Europe – the invasion of France – the Anglo-American Allies opted for near-total integration of their special operations forces. In the western Mediterranean theatre the result was the Special Projects Operations Center (SPOC), the Anglo-American-French outfit that assisted the June 1944 D-Day landings in Normandy and played a crucial role in the success of Operation 'Anvil' – the follow-up invasion of southern France in August (see chapters 6 and 8). SPOC was a conspicuous success, and fits the paradigm of British-US intelligence relations portrayed in the official histories: initial suspicion and conflict, followed by growing understanding, comity and unity. But there is another, secret, side to this story. OSS Director William J. Donovan was playing a double game.

While the Allies were working to establish an unprecedented level of mutual trust and integration in special operations at SPOC, the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was pursuing its own agenda in secret intelligence (SI). At the beginning of June 1943, Donovan used William Maddox, his Anglophile head of OSS-SI Branch in London, to negotiate a deal with the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) that would pool US-UK SI resources during any future assault on Nazi-occupied France (plan 'Sussex'). Yet Donovan was simultaneously plotting to circumvent his new SIS partners. Against the wishes of its British allies, the US Army, and some voices within the agency, OSS began a covert struggle to build its own, entirely separate, espionage network in France. An account of this top-secret project, code-named 'Medusa,' is presented here for the first time.

'Medusa' was the brainchild of two men who were committed to building an independent US intelligence capability: the OSS Director, William J. Donovan, and his SI Chief in Algiers, Henry B. Hyde. Donovan had apparently lost the struggle for autonomous American special operations in southwestern Europe in January 1943, when the Allied theatre commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, directed him to work "together 100 percent" with the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) establishment based outside Algiers (code-named 'Massingham').[1] Yet even as Donovan was forced into an effective merger with the British on clandestine missions to France – a process the culminated in SPOC and 'Sussex' – he secretly moved to create a separate US intelligence capability there. Hyde quietly trained a small cadre of French agents for this purpose outside Algiers during the summer of 1943, smuggled them to London aboard a RAF transport, and demanded that the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) help insert his men into France. Presented with a *fait accompli*, SIS arranged for the US mission (code-named 'Penny-Farthing') to be parachuted behind enemy lines, but refused to render further assistance. Against all odds, 'Penny-Farthing' established itself successfully on the continent. But faced with British hostility and the initial reluctance of US military authorities to support what they rightly suspected was an operation of negligible strategic importance, Hyde cast about for a new means of supplying and expanding his French network. His solution, plan 'Medusa,' involved using the small OSS presence in Spain to smuggle men, materiel, and intelligence by land over the Pyrenees.

The 'Medusa' Plan eventually bore fruit: by May 1944 it was producing a considerable volume of intelligence. But Hyde's accomplishment came at a price. Much of the intelligence was time sensitive, and lost relevance as it made the slow journey overland from southern France to Madrid. The monetary cost, in cash, was exorbitant compared to comparable British and Allied missions. And although the evidence is inconclusive, it is possible the entire network was discovered, and turned, by German counterintelligence. Yet for Donovan and Hyde, none of these caveats mattered; in their eyes 'Medusa' was a splendid success. It proved that America could operate independently of its British allies in Europe, and fortified the OSS case that the US could, and should, establish a permanent intelligence agency after the War was over.

'Medusa' has an important historical legacy. It was not a shining example of efficient intelligence collection. But 'Medusa' is a revelatory window on the

complexities of the Anglo-American intelligence relationship, the heretofore overlooked Allied clandestine effort in Spain, and William Donovan's vision for a significant postwar role for OSS. Plan 'Medusa,' was one of the awkward steps in America's journey toward a permanent role in world affairs beyond the western hemisphere.

Henry Hyde, William Donovan and the Renewed Struggle for an Independent US Secret Intelligence Capability, May to June 1943

Following Eisenhower's January 1943 directive mandating Anglo-American cooperation in special operations – which both OSS and SOE saw as tantamount to US subordination – in the Western Mediterranean, Donovan curtailed his agitation for independent OSS operations in Europe. He knew that debating OSS prerogatives with powerful theatre commanders was a losing proposition. But the bureaucratic warfare in Washington only intensified. By the summer, Donovan had to defend OSS against new charges of extravagance and incompetence from his perennial antagonist, US Military Intelligence Division (MID) Chief Major General George V. Strong. On 12 June, General Strong wrote scathing report to his superiors on the American Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), which claimed OSS was "a hydra-headed organization" led by an "ambitious and imaginative Director" that was beginning "to take on the ethical color of its enemies in all particulars." As usual, Donovan couched his rebuttal in a catalog in his Agency's "successes" – particularly in operations independent of the British. Apart from the now well-worn account of Robert Murphy's pre-Torch 'Apostles' and a couple vignettes from Asia, however, his ledger of purely American adventures was short. Donovan was running out of time to augment these exploits and strengthen the case for OSS: the JCS were pushing for a massive invasion of France, a plan that was confirmed by Roosevelt and Churchill at the Anglo-American Quebec conference in August. To guarantee OSS's survival after the War, Donovan wanted to secure an independent role for the Agency in the decisive battle for Europe.[2]

Yet some of his own men, now steeped in an ethos of mutual assistance with Britain, were unwilling to play the Director's game. Donovan's London SI Chief, the eminent Princeton political scientist and American architect of the 'Sussex' Plan, Dr. William Maddox, was one of them. "Nothing should be done that would jeopardize the fruitful relationship [with SIS]," he warned Washington. The SO branch brass in

London, who had just committed to the establishment of SPOC for Mediterranean operations into France, felt the same way. For Captain Paul van der Stricht, who manned the French SO desk, working with the British was the only practical option. OSS agents received the best training, produced more valuable intelligence, and survived longer in the field when they collaborated with SOE or SIS. Those who favored closer ties with the British also got indirect backing from the MID representative in London, General Jake Devers, who thought that OSS was too incompetent to be trusted with any significant role in the Allied assault on France, and did not "trust Donovan or his ideas."[3]

Donovan neutralized Devers by lodging a complaint with the JCS in Washington accompanied by a colorful threat to "tear [Devers] to pieces physically and throw his remains… into Grosvenor Square." The MID man backed down. But overcoming opposition to an independent mission within the OSS London ranks would be problematic. Moreover, Donovan knew that, if given half a chance, SIS would move to nip plans for a separate American SI network in the bud. Claude Dansey, the powerful Deputy Chief in Broadway, was believed to be particularly hostile to Donovan's ambitions. It was "increasingly and painfully clear," one OSS study reported, that some SIS officials were using their "power and influence" to hinder the "equal, independent, and coordinate" status of the American service, in order to maintain their "omnipotence" in European intelligence. Donovan had tried direct confrontation with the British over the 'Massingham' controversy during the winter of 1942-1943, and had lost (see chapters 2). This time, he would not risk another failure. Donovan decided to circumvent possible British objections, and the reservations of his own colleagues to an independent US intelligence network in France, by setting his plans in motion secretly. To bring off this mooted *fait accompli*, Donovan needed the help of a consummately skilled operator, based outside London, who shared his long-term vision for OSS.[4]

Henry B. Hyde, who headed the OSS-SI operation in Algiers, was Donovan's choice. Hyde was an immensely attractive character: gauntly handsome, witty, and urbane. Raised in France by American parents, steeped in French culture, he had taken his first degree at Cambridge, attended Harvard Law School, and worked as an attorney in New York before the War. Yet there was also, to borrow Anne Widdecombe's latter-day phrase, "something of the night about him." Perhaps it was Hyde's family background – his father had immigrated to France under a cloud of

suspicion regarding fraud and other irregularities at his American company, Equitable Life Insurance. Then there were his French politics. Hyde was rumored to be an ultra-rightwing monarchist – a supporter of the Comte de Paris – and was friendly with reputed Cagoulards in North Africa like Jacques Lemaigre-Dubrueil. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., who met Hyde after the liberation of Paris and later became friends with him in New York, disparaged these allegations and thought "he exaggerated his conservatism in order to *épater* the liberals." He was certainly no Gaullist partisan. Collectively, though, these traits made him the perfect mastermind for Donovan's scheme. He could use solicitousness and guile to keep the British and the Gaullist intelligence service (BCRA) quiescent, but had no scruples about bullying the Allies if necessary. His political orientation attracted conservative French officers disturbed by de Gaulle's growing prominence in Algiers. Most importantly, however, he had a genius for empathy. Indeed, Hyde understood people almost as well as James Angleton understood enemy bureaucracies, and this enabled him to recruit agents for especially dangerous missions while pulling the wool of the eyes of America's Allies.[5]

With the Director's mandate, Hyde wasted no time assembling the nucleus of an independent US intelligence network. In May, the head of OSS Algiers, Colonel William Eddy, made a deal with French military intelligence (*Service de Renseignements* – SR) officials under the conservative figurehead General Henri Giraud. In exchange for a payment of 70,000 US dollars per month (a huge sum in 1943) the SR would permit OSS to recruit agents from the French Army for its own purposes. One of the first of these was a wan, apparently tubercular, upper-class Lieutenant with connections in Lyon, Jean Alziary de Roquefort. Under the code-name 'Jacques,' he became the leader of Hyde's first successful independent SI mission to France, Operation 'Penny-Farthing.'[6]

Operation 'Penny-Farthing,' June to August 1943

The preparations for 'Penny-Farthing' took place at the Villa Magnol, OSS's whitewashed headquarters overlooking the bay of Algiers. Hyde knew, from several unhappy experiences with ill-prepared agents during the spring of 1943, that thorough training was vitally important if his men were to survive behind enemy lines. Beginning in May the 'Penny-Farthing' crew – Alziary and his newly designated radio operator Sgt. Mario Marret (code-name 'Toto') – were put through a rigorous

three-month course in evasion, small arms, Gestapo interrogation techniques, parachuting, radio ciphers, and agent recruitment. Hyde maintained the instruction was far more demanding than the usual OSS training, and met or exceeded British standards. Yet it was still easy to conceal the special nature of the 'Penny-Farthing' mission from the British and other OSS colleagues. By the summer of 1943 hundreds of Allied agents were being trained in and around Algiers; amid this teeming hothouse for spies, Hyde's men were unexceptional.[7]

Securing transportation to France was far more problematic. When Alziary and Marret neared the end of their training late June, Hyde realized that there was no available air transport in Algiers that could drop his men outside Lyon. OSS would not receive their first complement of dedicated B-17 'Flying Fortresses' for clandestine operations until late autumn. In desperation, Hyde was forced solicit help from the British in the person of his friend, Colonel Douglas Dodds-Parker. As the commander of 'Massingham,' the SOE training facility located on the coast west of Algiers, Dodds-Parker controlled several aircraft operating out of the Blida airstrip. But he could hardly transport two US agents to France, on a mission to establish an independent American intelligence network, without precipitating a major flap with SOE's sister service, and frequent rival, SIS. True to form, however, Dodds-Parker improvised an alternative suggestion. 'Massingham' would outfit Hyde, Alziary and Marret with surplus British Army uniforms, fake identities, and space on an RAF transport to England. Back in Blighty, Hyde's team could reveal themselves, demand help from OSS London boss David Bruce, and challenge SIS. Confronted with a *fait accompli*, 'Broadway' might be forced to back down and accommodate the 'Penny-Farthing' mission. If Alziary and Marret installed themselves successfully behind enemy lines, OSS could use its own transport to supply and augment the network.[8]

Dodds-Parker's scheme offered Hyde a desperate, but not implausible, chance. The Guards officer was an experienced bureaucratic operator, having survived the Anglo-American ructions over the establishment of 'Massingham' during the winter of 1942-1943, and finessed the Foreign Office over the 'Monkey' project – which facilitated the surrender of Italy – that July. It is not surprising that Hyde decided to play along. But why, friendship aside, would Dodds-Parker choose to help OSS? Dodds-Parker could recall nothing about the project when queried about his role in 'Penny-Farthing' almost six decades later. He did remember Hyde, though: a "splendid, bright man" who "knew a great deal about the work [intelligence]."

Dodds-Parker clearly trusted the American's judgment and had faith in Hyde's ability to bluff his way out of trouble. Perhaps most importantly, however, Dodds-Parker had bought into the idea of the secret 'special relationship.' Like William Maddox, he was willing to give his allies the benefit of the doubt, and help in any way he could. "I did not treat the Americans any differently from the way I treated my own men," Dodds-Parker maintained. "We had the same objectives." Ironically, the Hyde-Donovan attempt to break free of British tutelage and establish an independent US intelligence capability was rescued – by a British officer.[9]

On 28 June Hyde – with a uniform and papers identifying him as a Royal Army captain – flew to England accompanied by two faux-Royal Army lieutenants. Upon landing at RAF Prestwick, Hyde took the receiving officer aside, informed him that he was an OSS official carrying out a special mission for SOE, and demanded a phone call to David Bruce. The British commander, who had probably never heard of these organizations, pulled himself together after a few moments of comic incomprehension and telephoned his superiors. Eventually, someone figured out who Bruce was, and Hyde found himself having an awkward phone chat with his nominal superior at OSS London. As Hyde noted in his report to Donovan:

> I had decided ahead of time in Algiers that my best chance of flying my team out of England would be not to give advance notice to Colonel Bruce of our arrival lest he be forced to instruct us not to come at all. In my conversation with him I would have to feign surprise that he had not been notified of our trip to his theatre and clear up the deception with him, if possible, later on. I followed this plan on the phone with him.

Bruce reacted tolerantly to these shenanigans, and arranged for the 'Penny-Farthing' team to be brought to London. Given the nature of Hyde's mission, however, SIS had to be informed. The stage was set for a showdown.[10]

A few days later, William Maddox escorted Hyde to SIS headquarters in 25 Broadway. There he came face-to-face with Claude Dansey, the man that he and Donovan regarded as the primary impediment to independent OSS action in SI. Operating from what he perceived to be a position of strength – with two fully-trained agents in England, ready for deployment – Hyde gave the deputy SIS leader the full story: Donovan's plans for an American SI network, the training he had given the 'Penny-Farthing' team and the assistance provided by SOE's Dodds-Parker. According to Hyde's account, Dansey responded "politely but with the air of a man

who had other things to do on that particularly beautiful July Sunday afternoon." In SIS's view 'Penny-Farthing' was a waste of resources, given that it could not accomplish anything in France "that we and the French are not already doing." Moreover, Dansey continued, "one rotten apple can spoil a basket of good apples" and compromise the real intelligence effort on the continent. The OSS plan could not be allowed to proceed.[11]

Hyde refused to back down. Dansey "pre-supposed our apple was bad, which was not the case." His agents had been trained to an SOE standard in Algiers, and had their backgrounds carefully vetted. Finally, "our apple was under explicit instructions under no circumstances to make contact at any time with the already established fruits." Alziary and Marret were prepared to survive on their own, without contact or succor from SIS or the BCRA.[12]

The debate continued for a considerable period, ranging from small talk about mutual acquaintances to ferocious attacks on OSS recruiting methods – particularly the large sums of money the Americans were offering to potential French agents. Hyde cast his steadfast defiance romantically, contrasting his resolve in the face of personal attacks from Dansey and his deputy, General James Marshall-Cornwall, with the spinelessness of the "squirming" Maddox. Some of this was undoubtedly poetic license calculated to impress Donovan. But the upshot was that neither side was willing to compromise its position. Hyde left the meeting feeling stymied.[13]

Eventually, Dodds-Parker's estimate that SIS would not be able to prevent the insertion of the 'Penny-Farthing' team proved correct. Several days later, Dansey conceded that his service would provide air transport to France on a one-time-only basis. SIS acceded to Hyde's *fait accompli*. After some delay, due to the need to retrain the 'Penny-Farthing' agents to parachute from a British Halifax aircraft and bad weather, the team was dropped near Lyon on 17 August. On 1 September 'Toto' (Marret) broadcast an enciphered message indicating the team was safe. Donovan had the germ of an independent US network in France.[14]

But what was the price of this small success? Relations with SIS were seriously strained. Donovan and Hyde had embarrassed and potentially antagonized several important members of the OSS establishment in London. Worst of all, with the possibility of supplying his independent SI network via Britain precluded, and no dedicated OSS aircraft due to arrive in Algiers for several more months, Hyde could

not effectively maintain, much less expand, his French scheme. Without succor, Donovan's grand dream would wither on the vine.

Circumventing the British: Inventing Plan 'Medusa,' September to December 1943

With Alziary and Marret safely established and broadcasting outside Lyon, Hyde faced a dilemma. He could bring 'Penny-Farthing' back within the Anglo-American cooperative fold, which would give him access to the aircraft he needed to supply and expand the Allied clandestine network in France. Alternatively, he could keep his network outside British influence and invent a new, presumably more difficult means of supplying his men. The latter course held great risk: it would increase the vulnerability of his agents and reduce the timeliness of the intelligence they produced. Yet Hyde chose to remain autonomous, despite the dangers involved, for two reasons. First, unrelenting British hostility to 'Penny-Farthing' and subsequent independent US missions in France convinced him that persistence was in America's long-term national interest. Second, from late 1943 onward the OSS leadership – from Donovan to local field commanders – made the postwar preservation of their agency, and America's independent intelligence capability, a top priority. These two factors spurred Hyde to create an inspired, flawed scheme that became plan 'Medusa.'

Hyde's persistent attempts to overcome transport problems and maintain the independence of 'Penny-Farthing' were spurred by SIS efforts to undermine his network. In October and November, SIS lodged a series of complaints in London about French agents working for Hyde. One source reported that "American prestige was low in France," partly due to "their inaccurate bombing," and "partly [due] to the clumsy approach of American Agents from Algiers operating in the field." The anonymous SIS agent went on to complain that "Americans from Algiers are dealing with the ex-deuxieme bureau and go round [conspicuously] with questionnaires on the 'Gallup Poll' lines." Hyde was furious, and thought the whole affair was a hypocritical SIS ploy to shut down his operation. He was probably right. The SIS agent's complaints about OSS contacts with (presumably Giraudist) deuxieme bureau officials were spurious, given that SOE's (independent) F Section utilized similar connections. SIS may have done the same. The gripe about 'Gallup' methods, while accurate, was a cynical attempt to undermine OSS's standing with Gaullist resistance elements, who were concerned that the Americans might be trying to foster alternative

political movements. Hyde also pointed out that clandestine polling to gage French public opinion was originally a British idea. In any event, Hyde took this incident of inter-Allied 'black propaganda' as proof that he and Donovan had been right all along: American and British interests would not always be congruent, and OSS needed its own independent intelligence capacity. The flap also induced some important OSS figures to rally around their beleaguered colleague. Van der Stricht's London desk concluded that SIS's claims were unreliable because their source was "pro-British rather than pro-American."[15]

Meanwhile, the tide of the internal OSS debate between those who sought total integration with British intelligence and those who favored a more independent approach was shifting Hyde's way. A growing number of OSS officers were convinced that America's ability to maintain a permanent, peacetime intelligence service would be depend of the wartime agency's demonstrated capacity for independent action. On 10 September two leaders of OSS's labor desk in Algiers, Arthur Goldberg and G.P. Van Arkel, drafted a memo for Donovan that contended America's lack of a permanent, independent intelligence agency endangered national security. Relying on British intelligence for future succor was questionable; the United States needed to compete on a level playing field for agents and influence. Donovan, of course, had been thinking along similar lines for many months. But now his views were diffusing through the bureaucracy, and becoming embedded in the organizational culture. Hyde's hand was consequently strengthened within OSS.[16]

Fortified by these developments, Hyde cast about for some way to supply and maintain his independent French network. Aircraft and submarines were unavailable to him and German patrols made inserting agents by boat along the French Riviera very difficult.[17] But there was another way. The rugged Spanish-French frontier along the Pyrenees was difficult to patrol. A determined local agent, with a mountaineer's knowledge of the terrain, could get through. Short of an abject surrender to the British, infiltrating supplies through Spain was the only chance for 'Penny-Farthing.' But the political hazards inherent in any large-scale clandestine operation in a neutral country, and the logistical problems the plan entailed, made success far from likely.

The political sensitivity of secret work in Spain was the most formidable challenge. British and American intelligence had been active on the Iberian Peninsula since the beginning of the War. But concerned that an operational blunder might

drive Franco into an overt embrace of the Axis cause, the British Ambassador to Madrid, Sir Samuel Hoare, and his American counterpart, Carleton J. Hayes, had straight-jacketed their clandestine services in Spain. Most operations were tightly controlled and personally supervised by the relevant Ambassador. British and American intelligence officers were few in number, and generally restricted to operating out of their respective embassies. This limited their scope for action. By late 1943, the Anglo-American intelligence services' main *raison d'etre* in Spain was money laundering to secure local currency for secret operations in Nazi-occupied Europe. However, a few exceptions to the intelligence *cordon sanitaire* around the country had been permitted in the past. During the spring of 1941, Winston Churchill had personally authorized a daring SIS scheme to funnel millions of pounds in bribes to Nationalist Generals in exchange for maintaining Spanish neutrality. After operation 'Torch' (the US-British invasion of French North Africa in November 1942), Allied leaders, concerned that Hitler might be planning an attack on Gibraltar via the Iberian Peninsula, had authorized OSS to operate in Andalusia and Spanish Morocco. These precedents gave Hyde hope that his plan to infiltrate France through the mountains would be allowed to proceed. Yet previous Spanish operations had been authorized for compelling reasons of military necessity, not to support parochial national or agency interests. To get his plan off the ground, Hyde needed to bring two key players on board: the OSS-SI bureau chief in Madrid, H. Gregory Thomas, and Ambassador Hayes. That task would require all of Hyde's considerable smooth talking skill.[18]

Thomas, a Francophile businessman who had looser ties to British intelligence than his colleagues at OSS London, was won over by Hyde with relative ease. Hayes proved a more difficult mark. In late August an OSS network ('Banana') that had been established, without the Ambassador's knowledge, in the post-'Torch' period was rounded up by Spanish police in Malaga. The unit, run by one of Donovan's perennial favorites, the leftist Yale graduate Donald Downes, was comprised of more than a dozen Spanish Republicans and several former members of the International Brigades. Its exposure threatened to undermine more than two years of patient diplomacy, including Hayes' attempts to preemptively purchase Spanish wolfram – a vital resource for the German war machine. This disaster came hard on the heels of the arrest of OSS officer Frank Schoonmaker that spring. Schoonmaker, a sommelier, travel guide author, and close associate of Hyde, had been spotted handing cash to a

member of the French resistance. He spent six months in a Spanish prison before Hayes could get him deported back to Algiers. The Ambassador was understandably furious, and did not hold OSS in high regard. But by the autumn of 1943, his attitude towards US intelligence operations in Spain was softening. On 1 October, the "Day of the Caudillo" – Franco's annual reception for foreign diplomats at Madrid's Oriente Palace – the Generalissimo indicated that he understood the Axis powers were losing the war. He was willing to work toward a closer accommodation with the Anglo-American Allies. Henceforward, the exposure of US agents in Spain would have less serious repercussions. Prodded by Hyde, Thomas apologized to Hayes and pleaded OSS's case for an overland operation into France. On 3 November, the Ambassador relented. OSS would be allowed to run missions through Spanish territory, on three conditions: they were not to be directed against Spanish interests, the number of agents involved would be strictly limited, and Hayes would have the power to veto ("sanitize") any OSS mission, or segment thereof. Hyde had the green light.[19]

Hayes' approval came just in time. By late October the communications and supply problem with 'Penny-Farthing' had grown so desperate that Hyde was considering the use of carrier pigeons. The dangerous clandestine sea route from Bastia to the coast of France was not able to give Alziary and Marret the regular load of spare radio parts they needed. Therefore, like the Scarlet Pimpernel, they were to be sent "four pigeons" and Hyde was investigating whether "the pigeon containers are suitable for dropping out of a B-25 or B-17."[20]

The go-ahead from Hayes on an overland infiltration scheme avoided the prospect of airsick pigeons, but Hyde still had significant problems. Although the Spanish-French frontier was increasingly porous now that Franco was permitting French refugees and downed Allied airmen to cross the border openly, arranging rendezvous points for American, French and Spanish agents on both sides of the Pyrenees was complicated. The first draft of Hyde's plan for an exclusively American Spanish-French smuggling and communications network envisioned two separate, self-contained "courier systems" from Madrid to the border areas near Barcelona and San Sebastian. Once agents' reports or stolen German documents reached the Spanish capital, they would be transported via US diplomatic pouch along three routes: Madrid-Gibraltar-Algiers, Madrid-Lisbon-London, and Algiers-London. It would obviously be a difficult, manpower-intensive operation, hampered all the

more by the necessity for airtight security and Ambassador Hayes' strict limit on the number of OSS personnel that could operate in Spain. Hyde sought to address these concerns by keeping most of the regular OSS staff in Spain in the dark about the plan, and asking Hayes to detail more regular State Department employees as overt pouch couriers to Madrid, Lisbon, London and Algiers. OSS agents would only operate in the Spanish network north of Madrid, and in southern France. Thomas would be in charge of day-to-day issues in Spain, Schoonmaker would act as liaison officer for the scheme at OSS London, and Hyde would have control the French side of the operation from Algiers.[21]

It was a large, messy, potentially chaotic plan. But Hyde was adamant that America must have an independent intelligence presence in the most important theatre of war. "Physical obstacles, agreements with the British" and "French political difficulties," had prevented OSS from building up its own capabilities in the past.[22] In Hyde's mind, even a hideously complex, inefficient American network was preferable to continued dependence on British intelligence. The code-name Hyde invented for his scheme was a wry acknowledgement of its tangled, unsightly nature: 'Medusa,' the monstrous woman with hair of writhing snakes.

Operating Plan Medusa, January to April 1944

Against all expectation, 'Medusa' became a relatively fruitful means of inserting operatives and exporting secret information and stolen documents from France. The network was slow, sometimes unreliable, and US agents were occasionally apprehended by the police on the Spanish side of the border.[23] In a rudimentary fashion, however, it worked. Hyde was able to expand his clandestine SI chains in France. The intelligence they secured, while frequently out-of-date by the time it crossed the mountains into Spain, proved useful to the US military as planning began for the invasion of southern France ('Anvil'). And despite several determined attempts to undermine Hyde's operation, the British SIS remained firmly on the sidelines. Yet the apparent success of 'Medusa' also invited more internecine sniping within the Allied intelligence community. OSS Special Operations Branch (SO) supported SIS's continued attempts to bring the Hyde network to heel during the spring of 1944. This cast doubt on the role 'Medusa' would play in Allied invasion of France.

During the first half of 1944 the 'Medusa' chains, and the intelligence network they serviced in southern France, grew by leaps and bounds. By the late spring at least 50 French spies, in 12 separate cells, were working with Henry Hyde's Algiers-based SI mission. Existing cells, like 'Penny-Farthing,' were augmented with new agents, and new cells were started from scratch. Several hundred agent-couriers, operating through high-passes in the Pyrenees, brought supplies into France, smuggled documents out, and moved agents across the frontier in both directions. Since December, Hyde had been able to augment their efforts using supplies dropped by a small group of American B-17s, which had finally been made available to OSS Algiers by the US Army. Unlike the tiny, single-engine, short-takeoff British Lysander, however, these large bombers were unsuitable for landing supplies behind enemy lines. 'Medusa' remained Hyde's preferred method of interdicting supplies and agents into France.[24]

Over time, the methods used by the 'Medusa' chains to communicate with French agents, and smuggle men and documents over the border, became more subtle, efficient and sophisticated. Thomas' agent-couriers developed a clandestine dead drop system that incorporated secret 'letterboxes' hidden in dozens of small French towns. Members of the Resistance would designate these boxes, draw a longhand map to the site, and indicate the rock, hollow tree, or other place where stolen documents would be secreted. In some cases, the Resistance might also take a photograph of the letterbox in question, so that there would be no mistake about the location. For example, in the village of Tremblay, near Lyon, the 'Medusa' box was secreted near a monument on the edge of town. This helped reduce the transit time, and risk involved, bringing these materials to Madrid. To a degree, the letterbox system also alleviated communications problems caused by the inadequate number of radio operators in Hyde's French network. In his rush to expand the 'Medusa' system, Hyde had sent several groups of agents behind enemy lines without the same degree of training afforded to 'Penny-Farthing.' In other cases, sub-agents recruited in France who lacked radios had no alternative means of communication. Even with radios, however, Thomas' small, overworked staff in Madrid might not have been able to handle an increase in enciphered Morse-code traffic. The letterbox system became the backbone of the 'Medusa' network.[25]

The letterbox system was slow (the journey to Madrid sometimes took nearly a month), and reduced the timeliness and military relevance of the information that

reached the US Army via 'Medusa.' Still, the Army found much of the intelligence, particularly on permanent coastal fortifications, to be invaluable, and assigned a relatively high grade to 'Medusa' product. Army Intelligence (G-2) also found that the network, while sometimes painfully sluggish, was unusually good at carrying out requests for specific data. Hyde received a personal commendation from G-2, Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ).[26]

Yet 'Medusa' had a dubious reputation, at best, among the rest of the Allied intelligence community. British hostility was unrelenting. Certainly, some of the bureaucratic flak directed toward 'Medusa' came in the context of a bitter Ango-American debate over strategic priorities in the Mediterranean. Although the Combined Chiefs of Staff had agreed to dedicate the lion's share of their resources in 1944 to Operation 'Overlord,' the invasion of Normandy in June, there was indecision about where the Mediterranean follow-up to the main assault on Hitler's *Festung Europa* would proceed. The American JCS favored an invasion of southern France (Operation 'Anvil'), while the British were pushing for an advance from Italy into Austria through northwestern Yugoslavia ('Armpit'). British intelligence naturally supported their government's preferred policy; SOE had already developed a plan to infiltrate saboteurs and Resistance organizers into Austria ('Clowder'). The Americans, by virtue of their increasing predominance in manpower, won the debate in May. In the interim, however, 'Medusa' was portrayed by the British as a pointless extravagance in a strategically irrelevant theatre. Even OSS Special Operations Branch (SO), which enjoyed strong ties to British intelligence through SPOC, was used as a club against Hyde's SI men. In late January the British (probably SIS) informed SO that SI was supplying weapons to the French Resistance through 'Medusa' – an infringement of SO's turf. This clever piece of misinformation caused considerable confusion within OSS.[27]

Yet some of the criticism directed at Hyde, 'Medusa,' and the American network in France was justified. Besides the issue of timeliness – Hyde's insistence on independence rendered much of the intelligence collected by his network irrelevant by the time it made the long overland journey, via Madrid, to London and Algiers – there were three serious problems with the 'Medusa' system: the political affiliation of its agents, their competence, and their high level of pay.

The most serious questions about 'Medusa' concerned whether the agents Hyde employed were appropriate liaisons to the Resistance. Most of the men were

French Army officers recruited in exchange for the large 'subsidy' OSS Colonel William Eddy arranged with the Giraudist SR in May 1943. But General Giraud had been eased out of National Committee of French Liberation (CFLN) in Algiers on 9 November 1943, and lost his status as Supreme Commander of the French Army in North Africa in April 1944. By the late spring, Gaullist forces were firmly in charge of both the CFLN and most Resistance forces in occupied France. Hyde's cadre of independent, conservative French officers was not looked upon kindly by the new regime in Algiers. This made contacts with Resistance elements difficult. To be sure, its agents' background allowed 'Medusa' to recruit elements disaffected by de Gaulle's leadership – much like SOE's independent F Section. But these political issues caused more problems than they solved.[28]

Apart from their ideological undesirability, questions were also raised about the basic competence of Hyde's agents. While his men were producing masses of interesting stolen documents, they had proven spectacularly incompetent at arranging 'reception committees' for airdrops in southern France. There was a period of more than three months during the spring and early summer of 1944 when not a single successful drop to 'Medusa' chains could be confirmed, despite ample notice through coded BBC transmissions. This aroused suspicions in London that the network might be partly 'blown' to German intelligence. The capture and execution of Marret ('Toto'), Hyde's most dedicated radio operator, by the Gestapo in April 1944 exacerbated these fears. Although Alziary ('Jacques') and the other members of the 'Penny-Farthing' cell escaped the net, this failure by the most productive 'Medusa' unit raised further security concerns.[29]

Finally, SIS continued to upbraid Hyde for the lavish sums he was paying his agents. Claude Dansey had originally raised the issue with Hyde during their Broadway discussions in 1943. British intelligence claimed these payments could undermine morale among other, less well remunerated Resistance members, and questioned the loyalty of men who were partly motivated by avarice, rather than pure patriotism. Some US contacts demanded huge sums – tens of thousands of francs – for individual documents. It was a purely self-serving argument, since SIS was perfectly willing to spend large sums on its own agents when necessary.[30]

Hyde and his confederates fiercely rejected these criticisms. In their reports to Washington and London, they implied that because 'Medusa' furnished "original American intelligence" it should be judged by a more lenient standard than joint US-

UK missions. By the late spring of 1944, with the end of the war on the horizon and attention shifting towards the form of America's postwar involvement on the international stage, the OSS top brass found this argument compelling. Even David Bruce, whom Hyde had misled during the 'Penny-Farthing' team's surreptitious trip to London the previous June, became an enthusiastic fan of the Spanish-French SI network. "'Medusa' operations are among the most promising of which I am aware," the OSS London Chief wrote Ambassador Hayes. "Indeed, the results of those operations have already received most favorable comment." Hyde's scheme was OSS's chance to prove that its period under British tutelage was over, and that the US intelligence community was ready to become an independent, world class organization.[31]

Whether this strong backing from the OSS establishment would be enough to secure 'Medusa' a prominent role in the Allied invasion of France, however, was far from clear. British hostility and the distrust of the Gaullist establishment meant that 'Medusa' would have to cater entirely to, and rely on, US Army patronage.

Medusa and the Liberation of France, May to September 1944

'Medusa' had little role in the Allied invasion of Normandy ('Overlord') on 6 June 1944. This was mostly because of the network's confinement to southern France. But the integrated, burden-sharing nature of the Allied intelligence effort in 'Overlord' also left little scope for an independent American operation. The 'Anvil' landings – slated for August along a stretch of France's Mediterranean coast encompassing Marseilles and Toulon – offered more fertile ground for Hyde's men. Instead of an equal partnership with British and other Imperial troops, 'Anvil' was primarily a Franco-American enterprise. This put the primary 'consumer' for 'Medusa' product, US Army Intelligence (G-2) in the driver's seat. The ability of 'Medusa' to supply US forces (7th Army) with timely, accurate order-of-battle and strategic intelligence would determine the success or failure of Hyde's struggle to create an autonomous American intelligence network. The OSS leaders who ran 'Medusa' spared no effort or expense in the campaign to vindicate their scheme. Although the results were mixed, Hyde and the US Army regarded the performance of 'Medusa' during 'Anvil' as a creditable prototype for the future of American intelligence.

'Medusa' preparations for 'Anvil' began long before the invasion was officially given the green light by Allied leaders during the spring of 1943. The first step was to discuss areas of interest with G-2, and assign teams of agents to cover them. In April, a 'Medusa' representative met with General Roderick, the head of military intelligence at AFHQ, to discuss his requirements and offer up an *a la carte* menu of targets in southern France. By the end of the interview Roderick was a confirmed supporter of the scheme, and announced that "G-2, AFHQ was exceedingly interested in obtaining [battlefield] intelligence of the type that Medusa was producing." With G-2's backing, Hyde's team narrowed their list of intelligence priorities over the next several months, and organized their resources to address each area of concern. In May, Schoonmaker proposed that railway employees in touch with the network be organized as "train watchers" and that airfield workers be given similar tasks near Toulouse, Istres, and Salon. He pointed out that since most 'Medusa' agents were regular or reserve officers in the French Army "briefed in enemy Battle Order," OSS could use them to conduct field analyses of enemy movements. Schoonmaker's recommendations were adopted and order-of-battle intelligence became Medusa's primary object.[32]

Most enemy order-of-battle information was highly time-sensitive, however. Sluggish communications were one of two weaknesses endemic to the 'Medusa' system that handicapped its performance. In his May memo, Schoonmaker reported that "seven [radio] operators are now being trained" and "six others have been recruited" to fill the need. But inevitably, some of these men proved unsuitable for coding work and OSS no longer had access to additional recruits. When General Giraud was sacked as leader of the French North African Army in April, Eddy's 1943 deal with the SR was vitiated, creating a chronic shortage of manpower. No new agents were made available to fill the gap. The new French regime in Algiers was not interested in abetting an independent US intelligence network in France.[33]

Gaullist hostility to 'Medusa' was the second major barrier to the effectiveness of Hyde's network in the period leading up to 'Anvil.' The Americans needed more men and the French were willing to provide them – if OSS would transform 'Medusa' into a joint operation. Predictably, Hyde said no. After nearly two months of negotiations, the French softened their position. In a late-May conference with Commandant Pelabon, technical director of the *Direction des Services Speciaux* in Algiers, Hyde and Schoonmaker learned the French were willing to lend more men to

'Medusa.' In exchange, "Pelabon stated that he was very much interested in having a complete list of the real identities of all the Frenchmen employed [by OSS] on missions to France." Although this was a reasonable demand from the French point of view, Hyde rejected it out of hand. It might subject his men to postwar reprisals or civil-service blacklisting for having worked with a foreign power. Most importantly, it would prevent the Americans from turning 'Medusa' into the showcase of US independence that Donovan wanted. OSS would simply have to work around the problems created by an inadequate W/T network. Scoring points in the postwar scramble to determine America's worldwide intelligence posture was more important to Hyde than maximizing the effectiveness of 'Medusa' during the summer of 1944.[34]

Hyde and his team worked determinedly to overcome the self-imposed handicap created by maintaining the independence of their mission to France. In late May and early June, the 'Medusa' commanders decided to adopt a "forward posture" in order to overcome their communications problems. This meant that a leadership team of 16 men, including Hyde and Schoonmaker, was detailed to accompany the Allied troops as they stormed ashore on D-Day of the 'Anvil' invasion. It was hoped that they might be able to make direct contact with members of the 'Medusa' network, and reduce the need for radio traffic. Simultaneously, Spanish agents that had previously served as mere couriers through the Pyrenees would cross the border and remain in France for the duration of the battle. Operating in groups of six to ten men, they would remain in constant touch with the French side of the network, and thereby reduce the transit time for messages to Madrid. Thomas also convinced Ambassador Hayes to increase the frequency of the State Department's diplomatic pouch runs between Madrid and Algiers to "tri-weekly," which cut the delivery time for documents bound for North Africa by several more days. The pouch would also travel through Casablanca, avoiding Gibraltar and, in Thomas' words, "the consequence of our pouches falling into the hands of the British."[35]

These stratagems, calculated to make 'Medusa' function more efficiently, carried great risk, however. A number of relatively inexperienced Spanish agents would suddenly appear in France on or just before the Allied landings slated for 15 August. If apprehended, it was conceivable they might tip off the Wehrmacht about the immanent amphibious assault. Exposing senior officers who possessed a detailed knowledge of the entire 'Medusa' system to the prospect of capture was similarly

hazardous. But these were calculated risks. Hyde's OSS team understood that their operational plan was dangerous, but decided to proceed regardless.[36]

In the sense that the 'Medusa' project avoided any major blunders during the 'Anvil' operation, and even produced a few creditable pieces of intelligence, Hyde's gamble paid off. This was a considerable accomplishment, given the pressure on the OSS team to perform. Only two days prior to the Allied assault on the south of France, Donovan demanded a personal update from Hyde on the capability and number of 'Medusa' W/T stations in the region. But despite its patchy and undermanned radio network, the 'Medusa' system worked. Allied forces stormed ashore on 15 August, established viable beachheads, and rapidly broke through German resistance during their drive inland. Marseilles and Toulon fell with unexpected speed. A week later, OSS received two effusive telegrams of congratulation from Roderick and his cohorts at G-2. 'Medusa' intelligence on the fortifications around Marseilles was singled out for particular praise. By 5 September, the US 7th Army and French FFI had driven so far inland that the entire 'Medusa' network was within Allied-controlled territory, and out of danger. Hyde had his victory.[37]

It was not an unadulterated triumph. Predictably, an SIS audit of the 'Medusa' plan in late September found many instances of over-hyped and inaccurate intelligence. Hyde lost several agents to Gestapo sweeps prior to the 'Anvil' landings: the most serious blow came when two French agents, part of the 'Grapefruit' cell, disappeared with 2.5 million francs in OSS funds. Yet even British intelligence was forced to conclude that 'Medusa' had notched some solid accomplishments. On order-of-battle intelligence and tracking enemy troop movements, where Hyde's network had been hobbled by poor radio communications, 'Medusa' had performed very creditably. SIS rated most of the information it provided in these areas as "good, very good, or excellent." Donovan and Hyde had signed America's declaration of independence as an intelligence power in Europe.[38]

Medusa's Legacy

The 'Medusa' project had an important, three-part historical legacy. As Hyde intended, many agents and officers who trained in the secret French-Spanish network became the nucleus of America's expanded postwar intelligence footprint in Europe. 'Medusa' also serves as a useful counterpoint to the narrative of allegedly harmonious

Anglo-American intelligence cooperation during the Second World War. The secret 'special relationship' was not nearly so clear-cut. As John Dumbrell surmised, cultural factors may have had a part in building the Atlantic community, but questions of national interest always come first.[39] As the Second World War drew to a close, and American leaders grappled with their country's vastly expanded role in world affairs, it became apparent that Britain's interests were not always compatible. In certain cases, America would look to its own needs, before any Ally's – no matter how close. Lastly, 'Medusa' shows just how far some American leaders were willing to go in pursuit of the national interest as they saw it. The 'Medusa' network would have been much more effective as a joint UK-US-French enterprise, as Hyde implicitly acknowledged. It is conceivable that American and French soldiers may have paid with their lives for Hyde's pursuit of autonomy in intelligence. But America's status as an emerging superpower, and Donovan's view of the national interest, dictated otherwise.

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[1] Eisenhower quoted in Jay Jakob, *Spies and Saboteurs: Anglo-American Collaboration and Rivalry in Human Intelligence Collection and Special Operations, 1940-1945* (London: Macmillan, 1999) pp.78-79.

[2] For a revealing take on the British attitude toward intelligence cooperation with the United States see Letter from AM [unidentified] to D/CD(O) [Colin Gubbins], circa 23 November 1942, HS 3/56. Strong quoted in Thomas Troy, *Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency* (Frederick, Maryland: Aletheia Books, 1981) p.205; also see Troy, *Donovan and CIA*, pp.205-229; R. Harris Smith, *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Intelligence Agency* (New York: Delta, 1972) p.171.

[3] Maddox and Devers quoted in Harris Smith, *OSS*, p.165, 172; Memo: "France #3 – 'Robin,'" from Captain Paul van der Stricht to Robert Pflieger, 25 August 1943, RG 226, Entry 97, Box 40, Folder 711.

[4] Donovan and OSS report quoted in Harris Smith, *OSS*, pp.172-173.

[5] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Life in the 20th Century: Innocent Beginnings, 1917-1950* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2000) pp.336-337; Harris Smith, *OSS*, pp.177-178, 180.

[6] There is an extended narrative of the 'Penny-Farthing' mission in Anthony Cave Brown, *The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan* (London: Michael Joseph, 1982) pp.316-340, which is unfortunately rife with errors and fails to mention anything about plan 'Medusa' – the most important legacy of 'Penny-Farthing.' Among other inaccuracies, Brown's account gets Alziary's (Jacques') true name wrong, which is clearly indicated in the partially sanitized Salary Sheet for French SI Agents at the US National Archives and Records Administration, RG 226, Entry 197A, 190, 38/25/04, Box 44, Folder 232. Information from Brown's book is only used as a source in this monograph when it can be independently corroborated through other documents or testimony.

[7] Brown, *Last Hero*, pp.528-529; Memo: "On Battle Order and Other Military Information on France Distributed to AFHQ Algiers By 2677 Headquarters Co," author unknown [Hyde, Schoonmaker?], 12 November 1943, RG 226, Entry 97, Box 33, Folder 576. The latter document contains a summary report on the independent OSS-SI networks in France, how they were created, their accomplishments, and a brief reference to future plans.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Interview with Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker, Lord North Street, London, 15 February 2001.

[10] Hyde quoted in Brown, *Last Hero*, pp.532-533; Memo: "On Battle Order and Other Military Information on France Distributed to AFHQ Algiers By 2677 Headquarters Co," author unknown [Hyde, Schoonmaker?], 12 November 1943, RG 226, Entry 97, Box 33, Folder 576.
[11] Brown, *Last Hero*, pp.534-536; Memo: "On Battle Order and Other Military Information on France Distributed to AFHQ Algiers By 2677 Headquarters Co," author unknown [Hyde, Schoonmaker?], 12 November 1943, RG 226, Entry 97, Box 33, Folder 576.
[12] Ibid; Fabrizio Calvi, "The OSS in France," in George C. Chalou, ed. *The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II* (Washington, DC: NARA, 1992) pp.250-252.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Brown, *Last Hero*, pp.538-340; Calvi, "OSS in France," p.251; Memo: "On Battle Order and Other Military Information on France Distributed to AFHQ Algiers By 2677 Headquarters Co," author unknown [Hyde, Schoonmaker?], 12 November 1943, RG 226, Entry 97, Box 33, Folder 576.
[15] For more on F Section and Giraud see M. R. D. Foot, *SOE in France: An Account of the Work of the British Special Operations Executive in France* (London: HMSO, 1966) p.231; Julian Jackson, *France: The Dark Years, 1940-1944* (London: Oxford, 2001) pp.392-395; "France #32," Memo from Major Paul Van der Stricht to Major Robert P. Pflieger, 15 November 1943; "American Agents in France," Memo from Pflieger to Van der Stricht, 22 November 1943, RG 226, Entry 97, Box 40, Folder 707.
[16] "Memorandum on the Need for a Permanent Independent Intelligence Organization for the United States," Goldberg and Van Arkel to Donovan, 10 September 1943, RG 226, Entry 97, Box 31, Folder 548.
[17] Supplying the OSS network in France by sea was difficult, but not impossible. On a couple of occasions in late 1943 and early 1944 OSS utilized PT or high-speed Italian MAS boats, operating out of Bastia (in Northern Corsica) to supply its agents in France. This was no substitute for the regular infiltration and exfiltration of men and weapons that 'Medusa' provided, however. See F. Brooks Richards, *Secret Flotillas: The Clandestine Sea Lines to France and French North Africa, 1940-1944* (London: HMSO, 1996) pp.653, 688-689.
[18] SOE War Diary, Spain and Portugal, pp.1-14, HS 7/164; The British Intelligence scheme to bribe Nationalist Generals via the unscrupulous Spanish businessman Juan March is described in David Stafford, *Roosevelt and Churchill: Men of Secrets* (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1999) pp.79-110; Post-'Torch' OSS operations in Spain and Spanish Morocco are detailed in Robin Winks, *Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War* (New York: William Morrow, 1987) pp.197-202.
[19] Harris Smith, *OSS*, p.79; Winks, *Cloak and Gown*, pp.199-202; Carleton J. H. Hayes, *Wartime Mission in Spain, 1942-1945* (New York: Macmillan, 1945) pp.175-181, 194-201; the history of Hayes' fractious relationship with OSS and the 3 November Agreement is described in "X-2 Difficulties with Ambassador Hayes," Memo from Annette Flugger to Major R. A. Pfaff, 15 July 1944, RG 226, Entry 210, Box 295, Folder unnumbered.
[20] "Memo," from Henry Hyde to Colonel Edward J. F. Glavin, undated [circa October 1943], RG 226, Entry 97, Box 32, Folder 568.
[21] Hayes, *Wartime*, p.206; "Plan for an American Penetration Mission into France for the Collection and Dissemination of Secret Military Information," author unknown [almost certainly Henry B. Hyde], undated [circa November 1943], RG 226, Entry 127, Box 13, Folder 93. Hyde and Thomas seem to have shared information on 'Medusa' on a strictly need-to-know basis within OSS. Even members of Thomas' staff in Madrid who handled radio traffic with Hyde's network in France were not privy to the unique, independent nature of the project. See Countess Aline of Romanones, "The OSS in Spain During World War II," in George C. Chalou, ed. *The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II* (Washington, DC: NARA, 1992) pp.124-125.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Romanones, "OSS in Spain," p.126.
[24] Hyde's SI pay-sheet for French agents listed 50 in 1944, see "Salary Sheet for French SI Agents," RG 226, Entry 197A, 190, 38/25/04, Box 44, Folder 232. In a March 1944 report he estimated that the sub-agents employed by his men brought the total size of the network to more than "one hundred and fifty bona-fide agents" or more, but there is no way to confirm this figure. See "Intelligence Operations in France After D-Day," to Commanding Officer, 2677th Headquarters Company, Experimental [Colonel Glavin] from unknown [certainly Hyde – "Commander Hyde" is scrawled in longhand in the upper left-hand corner of the memo], 4 July 1944, RG 226, Entry 97, Box 29, Folder 508.
[25] Aline Romanones, "OSS in Spain," pp.124-125; "Memo," from Monte [unknown] to Zenda [probably Thomas], 5 June 1944, RG 226, Entry 127, Box 23, Folder 160.

[26] "Intelligence Operations in France After D-Day," to Commanding Officer, 2677th Headquarters Company, Experimental [Colonel Glavin] from unknown [probably Hyde – "Commander Hyde" is scrawled in longhand in the upper left-hand corner of the memo], 4 July 1944, RG 226, Entry 97, Box 29, Folder 508. The memo describes the network's current position, its accomplishments and outlines plans for the future.

[27] Matthew Jones, *Britain, the United States and the Mediterranean War, 1942-1944* (London: Macmillan, 1996) pp.170-180; on 'Clowder' see William J. M. Mackenzie, *The Secret History of SOE: The Special Operations Executive, 1940-1945* (London: St. Ermin's Press, 2000) pp.694-699; "Supplies for Resistance Groups in France," to Argus [unknown SI officer] from Tertius [unknown SO officer], 27 January 1944, RG 226, Entry 127, Box 23, Folder 160.

[28] Jackson, *The Dark Years*, pp.456-460; Martin Thomas, *The French Empire at War, 1940-1945* (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1998) pp.177-184; some of the political impact on relations with the Resistance is detailed in "Supplies for Resistance Groups in France," to Argus [unknown SI officer] from Tertius [unknown SO officer], 27 January 1944, RG 226, Entry 127, Box 23, Folder 160.

[29] "Incoming Messages [from France]," February to April 1944, RG 226, Entry 97, Box 45, Folder 788; a detailed description of Medusa's air-dropping failure is appended in an OSS "Memo," to Whitney Shepardson from Frank Schoonmaker, 8 August 1944, RG 226, Entry 97, Box 33, Folder 582; Marret's capture is described in "Recommendations for Awards," to Lt. Col. H. W. Gamble from Henry B. Hyde, 4 July 1944, RG 226, Entry 97, Box 32, Folder 569.

[30] Brown, *Last Hero*, pp.534-536; "Incoming Messages [from France]," February to April 1944, RG 226, Entry 97, Box 45, Folder 788.

[31] The magic phrase, original American intelligence, was frequently underlined or emphasized by OSS officers in their reports on plan 'Medusa.' See "Memo," from Frank Schoonmaker to Colonel Gamble, 10 May 1944, RG 226, Entry 97, Box 32, Folder 571; "The Medusa Mission," from Chief of Medusa Mission [Thomas or possibly Hyde] to Commanding Officer, OSS Algiers [Glavin or Rodrigo], 20 April 1944, RG 226, Entry 190, 9/27/07, Box 190, Folder 1524. Letter from David K. E. Bruce to Ambassador Hayes, 28 March 1944, RG 226, Entry 127, Box 23, Folder 160.

[32] Roderick quoted in "Memo," from Morey[?] to Colonel Rodrigo [OSS commandant in Algiers], 22 April 1944, RG 226, Entry 127, Box 22, Folder 153; "Memo," from Frank Schoonmaker to Colonel Gamble, 10 May 1944, RG 226, Entry 97, Box 32, Folder 571.

[33] Ibid.

[34] "Resume of Meeting of 24 May attended by Commanding Officer, Intelligence Officer, Chief of French Desk – SI, Chief of Spanish Desk – SI," to Colonel Glavin from Lt. Colonel Thomas C. Early, 25 May 1944; "Memo," to Commanding Officer from Henry B. Hyde, 29 May 1944, RG 226, Entry 97, Box 32, Folder 568.

[35] "Memo," to Chief, Intelligence, from French and Spanish SI Desks, 25 May 1944, RG 226, Entry 190, 190, 9/26/06-07, Box 138, Folder 830; "Memorandum to Colonel Glavin and Major Mero Algiers," from Climax [probably Thomas], 3 June 1944, RG 226, Entry 97, Box 33, Folder 572; "Memorandum: Madrid-Algiers Pouch Schedule," to Colonels Glavin and Early from Climax [probably Thomas], 6 June 1944, RG 226, Entry 97, Box 32, Folder 556.

[36] In their internal correspondence, the OSS 'Medusa' team frequently demonstrated a cognizance, even unease, about the risks they were taking. See "Pouch letter No. 64," RG 226, Entry 190, 190, 9/27/07, Box 190, Folder 1524.

[37] "French and Spanish SI Desk W/T Coverage," to Brig. Gen. William J. Donovan from Henry B. Hyde, 13 August 1944; "Regis to Climax [Thomas?]," 23 August 1944; Romanones, "OSS in Spain," p.126; Letter from Jackson Mathews to Alfred Dupont, 5 September 1944, RG 226, Entry 97, 190, 6/7/04, Box 33, Folder 576.

[38] "BROADWAY COMMENTS," RG 226, Entry 97, Box 30, Folder 520; "Operation Grapefruit," to Lt. Peter M. F. Sichel from Henry B. Hyde, undated accounting document circa late 1944 to early 1945, RG 226, Entry 197A, 190, 38/25/04, Box 44, Folder 232.

[39] John Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After* (London: Macmillan, 2001) pp.1-4.

Chapter 8 and Conclusion, Secret Armies in Southern France: The Triumph of Anglo-American Special Operations, March to September 1944

Introduction

William Donovan succeeded in creating an independent American secret intelligence (SI) network in France during the spring of 1944, but General Dwight D. Eisenhower forced the OSS Director to abandon the fight to maintain an autonomous American special operations (SO) headquarters in Algiers. On 23 May, the OSS-SO contingent housed at the Villa Magnol, overlooking Algiers harbor, formally merged with SOE's 'Massingham' operation, based west of the city at the Club des Pins. Command authority was centralized under Lt. Colonel John Anstey, who ran 'Massingham' for Colonel Dodds-Parker, and Lt. Colonel William P. Davis, Colonel Glavin's SO Chief, through the Special Project Operations Center (SPOC).[1] SPOC represented a triumph for SOE's policy in the region, which was designed to co-opt its American counterpart under Baker Street's leadership. It was also one of several elements that helped make the SO campaign against the Nazis in southern France that summer a tactical and strategic triumph. The key to success, however, was that SPOC's special operations took place in the context of a gigantic conventional military campaign. The Allied offensives in France during the summer of 1944, and the strain they put on the Wehrmacht, left the occupiers vulnerable to unconventional warfare.

With the German Army preoccupied by the enormous Allied assault on Normandy, the French Resistance, abetted by Anglo-American special operations groups, had an outsized strategic impact. The sheer scale of the 'Overlord' invasion force created conditions uniquely suitable for special operations. In Italy, for example, where Allied strategic priorities limited troop numbers after the fall of 1943, the Resistance was much less effective. The amphibious Allied assaults on Salerno (September 1943) and Anzio (January 1944), which involved initial forces of five and three army divisions, respectively, did not loosen Germany's grip on the country enough to aid the Resistance. Operation 'Overlord' mustered 10 Allied divisions on D-Day, which ballooned to 24 by the end of June and 34 by mid-July.[2] It attracted Nazi reinforcements stationed hundreds of miles from the invasion zone. This left

large swathes of the countryside outside German control. The 'Overlord' crisis exposed transiting German units, and the strained Wehrmacht logistics system, to clandestine attacks, and invested any damage caused by guerillas or saboteurs with strategic importance. In the first hours after D-Day and later as the Nazi battlefield position crumbled in early August, when even a momentary delay compromised the Wehrmacht's ability to counterattack, acts of sabotage on Nazi communications and transportation were of military value. Destroying a rail bridge during France's agonizingly long occupation was a brave, desperate, and largely futile gesture of political defiance; destroying the same line when the German army was staging its desperate rearguard action at Falaise in August was a crushing military blow. By mid-August, when the Allied 'Anvil/Dragoon' landings on the Riviera commenced, the German position in Normandy was collapsing, and the Resistance ran rampant in the southern invasion zone. French, British and American irregulars helped conventional Allied forces blast out of their beachheads, disrupted enemy communications, and even captured numerically superior Wehrmacht units. Operating in near-ideal conditions, Allied special operations transformed the fighting in southern France from a victory into a rout.

There were, of course, other factors that contributed to the triumph of Anglo-American special operations in the south of France. A last-minute delay in the timetable for the 'Anvil/Dragoon' landings, which were originally scheduled to coincide with 'Overlord,' expanded the possibilities for special operations. Allied saboteurs and guerillas could disrupt and delay German units as they moved out of southern France to meet the crisis in Normandy, while simultaneously preparing to facilitate the 'Anvil' landings. SPOC allowed British, American and French SO teams to operate more like a single force, with fewer redundant or overlapping missions, than in previous Mediterranean campaigns. The growing political ascendancy of a Gaullist – or at least a Resistance – ethos in France made for a more receptive civilian population. And the Agent-Organizers dispatched to the 'Anvil' invasion zone, particularly those from SOE's sometimes-maligned F Section, were unusually effective.

But it was the total commitment of Allied resources and manpower to operation 'Overlord' that allowed special operations to play a major role in the battle for France, and the 'Anvil' campaign. In 1940, Hugh Dalton, the first British Minister responsible for SOE, had imagined special operations could serve as a potential

"independent fourth arm" of the military, complementing Britain's sea, air, and land forces. For a fleeting moment, Dalton's socialist vision of the revolutionary power that could be brought to bear by the 'partisans of freedom' was vindicated. But it was a mirage. Except in rare circumstances, the political expediency of special operations was not matched by military utility – a maxim that strategists ignored to their cost in the postwar era.[3]

Anglo-American 'Anvil' Controversy and Special Operations, March to April 1944

On 20 March 1944 General Maitland Wilson's AFHQ staff recommended that the Allies abandon their plans for an attack on southern France. His ruling precipitated perhaps the greatest crisis in Anglo-American military planning during the war and revealed heretofore hidden "strains" in the integrated command structure. The British had not warmed to 'Anvil' during the Tehran conference the previous year; they wanted Italy to remain the Allied strategic focus in the Mediterranean. The American JCS, abetted somewhat by Eisenhower at SHAEF, thought an attack on the Riviera would force the Germans to divert more resources away from 'Overlord.' With the Generals at odds, the debate reached the highest levels. Once again, Winston Churchill used 'Ultra,' Britain's superb signals intelligence system, to bolster his political and strategic case against 'Anvil.' This time, his gambit failed: 'Anvil' was retained, although its timetable was eventually pushed back to August, two months after the Normandy invasion. The delay was useful for SPOC's special operations teams. It loosened the Wehrmacht's grip on the south as units redeployed to meet the 'Overlord' threat, created more enemy convoys vulnerable to sabotage or guerilla attack, and gave them more time to prepare the ground for 'Anvil.' Although the new timetable also brought new challenges – like the difficult task of restraining quixotic Resistance attacks until the Riviera landings were imminent – for the most part the delay improved the environment for special operations.[4]

British hostility toward 'Anvil' was more vehement among the Chiefs of Staff (COS) in London than at AFHQ. Their objections boiled down to the argument that Allied forces were already engaged in Italy, and a breakthrough there would be a more powerful strategic blow against Hitler than a landing in southern France. Some postwar historians have posited that a campaign through the north of Italy, into the Balkans and Central Europe, might also have checked Soviet influence further east. But Matthew Jones makes a compelling case in his recent study of the Mediterranean

war that British resistance to 'Anvil' was mainly the product of a larger power struggle within the Anglo-American alliance.[5] As the "senior" partner in the theatre, Britain resented America's desire to influence strategic planning in a way that was proportional to its growing share of the military burden. The British were unwilling to divert any military resources away from Italy for 'Anvil,' even if it might help ensure the success of the cross-channel invasion – an operation that, in the words of John Keegan:

> ...[F]or all their lip-service to the concept, the British had shown nothing like the commitment to it that the Americans had done; they had not merely advanced practical objections when it was right to do so, during the periods of Allied inferiority... but had argued so persuasively for alternative approaches to Hitler's heartland that the Americans had come to suspect a lack of resolution in their Allies.

Earlier in the war, the British had won most of the grand strategic arguments with their American counterparts; but now the situation was reversed, and the COS found itself playing an increasingly junior role to the US JCS. Indeed, the situation was startlingly similar to OSS's struggle to avoid playing a subordinate role to SOE in North Africa. Cooperating with allies was always more amenable to the strongest party in the alliance. But Britain fought fiercely to preserve its primacy in strategic planning, and the Prime Minister used 'Ultra' intelligence to back his Generals.[6]

Two weeks after Wilson's assessment, and the hostile reaction from the JCS, Churchill asked 'C' (Stewart Menzies, Director of SIS) to send him any "'Boniface' telegrams of the last fortnight referring to the German Defence Force on the Riviera coast." ('Boniface' was another code-name for 'Ultra' intelligence gleaned from the cryptography operation at Bletchley Park.) This information, augmented by the decrypt of a message to Tokyo from the Japanese Military Attaché in Vichy, indicated that the Germans were moving reinforcements – four infantry divisions and possibly one panzer division – to the south coast of France. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), General Sir Alan Brooke, confirmed that this was the best available order-of-battle intelligence for the area: sobering information, given that 'Anvil' anticipated an initial landing force of only seven divisions. Enemy strength might now be considerably greater. Churchill forwarded his discovery to the Chiefs of Staff (COS) who included it in their April report recommending the cancellation of 'Anvil.'[7]

The 'Anvil' controversy was not the first instance where faulty analysis of 'Ultra' intelligence was used to bolster a dubious strategy. British policymakers also used 'Ultra' to defend their approach to the Italian armistice (see chapter 3), which resulted in an underestimate of potential Wehrmacht strength in Italy, the rejection of Marshal Badoglio's offer of a military alliance, and German occupation of north-central Italy. In both instances, accurate intelligence on current German military strength was used to support a questionable assumption that the enemy order-of-battle would remain the same indefinitely, thereby validating the preferred British policy. In the 'Anvil' case, Brooke and Churchill ignored the fact that 'Overlord' would likely draw enemy forces away from other theatres, including southern France.[8]

But Britain lost the 'Anvil' debate, even with this piece of intelligence slight-of-hand. America's material preponderance was so great that by 1944 it could simply veto objections to its strategic priorities. On 19 April, the JCS refused to release the landing craft required to continue the campaign in Italy beyond an offensive in the late spring ('Diadem'), and allocated them to 'Anvil' instead. The American Chiefs agreed to delay the assault on southern France until some weeks after 'Overlord,' but cancellation in favor of a renewed focus on Italy was out of the question. Brooke's diary reflected his fury:

> History will never forgive them for bargaining equipment against strategy and for trying to blackmail us into agreeing with them by holding the pistol of withdrawing craft to our heads!

Churchill was even more incensed, and drafted a telegram to Roosevelt in which he claimed that "the whole campaign in Italy is being ruined." He threatened to resign, noting "we agreed that you would have command in 'Overlord.... [But] we have to command in the Mediterranean." Again, the parallels with the SOE-OSS situation in North Africa are unmistakable, where SOE's material superiority – particularly in transportation and communications – gradually forced OSS into a subordinate position. Ultimately, the weaker partner had to back down; Churchill's telegram to the President was never sent.[9]

Britain's strategists may have lost the 'Anvil' debate, but one of the main beneficiaries of the decision to authorize an invasion of southern France was SOE. The delayed 'Anvil' timetable gave SOE agents in the south the opportunity to plan parallel campaigns in support of 'Overlord' and the subsequent 'Anvil' operation.

SOE would enjoy a near monopoly on the early stages of this undertaking: General Eisenhower's security concerns kept most OG and 'Jedburgh' units on standby in Algiers until long after D-Day. This grand opportunity, however, came with hidden pitfalls. SOE had to select its initial special operations objectives carefully, lest a German counterstroke cripple its networks prior to their main task – supporting the 'Anvil' invasion in August. To succeed, it needed agent-operators of uncommon skill, subtlety, and courage.

Transforming the Resistance into a Weapon of War, May 1944

The creation of SPOC in late May did not alleviate Eisenhower's concerns about the presence of irregular Allied troops in southern France prior to 'Overlord.' He feared that uniformed irregulars would be tactically counterproductive, insecure and a waste of resources. The Supreme Commander kept a tight reign on SPOC's ambitious plans; "some 14 OGs (over 400 men) and 13 'Jedburgh' teams" were held on the ground in Algiers until mid-July, when Eisenhower finally delegated his authority over special operations in the south of France to SPOC. Special Nissen huts and other temporary billets had to be erected at the Club des Pins and the Villa Magnol to accommodate the stranded SO teams. Much to OSS's frustration, this mostly sidelined the American contingent during the first phase of special operations in the south to support the Normandy invasion. SOE and its counterparts in the Algiers-based French DGSS were left with the difficult task of transforming nebulous Resistance groups into an effective weapon of war. But fortune favored the Allies: the British and French agent-organizers in southern France were a cut above their counterparts elsewhere.[10]

Jacques Soustelle, the DGSS leader, had built his organization into an effective manager of special operations in a short period of time. He worked closely with General Jean-Marie Lattre, to coordinate Resistance activity in the south with the conventional military campaign. Under the auspices of de Gaulle's CFLN, Lattre was in Algiers to command the French First Army, which was slated to take part in the 'Anvil' invasion. Soustelle and Lattre understood that the key to effective special operations in support of 'Anvil' and 'Overlord' was tight coordination between the Resistance and the Army's tactical objectives. This would enable the French Army to take advantage of the explosion of potential Resistance manpower created by the STO, and the increasing political comity among diverse Resistance factions – from

Monarchists to Communists – under the CNR. Without knowledge of the Army's priority targets, the Resistance was just an armed, politically inspired, rabble. With it, the Resistance could be a weapon of war. To this end, on 15 May Lattre seconded his aide, Lt. Colonel Jean Constans, to serve as Soustelle's SO Chief (*Chief, Service Action*).[11]

Soustelle's relationship with Lattre allowed the French to become a full, albeit junior, Allied partner in the special operations enterprise at SPOC. By the end of May, they had built an integrated political, military, and resistance program – a feat that the Italian Resistance never had an opportunity to achieve. But Soustelle, a former anthropologist (like OSS's Carleton Coon), and Constans also understood that personal relationships were an important part of any successful alliance. They worked to build friendships with their Anglo-American counterparts. Constans' deputy, Captain Guillaume ('Gerry') Widmer, who manned the French Desk at the Club des Pins with Lt. Commander F. Brooks Richards of SOE and Captain Gerard de Piolenc of OSS, soon made himself indispensable. These men visited London together during the spring to divide responsibility for supplying the Resistance between SFHQ and the nascent SPOC organization, and became wedded to the idea of a common enterprise.[12]

By the end of May, Anglo-American-French special operations coordination was a reality, despite Franklin Roosevelt's personal hostility to de Gaulle. Serious policy differences remained, notably over who would constitute the post-occupation interim government in France: de Gaulle and the CFLN or SHAEF. But this question was more of a headache for Eisenhower than for SPOC, which could generally ignore larger political questions. There was one exception. De Gaulle was determined to restore national morale by encouraging the Resistance to liberate as much of the country as possible, even when such uprisings made no military sense and could not be effectively supported by the Allies. This policy led to a few periods of tension at SPOC, particularly after large numbers of *Maquisards* took up arms in the south during the initial post-'Overlord' euphoria. In the end, though, Soustelle's solicitous treatment of the Anglo-Americans paid off. France became a full partner in special operations.[13]

Although strengthening contacts between the Resistance, the DGSS and the French Army gave a boost to Allied SO prospects in southern France, the supply and direction of the campaign, particularly during the post-'Overlord' phase in early June,

fell almost entirely to SOE. The French had created fertile ground for special operations, but only SOE had the communications, transportation, and skilled agent-operators necessary to exploit it.

SOE's F and R/F section networks in southern France were unusually strong. Two factors made them exceptional: their relative imperviousness to penetration by German counterintelligence, and the influence some of their leaders exercised over local French Resistance networks. Although the rural, insular character of the southern provinces may have lowered their profile to the Gestapo, SOE's effectiveness was mostly the byproduct of an adept cadre of agents. Two F-Section agent-organizers, George Starr, commander of the 'Wheelwright' network in Gascony and Francis Cammaerts, who led the network code-named 'Jockey' in the Rhone Valley, had a particular genius for secrecy and special operations. Their efforts helped the Resistance turn its growing numbers against the Germans after the Normandy invasion.

The exploits of Starr and Cammaerts are all the more remarkable given the prior history of SOE's French schemes. For all of its postwar acclaim, SOE's overall performance in France before the late spring of 1944 had been poor. The nadir came in 1943, when a series of largely self-made disasters delivered a score of senior SOE agent-organizers and an even larger number of local French sub-agents into German hands. Worst of all the rash choices of SOE's representatives under interrogation created a lasting grievance among Resistance sympathizers, and did incalculable damage to F Section's credibility.

The collapse of SOE's largest French network, code-named 'Prosper,' was the worst blow. Created by an Anglo-French barrister named Francis Suttill during the autumn of 1942, Prosper's tentacles eventually stretched across a huge swathe of northern France, from the Channel coast to near Alsace and the new boarder with Germany. But 'Prosper' shared a number of the distinctive traits, and faults, of Suttill, its creator and namesake. Henri Dericourt, a Frenchman who served as an SOE pilot and courier for 'Prosper' described his former boss as

> ...magnificent, strong, young courageous and decisive, a kind of Ivanhoe; but he should have been a cavalry officer, not a spy. He was not sufficiently trained in these things.

Suttill's charisma made him a great success as a recruiter: few men and fewer women seem to have been capable of turning him down. But he also had a dangerously flamboyant romantic streak. Suttill arranged meetings in Parisian cafés frequented by German soldiers, allowed his agents to visit relatives and associates who knew their true names, and rarely varied his daily routine. He was also deeply naïve, and had too much faith in men who were unworthy of his trust.[14]

Suttill's arrest on 23 June 1943 was therefore predictable, but need not have been catastrophic for his network or SOE. Yet Suttill compounded his failure once in Nazi custody, and Baker Street's lack of due diligence made the problem worse. German Military Intelligence (Abwehr) had been observing 'Prosper' for some time, partly as a by-product of its successful penetration of SOE's operations in the Netherlands, and partly through double agents run by a canny Abwehr sergeant named Hugo Bleicher. Using information gleaned from these sources, Suttill's interrogator, an SS officer named Josef Kieffer, convinced the credulous SOE leader that German intelligence knew everything there was to know about 'Prosper,' and that all of its contacts and sub-agents faced imminent capture. Kieffer guaranteed that if Suttill provided the Gestapo with all of their true names, addresses, and contact routines, however, the 'Prosper' agents would be "paroled," rather than executed. Presumably stimulated by despair, desperation and a bizarre confidence in Kieffer's word of honor, Suttill agreed to cooperate. It was, as Francis Cammaerts later observed, "unspeakably stupid." The consequences of Suttill's confession were exacerbated by Baker Street's sluggish response. When the entire 'Prosper' network was swiftly rolled up, the Gestapo netted several SOE-trained radio operators and their coding materials. Under threat of torture and execution, several of these men were 'turned.' Baker Street received reassuring signals indicating that 'Prosper' was fine, new agents should continue to be airdropped, and contacts with other SOE circuits expanded. Normally, Baker Street protected itself from such disinformation by noting the operator's "security check" – a secret signal used by the radioman to indicate that he had been captured. In this case, however, SOE London chose to ignore the absence of the normal "checks" and continue to correspond with the now-fictional circuit. It became one of Germany's greatest counterintelligence coups of the War.[15]

The consequences for SOE's credibility throughout France were terrible. Dr Josef Goetz, a former schoolmaster turned Gestapo officer, supervised a *funkspiel*

(radio game) using captured 'Prosper' operators that lasted for almost a year, from July 1943 to April 1944. Although Baker Street eventually caught on to the existence of the 'game,' in the interim Goetz did incredible damage to F Section. Several other British agents dispatched to join 'Prosper,' fell into the hands of Kieffer and Goetz. Worse, between 400 and 1,500 French sub-agents, supporters, and sympathizers were seized and deported to concentration camps. Many friends, family members and Resistance comrades of those Goetz netted were furious, and blamed either British perfidy or incompetence. Bad blood stemming from *l'affaire Prosper*, as the scandal became known, lasted well into the postwar era. In the near term, it made SOE's job much more difficult. When Baker Street tried to establish new circuits in northern France and Normandy during the spring of 1944, the lack of enthusiasm among local *resistants* was palpable and disheartening. 'Prosper' created a "stony recruiting ground."[16]

Were it not for Cammaerts and Starr, German counterintelligence and the repercussions of the 'Prosper' affair would have destroyed most of SOE's networks in southern France as well. But through a combination of luck, patience, inspired leadership, and fanatical adherence to security procedures, they created two of the most successful F Section circuits. Both men had the advantage of a rare, almost uncanny ability to sense imminent danger. They learned to heed this instinct the way a cat relies on its whiskers in the dark.

Starr, an Anglo-American mining engineer and sometime SIS spy, was deposited outside Marseilles by an SOE fishing felucca in November 1942. His orders were to join one of F Section's existing circuits in Lyon; unbeknownst to Baker Street, it had been penetrated by the Gestapo. After discussing the setup with Peter Churchill, a fellow SOE organizer who would soon fall into Bleicher's net, Starr had an odd, nervous reaction. "I didn't like the look of it. The whole situation had the wrong smell about it." Avoiding Lyon, Starr headed west, to Castelnau-sur-Auvignon in Gascony, where the anti-German mayor offered him shelter. It was a good place for a clandestine headquarters. Gascony, a region famed for rugged individualism and resistance to outside authority (D'Artagnan, the hot-blooded hero of Dumas' *Three Musketeers*, was a Gascon), was a hotbed of Resistance activity. Eschewing communication through SOE's established French networks, Starr contacted Baker Street directly and convinced his superiors to set up a new circuit under his command.

Soon London and 'Massingham' began airdropping radiomen, couriers and arms to his new network, dubbed 'Wheelwright.'[17]

Cammaerts had a remarkably similar independent streak and ability to follow his nose. Dispatched to France in March 1943 to make contact with the Resistance group code-named 'Carte,' he decided that the whole organization was amateurish and should be avoided. Like Starr, he 'went to ground,' disappearing into the countryside along the banks of the Rhone; less than a month later his local 'Carte' contact, SOE's Peter Churchill, and the first tentacles of 'Prosper' were arrested by Bleicher. Cammaerts survived, with a new identity and a fresh group of French recruits, to found 'Jockey.'[18]

'Jockey' and 'Wheelwright,' the new circuits they created, were as exceptional as their commanders. They grew very slowly, over time, while Starr and Cammaerts painstakingly vetted French sub-agents, cultivated Resistance contacts, and built trust among taciturn peasant-farmers. Starr did not even bother to establish regular radio contact with Baker Street until July. Patience and deliberation were their watchwords. "Building a network," Starr recalled,

> ...is like making a ladder. You fix one rung. You stand on it. You jump on it. If it holds, you build the next one. The people who wanted to do it in five minutes got caught. I was bloody lucky.

Other SOE agent-organizers, like the flamboyant Claude de Baissac, rushed to assemble huge arms dumps and reserves of committed men. But de Baissac's 'Scientist' circuit in Bordeaux was detected and destroyed by the Gestapo in September 1943, with the loss of more than 9,000 weapons, while the southern networks endured. The time and patience Cammaerts and Starr invested in their enterprises paid off in many ways. Careful compartmentalization and inconspicuous personal behavior – both men avoided sexual relationships with local women – insulated them from Gestapo probes. Rookie SOE couriers and radio operators had the opportunity to train and improve their skills in the field. Best of all, their competence and personal magnetism won over Resistance leaders. Cammaerts treated even his most humble sub-agents – housewives, peasants, waiters – with the utmost respect, and they loved him in return. Gascon Resistance members came to trust not only Starr's word, but his judgment as well. Baron Philippe de Gunzbourg,

the Franco-Jewish aristocrat who became Starr's chief lieutenant, called him "*un grand chef, de la classe de Lawrence.*"[19]

The esteem Starr, Cammaerts and their circuits earned after more than a year of clandestine operations transformed them into something exceptional. There were plenty of other F Section agents operating in France, including the area supplied by SPOC in the south, before D-Day. Baker Street worked furiously to recover from the fall of 'Prosper.' But most of these new circuits limited their ambitions to supplying and stimulating the Resistance. Cammaerts and Starr could exert some degree of control over Resistance activity in their fiefs.[20] Coupled with the growing operational cohesion between British, American and French military and special operations commanders at SPOC, 'Wheelwright' and 'Jockey' increased Allied tactical coordination with the Resistance in southern France.

Supporting 'Overlord' with Special Operations in Southern France, June to July 1944

Resistance forces in southern France had an important role to play in 'Overlord,' even though the invasion took place hundreds of kilometers away. On 6 June, as the first Allied troops stormed ashore, French Resistance forces cut telegraph lines, destroyed rail junctions, and created roadblocks. In southern zone supplied by SPOC, there was a particular emphasis on harassing and delaying enemy forces as they moved north to reinforce German defenses. The effectiveness of these tactics is the subject of considerable historical controversy, although the Resistance achieved its main objective. Resistance attacks and roadblocks may not have slowed Wehrmacht troop movements, but the mere existence of insurgent groups sometimes forced the Germans to respond. Wehrmacht units detailed to suppress Resisters could not participate in the defense of Hitler's *Festung Europa.* These passive effects, while small, were of strategic significance during the 'Overlord' campaign of June-July 1944. On their own, Resistance forces did not accomplish much until the 'Anvil' landings in mid-August. But in the context of 'Overlord,' when the prospects for Allied victory or defeat were finely balanced, passive checks on the German war machine assumed the character of mortal blows. Politically motivated Resistance attempts to liberate sections of the country without conventional military support fared less well. In few cases, the local German garrison chose to ignore these

symbolic, strategically insignificant provocations; but wherever they chose to intervene, the insurgents were bloodily put down.

On H-Hour, when the first British, American and Canadian soldiers landed in Normandy, SOE and the FFI initiated several sabotage schemes. A series of coded plans (Vert, Tortue, Violette) corresponding to particular targets (railways, roads and canals, telephone and telegraph wires) went into action. Allied special operations chiefs intended to concentrate their efforts solely on Normandy and its adjacent provinces, but decided at the last minute that a more general uprising would maximize the enemy's confusion about the true location of the Allied invasion. Besides facilitating an elaborate British deception operation, activating Resistance forces throughout the country allowed guerillas and saboteurs to target German units transiting to Normandy. London and Algiers did not specify how the Resistance should go about confronting these powerful Nazi columns, and tactics inevitably became the responsibility of local Resistance commanders.[21]

The most famous of these encounters began outside Montauban, north of Toulouse, in George Starr's area of operations. One of the most powerful units in the German Army, the 2nd SS Panzer "Das Reich" Division, was stationed near the town; its officers and men expected to play a major part in the drama unfolding in Normandy. But instead the *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht* (Germany Army High Command or OKW) delayed, mesmerized in part by a successful British deception operation that indicated the Allied cross-channel invasion would target the Pas de Calais. Das Reich had no word from their superiors at Army Group G Headquarters until 11:15 on 7 June and did not actually get underway until the following morning. When they did, SS commanders were surprised to discover that moving men and material by rail was out of the question: the FFI and SOE had done too thorough a job sabotaging track in the area. But this delayed their progress only slightly. Das Reich was fully mechanized and could transit rapidly by road. The content of their orders were far more shocking. Instead of racing to engage the enemy in Normandy, Das Reich was directed to perform a *ratissage* – literally "rake" the countryside for "gangs" of Resisters.[22]

The leaders of the 2nd SS were without scruple when it came to suppressing civilian uprisings; they had already demonstrated an aptitude for barbarity during the Division's deployment in Russia. But the *ratissage* order offended their pride. Das Reich was a front line formation, equipped with the latest Panzer Mark V battle tanks.

Using their firepower against ragtag bands of Resisters was pointless overkill. General Heinz Lammerding, the commanding officer, complained to Army Group G:

> Panzer divisions in the fifth year of the war are too good for this [work.] In the division's opinion, the local [German] forces are quite capable of maintaining order if they are pulled together sharply, given transport, and led energetically.

His assessment was astute. Local German garrisons proved more than a match for the FFI whenever they chose to engage the Resisters. In the panic and confusion created by the initial uprising, however, the Wehrmacht sometimes deployed its forces in tactically schizophrenic ways. Das Reich was largely invulnerable to guerilla attacks and proved to be a fearsome weapon against the Resistance. Given that its firepower was desperately needed in Normandy, however, the decision to initially deploy the division against the Resistance constitutes a significant accomplishment for the FFI.[23]

The price in blood paid by French civilians for Allied tactical advantage was terrible, though. On 9 June, Lammerding's divisional headquarters advised its officers that "guerillas have occupied the Figrac-Clermont-Ferrand-Limoges-Gourdon area." Using dehumanizing language, the order of the day demanded that for every German soldier killed by the "communistic… hordes" three guerillas should be executed. Each murdered SS officer required the reciprocal slaughter of 10 guerillas. Since live Resistance members were hard to come by, reprisals were carried out against innocents. The worst atrocities came at the village of Tulle on 9 June, where 99 civilians were hanged, and at Oradour-sur-Glane the next day, where 649 townsfolk – including several hundred women and children immolated inside the parish church – were butchered. Indeed, the atrocity at Oradour, situated west of Limoges in an area almost devoid of Resistance activity, was so wanton that it shocked the local Wehrmacht garrison commander, who sent a protest cable to the OKW. Nothing came of it, of course: such violent orgies were common on the Eastern Front, where Das Reich had spent years practicing overtly genocidal killing. The Oradour massacre was only exceptional in geographical terms. Nevertheless, it was shocking to the FFI, which had no previous experience with the Nazi approach to 'collective guilt.' Most FFI and *Maquis* groups in the Limoges area, apart from the Communist FTP, decided to avoid provoking further reprisals and went temporarily to ground.[24]

Two small guerilla missions dispatched by 'Massingham' aircraft from RAF Blida in Algiers had a small role in the Das Reich affair. On the night of 8-9 June 'Emily,' one of only two OG units cleared by SHAEF to enter southern France during the early stages of the Normandy landings, and the Jedburgh team 'Quinine' parachuted into Lot region, between the Dordogne and Lot rivers south of Limoges. They found the Resistance deeply demoralized by reports of Nazi atrocities. 'Emily,' which landed far to the west of Das Reich's route to Normandy, did not succeed in rousing the *Maquisards* and played no significant part in the guerilla war until 'Anvil,' in August. 'Quinine' had better luck, thanks in part to the willingness of its aggressive Scottish commander, Major Tom Macpherson, to work with the FTP. On the morning of 10 August Macpherson and a group of *Maquisards* ambushed an armored column of the 2nd SS at a small bridge, destroying a German half-track and damaging the tracks of one tank. Although repairs delayed the panzers for a few hours, Macpherson lost 20 of his 27 men in the exchange.[25]

Apparently futile, self-destructive guerrilla actions were the rule in the SOE-OSS-FFI campaign in southwest France during operation 'Overlord.' Despite taking subsantial casualties and provoking gruesome revenge against civilians, Max Hastings estimates the *Maquis* killed only 35 members of the Das Reich Division, out of an effective combat strength of 15,000. But the fact that OKW and Army Group G felt compelled to detail one of their finest front-line units to counterinsurgency duty, when its presence at the front was vital, represents a victory for the Resistance. The lead elements of the 2nd SS did not reach Normandy until 13 June and most of the Division arrived four days later. A journey of only 150 miles consumed more than a week while Lammerding wasted time blasting French irregulars. *Maquis* assaults on Das Reich may have been suicidal, but the passive psychological effect that thousands of armed men roaming the countryside had on the Nazi high command was considerable. While the firepower of the 2nd SS was occupied chasing puny FFI bands, Allied troops were consolidating their hold on the Normandy beachhead. Tactical defeat in guerilla warfare helped produce strategic victory in the context of a conventional campaign.[26]

Strategic context is the most important factor to consider when assessing the utility of special operations. Diverting Das Reich from Normandy was arguably a military objective worthy of sacrifice. In situations where irregular warfare is designed to serve purely political purposes, justifying its use is more problematic.

Some Allied statesmen, like Winston Churchill, were willing to pay almost any price to embarrass the Nazis. "The blood of the martyrs," the Prime Minister reminded his Chiefs of Staff, "was the seed of the church." But SOE recognized Churchill's maxim had limits. The propaganda value of uprisings against Hitler's New Order was often outweighed by the cost in civilian lives and damage to SOE networks during savage Nazi reprisals. The Vercors tragedy of June to July 1944 is an example.[27]

Vercors is an expansive, high plateau southwest of Grenoble, just north of Francis Cammaerts' territory along the banks of the Rhone. A natural fortress, in 1943 Dewavrin and Soustelle had designated it as a rally-point for their *Montagnard* (mountain dweller) scheme. The idea was to ensure that certain remote regions of the country were liberated by FFI forces alone, boosting their reputation with the Anglo-Americans and the movement's political standing in France. SOE and OSS, who had taken severe punishment in Italy during similar attempts to 'liberate' and hold territory using Resistance forces behind enemy lines, were unenthusiastic. The Vercors was far from Normandy and the developing military crisis there. Cammaerts thought a rising in the area was unnecessarily provocative, militarily pointless, and a potential impediment to the 'Jockey' network's preparations for 'Anvil.' But he and Brooks Richards were unable to dissuade the French. *Maquisards* began massing on the plateau shortly after D-Day. By 3 July, when local *Resistant* leaders declared the reestablishment of the Republic, over 4,000 fighters were ensconced in the Vercors.[28]

Nazi retribution was swift. Troops from the local Wehrmacht garrison surrounded the area and gradually ratcheted up the pressure on the FFI redoubt. On 21 July, forty German gliders swooped down onto the unprepared defenders. The plateau fell shortly thereafter. More than 640 *Maquisards* and 201 local civilians died in the fighting. Few of the prisoners deported to concentration camps survived the war.[29]

Although French historians claimed for a generation that the Anglo-American Allies failed to succor the beleaguered FFI forces with weapon drops or military support, the charge is simply untrue. Aircraft from SPOC's Blida airfield, near 'Massingham' west of Algiers, delivered ammunition, food and supplies. 'Justine,' the only other OG unit besides 'Emily' authorized to drop into southern France by SHAEF before mid-July, parachuted onto the plateau during the night of 28-29 June. It was accompanied by 'Jedburgh' team 'Eucalyptus,' another rare exception to Eisenhower's ban on uniformed irregulars in the southern invasion zone. SPOC's

forces helped train FFI volunteers and contributed heavy weapons, including bazookas, to the Vercors stockpile. 'Justine' also led a series of guerilla raids with the Maquis against German supply convoys through the adjacent countryside. But they were no match for the flood of German regulars that poured into the region. Cammaerts tried to help, but outside the ring of German forces surrounding the plateau there was little he could do. Confronted by overwhelming force, it was all in vain.[30]

While the Versors and Das Reich incidents share certain superficial characteristics, the strategic impact of Resistance activities in each case was different. The two battles drew the attention of a comparable number of enemy troops: 15,000 soldiers of the 2nd SS Division, and roughly 11,000 members of the Wehrmacht regional garrison in Grenoble. But Das Reich was one of the most powerful formations in the German army, ultimately bound for Normandy, while the Grenoble garrison was tied to a post far from the fighting. Das Reich's murderous march north temporarily cowed *Maquis* fighters along its route, but it failed to kill most of them; when 'Anvil' came they fought furiously to avenge the townspeople of Tulle and Oradour. In the Vercors, many of the most dedicated members of the FFI did not survive.[31]

Although it typifies the frustrating Anglo-American experience with wartime special operations in general, Vercors was one of the few unequivocal setbacks during the summer of 1944. Most other special operations in southern France in June and July, like the Das Reich affair, had a positive impact on the Allied war effort. In the context of the 'Overlord' campaign, the mere existence of armed resistance bands caused the Nazis to alter their deployment plans and logistics. In a few instances, as in the case of Das Reich, powerful units were temporarily diverted from front-line duty to counterinsurgency warfare. These passive results, while impressive, were not generated by particular Resistance tactics, but by German countermeasures. Wherever the Nazis chose to confront the FFI or FTP directly, the result was a foregone conclusion. During the 'Anvil' invasion and its aftermath, however, the nature of the Resistance campaign changed again. By operating in the same area and coordinating their tactics with conventional Allied forces in the invasion zone, SPOC SO acted as a 'force multiplier.' In military terms, a 'force multiplier' is a tactic or weapon that, while it may not be capable of deciding a battle on its own, greatly

increases the striking power of the main force. This is the role Resistance forces played during the 'Anvil' invasion.[32]

Special Operations and the Invasion of Southern France, July to September 1944

Special Operations missions in the western Mediterranean had a limited impact until the Allied invasion of the Riviera (operation 'Anvil/Dragoon') in August 1944. At best, they were low grade tactical successes like the pre-'Torch' putsch in Algiers; frequently they produced outright disasters like OG mission 'Ginny' in Italy. But as the great German panzer tactician, Heinz Guderian, demonstrated during the Battle of France in May 1940, concentrating different forms of striking power – artillery, armor and airpower – can act as a 'force multiplier' and enable inferior forces to crush strong enemy formations. During the Allied invasion of southern France special operations coordinated through SPOC became another factor in this equation, as Hugh Dalton had envisioned during the dark days of 1940. Allied irregulars confronted large numbers of German troops directly at several points during the 'Anvil' campaign – and won.[33]

Again, the most important factor in SPOC's SO triumph was proximity to, and coordination with, a powerful conventional invasion force. General Alexander Patch's US 7th Army, which would lead the 'Anvil' assault between Toulon and Cannes on 15 August, encompassed Lattre's 1st French Army (three divisions) and an over-strength corps of four American divisions. 7th Army was puny next to the 'Overlord' armada, but represented a stiff challenge for the Wehrmacht. Although the German defenders of southern France were not weak, as some historians allege, they had been drained of men and materiel, and demoralized by the expanding Allied bulge in Normandy. On paper the 19th Army component of German Army Group G, charged with the defense of the Riviera, mustered 12 divisions, or 180,000 men. But of this nominal total only four divisions were at full strength; thanks in part to a deception operation run by British SCI and OSS X-2 Italy these forces were widely dispersed along the coast. Unlike in Italy, the Wehrmacht would have a difficult time concentrating its firepower against an amphibious landing. But the Germans' main difficulties were hidden: the growth in pro-Allied sentiment in southern France as the tide of war turned against Hitler, and the ability of SPOC to arm and provide a degree of direction to new *Maquisards*. With the pressure created by the 7th Army's assault on southern France, the Wehrmacht had neither the time nor the ability to combat the

insurgents. In August 1944 Allied secret armies emerged from the shadows and found that they were strong.[34]

On 15 July, one month before 'Anvil' (or 'Dragoon,' as the operation was re-designated in August) was slated to commence, SHAEF finally gave SPOC permission to deploy the bulk of its uniformed irregulars, including the OGs and 'Jedburghs,' as it saw fit. To OSS's frustration, bad weather during the last two weeks of July delayed deployment of the remaining 11 OG teams billeted at 'Massingham' and outside the Villa Magnol in Algiers. Only two of these OG units made it to France before August; they both parachuted into the Ardeche Department west of the Rhone. Five more units, all but one also bound for the Ardeche, followed in short order. The balance of SPOC's OG strength arrived only a few days before the invasion.[35]

Twenty-five 'Jedburgh' units from Algiers complimented the OG contingent, although poor July weather conditions and a dispute over the most effective deployment area for the three-man teams delayed their arrival until August. When they landed in southern France, however, the teams' French officers and greater affinity for the language allowed them to quickly build ties with the FFI. Those that parachuted immediately prior to the landings were quickly allocated useful sabotage missions by local Resistance commanders.[36]

SOE was the glue that helped join these disparate Allied irregulars to the *Maquis*, coordinate their activities, and bring maximum pressure on the Wehrmacht's weakest points. Again, Cammaerts and Starr led the way by drawing on their longstanding relationships with FFI and FTP leaders. Utilizing intelligence funneled from SPOC (including information derived from Henry Hyde's 'Medusa' network) and their own knowledge of local conditions, they identified high priority targets. 'Jockey' and 'Wheelwright' also acted as clearinghouses for Resistance requests for arms and ammunition. Despite the Allies best efforts, the French underground was chronically short of weapons, especially as STO resisters and political opportunists flooded into the movement in July and August. F and R/F section agent organizers prioritized the cacophony of Resistance demands for arms, and funneled directed them to areas of the greatest strategic importance. Most importantly, Cammaerts and Starr exercised a rare degree of control over the tactical deployment of Anglo-American and French guerillas in their sectors. When they spoke, the *Maquis* listened and would often follow their advice. They also assumed some responsibility for

receiving, briefing and supporting OG, 'Jedburgh' and SAS units. Unlike the rest of France, where tactical confusion and disputes over intelligence and command responsibility reigned when many Allied irregulars operated in the same area, Cammaerts and Starr could act as improvised regional authorities. SPOC recognized, and sought to exploit, the unique advantages of F Section's premier agents. "Their discipline [is so] strict that," as one OSS report noted, "although [their] numbers... are small, they can be relied upon to carry out the letter of any orders given." Some OG and 'Jedburgh' teams were placed under the direct authority of 'Jockey' and 'Wheelwright.' Cammaerts and Starr used these dedicated units for high-priority demolitions work and to bolster Resistance morale in critical sectors.[37]

Meanwhile, James Angleton's X-2 counterintelligence outfit and British SCI in Italy helped ensure the success of 'Anvil/Dragoon' and concurrent Allied special operations with a piece of deception. On 16 June, the decrypt of another message from the Japanese Military Attaché in Vichy revealed that Army Group G anticipated an assault on the south of France to complement 'Overlord.' In response, the Allies implemented 'Ferdinand,' an operation designed to convince the Germans that the military buildup in North Africa was aimed at the Gulf of Genoa. 'Ultra' product revealed that a landing in northwest Italy had become an obsession of Hitler's – to the consternation of OKW, which correctly viewed the Riviera as the most probable point of attack. X-2 Italy helped play on this division using an Abwehr radio operator captured during the fall of Rome. X-2 persuaded the fascist agent, Signor D'Onofrio, to voluntarily switch sides and not broadcast his security alert. Given his glowing reputation with the Germans for accurate intelligence, it proved a valuable defection. Throughout July, D'Onofrio, in concert with several London-based German double-agents, fed the 'Ferdinand' story to the Nazis. Although the Abwehr was initially skeptical, it took the bait. On 12 August two German agents were captured in Corsica. Under interrogation, they revealed that their task had been to ascertain the composition of the invasion force massing there for Italian operations. Uncertain about Allied intentions, the Wehrmacht failed to concentrate its defenses in the Riviera.[38]

Therefore, as D-Day for 'Anvil/Dragoon' approached on 15 August, SPOC had an unusually favorable operating environment in southern France. A powerful, and in the case of its French element, highly motivated, Allied army was about to confront a numerically superior but demoralized, scattered and equipment-starved

German force. Sentiment in the region, particularly the countryside, had turned against the Germans; but apart from the Vercors, SOE and the Resistance had avoided any large-scale uprisings that might tip the Germans off about the timing and location of the landings. 'Ferdinand,' the Anglo-American deception scheme, also helped preserve the element of surprise. Above all, the Resistance was more unified and better armed, equipped and led than at any time in the past. The German 19th Army was about to experience the special operations equivalent of a 'perfect storm.'

In retrospect, the Wehrmacht's failure to destroy the first two OG teams that parachuted into southern France signaled the 'Anvil/Dragoon' campaign would be different. Even the men of 'Justine,' the OG involved in the Vercors tragedy, managed to slip through the Nazi cordon and escape. Succored by sympathetic civilians, they lived to fight another day. 'Jedburgh' units that entered the region in June and July also avoided capture. Their experience is testimony to the degree that French opinion had swung toward the Allies – a radical shift that took much longer to accomplish in Italy. But it also indicates the tactical advantage SPOC's irregulars enjoyed by operating in an invasion zone. Army Group G knew that Mediterranean landings were imminent but, faced with contradictory and confusing intelligence, spread its forces thinly along the coast. This left insufficient manpower for dedicated counterinsurgency operations. When a static concentration of guerillas could be identified, as in the Vercors, they could be surrounded and crushed. Small, mobile, heavily armed OG commandos, succored by friendly civilians in an invasion zone, were more problematic. Indeed, Ellery Huntington had originally designed OSS OGs to exploit conditions precisely like those along the Riviera during the summer of 1944. Previously, OSS's urgent desire to score points in Washington had precipitated the misuse of OGs in tactically unfavorable situations. Luck was also with the OGs in southern France: bad weather and Eisenhower's refusal to authorize SPOC's special operations campaign until 15 July meant that most OGs were not inserted behind enemy lines until August. If American commandos had arrived in the region earlier, in greater numbers, the Wehrmacht might have dedicated more resources to their destruction.[39]

Instead, Operational Groups from Algiers saturated southwest France during the second and third weeks of August and created chaos. The first priority was sabotage, rather then direct guerilla action. Abetted by Cammaerts, who had moved his base of operations to Seyne, southeast of Grenoble, the OGs destroyed 32 bridges

in the region over the next several days, including dozens over the Rhone. This effectively divided the Cote d'Azur in half, making it difficult for the Wehrmacht to bring in reinforcements. Simultaneously the FFI and FTP, assisted by the remaining SPOC 'Jedburghs' inaugurated a controlled campaign against German communications, transportation, and fuel convoys. In the midst of this uprising the 7th Army struck on 15th August, secured most of their beachheads with relative ease, and drove inland. Guided by SOE and instructions from SPOC, Allied irregulars transitioned from sabotage to direct attacks against known 7th Army objectives.[40]

At this crucial moment, as the guerilla campaign began in earnest, SPOC nearly experienced a disastrous piece of ill fortune. Despite the best security precautions, Francis Cammaerts was apprehended at a roadblock near Digne. It was a terrible stroke of luck: rather like a sailor who buys the best foul weather gear only to be struck by lightning. But one of his most resourceful lieutenants, a Polish noblewoman named Krystyna Skarbek (alias Christine Granville), managed to bluff and bribe her way into the confidence of a Gestapo officer. Through her guile, Cammaerts was released a few days after his capture. It was a small, but critical victory for the Allies. Communicating directly with SPOC was almost impossible when Allied irregulars were directly engaged with the enemy; in those conditions, local agent-organizers assumed the burden of coordinating Resistance tactics with 7th Army. Apart from George Starr, Cammaerts was by far the most well respected and influential SOE organizer in the area. Without him, making the diverse elements of the Resistance serve the tactical needs of General Patch's Army might have been impossible.[41]

With Cammaerts again at large, the 'Jedburgh,' OG and Resistance forces in southern France performed roles that virtually transformed them into irregular auxiliary units of 7th Army, rather than simply guerilla co-combatants. Allied troops were able to advance much more rapidly than expected, thanks to effective FFI protection of the Army's flanks and supply line. When Patch or Lattre decided to bypass Wehrmacht formations and press inland, the Resistance was able to surround and essentially invest the Germans. Although the irregulars still could not defeat large groups of enemy soldiers in a direct confrontation, they severely hampered enemy movements. And there were several exceptions: on 19 August FFI guerillas, acting in conjunction with 'Jockey,' routed the German garrison at Grenoble. Some 150 enemy soldiers were killed and four captured. On the same day, the Vaucluse

Maquis destroyed several outlying companies of the 338th Wehrmacht Infantry Division, killing 250. Coordination between 7th Army and the Resistance was far from perfect, especially when FTP hotheads were involved. But the Communists' principle fault – excessive zeal – became less of a factor after the first few days, when Allies gained the strategic advantage.[42]

Allied irregulars were also responsible for reversing the balance of morale between the French citizenry and their German occupiers. When OGs and 'Jedburgh' teams began parachuting into the region in large numbers after 7 August, they had an electrifying effect on the *Maquis*. By the third week of August the Wehrmacht, suffering from incessant guerilla attack and the pressure of 7th Army's advance, started to crack. Units of "volunteers" from Armenia surrendered en masse and requested amnesty from the Soviet delegate from Algiers. Poles and other eastern European conscripts followed. Finally even the wholly German formations of 19th Army began to disintegrate. Nazi units preferred to surrender to the Americans because they were terrified that the FFI would seek bloody revenge after four years of suffering. By the beginning of September, whole battalions of German troops were surrendering to OG units of 15-30 men. When the fighting was over, the 300 SPOC OGs had collected more than 10,000 prisoners.[43]

The speed and scale of the Allied triumph might have been even greater if Patch had sought to aggressively exploit tactical opportunities created by the Resistance. On 16 August, for example, the FFI destroyed a vital bridge at Livron, trapping thousands of German soldiers between the River Drome in the north, the Rhone in the west and the vanguard of 7th Army advancing from the south. Patch recognized the chance this presented to annihilate the enemy in the area, but advanced with undue caution. The Wehrmacht was able to restore the crossing and extract the majority of its forces from the vice before US and French troops arrived. Historian Arthur Funk aptly characterizes the clearing of the route up the Rhone to Grenoble as one of the greatest strategic achievements of the Resistance; but it could have been even more decisive if exploited by a more imaginative commander. Likewise, dispatching Allied paratroopers to complement the Resistance in Gascony, where Starr, the FFI and FTP guerillas were inflicting heavy losses on the retreating Germans, might have increased the strategic magnitude of their victory. As it played out, Starr and de Gunzbourg helped drive the Nazis out of Toulouse and harried their retreating forces all the way to Carcassonne; on 15 September their forces participated

in the investiture and destruction of a large German formation at Royan. But by then 7th Army had linked up in the north with Allied forces under US General Jacob Devers and SPOC's war in France was over.[44]

Assessing the Resistance Contribution to Victory in France

Resistance activity supplied and coordinated through SPOC made two separate, yet equally valuable, contributions to the Allied military campaign in France. The first was to increase the psychological pressure on the Germans during the 'Overlord' and 'Anvil/Dragoon' operations. Frequently, this resulted in the dedication of strong Wehrmacht units to counterproductive or militarily irrelevant counterinsurgency warfare – as in the case of the 2nd SS 'Das Reich' Division. Although the effect was passive – an existential by-product of the Resistance rather than the result of its deeds – it became strategically important in the context of 'Overlord.' During 'Anvil/Dragoon' the Resistance contribution to victory was more obvious and direct. Strong groups of Allied irregulars, acting in conjunction with the conventional forces of 7th Army, became a strategic threat to the Wehrmacht. Resistance forces almost constituted an irregular adjunct of the Allied army. By performing vital tactical chores, like protecting the flanks of 7th Army from enemy counterattack and surrounding bypassed pockets of German troops, the Resistance enabled General Patch's forces to advance more rapidly than anticipated. In the Rhone valley, for instance, FFI activity allowed Allied troops to reach Grenoble on 22 August, only a week after the landings, instead of the three weeks anticipated by AFHQ's staff planners. During operation 'Anvil/Dragoon' tactical coordination between SPOC and 7th Army, the superb work of SOE's agent-organizers, and the political flowering of the FFI allowed the Resistance to achieve unprecedented military relevance. Active moves by the Resistance, rather than its passive psychological effect, played a role in Germany's defeat.[45]

In both of these cases, however, it was the larger strategic context that invested the Resistance and its works with unprecedented importance. By distracting Nazi commanders and limiting their ability to conduct reprisals, 'Overlord' and 'Anvil/Dragoon' allowed the Resistance to expand its influence beyond the political, into the military sphere. *Maquisards*, particularly those organized under the rubric of the FFI, acted like a 'force multiplier' for the Allied armies – much like airpower in Guderian's 'combined arms' doctrine.

Ever since, military and special operations theorists have struggled to derive strategic lessons from SPOC's triumph during the summer of 1944. It has proven to be a difficult and dangerous conundrum. The unusual confluence of political and military conditions that created the SO breakthrough in France has proven difficult to recognize or replicate in subsequent conflicts. SPOC's achievement, while profound, was atypical.

Summary and Conclusion

Creating an Anglo-American intelligence hub and staging area in Algiers to support the secret war against fascism in southwestern Europe was no easy task. Different national interests and priorities, the competing ambitions of the clandestine agencies involved, and cultural irritants all had to be reconciled. But a joint establishment was successfully installed at the 'Massingham' special operations base: first on a *de facto* basis in early 1943, then under the more formal SOE-SO rubric, and finally as a fully-merged Anglo-American organization in May 1944 (SPOC). In secret intelligence, however, the American contingent in Algiers resisted arguments in favor of a 'cooperative' approach, which they viewed as a euphemism for British control. OSS retained an independent SI function throughout the Algiers region, including southern France.

The process in which a regional intelligence center in Algiers was created, and the notably divergent results – despite the employment of similar tactics – achieved by the Anglo-American intelligence campaigns in Italy and France, are revealing. They offer insights on the utility of intelligence in war, the role of intelligence agencies in the so-called 'special relationship' between Britain and the United States, and the use and abuse of clandestine information and special operations by Allied leaders.

Special operations, as this dissertation has attempted to demonstrate, were only effective in the Algiers region under narrow conditions. In order for special operations to have a meaningful impact in military terms, they usually had to coincide with a powerful military offensive. During the period under study, this confluence of events did not take place in Italy. Operation 'Diadem,' General Alexander's push to turn past the Cassino position and capture Rome, provided a brief window of opportunity (see chapter 4). This allowed for some temporary Resistance gains during late May and early June 1944. But as the military focus of Allied strategy

shifted to France in preparation for operation 'Overlord,' this momentum petered out. Unable to sustain their attempts to hold territory behind a static battlefront, in the face of fascist reprisals, large Resistance formations were crushed. The survivors remained active even after General Alexander's 'halt order' of December 1944, but were unable to effect the military balance in a meaningful way. By then the Algiers networks' OSS units in Italy had lost much of their autonomy to James Angleton and SCI/Z, while SOE's operation lapsed into ineffectuality.

The contrast with the Algiers networks' experience in southern France could not be starker. Under a unified command (SPOC) British and American SO officers worked with their French counterparts, and the military authorities at AFHQ, to make special operations serve the needs of the Allied armies during 'Overlord' and 'Anvil/Dragoon.' OSS and SOE used their resources to cater to the tactical priorities of 7th Army. In turn, they benefited greatly from the distraction provided by two huge military offensives. Unable to wage an effective counterinsurgency campaign while faced with a military crisis, the Wehrmacht was vulnerable to Resistance activity. Sometimes the military benefits that flowed from special operations were passive – like the fact that the German high command felt compelled to detail important front-line units to sweeping the countryside or collective reprisals against civilians. During the 'Anvil/Dragoon' landings along the Riviera, however, Resistance forces were able to actively assault, and sometimes overcome, German army units. Even in this case, however, special operations usually served as a 'force multiplier': facilitating the advance and striking power of 7th army, rather than independently destroying Nazi formations.

Yet conditions during the French campaign were unusually favorable for special operations – not just in a military sense, but in political terms as well. This study posits that British and American SO officers recognized the limited utility of special operations. If so, why did they attempt to apply ambitious special operations plans everywhere, rather than when they were most appropriate militarily?

On some occasions SO work was performed in order to raise Resistance morale. But evidence presented in this dissertation shows that parochial agency interests and the competitive aspect of the 'special relationship' were also behind an untoward emphasis on special operations. OSS Operational Groups (OGs), created to perform a specialist role during Allied offensives, were deployed in less appropriate situations in order to bolster agency prestige in Washington, and counter SOE's

'Jedburgh' scheme. In his study of the CIA's place in Beltway bureaucracy, James Q. Wilson notes that special operations were a "culture-defining task," which the agency used to differentiate itself from competitors that shared responsibility for gathering secret intelligence. The history of wartime intelligence in the western Mediterranean suggests that this emphasis on special operations may date from the OSS years.[46]

Studying the Algiers networks also helps expose some of the inner workings of the US-UK 'special relationship.' National and agency interest sometimes undermined attempts at cooperative enterprise. Even in situations where basing arrangements, training, communications and transport were shared, questions of relative power and autonomy were never far from the surface.

The controversy surrounding the establishment of 'Massingham' in late 1942, highlights the mutual distrust that existed between OSS and SOE. OSS was concerned that a cooperative special operations regime might amount to *de facto* British control. These fears were well founded. SOE valued the material contribution the Americans could make to the secret war, but distrusted their competence. From the British perspective, OSS was useful in a subordinate role, but dubious as an equal partner. Military necessity forced OSS director William Donovan to cooperate with the British services at 'Massingham,' although he continued to insist on the appearance of American autonomy in special operations. But as Baker Street predicted, this façade was untenable, and special operations run from Algiers were merged into the SPOC organization in May 1944. SOE retained the most prominent position under the new regime.

Donovan continued to seek independent missions for OSS. He believed they would help ensure the postwar survival of his agency in Washington, and protect America's ability to play a major part on the global stage. These motives propelled the creation of Henry Hyde's SI network in France. Indeed, Donovan and Hyde believed that developing OSS's independent capabilities were more important than the efficiency of the network itself. Plan 'Medusa' sacrificed the timeliness of the intelligence produced by the Hyde network, thereby reducing its usefulness to the US Army, but kept it outside British control. For Donovan, the quality of the product was less important than its packaging – OSS independence.

Thus, in Algiers and the western Mediterranean, the secret 'special relationship' was defined by a constant struggle for power, competing interests, and leadership. A cooperative approach was usually favored by the stronger power; the

weaker party viewed 'cooperation' as a euphemism for subordination. But personal relationships and empathy still had a role to play. SOE's Dodds-Parker understood Donovan's motives and, within the constraints of his mandate, did his best to accommodate them. Some the most important accomplishments of the Anglo-American intelligence establishment in Algiers – like the joint training regime at 'Massingham' and the strong relationship between the SO agencies and AFHQ – were the product of this compromise. Dodds-Parker's focus on shared interests helped make the relationship work.

Finally, the clandestine negotiations that led to the surrender of the Italian government in September 1943 illustrate a perennial problem for intelligence agencies. Policymakers often ignore or misinterpret accurate intelligence. Sometimes faulty analysis is to blame; it had a role in the 'Monkey' episode. But even when it is not, policymakers may be unable or unwilling to reexamine their convictions in the face of contradictory data. Of course, it is the policymaker's duty to ensure military strategy conforms to perceived political imperatives – like the "unconditional surrender" doctrine. The sometimes self-serving views of intelligence agencies and generals cannot be allowed to dictate policy. But statesmen also need to be cognizant of military reality, and adjust their political objectives accordingly.

The themes that appear in this regional study of intelligence during the Second World War had an important legacy in the postwar Anglo-American intelligence community. Many of the figures who defined the structures, objectives, and powers of the intelligence agencies that operated in the western Mediterranean played similar parts in the construction of the postwar secret states in Britain and America. Special operations, which received pride of place in the Algiers area, enjoyed similar status inside the Cold War-era agencies. The 'special relationship,' which seemed to offer Britain a chance to hold on to much of its old influence, retained its periodic allure. And the difficulties politicians face interpreting intelligence and incorporating it into government policy remain. But as this study has demonstrated some of these themes – particularly the prominence given to special operations – were based on unsound premises. "Man spends his time devising techniques of which he afterwards remains a more or less willing prisoner," observed historian Marc Bloch.[47] Some of the bars that constrained the effectiveness of the Anglo-American intelligence agencies during the postwar era were forged during the Secret War in the South.

[1] Arthur Layton Funk, *Hidden Ally: The French Resistance, Special Operations, and the Landings in Southern France, 1944* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1992) p.32.
[2] John Keegan, *The Second World War* (London: Pimlico, 1989 [1987]) pp.291-297, 336; My numbers on Allied divisional strength during 'Overlord' are drawn from the Appendix in John Keegan, *Six Armies in Normandy: From D-Day to the Liberation of Paris* (London: Pimlico, 1982 [2004]) pp.335-336.
[3] Dalton, memo of 17 August 1940 to the British Chiefs of Staff, quoted in David Stafford, *Britain and European Resistance, 1940-45: A Survey of the Special Operations Executive* (Macmillan, 1980) p.29.
[4] Matthew Jones, *Britain, the United States and the Mediterranean War, 1942-1944* (London: Macmillan, 1996) pp.166-173.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid; Keegan, *Six Armies*, p.19.
[7] Notes from the Prime Minister to C [Menzies], 3 April 1944; C to the Prime Minister, 4 April 1944; Telegram [decrypt] from the Japanese Military Attaché in Vichy to Tokio[sic], 23 March 1944; CIGS/PM/497, 29 March 1944, HW 1/2686. Also see Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, *War Diaries, 1939-1945* Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman, eds. (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2001) p.541.
[8] For more on the role of 'Ultra' in the Italian Armistice debate, see Chapters IV-V.
[9] Brooke and Churchill quoted in Jones, *Mediterranean War*, p.168, 179; Alanbrooke, *War Diaries*, p.541.
[10] Figures quoted from Arthur Layton Funk, "OSS in Algiers," in George C. Chalou, ed. *The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II* (Washington, DC: NARA, 1992) p.172; Photos with handwritten captions, "Tent Area, SPOC, Under Construction," RG 226, Entry 97, Box 12, Folder 211.
[11] Funk, *Hidden Ally*, pp.27-31.
[12] Ibid; Funk, "OSS in Algiers," p.175; "A Short History of the EMFFI," 21 September 1944, HS 7/126
[13] Arthur L. Funk, "Churchill, Eisenhower, and the French Resistance," *Military Affairs*, Vol. 45, Issue 1 (February 1981) pp.31-33; Julian Jackson, *France: The Dark Years, 1940-1944* (Oxford: Oxford, 2001) p.543.
[14] Dericourt, who was later accused of serving as a German double-agent, is quoted in Rita Kramer, *Flames in the Field: The Story of Four SOE Agents in Occupied France* (London: Penguin, 1996) p.95; M.R.D. Foot, *SOE in France: An Account of the Work of the British Special Operations Executive in France, 1940-1944* (London: HMSO, 1966) p.198.
[15] Cammaerts quoted in Kramer, *Flames*, pp.103-104, 143, 153-154, 178-179, 208-211; SOE's debacle in the Netherlands and its connection to the 'Prosper' affair is described in M.R.D. Foot, *SOE in the Low Countries* (London: St. Ermin's Press, 2001).
[16] Kramer, *Flames*, pp.158-160. The difficulties that Sydney Hudson, commander of SOE's 'Headmaster' circuit, faced as the result of fallout from 'Prosper' are described in David Stafford, *Ten Days to D-Day: Countdown to the Liberation of Europe* (London: Abacus, 2003) pp.57-58, 301.
[17] Starr quoted in Max Hastings, *Das Reich: The March of the 2nd SS Panzer Division through France, June 1944* (London: Pan, 1981 [2000]) pp.84-85.
[18] William J. M. Mackenzie, *The Secret History of SOE: The Special Operations Executive, 1940-1945* (London: St. Ermin's Press, 2000) pp.568-569; Kramer, *Flames*, pp.161-162.
[19] Starr and Gunzbourg quoted in Hastings, *Das Reich*, pp.80-83; Mackenzie, *SOE*, pp.571-572; Kramer, *Flames*, pp.288-290.
[20] This sort of influence was rare: for the most part, F and R/F Section agent-organizers acted as quartermasters to the French Resistance, not war leaders; see Mackenzie, *SOE*, p.585; Hastings, *Das Reich*, p.83; Kramer, *Flames*, pp.288-290. Even the authority of FFI-designated officers parachuted in from London or Algiers to command French irregulars was much more notional than real. Local Resistance commanders, often with little or no military training, usually exercised unchallenged authority; see Jackson, *Dark Years*, pp.549-550.
[21] "The Plan: SHAEF (44) 25," 23 March 1944, HS 7/125 – this is the SHAEF plan for special operations during the 'Overlord' period. It also makes suggestions for concerning subversive activity in southern France.
[22] Hastings, *Das Reich*, pp.94-103; for more on 'Fortitude North' and 'Fortitude South,' the Allied deception operations that coincided with 'Overlord' see Stafford, *D-Day*, pp.49-51; Thaddeus Holt, *The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2004) pp.510-534.
[23] Lammerding quoted in Hastings, *Das Reich*, p.164.

[24] "Translation: The Position With Regard to Guerilla Bands and How to Fight Them," Divisional Headquarters, 2 SS-Pz. Division 'Das Reich,' 9 June 1944, HS 7/125; Hastings, *Das Reich*, pp.181-200; Jackson, *Dark Years*, p.546.
[25] Funk, "OSS in Algiers," p.176; Hastings, *Das Reich*, pp.159-162.
[26] Ibid, pp.232-238.
[27] Churchill quoted in Mackenzie, *SOE*, p.413.
[28] Jackson, *Dark Years*, p.551; Mackenzie, *SOE*, p.619; Funk, "OSS in Algiers," p.176.
[29] Casualty figures quoted in Jackson, *Dark Years*, p.551.
[30] Ibid; Ian Dear, *Sabotage and Subversion: Stories from the Files of SOE and OSS* (London: Arms & Armour, 1996) pp.156-158; Henri Nogueres, *Histoire de la Resistance en France de 1940 a 1945*, Vol. 5 (Paris: Laffont, 1981) pp. 380-385; Paul Dreyfus, *Vercors: Citadelle de Liberte* (Grenoble: Arthaud, 1969); Funk, "OSS in Algiers," p.176.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Heinz Guderian, the innovative German tactician, saw tactical air power as just this sort of 'force multiplier' – a surmise that he proved to be accurate in May 1940 during the Battle of France. His pre-war musings along these lines are detailed in Heinz Guderian, *Achtung Panzer!* (New York: Cassell Military Paperbacks, 1999).
[33] On Dalton see Stafford, *Britain and European Resistance*, p.29. Guderian's ideas on combined arms are also described in *Achtung Panzer!*
[34] Keegan, *Second World War*, pp.300-301, 315; Max Hastings is one of those who disparages the quality of German forces during 'Anvil/Dragoon.' See Hastings, *Das Reich*, p.240.
[35] Funk, "OSS in Algiers," pp.176-177; Dear, *Sabotage*, pp.160-164.
[36] Funk, "OSS in Algiers," p.177; Dear, *Sabotage*, pp.189-194.
[37] Funk, "OSS in Algiers," pp.177-178; Dear, *Sabotage*, p.191; Mackenzie, *SOE*, pp.602-603, 605-606; "Plan 'Float,'" undated [circa May-July 1944], RG 226, Entry 97, Box 36, Folder 628.
[38] Holt, *Deceivers*, pp.616-618; "War Diary: SCI Unit in Italy," RG 226, Entry 210, Box 3, Folder 295.
[39] Dear, Sabotage, pp.160-164, 188-191; Memo from Huntington to Donovan: Auxiliary Operations Groups, 6 March 1943, RG 226, entry 97, box 3, folder 26.
[40] "Southern France: SPOC Review for the Week Ending 26 Aug," 26 August 1944, RG 226, Entry 97, Box 36, Folder 628; Funk, "OSS in Algiers," pp.176-177; Dear, *Sabotage*, pp.160-194.
[41] Mackenzie, *SOE*, p.569; Kramer, *Flames*, p.239; "Southern France: SPOC Review for the Week Ending 2 Sept 44," 2 September 1944, RG 226, Entry 97, Box 36, Folder 628.
[42] "Southern France: SPOC Review for the Week Ending 26 Aug," 26 August 1944, RG 226, Entry 97, Box 36, Folder 628.
[43] Ibid; "Southern France: SPOC Review for the Week Ending 2 Sept 44," 2 September 1944, RG 226, Entry 97, Box 36, Folder 628; Funk, "OSS in Algiers," p.176.
[44] Ibid; "A Short History of the EMFFI," HS 7/126; Mackenzie, *SOE*, pp.584-585; Jackson, *Dark Years*, pp.554-555; Funk, *Hidden Ally*, pp.123-128; Funk, "OSS in Algiers," pp.178-179.
[45] "Southern France: SPOC Review for the Week Ending 2 Sept 44," 2 September 1944, RG 226, Entry 97, Box 36, Folder 628; Funk, *Hidden Ally*, pp.123-128.
[46] Quoted in James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It* (New York: Basic, 2000) pp.188-189.
[47] Marc Bloch, *The Historian's Craft,* trans. Peter Putnam (New York: Vintage, 1953) p.39.

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[1] Note that the National Archives has recently adopted a new filing system for its HS documents, although these files are still retrievable using the old system. Most of the citations in this dissertation utilize the old system. Chapter 8 utilizes the new system.

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